How to Define an Idea: The Architecture of Meaning. Part 2.

In this article, we will incorporate the principles of definition by genus and species, the classical vs. prototype theories of the structure of concepts, and finally the difference between an intensional and extensional definition. Most importantly, we will show that a precising definition, is an intensional one and that extension follows intension and not the other way around.

If you’d like to start from the beginning of this series, please read the introduction.

The default position in cognitive science, enjoying widespread support in the philosophy of mind, is that concepts are mental representations. According to the language of thought hypothesis, the classic contemporary treatment maintains that the internal system of representation for a concept has a language-like syntax consisting of word like tokens and compositional semantics¹. Stanford University, describe concepts as “constituents of thoughts,” crucial to the psychological processes as categorization, inference, memory, learning, and decision-making.

Concept Formation

Concept Formation is a process of abstraction, a method of reasoning; a selective mental focus that identifies certain distinguishing necessary and sufficient stateless² universals (attribute or action) that form a mental unit…