[Essay] Critically analyse how China’s geopolitical and economic motives converge or clash behind in the Belt and Road Initiative.

[Essay written for a Social & Political Theory Masters. Module: Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations — 2020]

In the same year in which the world was plunged into a global financial crisis, China showcased itself to the world via the 2008 Beijing Olympics. In relative terms, the 2008 financial crisis failed to destabilise China’s economy or significantly curb its economic growth (Vaswani, 2018). Whilst other major economies attempted to pick up the pieces of a broken financial system, China continued on its path to becoming a global power. A recent and hugely significant chapter in the remarkable story of Chinese growth has been the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), formerly known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), which was unveiled by President Xi Jinping during his visit to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in October 2013 (Hong, 2017). The BRI strikes right to the core a range of issues with regards to China’s role on the international stage, its relationship with its territorial neighbours and its ongoing ‘peaceful rise’. This essay will begin by defining China’s general geopolitical and economic motives and how the BRI has been implemented up to this point. This will be followed by documenting how these motives manifest themselves within the BRI and look to determine whether the initiative is evidence of Chinese motives to try and encourage development amongst its neighbours; or is the BRI an attempt to enact a new level of control over these countries and global politics as a whole.

Defining China’s Geopolitical and Economic Motives

Due to the closed nature of the Communist Party of China (CPC) there is always a degree of difficulty when it comes to defining the exact domestic or foreign policy agenda of the Chinese state. However, through researching the speeches of senior members of the government, official government documents and the wealth of academic literature on the topic, a general picture of China’s geopolitical and economic motives can be formed. A strong definition for geopolitical and geoeconomic motives ca be found by Spark (2007: 339–340). He pinpoints geopolitics as an old expression which concerns the examining of ‘the links between geography, state territoriality, and world power politics.’ This stands in contrast to geoeconomic motives, which he defined as a focus on ‘capitalist inclusion rather than the expulsion or containment of evil others. Focus is on networks not blocs, connections not walls, and transborder ties instead of national territories.’

In terms of economic performance, China’s rise has been remarkable. Since opening itself to the foreign trade and investment, China has doubled its GDP every eight years and now sits as the world’s largest economy (on a purchasing power parity basis) (Morrison, 2019). With its remarkable economic advance, China’s geopolitical and economic motives have become intrinsically linked. Shambuagh (2013: 7) argues that ‘the common denominator to most of China’s global activities and foreign policy is China’s own economic development.’ Whilst the likes of Shambaugh (2013) and Blaauw (2013) note the impressive economic growth of China, they insist the country remains only a significant global actor and does not exhibit the characteristics to be considered a ‘true global power.’ It therefore could be concluded that China’s geopolitical goal, through its economic might, is to become a ‘true global power’.

This goal and motive of becoming a ‘true global power’ has a number of ingredients, including a Chinese nationalism that can be traced throughout the country’s history and manifests itself today in a sense of national pride within Chinese society. Breslin (2013) holds that China’s foreign policy, especially since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, has moved away from the long-held policy of keeping a low profile with regards to international affairs and has become more proactive due to an increasing sense of national pride within China. This argument is in line with that of Zhao (2013: 535), who explains the Chinese government has made a ‘strident turn’ with regards to its geopolitical motives and has become increasingly respondent to popular nationalist calls for a more muscular foreign policy. In 2018, for example, President Xi Jinping promised that China will ‘ride the mighty east wind of the new era’ and ‘charge forward with a full tank’ (Xi, 2018). Other factors at play in this geopolitical shift are Chinese economic concerns regarding ‘decreasing marginal product on capital, and very low domestic consumption’; domestic insecurities and U.S international pressure (Hong, 2016: 13).

