Rawls’ Original Position

The principles of justice, in Rawls’s perspective, are normatively derived from a hypothetical position of equality by rational, mutually disinterested parties who comprehend economic and social truths, yet are oblivious to particular information regarding their own aptitudes, social stature and preferences. This theoretical device, otherwise known as the Original Position, establishes the basis for Rawls’s approach to moral consciousness, which supports his contractual model of the ‘basic structure’ of society. This article will foremost explicate Rawls’s justification that the Difference Principle is consistent with rational parties in the aforementioned position, whilst subsequently defending the tenability of Rawls’s distributive justice principle as integral to a moral and equitable society.

The Difference Principle provides that social and economic inequalities, if existing, should benefit the least advantaged in society. However, the assumption that an institutional framework ensuring the most extensive equal “basic liberties” and “fair equal opportunity” serves as a prerequisite to this affirmation. For instance, an allocation of beneficiary inequality to the least advantaged would be unjust if there was a resultant loss in the scheme of basic liberties, or loss in fair equality of opportunity. Nonetheless, presupposing this framework is applied, this “strongly egalitarian conception” (Rawls 2009) justifies inequality assisting the least advantaged in the following way: if the greater expectations of a representative person in a social group work out to be the advantage of the least advantaged, then those greater expectations are consistent with justice. In essence, the basic structure regulates the distribution of social and economic advantages to maximise the least fortunate as substantially as possible. Intuitively, there is a relation between Rawls’s principle and the general sense of maximin principles. Yet Rawls judiciously distinguishes them, insofar as this association incorrectly infers that risk aversion is the primary basis for its rationale from the Original Position. Conversely, Rawls’s principle requires the benefit of the least advantaged as a necessary condition upon permissible increases in inequality, rather than a choice under uncertainty.. Injustice, then, is the increases of inequality which improve the condition of the more advantaged, but neither improve nor diminish the condition of the least advantaged. For ease of exposition, the following table will elucidate the Difference Principle numerically; suppose, A and B denote the given welfare of a representative individual within a social group and the numbers convey their expectations of primary goods.

Rawls’s Difference Principle for discerning distributive justice, assuming background constraints are applied, would advocate a transition from state x to state z being advantageous, whereas a transition from state x to state y being unfavourable, although counterintuitive to capitalist ideals, aggregate expectations being greatest in state y. Rawls partially justifies this judgment by presupposing the irrationality of operating under uncertainty within the Original Position. Analogously, consider a system of slavery is proposed to agents in the original position, whereby 90% are slave owners and their ownership of primary goods is far superior to those 10% of slaves. Utilitarianism would be required to advocate this system assuming that utility is maximised. However, despite intuitively rationalising that, beyond the veil of ignorance, there is a significant improbability of the slave outcome, Rawls affirms that a rational agent would refrain from the uncertainty of suffering the plight of a slave, irrespective of the probability.Therefore, since the Original Position ensures impartial judgement by prohibiting both the attainment of inequitable advantages, nor the acquiescing of disadvantages, Rawls maintains that the application of the Difference Principle provides an equitable justice system.

In sum: Principally, the Difference Principle is a maximising principle, thus is distinct from cases where the optimum arrangement is not satisfied. Consequentially, it’s a principle ensuring the least favourable outcome is functioning at optimum capacity; in virtue of maximising living standards. Considering that rationality within the Original Position is impartial, this infers that choices are moral and just, due to the absence of self-interest or coercion. Therefore, to critically assess the rationality of the Difference Principle within the Original Position, this essay will foremost consider the principles potential capacity of widening the inequality gap between the least and most fortunate members of society, whilst subsequently assessing Libertarian critiques concerned with its relation to maximin principles.

Prima facie Rawls’s Difference Principle theoretically permits recurring proportional inequalities in exchange for small gains to the least advantaged, thus an egalitarian rationale is compromised. For instance, in reference to the preceding table, the Difference Principle advocates a transition from state x to state z as everyone benefits from their prior position; however, proportional inequality between the most and least advantaged widens. Consider, for example, the two-variable scenario in ‘state y’ represents a representative business owner (A) and a representative sweatshop worker (B); likewise to contemporary fashion brands. An egalitarian would rationally infer that small gains in the expectations of the sweatshop worker fail to justify the large gains in the expectations of the business owner and vice-versa, considering the exploitative nature of contemporary economic systems coercing sweatshop workers to work as a means of survival. Whereas interpretation of Rawls’s Difference Principle independent from its requisite principles, advocates for this transition due to sweatshop workers benefitting marginally from their original maximised position. Evidently, due to this inequitable scenario, there is a conflict with rational choice and the Difference Principle. Egalitarian theories typically consider economic and social inequalities as impermissible in a just society (Marx 2002). Accordingly, Rawls’s distributive justice system is distinguishable from egalitarian philosophies, insofar as inequalities are permissible, contingent upon certain factors. Rawls recognises inequalities within a just society, insofar as they are in accordance with requisite background institutions, which Rawls claims will reduce the escalation of widening distributive inequality. Namely, the presence of equal basic liberties, inequality favouring the least advantaged and equality of opportunity, whereby better rewards or higher incomes being exclusively available to persons of specific aptitudes or social spheres are inconsistent with the requirements of the Difference Principle. Therefore, the aforementioned reductio ad absurdum example of the sweatshop worker is an illegitimate critique due to the omitted requisite principle, specifically equal and extensive basic liberties being met. For instance, in reference to the previous example, Rawls’s justice system would primarily affirm that both sweatshop worker and business worker attain equal and extensive basic liberties; as a result, the sweatshop worker would not be exploited by the economic system to work as a means of survival, as adequate living standards are already safeguarded. By definition, sweatshop workers would cease to exist in a society governed by Rawls’s principle of justice, as providing extensive and equal ‘basic liberties’ is incompatible with the notion of sweatshop workers operating in socially unacceptable working conditions.

