Xi-ism as China’s Present Reality and Future Course: Getting Beyond Catastrophe, Distortion, and Overgeneralization

One of our central methodological meta-narratives is that analysis of China news outside of China frequently suffers from cognitive bias of the catastrophizing variety. Correcting and overcoming this bias, however, is difficult due to the lack of data drawn from original sources and which does not already come pre-translated and embedded within catastrophizing analysis — a Catch-22 in the sense that the harder one looks for alternatives to dominant storylines, the more likely one is to end up reinforcing those storylines via the aggregation of a more detailed picture which, though data-rich, is largely devoid of nuance.

With respect to China news of the past weeks, the dominant storyline — one which has been floated for weeks but is increasingly gaining confirmation as fact — is that Xi Jinping’s government is increasingly subject to “ideological” distortions in policy. It is not our practice to criticize individuals for their viewpoints, many of which are informed by years of high-quality reporting on China’s politics and economy, but here we would like to note that use of the term ideological is of little use in forward-looking analysis for the reason that it merely confirms the existence of features of Chinese politics which are 1) already well-known, and 2) so common to political systems throughout the world that identifying them is more or less tantamount to the statement that “China has a government” — in other words, true but of the wrong level of generalization to be insightful. In brief, the updated ideological narrative (an earlier iteration of which we have covered in some detail elsewhere) consists of the following fundamental claims:

The essence of Xi Jinping’s approach to politics lies in the Chinese Communist Party’s anti-corruption work (反腐败工作).
China’s government seeks greater “control” across any number of policy areas, ranging from border security to minority affairs to the internet.
Xi Jinping has reneged on the CCP’s promise to pursue more market-oriented economic reforms.
Chinese society is becoming increasingly ideologically (and economically) polarized, leading Xi and his supporters to double down on an adventurist national foreign policy of irridentism under the guise of China becoming a “great power,” experiencing “national revival,” etc.

Again, the argument we are making is not that these claims are incorrect, but that they show a tendency to use new information to reinforce existing stereotypes of China as an authoritarian and globally revisionist power. (A tendency typical of analysis of political “others,” as shown by recent evidence drawn from American domestic politics.) Such a stereotype — or, in international relations terms, an image — can inform forward-looking analysis only in the broadest sense.

Below we consider several recent perspectives, drawn from Chinese Communist Party sources, which provide insight into current political and economic trends in China, and prescribe courses of future action which are likely to be manifested in future policy. In sum, new themes emerging from these sources include:

Elitism: Xi’s goal is not merely to consolidate the CCP and promote his own “strategy” of the Four Comprehensives, but also to re-legitimize his authority and that of other princelings within the CCP by promoting ties to China’s pre-1949 revolution the ultimate criteria for leadership in Party work. More broadly, Xi’s China remains Marxist-Leninist, socialist, and Chinese, and democratic-capitalist-Western “universal values” are not welcome.
Unambiguous Rejection of Capitalism: There is little sense anywhere within China that, should economic conditions improve, China would return to reforms purely intended to emulate the economic systems of capitalist economies. Xi talks of Marxism as the study of political economy; the goal of studying political economy is to seek alternatives to the contradictions and failures of capitalism. Private enterprise, and charities, will gain ground in China only grudgingly — under Xi there is no willingness to further engage the private sector except as a resource for supporting CCP-directed agendas and economic institutions.
National Rejuvenation as International Movement: Quite obviously, Xi’s “China dream” of national rejuvenation is not confined to China’s domestic political economy. Within the military and in its foreign policy, the CCP under Xi defines national rejuvenation in terms of territorially and strategically breaking through U.S. encirclement (“containment”) and, more broadly, as a process of de-Westernization taking place not only within China, but potentially among other non-U.S. aligned powers — most notably, Russia — as well. As is inevitably the case in Xi-ist thinking, the deepening relationship between the two countries is mainly attributable to the appeal of the CCP’s success in the areas of socialist development, national rejuvenation, and fostering a more multipolar international system.

In Praise of Marx, Lenin, and Xi

An April 8, 2016 article in central Chinese Communist Party political theory journal Red Flag Manuscripts (红旗文稿) ruminated on Lenin’s legacy as party “unifier” to suggest that the goals of contemporary CCP members should be to unite the party, consolidate leadership, and “safeguard” the most pressing tasks of economic construction.Implied in these statements is that there is not complete uniformity within the CCP, particularly with respect to economic policy.

Internally, Xi Jinping has personally called for deeper commitment to Marxism within the CCP, in the form of a new workstyle designated for intensive cadre study and referred to as the “two studies, one do” (两学一做). The goal: to discover organizational obstacles to effective policy implementation. Xi’s point, however, is not simply that the CCP could be more efficient, but also that there are CCP members whose “Party consciousness is weak.” This observation lends some credence to the assertion that Xi and the CCP center continue to face bureaucratic resistance.