Due to becoming a ‘true global power’ being the foundational belief upon which China’s geopolitical and economic motives are built upon, academics have pondered how exactly China will achieve this goal. One of the key elements of China’s vision is the creation of an alternative global power dynamic and an angling away from the post-World War II liberal order and institutions. China has demonstrated its strong views on the ‘inequities of [Global] North-South Relations’ and holds the view that ‘the post-World War II order is in crisis and its institutions are in need of fundamental reform’ (Shambaugh, 2013: 122, 153). Lateinge (2020: 13) argues that within institutions such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation, China has been very active in ‘defending the rights of developing states to a new global trade deal which better reflects their interests.’ This can be seen through policies such as the BRI and the Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), both of which are part of China’s strategy to challenge ‘a variety of established international institutions and norms’ (Sutter, 2016: 1). Instead of engaging with the U.S head on, China has sort to modify the world order that ‘the West has created…to suit its interests’ (Nathan & Scobell, 2014: 347).

Defining the Belt and Road Initiative

The BRI has snowballed into becoming a key part of China’s foreign policy and their geopolitical/economic ambitions. During President Xi’s visit to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in October 2013, he announced the strategy for the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road of the Twenty-First Century. These two plans formed the foundations of the BRI, or what is sometimes referred to internationally as ‘One Belt, One Road’ (Kuo & Kommenda, 2020). The official blueprint for the initiative, which was released by the Chinese Government in 2015, identified the opening up of six core ‘economic corridors’ which could accelerate economic growth through infrastructure development, stronger energy connectivity, lower trade barriers and other means (NRDC, 2015). The Chinese strategy is to encourage its own capital, and products, to flow out to its neighbours in an attempt to improve its own economy as well as the regional economy, allow access to natural resources, improve diplomatic relations with the states involved and look towards solving some of the regions security issues (Hong, 2016). President Xi has made it clear he wishes the initiative to ‘break the bottleneck in Asian connectivity’ (Xi, 2014). There are now 71 economies which are geographically located along the BRI transport corridors (The World Bank, 2018).

The initiative ties neatly into the continuing Government policy of inflaming national pride as it is inspired by the historic Silk Road, which was created during the Han dynasty to link China to countries of the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Europe (Hong, 2017). The importance of the BRI can be highlighted through the staggering scope and scale of its investment and reach. China has created an institutional framework to support the initiative which includes the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund (SRF) (Lu et al, 2018). The AIIB is mainly funded by China and has distanced itself from institutions such as the World Bank due to its willingness to finance infrastructure projects for low-income countries (Lim, 2015). Through its investments in the initiative directly, and via the AIIB and the SRF, Chinese Government spending on BRI is reported to reach the one-trillion-dollar mark (The Economist, 2015). The elevated status of the BRI is evident in the fact that in 2015 Beijing appointed the seventh-ranked member of the Politburo, Executive Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli, to chair the Central Leading Group on the Construction of OBOR (Lam, 2015).

A major issue for the BRI remains the sense that what constitutes a BRI policy has become increasingly unclear. Since the grand plan was announced by President Xi the initiative has transformed into a catch all term that refers to a range of Chinse engagements abroad (Kuo & Kommenda, 2020). The expanding nature of the initiative, with the support of the AIIB, has resulted in the whole project moving further and further away from its original stated aim of encouraging infrastructure projects along the ancient silk road route. Whilst visiting the UK, Xi Jinping declared that the BRI was open to any countries that were interested in being involved (2015). The BRI now continues to expand out of its original parameters and effectively stretches to the likes of Australia, Brazil and Peru (Wang, 2016). The result of this has been criticisms from some academics that ‘The Belt Road Initiative’ has become too vague a concept and simply represents hollow rhetoric on the part of the Chinese Government (Allison, 2015). Robertson (2020) agrees the term ‘BRI’ has become increasingly unclear, writing: ‘Who determines what is a Belt and Road project or a Belt and Road country? Nobody is sure. Everything and nothing is Belt and Road.’

With regards to the reaction to the BRI around the world there has certainly been a mixed picture. Countries that are within the New Silk Road Economic belt have showed a positive attitude towards China’s BRI, especially Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Hong, 2016). However, the same can’t be said for the U.S or Southeast and South Asian Countries. BRI projects have reportedly caused ‘unease in Washington’ due to their impact on ‘democratic governance, debt sustainability, and existing international environmental and labour standards’ (Jones, 2019). Continuing on this trend there is India and Japan on the one hand, who have showed caution with regards to the BRI, and then Pakistan on the other who have been the beneficiaries of a forty-six-billion-dollar Economic corridor between itself and China’s Xinjiang region (Sutter, 2016) In Europe, China ran into difficulties with regards to negotiating with the EU but has member states such as Italy signed up to the BRI (Lanteigne, 2019) and, against the wishes of the U.S., recruited the U.K to join the AIIB (Hong, 2017).

