On the Feud between Eritrea and Ethiopia

Tuesday, 27 July 2010

Peace and the Horn of Africa are rarely mentioned in the same breath, and for good reason. The Horn is a region in which conflicts are over determined. The crisis of instability in the Horn is almost mystical and structural; history is often defined by conflict. A sense of despair grips the region for other reasons, too: the Horn trails the Middle East, Asia and Sub‐Saharan Africa. There are fragile and failed states along both sides of the Red Sea. Apart from the structural issues that make the Horn of African region inflammable, there are multi‐layered proximate factors that could easily spark armed conflict and violence. The region has been vulnerable to historical fault lines and fragilities, only to be further complicated by the recent emergence of new political geographies which turned to be a torn in the region’s international system. On12 May 1998, the entire political landscape in the Horn changed, when Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war over regional power hierarchy. So, it is time to clarify the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. I would have been sympathetic to the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia on one condition: If it could bring peace. This stems from the view that peace is the fundamental value.

Instead, what transpired were war and devastation, and perpetual instability. This has killed the moral reasoning behind Eritrean independence. Though it has become inescapable and irreversible, Eritrean statehood could not be based on a separate tradition, history or identity. Post‐independent Eritrea wanted to play an unfamiliar, if not abnormal security role. We were confronted with an unlikely hegemonic project. There are two analytical objections to this project. The first is Eritrea cannot achieve this goal. Due to the distribution of regional power, the project is intrinsically impossible, and all that we have is increasing economic and political instability. The second is the way Eritrean foreign policy has worked out since 1991. It is wildly ambitious, and has become a strong mechanism and arrangement for producing and distributing instability across the region. The results have been appalling in their destructiveness, and external actors have done little to improve matters.

It is easy to criticize Ethiopia’s refusal to accept the border ruling and allow demarcation, and justify Eritrean mendacity and destabilization strategy in the Horn. But one thing is clear. Ethiopia is ready to give the territory awarded to Eritrea, if there is anything sensible one can get out of it; and prominent among which is a workable peace agreement. Ethiopia could surrender the disputed area to Eritrea, if Asmara is ready to value the gesture and change its heart. However, that is a distant prospect. The question that analysts should have asked is‐ is Eritrea ready to settle the matter i.e. take the prize and settle for peace? Could this positively influence the behavior of the Eritrean leadership? Is Eritrea ready to abandon its destabilization strategy all together for a swap on the disputed territory? Nobody is sure about this. Ethiopia’s call for a comprehensive peace deal with Eritrea doesn’t preclude the giving away of the contested territory. It doesn’t automatically disqualify Eritrean claim over the area of Badme.So border is not an issue. Certainly the issue is power politics. As I tried to argue in previous commentaries, the disputed area of Badme is significant to the Eritrean regime only to the extent that it serves as a reminder of Ethiopia’s loss, and resultant political crisis to the EPRDF. Short of that, it is irrelevant. Besides, the border dispute and the Eritrea and Ethiopia conflict are not one and the same. Border is a very small part of the broader conflict. It was not the cause of the war and it cannot be the solution.

For the past ten or so years, political analysis on the conflict has devoted a vast amount of (largely wasted) energy to the so‐called border dispute. The obsession with the border had gone all together too far, and that it was time to bring back a sense of subtlety. It has become apparent that domestic state building is too closely associated with regional politics for the two to be kept apart. Besides the Horn of Africa region as one conflict system dictates the nature of political systems and vice versa. It is true that 2 regional power order and for that matter economic relations was one major area of difference between the two countries.1 That such difference should produce war, however, speaks more strongly to the nature of some political establishments’. It is linked to Eritrea’s hegemonic project and the failure of the EPLF to oversee a democratic transition, even of the weak kind being carried out in Ethiopia; than of border disputes that were never a problem for the two governments as well as the people who lived in the areas in question.

The ferocity with which the war had been fought speaks, among others, to deeply political nature of the conflict that leaves little room for compromise. Hence, demarcation is a non‐starter. Demarcation, both virtual and actual, will not change, even a bit, the nature of the conflict between the two countries. The Eritrean government is cognizant of this fact. And short of a fresh peace deal, the Ethiopian leadership doesn’t see any benefit in border demarcation either. Both sides don’t see it fit to go for demarcation. It is‐in political terms‐ in no body’s interest. Then why the huff and the puff regarding border demarcation. For many external actors it is purely out of ignorance; for the respective leaders in Ethiopia and Eritrea because it justifies other political and security strategies of a regional character. This explains the reason why the Ethio‐Eritrean peace process has been deadlocked at a moment when the African continent appears to be more serious about a regional approach to peace and security than ever before.

