Obama’s Common Sense
Sunday, 08 May 2011
That Obama is in most respects better than George W. Bush is beyond dispute and completely beside the point. But most importantly Barack Obama is judged by many around the world by his approach to the war on terror that redeems the sins of America’s shameful past. The first and most important one is to undermine the Al-Qaida Narrative by pushing back against their propaganda and lies. The New Obama Strategy centers on fighting terror as a tactic but the real focus is on Countering Violent Extremism. This being the major obective, eliminating top AQ leaders and the operational focus on their associates everywhere will continue to form a major component of the strategy. Luckily, AL-Qaida’s line of argument was fatally wounded by the recent Arab revolts, because AQ was arguing that peaceful revolts cannot topple autocratic regimes and this has been proven otherwise.
Obama’s Strategy of Countering Violent Extremism
The new Obama Strategy on terrorism has been a subject of discussion in the last year and half. In November 2008, on the eve of the US Presidential election Barack Obama argued that he will figure out a more sensible and plausible approach to the war on terror. There were few clues on the would be strategy. He himself insisted this won’t be easy, but it is important. It seems, looking at the new strategy and focus, that Obama had a strong capacity for self reflection and awareness, and for arriving at fresh and realistic solutions. As it turned out to be Obama’s strategy is centered on the phenomenon of terrorism. Certainly, he continued to make every effort to disrupt terrorist groups and independent cells or lone wolves, and to prevent attacks. He has acted on the promise he gave to the American people to take out the top leadership of Al-Qaida/AQ/, and continued to do that with laser type focus and resilience.
However right after assuming the presidency Obama’s main thesis, though understated, was that unless you address the underlying causes and counter the ideological underpinnings of terrorism the fight against AQ will not go far enough to ensure security. The fight against radicalization is a story that has received only intermittent attention in the mainstream approach on the global war on terror. It was refreshing to see an American President base his policies on terrorism on a broader analysis. As the months have passed, the President’s national security team has become preoccupied by the deteriorating war in Afghanistan and the Taliban-led insurgency in Pakistan. Amid such difficulties, the idea of thinking afresh about the subject as old and complex as terrorism might seem preposterously ambitious.
Since then the Obama Administration has worked quietly to map out a new and broader strategy against terrorism. The main focus is on prevention through addressing threats of radicalization. The premises of the new approach were revealing both in terms of fighting terrorism at strategic and operational levels. This view has been reinforced by the newly evolving dynamics in the war against AQ. For Obama it has become evidently clear that the US has achieved tactical successes against Al-Qaida. Its core has become weaker while its associates/affiliates have been stronger. In such a situation, a military focus on AQ will be a misplaced strategy. Even very effective military, counterterrorism, law enforcement and homeland security efforts (and their synthesis — no small challenge itself) cannot succeed in eliminating the threat because the universe of potential actors is simply too large and dispersed. Obama’s Comprehensive approach to Counter Terrorism is thus centered on ‘Constraining the Environment’. It is referred to as Countering Violent Extremism /CVE/ which is central to the current policy of the US on the subject. This has three lines of strategy:
The first and most important one is to undermine the Al-Qaida Narrative by pushing back against their propaganda and lies. This should not look like countering Islam: never describe the enemy in religious terms so as to show AQ and other Islamic terrorist are nothing more than simple murderers, which they are. This strategy was put in full force recently supported by a web of new infrastructures such as the Center for Strategic Counter Terrorism Communications. Luckily, AL-Qaida’s line of argument was fatally wounded by the recent Arab revolts, because AQ was arguing that peaceful revolts cannot topple autocratic regimes and this has been proven otherwise. The main narrative of AQ was that change can only come through terror and violence and this was largely rejected. Thus, the US should press hard on the new narrative in the Arab world and easily counter AQ’s argument. In political and ideological terms this is a major set back for the organization.
In terms of the narratives and political agendas, the AL Qaida and its affiliate’s political rational has generally suffered a setback. Because, most of the leaders of the uprising and the young protesters vowed for democratic transition and by peaceful means, two aspects that doesn’t bode well with the strategy of terrorist organizations. Besides, the main political agenda of Al-Qaida and other radical groups in the Middle East i.e. the role of the US and the existence of Isreal, and opposition to them and the usual rhetoric against both has not been a central issue in the uprisings. Indeed, that makes it all the more strange that the Arab opposition movements — from Libya to Bahrain — have not made overt and covert cooperation with Israel a central issue, if for no other reason than to mobilize the Arab masses.
