The future of Europe in the shadow of the war in Ukraine

Keynote lecture held at LUISS University Rome, at the 11th Biennial Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Standing Group of the European Union

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you for the opportunity to address you today on the future of Europe in the shadow of the tragic war in Ukraine.

February 24 changed Europe forever. Death, destruction, and despair, on a scale we only knew from history books, are now part of our lives once again.

Beyond its tragic toll in Ukraine, Putin’s unprovoked and unjustified war also disrupted the very foundations of the European Union.

In the EU, we pride ourselves to be a peace project‒ and rightfully so.

Our institutions emerged from the horrors of the Second World War, and through deepening and widening integration, they ushered in a new era of freedom and prosperity on our continent. In 2012, the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of over 60 years of peace, reconciliation, and democracy.

We are a peace project, and “never again” is one of our most important moral anchors ‒ and yet here we are.

On the EU’s doorstep, over 14,000 people have already died in this brutal act of aggression. International investigators have gathered credible evidence for war crimes, and crimes against humanity perpetrated by Russia. Russian armed forces and their proxies are deliberately and indiscriminately shelling nurseries, schools, and hospitals. They use rape as a weapon of war. According to the Human Rights Commissioner of the Ukrainian Parliament, 400,000 Ukrainian civilians, including more than 200,000 children, have been forcibly deported to the Russian Federation.

This war shattered illusions about the impossibility of a major war on European soil, or that we somehow found the key to reconciliation between nations, at least in our immediate neighborhood. It also shattered illusions about the power of economic interdependence to make wars obsolete.

Putin’s invasion was a gut punch for Europe‒ but in many ways, it also served as a wake-up call.

The European Union’s reaction to the crisis was remarkably swift.

Denouncing Russian aggression was clear and unequivocal from the side of European institutions. Member states immediately agreed to a long list of economic sanctions‒ six packages to date. And we see tangible solidarity towards the millions seeking refuge. For the first time, the EU triggered the Temporary Protection Directive, which provides access to jobs, housing, education and medical assistance. Moreover, in a truly unprecedented step, the EU also found a way to finance and coordinate military assistance to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility.

The change is truly significant‒ and it is mirrored in member state capitals as well. Sweden and Finland decided to break with their historic policy of neutrality and applied for NATO membership. German policy has also changed course. Denmark has voted to abandon their opt-out from EU defense integration.

These swift reactions really underline how eye-opening these events have been to Europe. But the fact that the war shocked and startled the EU is also a problem, in my view. Why didn’t we see it coming? Why were we in collective disbelief, even on the eve of Putin’s invasion? It’s not like there were no warnings.

In a similar vein, many in Europe congratulated themselves that we managed to surprise everyone by acting so swiftly and decisively. But again, isn’t this also a problem? The question we should be asking ourselves: why was the outside world so surprised at a forceful reaction from the EU? And isn’t this part of the reason why Europe could not deter Putin?

In this talk, I will attempt to tackle these questions. They may be uncomfortable questions, but I truly believe that we first need to understand how we got here. After this critical reflection on what I believe the EU has done wrong‒ I will turn to what I believe should be done.

Critically assessing Europe’s own shortcomings is of course not a way to shift blame for this war in any way, shape, or form.

The invasion of Ukraine presents us with a rare case of moral clarity. There is an aggressor here, and he should be named. It was Russian dictator Vladimir Putin who waged this war against a peaceful neighbor. There can be no question about that. And it also forces leaders to show their true colors: because you either stand with the victim, or the aggressor.

So our moral outrage is absolutely justified. However, it would still be a mistake to stop here, and not look at the deeper reasons why Europe could not deter Putin. And here, we do need critical self-reflection.

I will talk about three factors that I believe fatally weakened our credibility as a global actor, and also compromised our ability to deter Russian aggression. And if we do not solve these problems, they will keep undermining any credible European foreign policy posture, also in the future.

The first was putting short-term economic gains ahead of strategic interests. The second was the unanimity rule in foreign affairs. And the third was the erosion of the rule of law within Europe, in other words: the Putinization of Europe itself.

First, about Europe’s focus on short-term economic gains, and shocking lack of strategic foresight. I have always been puzzled how the EU can be such a formidable economic power with so little appreciation of the strategic implications of economic relations.

Thinking strategically means understanding that a course of action does not only have direct monetary costs and benefits, but it is usually also a political signal‒ that will influence the actions of others.

Nord Stream 2 is not only a pipeline, it is not only a lucrative investment project for the German chemical industry. And its costs and benefits should never have been assessed only in that light. The political decision to greenlight the pipeline after the illegal annexation of Crimea was a powerful message to Putin.