Nonetheless, the border issue is not only outwardly offensive in character. As far as the leaders in Asmara are concerned it has a defensive character. The border dispute does not only serve as a continuous pretext to go after their deadly foes in Addis; most importantly it serves to perpetuate domestic power and control. In 2000 President Isayas suffered his worst military defeat and humiliation but he turned the event, though cynically, to his personal political advantage. The war and its devastating impact became an effective weapon to block any call for political reform and democratic transition. It became the reason for everything that the Eritrean leadership does inside and outside its borders. It has become the reason to stop any good coming to Eritrea and its people. Then, why would we expect Eritrea to change its position and opt for real peace. Isayas perfectly understands he would be the first victim of peace. The victims of peace are many, but in this particular case the top leadership of the PFDJ seems to be more cognitive than any other political establishment around. For the leaders in Asmara, peace with Ethiopia and opening up Eritrea’s relations with the outside world could have unintended political consequences. Ethiopian leaders don’t see any political benefit, at least in the short term, from demarcation either.

Then why would Ethiopia go for demarcation without the guarantee of friendship from Asmara. EPRDF leaders are not interested in giving away Badme and lose gratitude from many Ethiopians without a hint Eritrea will hinge. Otherwise, the EPRDF‐led government in Ethiopia is ready to live with Isayas’s Eritrea. I am not sure whether the reverse is true. And this has to do with the psychological factors surrounding the end of the last war. In real politics the current Ethiopian government is the best that Eritrea can get in any super market. In strategic terms Eritrean interest will be guaranteed if the regime in Addis stays in power. It accepted Eritrean independence and decided to live with it. So the issue has nothing to do with Eritrean national or strategic interests. The EPRDF leadership in Addis could not be accused of harboring bad intentions towards Eritrea. Infact, the Meles government is accused of giving up, or being about to give up, on Ethiopia’s sovereignty and interest, over Eritrea. The pressure from Ethiopians on EPRDF leaders to respond more forcefully to Eritrea gradually changed the nature of relations, the conflict and peacemaking efforts. Somebody,somewhere must be responsible for the deterioration of historical relations and strategic bondage. Whatever came after 1998 is attributed to the way Eritrea attacked Ethiopia. King Alexander of Greece died, in 1920, of blood poisoning after a pet monkey bit him. His successor became involved in a bloody war with the Turks in which a quarter of a million people died. It was a monkey bite, wrote Churchill, which caused the death of those 250,000 people. For most 3 Ethiopians, Isayas’s military occupation of an Ethiopian administered territory was nothing more than a monkey’s bite that led to the death of tens of thousands and scores of violent upheavals in social relations.

Over the past decade, much of the regional wars, particularly interstate conflicts, have been traced back to two countries: Sudan and Eritrea. Over the years both governments sought legitimacy and influence through exporting instability. That trend has been largely reversed in Sudan, perhaps because the National Islamic Front/NIF/ was weakened by internal split and regional wars and had to change course. Meanwhile, the Eritrean leadership was greatly weakened by the defeat from the 1998‐2000 war with Ethiopia. However, this wouldn’t lead to a change of policy or strategy in Asmara; it only changed the tactics. Incapable of launching a conventional war, the Eritrean leadership resorted to the task of producing and arming rebel movements for along‐term retribution. Having failed to become a regional hegemon, the only way to remain relevant in regional politics and news headlines is to actively involve in the making of conflicts and consistently seeking the attention of global powers. The full script of this has been written and is being played out in several walls along the national borders of IGAD member states. This strategy did not fare any better. Some countries have been blackmailed by this strategy and tried hard to ingratiate themselves with Asmara, others however resisted the new rouse and persisted.