Development or Debt Diplomacy

It can be argued that the BRI strikes right the core of China’s geopolitical and economic motives and continues to be an initiative of significant prominence within the Chinese government and the CCP. One area in which the country’s geopolitical motives are converging with the stated aims of the BRI is China’s aim of rebalancing power in Asia, and around the world, from American hegemony. For some, the BRI represents a much-needed rebalancing of power towards developing nations and away from American control within the post-world War II international institutions. The BRI, according to Wuthnow (2017: 1), is motivated by China wanting to grow its strategic influence in Eurasia whilst ‘deftly avoiding direct competition with the United States.’ Professor Wang Jisi, a Chinese scholar, was talking as early as 2012 about the need for China to avoid confrontation with the United states through a steady rebalancing of power between developing and developed nations (Jisi, 2012). This sentiment is echoed by the retired Major General Yang (2015: 37) who argues that the ‘post-World War II governance system’ is ‘out of step with the current reality characterised by multi-polarisation and rapid development of globalisation.’ The argument goes that the BRI is, through aiding the development of nations along the Silk Road and beyond, aiding the rebalancing of global power dynamics whilst avoiding the direct wrath of the U.S. ‘BRI is about more than road, railways, and other hard infrastructure’ writes Hillman (2020), ‘it’s also a vehicle for China to write new rules, establish institutions that reflect Chinese interests, and reshape soft infrastructure.’

This rebalancing has been possible due to the fact institutions surrounding the BRI, including the AIIB, have utilised a space abandoned by the World Bank — the funding of development/infrastructure projects. With only 30 percent of World Bank lending being channelled into infrastructure projects (Jones, 2019), the BRI and AIIB are much needed for countries caught in the middle-income trap and in desperate need of an upgrading of their manufacturing sectors (Yongnian, 2016). As can be seen in the global competitiveness index published by the World Bank, the majority of Southeast and South Asian countries are in dire need of upgrading in the areas of ‘road, air transport, port and railroad infrastructure’ (Hong, 2017: 358). China’s version of why they see the BRI so important to their own interests and Asia’s as a whole is because the initiative, according to President Xi (2013), represents the opportunity to build a ‘community of common destiny’ or ‘community of shared interests’ in which the region’s, and China’s, cooperative security and economic development can supplement each other. The investment in ports, railways and manufacturing sectors in various states is then also beneficial to China as it makes intra and inter-regional maritime transportation cheaper and easier (Hong, 2017: 358). Additionally, the BRI secures for China greater access to natural resources and allows it ‘to diversify its oil and natural gas supply and transport routes’ (Wuthnow, 2017: 1).

The BRI also alleviates some critical Chinese economic concerns with regards to overproduction and overcapacity. Take two key components of infrastructure building as an example of Chinese overproduction: steel and concrete. China is the world largest producer of steel, but production exceeded domestic demand by one-hundred and forty million metric tonnes in 2016 (Forbes, 2017). In terms of concrete, despite China consuming more cement between 2011 and 2013 than the U.S. had in the entire twentieth century (Harvey, 2019), there are thousands of unused cement factories across China (Hawkins, 2019). With the significant emphasis that is placed on infrastructure building within the BRI, Jianying (2015: 20) notes: ‘embarking on large infrastructure projects with OBOR recipients can help alleviate China’s industrial overcapacity and can help China transit away from investment-led growth to a consumer-driven economy.’ The economic motives for the BRI also flow neatly into China’s domestic security concerns. Take the economic corridor between Pakistan and Xinjiang as a stark example of this where not only are Pakistan being flooded with Hydropower projects, the corridor goes some way to balance the inequalities in the Uighur Autonomous region and, for the Chinese, will hopefully help solve some of its security concerns in the region (Sutter, 2016 :70).