Similarly, radical Islamists have always made Israel a central issue, yet it wasn’t there in this round of unrest. This was particularly surprising with regimes like Egypt’s, which had formal relations with Israel. This has reportedly shocked the top leaderships of radical and terrorist organizations, particularly Al-Qaida. In the uprisings Islam was not an issue, religion was not an issue, the US was not condemned negatively and Israel was not even mentioned, as AQ and its associates would have liked it to be. It is not clear why Israel was not a rallying point. This is probably attributed to several explanations.
One is that the protests were not mass movements involving all classes of society, but to a great extent the young and the better educated. It is known that several leaders of the Egyptian rising, for example, who were close to Hamas yet deliberately chose to downplay their relations. Most important, the events thus far have shown that the demonstrators were in no position to force the Arab governments they oppose, mainly the Egyptian military to do anything it didn’t want to do on Israel. Another possible explanation is that the demonstrations in the Islamic world were focused on unpopular leaders and regimes, and the question of local governance (and not external relations) was at their heart. So, in terms of ideology, political slogans, agendas and narratives the uprisings have embarrassed Al-Qaida and associates as well as other radical groups in the Middle East and Africa.
The second line of US strategy is to provide plausible alternatives to the roots of terrorism and radicalization. Support to credible voices in society (such as civil society, Media, and Business). Support and encourage non-violent alternatives to satisfy the needs of society, particularly the youth through training, voluntary services, leadership training, community works in known hot spots of radicalization. This helps to show that there are other normal ways and mechanisms to improve and change life. As I stated it in a recent meeting on this in Dakar, Senegal ‘If the US is serious about radicalization, it must take action to win the radicalized youth back’ (http://www.currentanalyst.com/index.php/conflictsregional/157-the-political-economy-of-radicalization-and-terrorism-in-the-horn-of-africa). This helps mobilizing the will to fight extremism.Denying would-be terrorists this multiplication effect prevents them from accomplishing their greater goals.
The third strategy is not new, but focuses on building the capacity of US partners to counter the AQ narrative both through governments and other actors (Regional organizations and CSO ect.) such as in Africa, particularly the Sahel and East Africa. Several consultations have been going on aimed at developing concrete strategies along the above lines and the Obama Administration seems to be committed to deepening this partnership. ‘We are in a race to stay a step ahead from Al-Qaida in all these areas and Africa must join hands to achieve that.’ This was really the main message of top officials of the Obama administration. It could be argued that the change of focus and approach came from a realistic assessment of the war on terror so far.
There was another important consideration too. Obama was very much concerned with the image of the US around the globe. He reasoned that the global war on terror in general and countering violent extremism in particular would not succeed while American image remains unchanged. That Obama is in most respects better than George W. Bush is beyond dispute and completely beside the point. But most importantly Obama is judged by an approach to the war on terror that redeems the sins of America’s shameful past. The New Obama Strategy discussed here centers on fighting terror as a tactic but the real focus is on Countering Violent Extremism. This being the major strategy, eliminating top AQ leaders and the operational focus on Al-Qaida’s associates everywhere will continue to form a major component of the strategy. To this effect currently, the US has two regional counter terrorism initiatives in Africa targeting the Sahel and East Africa covering 21 countries. And many agree the results, as confirmed by US officials, have been encouraging.
And on the top of the new strategy, new terms and approaches introduced by the Obama Administration, the already established conventional approaches to the ‘War on terror’ will continue to be pursued. And this is particularly true when it comes to Africa. On this, the view of US officials includes the following:
— That terrorism is still on the top of the list in US policy in Africa.
— Transnational terrorist groups are finding Sub-Saharan Africa an attractive place to operate. Mainly the Horn and Sahel remain major theatres of terrorism and the War on Terror.
— There is a unique mutation of violent extremism aided by the unique role of modern communications.
— African responses to terrorism have also proved more serious, focused and robust, the best example being the struggle by Ugandan and Burundian army in Somalia.
— Mainly Law Enforcement and Security Services are doing well in many African countries to meet the challenge of terrorism
For Obama there is a difference between Countering Violent Extremism/CVE/ and the War on terror. Yes ultimately he thinks he is in a war on terror (terror as a tactic) but CVE is more important as it attempts to deal with the problem much earlier, before it becomes terror as a tactic of war. In this process of radicalization and violent extremism which is understood as complex, the US should offer alternative futures and alternative opportunities to the people (mainly the youth) in extremism hot spots. Clearly, the concepts, strategies and approaches on the war on terrorism have slightly changed since Obama took power. That Obama will rarely live up to his changes, -particularly that has to do with changing the image of America abroad, is beyond dispute. Meanwhile it does matter, profoundly, that his new strategy on the war on terror is in most respects better, sensible and sustainable.