However, there is a considerable degree of consistency in Eritrean policy, and if Asmara seems to be pursuing reconciliation, as recently happened with Djibouti, appearances are deceptive. The Eritrean government’s connections to regional destabilization go back to the period before the country’s creation as an independent state, and the decision by the new Eritrean leadership to use its military status for other purposes. This fateful decision was made in late 1992.The Eritrean leadership reasoned out that its military ‘invincibility’, as understood in terms of ‘defeating’ its largest neighbor Ethiopia and prevailing over the largest army in sub‐Saharan Africa, will continue to serve as the lucrative source of economic, political and diplomatic leverage. Military power, real and imagined, was to be the source of international and internal legitimacy. The sense of military invincibility was considered to be the major asset that the Eritrean leadership could deploy at any time internally to subdue the population, thwart any attempt by the opposition to challenge its rule; and most importantly attract friends, resources and acceptance globally. This was taken as a basis for prosperity and stature. It was thought that the aura of invincibility would bring cash, as understood in terms of securing monopoly over military assets and resource lanes, and subsequently getting financial concessions from security‐related contracts in the sub‐region and beyond. All this was shattered after the military defeat in the 1998‐200 war. The whole Eritrean, as envisaged by the PFDJ leadership, suddenly crumbled. The foundations of the PFDJ’s survival, as understood by Eritrean leaders were dismantled. And this cannot be easily forgotten.

The argument in Asmara goes ‘we cannot forget or forgive’ and any policy formulation should aim at hurting Ethiopia and its leaders. So the conflict turned into a feud. Eritrea makes no secret of its desire for regime change in Ethiopia. That is how, the Eritrean leadership decided to disorganize the nucleus of the new born state and use it for other purposes, mainly to continue the war by other means. That is when the top Eritrean leadership decided to act like a non‐state actor in channeling support for armed groups both to gain internal legitimacy, delay democratic reform, block Demobilisation,Disarmament and Reintegration/DDR/ and most importantly to hurt its perennial rival, Ethiopia. Every politics is local. Decidedly, Eritrean leaders perpetuated a sense of insecurity and threat from Ethiopia. Any Eritrean demanding democratic or political reform is easily regarded as disloyal, if not treasonous. The war and the perception of encirclement helped to secure some degree of support for the Eritrean regime. This happens routinely when a country is under siege, no matter how unpopular the government.

Due to the deteriorating domestic situation ongoing conflicts allow the Eritrean government more domestic leeway on political and economic concerns.Any conflict with neighbors helps to present the picture of an Eritrea under siege as an excuse of recruiting an endless supply of teenagers in the army‐ from the schools and the labor market. This strategy, in addition of camouflaging internal economic and political crisis, was intended to impose a total dictatorship in Eritrea, and initiate undeclared state of war with all, particularly Ethiopia. Many young Eritreans are fleeing the country to avoid conscription. The sense of resentment and loss of internal legitimacy had made the government more intransigent in its dealings with the outside world and consequently had undermined Eritrea’s international legitimacy. There are three basic options that the international community, Ethiopia and its allies have regarding Eritrea. They can isolate and further pressurize Eritrea, engage it diplomatically, or focus to contain and deter the threat it poses.

Let me briefly state what each would entail and then explain why I prefer containment and deterrence. Eritrea’s regional ambitions are a problem. That could have been easily ignored. The balance of military power dictated by Ethiopia hinders a full regional war. This is the most important asset; hence the most realistic option. The deliberate policy of destabilization is however a major problem, and the Eritrean regime’s foreign policy‐which has involved support for armed groups and radical elements‐make it a destabilizing force in the region. This duality is a structural problem, rooted in history and a consistent policy of the PFDJ.It is not just the inadvertent outcome of decisions by some within the régime. Unless it changes course, Eritrea should pay the price for its actions. What then is the truth about the relations between this policy and the armed conflicts in the sub‐region? Those who argue that Eritrea is a sinister and valuable force manipulating armed groups across the region have to accept that Asmara will then be able to raise the temperature everywhere it has influence. There are those who say that Ethiopia has never really understood Eritrea’s concerns and never negotiated in good faith with the regime. It argues that Eritreans have legitimate security fears: there are troops around the border; Addis support groups seeking to overthrow the government, and so on. So the feeling goes, Washington and Ethiopia need to make a much more active effort to engage the Eritreans, listening and responding to their concerns, allaying their suspicions, ending the sanctions ‘regime’ and hostile policies and offering the real prospect of recognition to the regime and normal relations with Ethiopia. But this assertion and the surrounding analysis are flawed. In the case of Eritrea engagement is like a blind date.