Whilst the BRI is certainly in line with many of China’s economic motives, there are still significant grumblings around the world which may stifle China’s ultimate goal to become a true global power without U.S confrontation. Nkrumah (1965) discussed in the length about the fact that there is a significant distinction to be made between foreign capital that is used for neo-colonial means and foreign capital which is invested as a form of mutual development. Many critics of the BRI believe that the initiative has more characteristics of the former rather than the latter in this regard. The concern is that the BRI represents Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy’, with the aim being to grow its global influence and force strategic concessions from countries in receipt of BRI of AIIB funding (Kuo & Kommenda. 2020). The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) have grown increasingly concerned regarding Chinese motives and fear that the BRI is paving the way for increased Chinese aggression regarding territorial disputes (Hong, 2017). In a recent ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute survey in ASEAN countries, 70 percent of respondents said that their government should remain vigilant in negotiations with China over BRI projects (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019). Jones (2019: 5) writes that during BRI negotiations China has ‘put almost all of the risk on the recipient country…and is using political power in order to drive down the risk of non-repayment.’

Examples of a potential ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ in practice can be found in the likes of Pakistan and Tajikistan. In the case with Pakistan, it has been referenced that there has been a significant amount of investment from China, through the BRI and the AIIB, into infrastructure projects within Pakistan. The Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been completed with a Chinese investment of nineteen-billion-dollars (Gul, 2019). Due to the new relationship between the two countries, Pakistan’s apparent lack of reaction to China’s accused human rights abuses against Uyghur Muslims has been criticised. Dhume (2019) argues that Pakistan’s Prime Minister has given China a free pass when it comes to the oppression of Muslims, with Imran Khan (2020) himself saying, in response to perceived lack criticism regarding China’s policies in Xinjiang: ‘China has helped us. They came to us when we were at rock bottom, and so we are really grateful to the Chinese government.’

It would therefore appear that for every state embracing the BRI, there are those that have become increasingly concerned with China’s actions. If China’s goal is to peacefully rise without direct confrontation, perhaps the way the BRI is playing out is flying in the face of that motive. For example, there are already concerns growing regarding the possibility of trade disputes due to China trying to offload its overproduction and excess capacity. Ming (2015) writes: ‘transferring production surplus might arouse concerns of exporting backward technology and environmental pollution in the host countries.’ If China uses the BRI as a way of financially muscling its way into a dominant position within Asia, and further afield, then it will fail in its motive to try and avoid conflict with the U.S. The ASEAN countries, fearful of the true motives behind the BRI, have praised the U.S’s ‘pivot to Asia strategy as a…counterbalance against the rise of China’ (Hong, 2017: 364). Concern amongst Chinese analysts continues to grow that the major powers are already stepping up their opposition to the BRI with Washington promoting the Trans-Pacific Partnership and pressing for reforms to the Asian Development Bank (Wunthow, 2017).

Conclusion

The BRI has become symbolic of a wider narrative regarding China and its status as a global actor. The initiative strikes at the heart of an important question for academics and foreign policy actors around the world: Are China simply trying to curtail U.S hegemonic power to ensure their own survival — or are they determined on becoming the global hegemon in the future? For those that see the BRI as China simply using its economic might to help developing nations grow their infrastructure make the case that China is merely leading the charge in creating an global economic system alternative in contrast to the outdated post-World War II institutions. The other side of the coin are those that view the BRI through the prism of debt-trap diplomacy and Chinese imperialism, with a collision of China and the U.S increasingly inevitable. To say which of these accounts is accurate is difficult. What the BRI does show the world is that China is serious about its geopolitical and economic motive to become a true global power and be significant influencer in the area of global affairs. However, China must remain vigilant that the BRI is at risk of being seen by the U.S as a Chinese imperialist project with an ultimate goal of hegemony in Asia, Africa and beyond. The world should be watching how this initiative continues to evolve as it lies at the heart of Chinese foreign policy and the world’s reaction to China’s rise.

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