The Nile Issue: From the Unknown to the Uncertain
Friday, 12 March 2010
Egypt is a country — its body is in Africa, its head in the Arab world.
The Nile as a Conflict System
A major factor in the absence of a workable peace and security order in North East Africa is the unresolved issue of the Nile Waters and regional power order, which are not totally unrelated to each other. This structural logjam is both civilizational and geographic, and is deeply embedded in history and geopolitics. It is one of the existential problems in Africa. Borders and resources form a web of fault lines at which political and security problems tend to accumulate and intensify. Nonetheless, the issue of the Nile is not only about water resources. The final years of the last century saw a dramatic swing in the international relations of the Horn. The apparent change was occurring in the realm of traditional Egyptian influence in the Horn of Africa. This -to some degree- impacted in the asymmetrical power relations (linked to asymmetric control over the Nile water resources) in the broader sub-region.
Eleven years ago the ten Nile riparian countries established the Nile Basin Initiative/NBI/, the first cooperative institution in the basin to include all ten riparian states. This was meant to be a precursor for real and meaningful negotiations for a new legal and institutional regime on the shared and equitable use of the Nile Waters which is referred to as the Cooperative Framework Agreement/CFA/. As far as the issue of the Nile is concerned historical agreements and negotiations and water institutions play a critical role. The NBI which was established in 1999 was the result of a much broader change at a global and regional level, which forced Egypt to adopt a different posture. First is the change in the conception of security. The end of the Cold War led to the redefinition of security to famously include Cooperative Security or Common Security. One consequence of this is the creation of regional security organizations. African countries were encouraged, often pressurized, to resolve their problems through dialogue and cooperation.
The New Dispensation
The end of the Cold War has also been marked by some dramatic swings in regional and international alignments in North-East Africa. The National Islamic Front/NIF/ leadership in Khartoum which came to power in a military coup in 1889 increasingly distanced Sudan from Cairo and swiftly began pursuing an aggressive Islamist based foreign policy. This removed a stable buffer zone in the southern borders of Egypt, making Cairo’s otherwise-delicate regional area of influence shakier than ever. In the 1990s Egyptian influence in the Horn of Africa was at its lowest. Indeed, Cairo became increasingly aggrieved by the emerging hostile tendency of the new regimes in Khartoum, Asmara and Addis Ababa towards its hegemonic postures. Some of them were Islamist, others were nationalist; all of them were ideologically assertive (though there has been some changes in this regard in recent years). This was followed by new economic and political developments in the countries of the region. Besides, increased political and economic stability in recent years has meant that upstream countries are now in a position to develop the hydropower and irrigation potential of the Nile waters. These led to an important shift in terms of bargaining power and not only in material terms. Moreover, upper riparian countries have decided to use their collective voice and streamlined position to get concessions from downstream countries, mainly Egypt.
In recent years, the ‘collective’ power of upstream countries has been greatly enhanced. Many of them have continued to involve in the process in the belief that negotiations will bring about a new legal agreement or the much anticipated CFA as well as the much needed financial investment by external donors for hydrological projects. The possibility of securing alternative external support (such as China’s) for Nile Basin projects compounded the new external element. Alas, as the new kid in the block, the rise of China seems to impact on everything that matters to Africa. Downstream countries, particularly Ethiopia, have begun to exploit their bargaining power, while Egypt had to stay in the process without giving too much. Political and economic factors in Sudan have also contributed in reducing Khartoum’s comparative weakness Vis- a -Vis Egypt. Egypt has nothing to offer by way of a solution except to delay. This is neither useful nor tenable.