In addition, the greater expectations afforded to business owners encourages activity which increases the prospects of the worker. For instance, “better prospects (for everyone) act as incentives so that the economic process is more efficient” (Rawls 2009), thus production and innovation proceeds at an enhanced rate which facilities maximisation. This logically, assumes a “chain-connection” (Rawls 2009) between the expectations of social spheres, whereby advantages incurred by one group are transferred between all social groups. This assumption implies, for example, that increased expectations by business owners permit an identical reaction in all other social groups and vice-versa. Through application of economic redistribution methods such as progressive taxation and inheritance tax, an equitable distribution of primary goods further maximising the least fortunate due to the most advantaged expectations increasing can be theorised in practice. Accordingly, an increasing disparity between social classes seemingly violates the principle of mutual advantage; however, the “chain-connection” assumption reconciles both the principle of mutual advantage with the potential of increasing disparities through acknowledging economic incentives which favour all social groups. Therefore, although not strictly egalitarian, the Difference Principle is rationally consistent in allowing inequality gains favouring the most advantaged concurrent with marginal benefits for the least advantaged through acknowledgement of the requisite conditions curtailing the persistent widening of the distribution of wealth, thus providing justifiable moral basis for Rawls’s distributive justice.

Correspondingly, disproportionate large gains to the most advantaged simultaneous to small gains to the least advantaged are rationally acceptable within the Original Position; however, the Lexical Difference Principle affirms that inequalities favouring the most advantaged which forgo benefitting the least advantaged are permissible upon contingent grounds also. To explicate, the Lexical Difference Principle, which is presumed that Rawls utilises in “tie-break” situations (Sen 2018), affirms a beneficiary change for the most advantaged, which leaves all worse-off members unaffected is advantageous on the proviso that all worse-off members positions have been formerly maximised. For instance, in relation to ‘Table 1’, unlike the original Difference Principle, a transition from state x to state y is a positive change insofar as B’s position is functioning at its maxima at “10”. Problematically, this principle assumes social groups are limited by a maxima expectation, which is contrary to economic understanding of resources being both, capable of being readily redistributed between social groups and also, having the potential of growth. Consider, hypothetically, that all worse-off members have reached their maxima, then any additional benefit would be incurred by the most advantaged; however, as Rawls identifies, “laws governing the institutions of the basic structure insure that cases requiring the lexical principle will not arise” (Rawls 2009). Therefore, the lexical principle has limited application due to requisite laws governing background institutions, in addition to inconsistencies with contemporary understanding of economics where redistribution of primary goods is readily accessible. Hence, this essay will furthermore focus on the original reading of the Difference Principle in deriving its rationality in the Original Position.

Rawls distinguishes his principles of justice from a maximin criterion, by affirming that the association may incorrectly invoke the notion that the core rationale of his argument is risk aversion. Whereas, Rawls indicates there are various “considerations in favour of the Difference Principle in which the aversion of risk plays no role” (Rawls 2009). A maximin rationale, for example, would urge a person to always bring an umbrella, as the least desirable outcome of it raining and getting wet is counteracted through being prepared with an umbrella. Similarly, Rawls’s Difference Principle serves to counteract the least desirable outcome by maximising the benefit that social groups can incur. Despite Rawls’s prior distinction, evidently there is a relation between the two principles, thus criticisms of employing maximin principles to distributive justice systems remain applicable to Rawls’s discourse. Consequently, the utilisation of maximin principles in discerning distributive justice systems is objected by Libertarians, upon the basis that the Difference Principle encroaches infringements on liberty. To explicate, Rawls’s principle prohibits social circumstances or natural endowments to determine allocation of primary goods in society, whereby natural talents are determined as “common assets” (Rawls 2009) and redistributive economic systems ensure equality of opportunity. However, Libertarians acknowledge that the Difference Principle may advocate for redistributive progressive taxation to benefit the less fortunate, which Libertarians state elicits the immoral transfer of wealth, or alternatively “theft” (Nozick 1974). Significantly, the conflict between Libertarians and Rawls on this subject is concerned with the morality of wealth transfer to favour the least advantaged. Although this broad discrepancy doesn’t enter the scope of this essay, what would be rationally deduced in the Original Position does. Therefore, considering that impartiality is a necessary component of the Original Position, decisions derived from self-interest are unattainable. Accordingly, as indicated by Rawls, it is rational to support equitable basic structures which maximise the position of all social groups. Maximin principles accomplish this; hence, the maximin facet of the Difference Principle is consistent with rationality in the Original Position.

In conclusion, rational parties in the Original Position are encouraged to concur with the Difference Principle due to its consistency with morality and justice. Through prior critical engagement, the contentions of a persistent inequality gap and maximin principle have been justified to be rational within the Original Position. Therefore, Rawls’s Difference Principle, in conjunction with its requisite principles, comprise a theory of justice consistent with both rationality and morality.