While there has been some scoffing among observers that Xi is building a “cult of personality,” it is undeniable that the CCP is promoting Xi Jinping’s strategy (战略) of the “four comprehensives” (四个全面) as the correct guide to governing China and reforming the bureaucracy under what are being described as “new historical conditions” (新的历史条件).The goal of the four comprehensives is, blandly, to strengthen and grow “socialism with Chinese characteristics” by creating a well-off and stable society, deepening reform, governing the country by law, and effectively governing the CCP itself. In somewhat grander terms it represents fulfillment of the CCP’s historical task: fulfilling the “China dream” of a great revival of the Chinese people.

Xi is further promoting his own legitimacy, and that of other princelings within the CCP, by building a case that the model for CCP officialdom should be the historical “old base areas” of the pre-1949 revolution. As insightfully observed by Andrew Nathan, Xi and his princeling supporters seem wedded to the old “bloodline” theory of the Cultural Revolution, which gave descendants of pre-1949 revolutionaries the exclusive right to rule China.

This elitist strain in Xi’s thinking is reflected in the CCP’s renewed attention to media policy, the point of which is not merely “control,” as is casually alleged, but opinion leadership (舆论导向) through news media opinion work (新闻舆论工作). Xi has described this work as essential Party work; important to governance and national security; important to the “development” of internal and eternal conditions; and essential to CCP leadership of society and to “innovation” amidst reform. There are signs that media work, including censorship, will continue to be particularly strict in China’s sensitive frontier regions. Here it is also worth noting that control simply for its own sake runs head-on into another CCP goal, which is to use internet opinion as an effective source of consultation and feedback through which to manage Chinese society.

Economic Innovation

Since November 2015 Xi Jinping has stressed the study of Marxist political economy within the CCP. These remarks have been expanded in Red Flag Manuscripts to advance the doctrine that the goal of Chinese socialist political economy has been to develop and innovate solutions to capitalism’s internal contradictions. There appears to be no support for the notion that classical forms of capitalism can be recreated in China. Rather, the emphasis is on understanding the characteristics of China’s economic “new normal” and devising appropriate solutions that preserve the CCP’s political and economic dominance, and which will allow China to transcend, rather than strive to emulate, capitalist transition. Indeed, there is a messianic tinge to this rhetoric: China as the key to future “breakthroughs” in the global economy.

Xi’s remarks, and the interpretation thereof, have also left little doubt that the CCP will make economic development its highest priority between 2016 and 2020, when the task of creating well-off and stable society (小康社会) will be officially declared complete. Construction of “national innovation demonstration zones” (which now total 14) throughout China will serve as visible proof that the state is willing to commit considerable investment to the goal of moving away from China’s former — and similarly investment-driven — production-driven economy. Xi believes that the state can succeed in leading innovation, and given the amount of low-hanging technological fruit available given China’s (still) relatively low levels of technological advance, government legitimacy in this area will not necessarily be hard to achieve provided that new goods and services can be delivered, though credit expansion and rising wages, to households.

It should be noted, as we have done previously, that Xi and his advisors remain deeply suspicious of private (non-state, or 非共有) enterprise and private charity on ideological grounds, because the viewpoints of individuals in these sectors are seen as fundamentally incompatible with CCP- and state-centric views of political and social order, and as conduits of Western ideology. Instead, the leading model for development under Xi Jinping is the city-province of Chongqing, which has a long recent history of state-invested social programs and industries, and thus represents an archetype for growth, employment, and stability that can be clearly linked to CCP leadership. (Despite the disgrace and fall of former Chongqing strongman Bo Xilai, those responsible for the city’s economic successes have found themselves on the fast track to promotion.)

Rekindling China-Russia Ties

On the military front Xi’s agenda appears closely linked to political and economic goals : maintaining CCP control over the People’s Liberation Army, advancing the rule of law and adherence to objective performance measures, and modernizing China’s military forces in both organizational and technological terms. Concerning the global security environment, the dominant military perception seems to be that the United States is responsible for the arms race in the South China Sea and wider militarization of Asia; that the U.S. seeks to contain China; and that China must prepare for the eventuality of confrontation with U.S. forces. Here is it worth noting that despite constant blaming of U.S. policy for fostering a “Cold War mentality,” Chinese thinkers within the CCP seem comfortable with the idea of Russia as a partner in China’s historical revival. (Experienced Northeast Asia experts agree that this interest is mutual.) Once again, it bears repeating that China’s revival is defined in part as an overcoming of contradictions inherent in capitalism, and reassertion of national prerogatives in thought, culture, and social values vis-a-vis the encircling West. In this sense, the ideology of military and foreign policy is one of anti-U.S., anti-Western refusal. To the extent that China’s “great rejuvenation” will require breaking free of what is perceived as a historically inimical tandem of U.S. strategic encirclement and Western cultural encroachment, it can be expected that the People’s Liberation Army will be politically guided, and indoctrinated, accordingly.