Road Unpricing

Roads are allocated to individuals using the least efficient algorithm known to economics: the simple queue. The hellish consequences are painfully clear to the hapless commuters who sit in traffic twice daily simply waiting for their turn to pass a given point. Road pricing schemes seek to alter driver behavior — such as discouraging use at peak times — using a system of tariffs. Unsurprisingly such schemes are hugely unpopular; they introduce a charge for something that previously was free.

Daedalus points out that the unpopularity of road pricing would be avoided simply by introducing road rewards. An individual transponder in every car (identical to ones already in use by despised road pricing schemes) can monitor driver behavior and assigns rewards in real time, typically a few cents. As rewards are gained it rings an unobtrusive bell. The cost of the scheme is negligible compared to the total cost of maintaining the road system.

Initial trials have shown that the tiny incentive, coupled with the Pavlovian conditioning effect of the ringing bell, causes drivers to completely adapt their behavior to whatever wins them the highest score for their journey. On the freeway, rewarding drivers 1 cent for every minute that they kept their speed at 50 mph resulted in a traffic planner’s dream: a smooth flow of vehicles all traveling at the optimal speed for maximum road utilization.

The economists of Daedalus’ development organization DREADCO are now studying the video game compulsion loop for further possibilities for modifying driver behavior. Instead of closing a freeway lane, drivers can be offered dynamically chosen rewards to vacate the lane. And instead of repairing potholes, local authorities can simply pay motorists to drive around them.