The NBI 2010: Nothing in Sight
Notwithstanding this, the NBI had served as a forum of dialogue and cooperation and with the strong support of the international community, there was real hope that a multilateral agreement would be signed to move the whole region towards peace and cooperation. However, those hopes have been disappointed. Discussions surrounding the initiative are stalled and may have recently (since last June) faced real setbacks with Egypt and Sudan not willing to sign the CFA.A clearly agreed multilateral agreement on the Nile is less likely. Renewed negotiations would likely start, but real progress will be delayed by several months, if not years. Egypt doesn’t have a clear policy; it only has tactics i.e. delaying tactics. As in the Middle East peace process, Egypt wants the process not the solution. Apparently, on the part of Egypt there is no change of policy, only a different posture. Cairo is unlikely to change its mind and easily relinquish its position of what it calls as ‘its acquired rights’, unless it faces some form of international pressure, which is less likely to happen anytime soon. Evidently, negotiations on the Nile will continue to be messy and protracted. Hence, the NBI faces an increasing risk of polarization. However, the would-be standoff is unlikely to lead to confrontation and withdrawal from the NBI.The risk of going alone and selected multilateral cooperation would increase. Most of the countries of the Basin will gravitate towards a rag-tag kind of partial and bilateral cooperation. This brings me back to where I started i.e. the nature of regional peace and security order/disorder. What are the necessary political and technical resources required for the successful conclusion of the Nile Basin Initiative and rapprochement between Egypt and Ethiopia.
The Bigger Picture: The Paradox of Regional Power
Ethiopia and Egypt are two major powers with historical rivalry bordering two interlinked conflict systems. Both countries played an important role in shaping the region. The two countries are prisoners of history and geography. The contentious relations between the two are mainly historical and structural, and deeply cultural and political. This is compounded by conflicting myths and narratives. Age-old strategic concerns such as control over the Nile waters which were causes of major wars hundred years back are still a major feature that continues to shape their respective positions as well as roles in the sub-region. Ethiopia is a major African power with a relative weakness which conspires against its full-fledged leadership role in the Horn of African region. Egypt is powerful than Ethiopia, and still maintains an advantage, though increasingly declining, over Ethiopia. However, Egypt is also a country where its body is in Africa, and its head is in the Arab world. I have been arguing along this so that security specialists would interrogate the issues surrounding the absence of a power hierarchy in North-East African region, and how this directly impacts on the lack a regional peace and security order. Some correctly opinionated that probably the problem of the Horn of African region is the lack of an internal hegemon. This refers to the unfortunate geostrategic situation of the sub-region lacking an internal hegemon,but being adjacent to Egypt.
A major requirement for a robust regional peace and security order in the Greater Horn of Africa, including Egypt and the Red Sea is thus peace and cooperation in the Nile Basin, particularly between Egypt and Ethiopia. And it is exactly here that we see a major strategic shortsightedness. Here we have two major powers with a lions share in the distribution of regional power. Thus far, however, there has been little attention given by the international community to tackling a problem that does not seem to be immediate, even if the geopolitical damage that all of us would suffer should the main players in the NBI come to blows is incalculable. In this particular front I share Peter Pham’s analysis and timely call for increased US attention on the issue of the Nile (Go to Crisis and Opportunity in the Nile).
The key Policy Issue
The international community, mainly the US should focus on forging closer relations between Egypt and Ethiopia. The region has seen several bad moons rising in the horizon, including the death of a state; the proliferation of failing and pariah states; widespread radicalization ect. Somalia also reminded all of us that when a state fails-or rather when we allow the state to fail-there is no back up to resurrect it. With Yemen ailing and Somaliland is not recognized or supported, the region is increasingly running short of strong and responsible state actors that can deliver. And the two strong states that helped to shape and define the sub-region are not cooperating and helping each other. The situation in Yemen should not be viewed as a separate incident. And the world should approach this with a real sense of urgency. Probably it is too late to think about Somalia or Yemen; however it is time to think about peace and cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia. The complacency of the international community to deal with the issue of the Nile in general and relations between Ethiopia and Egypt in particular is to some extent understandable. The two countries are not in war and they are not visibly failing. On the contrary they are forging some closer economic relations, which needs to be reinforced and complemented through diplomatic and political dialogue. In the face of immediate disasters such as Sudan and Somalia or Yemen, there is no sense of urgency to stir interest and govern engagement on Ethio-Egyptian relations. Yet it is crucial, and deserves to be one of the major priority areas for Washington in Africa. And it is time the US initiates a meaningful, serious and robust dialogue between Egypt and Ethiopia.