Those in favor of engagement forget one very crucial aspect of Eritrean security policy: isolation as a survival strategy. When Ethiopia has made gestures, such as accepting the ruling without preconditions, Asmara has not reciprocated. And Ethiopian leaders do have some legitimate security concerns as well. In recent months the Ethiopian government have started to take tougher stances than ever before against the regime. I do not believe the Eritrean regime, at its core, wants normalized relations with Ethiopia or America for that matter. Isolation from the rest of the world, particularly the West and hostility towards Ethiopia are fundamental pillars that prop up the current regime‐ the reason that this system of government came into being and what sustains it every day. This is not a matter of ideology‐ though that is important‐but regime security. Those who rule in Asmara have created a closed, something resembling to oligarchic economy that channels the country’s scarce resources into the coffers of its political and military heavyweights and their unusually secretive clique. They benefit from a closed society that they can manipulate. An opening to the world, which would mean more trade and integration, commerce, and contact with the West, would strengthen Eritrean civil society, its trading class, its students, its bourgeoisie, and thus strengthens opposition to the regime.

On the other hand, however, there is the strong urge for revenge, and this resulted in the uniquely horrific level of enmity and distrust. It is an unsatisfying, frustrating approach but it is being pursued diligently. Eritrea also accuses the U.S of fuelling conflict in Somalia by supporting Ethiopian intervention 5 in the pretext of fighting terrorism. There is a great deal of displeasure towards the West and the US2 . The Eritrean government has tried hard to make the conflict with Djibouti part of the Ethiopian‐Eritrean conflict and its hostile relations with the US, but its propositions have been unconvincing. Asked about the conflict, President Isayas is quoted as saying that he doesn’t see a problem with Djibouti but with Ethiopia and its “sponsor” the USA.3 According to Eritrea, Washington is solely responsible for the failure to implement the decision of the Ethiopian‐Eritrean Border Commission, hence its obsession with the border issue. I believe we are now seeing the climax of a full‐fledged feud between Addis Ababa and Asmara, with the PFDJ exhausting its support to extremist and murderous groups in Somalia and Ethiopia pushing hard its diplomatic push for further sanctions on Asmara.

Eritrea couldn’t project regional power in any way different. Meanwhile, Ethiopia couldn’t diplomatically achieve more than what it has been able to achieve. Nonetheless, the main issue is not the limits of state power but limits on political and security agendas. Eritrea has developed the tendency to take its frustration out beyond its borders, the region, and the world. Until the Eritrean leadership truly takes on a more holistic view of the country’s national interests‐one that sees economic development, not strategic gamesmanship against Ethiopia and the US, as the key to Eritrea’s security and development‐ the conflict will not subside. A feud is a backward ‐looking conflict, more a sacrificial ritual than a political action looking toward the future. Quite apart from the questions of how it all started, and with what political rational‐if there was indeed any rational‐what is taking place now is a feud more that it is anything else. Feuds breed fatalism, and fatalism perpetuates uncertainity, and helps to increase support in Eritrea for Isayas, for it takes the form of a conviction that peace with Ethiopians can never be achieved.

As it turned out, the conflict and strategy left Eritrea in shambles and Isayas in power. It doesn’t matter, as long as this will have an uncomforting consequence on Ethiopia. For Eritrea, unsettling Ethiopia and the big powers by all means has become the only way of expressing its displeasure. As indicated above Eritrea’s foreign policy is strongly shaped by the narrow circle of the leadership of the Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice/PFDJ/,it may be assumed that personal and psychological factors have an impact on its foreign policy, like the political elites resentment towards what happened to them after the war with Ethiopia and their disappointment of the negligence of Eritrean positions and interests by the United States during the liberation struggle as well as on the border conflict with Ethiopia. Clearly, the conflict with Ethiopia doesn’t belong to the realm of politics. At some stage Eritrea and Ethiopia may try to revive some form of negotiations, but at the moment they have on their hands, not politics, but a feud, however vehemently each side may deny this. Eritrea may still want to destroy Ethiopia, reasoning that better the devil you don’t know than the one you do. That is the kind of action that suggests itself when you don’t deal with politics but pursue an endless cycle of revenge.

1 The Eritrean‐Ethiopian War: Retrospect and Prospects. The Making of Conflicts in the Horn, 1991‐1998.

2 Afronews. November 15, 2008.Eritrea now sees US as archenemy. Similar arguments were reportedly echoed in a cabinet meeting held in Asmara, on 28 August, 2008