And in fact, the signal Europe kept sending to Vladimir Putin through our economic and trade transactions, over and over again, is that even his most unspeakable crimes would not have consequences‒ money will keep flowing.

Another example is Europe’s handling of Russian oligarch money.

I will always remember Alexei Navalny addressing our Foreign Affairs Committee meeting in the European Parliament, only a few months after his poisoning. He told us the following:

“Let me say it very straight: as long as the most expensive yacht of Mr. Usmanov is standing in Barcelona or in Monaco, no one in Russia or in the Kremlin will treat European sanctions seriously. They just think that they are playing the European Union.”

And he was right. Putin spent twenty years freely stashing his money in the West, and he felt emboldened that he could do anything. Because what was really going on there? He robbed his own people, squeezed resources from them, trashed their human rights‒ and then his proxies took this money to buy luxury property in Italy, art in Paris, or company assets in Frankfurt. And when a journalist wrote about it, expensive lawyers showed up to muzzle them.

How could we ever think we had a credible Russia policy against this backdrop?

The second key factor weakening our credibility is the unanimity voting rule in foreign affairs.

Viktor Orbán’s frequent vetoes in the Council have been a gift to the Kremlin, who have a vested interest in a European Union that is divided and weak. Last week, the EU was unable to go forward with sanctions, because the Hungarian government wanted Patriarch Kirill off the sanctions list. The EU looked laughable, just as Vladimir Putin wanted.

The unanimity rule also makes us vulnerable to Trojan horses. Authoritarian influence can infiltrate the EU and human rights abusers can act with impunity. The perpetrators can muzzle the entire Union‒ all for the low, low price of a single corrupt prime minister.

When Lukashenka diverted an EU-owned civilian aircraft flying between EU capitals, we should have realized the extent of the damage caused by an EU that looks divided and incapable to act. Because how did Lukashenka even dare to go this far? He did because dictators read the news too. They see that the EU harbors its own authoritarians, who by the way, have veto power over EU foreign policy decisions.

Authoritarian Trojan horses and the EU’s passivity to deal with the problem made us all unsafe.

And this brings me to my third point‒ the grave credibility risk that was brought about by the erosion of the rule of law within the European Union. In order to safeguard our community as a beacon of human rights and democracy also in our external relations, we need to put our own house in order.

I will not delve into this very long, because Professor Daniel Kelemen will hold a keynote lecture about the rule of law crisis tomorrow, and his expertise on this is truly unparalleled.

Democratic backsliding is linked to our external credibility too. It is quite obvious that we cannot fight Putin without fighting the Putinization of our member states.

What we are witnessing in Hungary ‒rampant corruption, attacking civil society, hollowing out democratic institutions‒ these are all hallmarks of Putin’s regime too.

Orbán’s anti-gay law, conflating gay people and pedophiles is basically copied and pasted from Russia. So was the law that stigmatizes NGOs as ‘foreign agents.’ Or the law that shamefully expelled Central European University from Hungary.

Hungary’s steadily growing ‘business ties’ to Russia come with huge security risks. Orban invited a shady Russian bank to Hungary with ample secret security ties, handing out diplomatic immunity to personnel. There were reports that NATO allies were reluctant to share intelligence with Hungarian counterparts, fearing it would land with the Russians.

And don’t forget: Hungarian state media is the number one source of Kremlin propaganda in Europe. Sputnik and Russia Today were banned, but Hungary’s state-sponsored media machine is still spewing disinformation. They are spreading Kremlin talking points and lies about the Ukraine war.

Strong ties to Russia is a pattern throughout the entire far-right alliance‒ we see it with Le Pen in France or Salvini in Italy.

And the European Union needs to confront that if we want a credible Russia policy.

Fighting democratic backsliding at home is also an absolute prerequisite to breath new life into the EU enlargement project, and incentivize genuine democratic reform in accession countries.

And finally, I want to turn to what I believe should be done‒ or at least what my own priorities are as a European legislator.

Again, I will highlight three things: strengthening our EU-level strategic thinking, scrapping the unanimity rule in foreign affairs, and engaging Europe in the international fight against impunity for war crimes.

Firstly, strategic thinking. In all our policy fields, from economic policy to energy policy, we need to have long term strategic goals in mind.

In energy, which is a particularly complex field, we need to use this dramatic shift to hasten the green transition. There is simply no alternative to that. The climate crisis is here to stay, and we now see more than ever, how irresponsible it was to procrastinate on bold climate action, and not break with our fossil fuel dependency earlier. Now, we have a choice to opt for higher and earlier targets when it comes to renewable energy.

