By Alastair Berg and Chris Berg
The EOS mainnet launched earlier this year.
In EOS we are witnessing the emergence of what Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek would recognise as constitutional catallaxy — open source constitutional orders in which participants are continually developing the rules of the game even after the game has started.
EOS operates under a Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) consensus mechanism, with 21 Block Producers (BPs) overseeing the validation of transactions. As an open source constitutional order, the jurisdiction of these BPs has been guided by de jure constitutional arrangements. In the pre-launch phase of EOS, documentation was drafted and debated outlining an EOS Constitution, while users were to include a hash of that document in their transactions to acknowledge their understanding and acceptance of it.
However, open source constitutional orders like EOS also have stakeholders who may exercise de facto authority in the absence of formal procedural rules or technical constraints.
The launch of the EOS mainnet provides examples of how de jure and de facto constitutional arrangements can diverge. While no token holder vote has taken place on the EOS Constitution (via their proxies — BPs), de facto sovereignty was quickly exercised through the banning of seven (and later many more) accounts following a conference call between BP representatives and a body known as the EOSIO Core Arbitration Forum (ECAF).
As a result of this call, BPs chose to exercise de facto sovereignty and freeze these accounts. Only retroactively did this dispute resolution body ECAF issue a statement which indicated their support of the actions of BPs.
Similarly, 6 weeks after launch, an announcement was made to fundamentally change the way in which economic value is distributed across the EOS protocol. On July 28 Brendan Blumer, CEO of block.one (the organisation which developed the EOS mainnet), announced changes in the way EOS inflation is to be allocated. This will see new EOS tokens being distributed to users who stake tokens and vote for BPs, in addition to the rewards BPs receive for overseeing the validation of transactions.
These actions have drawn support as well as opposition. Some have called it a successful demonstration of off-chain governance, while some see it as jurisdictional overreach by emergent institutions.
In previous articles, we have argued that blockchains are a lot like countries. These (usually) open source protocols are constitutional orders which define how individuals interact and transact — complete with their own currencies, property, laws, corporations and security systems.
Blockchains, along with nation states, attempt to coordinate action in a world of incomplete information and opportunism — while computer scientists and economists have different vocabularies, Byzantine fault tolerance and robust political economy are the same thing.
Systems of governance for blockchain protocols are not new — the genius of Satoshi Nakamoto was to allow the Bitcoin network to reach consensus when two equally valid blocks are presented by miners, in effect solving the double-spend problem.
Yet now we can observe the emergence of — and have debate over — other governance arrangements in blockchain protocols. (Who writes and has permission to change the law (code), who enforces the rules, the role and method of voting, the role of developers and token holders, on-chain and off-chain governance etc).
What’s interesting is that these are analogous to the debates that individuals had during the emergence of nations. Consider the United States. With little to guide them but the musings of philosophers and radical thinkers, individuals grappled with a myriad of competing principles and interests as they set the ground rules for how their new constitutional order was to be governed.
Previously, constitutional orders emerged from revolution, civil war, conquest and other usually violent means — much like the constitutional order that emerged in the 13 American colonies.
In the real world, the emergence of institutions — as well as the jurisdiction which they exercise power over — can take many years after their formal establishment. The Supreme Court of the Unites States has the now familiar power of judicial review, evaluating the constitutionality of legislation and executive action. However it was only 16 years after it was established that the Supreme Court granted itself the power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional as a result of Marbury v. Madison. Similarly, the role of the President has significantly expanded over time, with the term the Imperial Presidency accounting for the increased powers gradually vested in the US executive since the administration of George Washington.
The US Constitution has similarly been amended, challenged and otherwise interpreted in a myriad of different ways over its lifetime, demonstrating a real-world divergence and interaction of de jure and de facto constitutional arrangements.
Likewise, blockchains are constitutional orders governed by social norms as well as technical constraints. The de jure constitutional order which governs how BPs represent EOS token holders, and the ways in which disputes are resolved, are ultimately subject to the exercise of authority by those who have the means.
What we are seeing is a process of constitutional entrepreneurism — constitutional catallaxy — in the establishment of new economies. The institutions that coordinate activity in these economies change and adapt to both the technological limitations built into the protocols, as well as the mutual expectations and power of interacting stakeholders.
Alastair Berg and Chris Berg are from the RMIT Blockchain Innovation Hub, the world’s first social science research centre into the economics, politics, sociology, and law of blockchain technology.