We also need to rethink our economic policies. Although the EU seems united behind our sanctions framework for now, it is questionable how long this unity will last, especially if the war continues to disrupt trade, cause supply bottlenecks, and drive up inflation. The cost of living crisis in Europe is already causing a great deal of suffering. Public opinion can easily turn against sanctions‒ this is probably what Russia is banking on. Putin is not vulnerable to electoral cycles, but European leaders are.

And we also need to grapple with the divides between our member states: because our levels of dependency on Russia are variegated. Threat perceptions also vary.

But interestingly, these new cleavages between member states can also be an opportunity for compromise. After the financial crisis, Europe got stuck in a bitter debate between North and South, creditors and debtors. This created obstacles for solidarity and redistributive schemes because some member states felt they would always be the ones footing the bill.

Now the divides have shifted, and there is much more uncertainty about the winners and losers of these distributive outcomes. And as we know from political scientists, this ‘veil of ignorance’ can make compromise easier.

Indeed, the only chance we have to come out of this crisis is if we stick together. Solidarity between member states will be crucial. And we have a blueprint for that: during the COVID-19 crisis, the EU has stepped up, and provided financial support for member states in need. We have to continue on the path we embarked upon with the creation of Next Generation EU. It was a historic step to fight the crisis through a joint investment package in Europe’s digital and green transitions, financed by genuine own resources and jointly issued Eurobonds. With the REpowerEU program, the Commission has already signaled its intention to carry on on this path. And that is a good direction and good strategic thinking.

Second, we need to scrap the unanimity rule in foreign affairs and come together in a genuine European security and defense union.

Let’s start with the latter one. Security and defense policy is predominantly a member state competence in the EU, and of course, this fact in and of itself limits our ability to be a genuine geopolitical actor with strategic goals (even though this is the explicit ambition of the current Commission.) The EU does not have an army, we largely rely on the United States and NATO allies as the main guarantor of our security. I strongly believe we should change that, and create an integrated European security and defense community. In reform proposals like the Strategic Compass, we already see important steps in the right direction.

And when it comes to unanimity, it requires, first and foremost, political work.

Frustration about national vetoes has been growing for years and is palpable at every corner of EU institutions. Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, former German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, and the EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell all came out in favor of qualified majority voting. It was previously unimaginable, but years of exasperation now arrived at a boiling point.

There is nothing inevitable about the unanimity rule. Although shifting to qualified majority voting will certainly be a contested issue throughout Europe, the EU demonstrated over and over again that it is capable of reform. A couple of years ago, few would have thought that linking EU funds to the respect of the rule of law, or the issuance of joint European debt is a possibility. The Conference on the Future of Europe, our participatory forum for institutional reform, also put the unanimity problem on the table and clearly addressed the risks of keeping the status quo.

And ultimately, European citizens in each and every member state can ask their elected leaders why they tolerate a dysfunctional, antidemocratic setup like this, that makes the EU look weak and ridiculous in crucial moments of crisis. Voters have the chance to critically assess their governments’ reluctance to stand up against autocrats, call out the failed appeasement strategy, and demand the global authoritarian threat be taken more seriously.

And finally, we need to work on a European answer to hold Russia accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

I started this talk by mentioning how Putin’s war threatens the moral foundations of the EU. And it does. Every day, we hear stories about naked bodies of civilians buried in mass graves, with signs of torture and rape on them. I know it is not comfortable to hear. And I know some politicians insist that we look away. But this is the reality emerging from Ukraine.

And if we believe that “never again” is the moral foundation of the European Union, then we need to act as though we mean it. We need to make sure it is a credible commitment.

Our European institutions must send a clear message to the perpetrators: one day, you will need to sit in front of an international tribunal, and you will be held accountable for these unspeakable crimes.

In our recent resolution, the European Parliament called for the establishment of a special international tribunal. We believe we already need to establish an interim office in the Hague, and the EU should provide financing for that. Every single one of these cases needs to be recorded. There needs to be diligent monitoring, documentation, and storing of evidence.

Again, this is about the message our actions send to Russia. Accountability may not happen today or tomorrow, as it should. But it will happen. Justice will be served.

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

I know the vision of a European Union I have just described ‒having a strong moral backbone, strategic foresight, and the political will to act‒ might feel elusive. Just as elusive as the end of this horrific war.

But let us remember this: the people of Ukraine are fighting and dying, because they want to belong to Europe. To our peaceful, prosperous community, whose historic success is rooted in the values enshrined in Article 2 of our Treaty. The respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

The people of Ukraine still believe in Europe‒ and we should believe in ourselves too.

Thank you very much.