[Essay] Is Liberalism ‘Obsolete’?

[Essay written for a Social & Political Theory Masters. Module: Liberalism and its Global Discontents — 2020]

The 2008 financial crisis has proven to be the starting gun for a series of seismic shifts in the so-called liberal world order. Populism of both left and right have taken a prominent social and political position in a number of so-called liberal states, with China, an apparently illiberal state, rising to the rank of global superpower. The USA’s status as the hegemonic world power is being vehemently questioned and the institutional foundations of the EU are shaking as a result of Brexit, struggles for state self-determination, and the rise in prominence of reactionary forces. These beacons of the liberal world order are now being faced with existential questions regarding their future vision. We appear to be a million miles away from Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ (1989: 4), and much closer to something more like Putin’s description of liberalism as being ‘obsolete’ (2019). This essay will argue that the issues that are now aggressively coming to light are inherent in the ideological core of liberalism as a political theory, and through various crises liberalism’s theoretical oversights are being exposed the world over. Through discussing and analysing the work of historic and contemporary liberal thinkers, I will argue that liberalism’s exclusivity and continuing oversights form the basis for why the foundations of the liberal world order are feeling increasingly unstable.

1. Liberal Theory

1.1 The Core of Liberalism

Bell (2014: 689) defines the liberal tradition as being ‘constituted by the sum of the arguments that have been classified as liberal, and recognised as such by other self-proclaimed liberals, across time and space.’ Taking Bell’s definition, one can begin to cross reference the arguments and opinions of self-proclaimed liberals, and the theory’s critics, and pinpoint common themes across their work. Mehta (1990: 427) argues: ‘In its theoretical vision, liberalism from the seventeenth century to the present, has prided itself on its universality and politically inclusionary character.’ This argument is supported by Shklar (1989: 21) who characterised liberalism as a ‘political doctrine’ with ‘only one overriding aim: to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom.’ This is built on by Dworkin (1985: 183) who notes that ‘a certain conception of equality…is the nerve of liberalism.’ These ideals descend from early liberal thinkers such as Locke (1967: 2), who discussed the idea of men naturally being in a ‘state of perfect freedom to order their actions…within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending on the will of any other men.’ Whilst these terms can be particularly vague, there’s not a lot that can be argued against regarding the pursuit of equality and personal freedom as being guiding principles for a society.

However, the tenants of liberalism then begin to spread further with Doyle’s (1986: 1152) discussion of ‘principles and institutions, recognisable by certain characteristics — for example, individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity.’ The question then becomes one of looking towards implementing these values and ensuring they are the foundational vision for any society. This is where the approach of Ideal Moral Theory (IMT) starts to take a prominent role within liberal theory. The task of IMT is to ‘work out what an ideally just society would look like as a way of clarifying our moral obligations and guiding reforms meant to realise that ideal’ (Goodhart, 2018: 1). This form of ideal theory took off in the early 1970’s through the writings of John Rawls, whose work is said to have ‘revived post-World War II Anglo-American political philosophy’ (Mills, 2017: 139). Rawls use of IMT is an attempt to solve the problems of justice, and by extension injustice, through ‘philosophical reflection on ideal moral principles of justice and on the nature and the extent of the obligations and responsibilities that follow from them’ (Goodhart, 2018: 6).

One of Rawls’ major works ‘Theory of Justice’ (1971), followed up with ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1985/2001), sort to outline the contribution IMT could make to liberalism as a political theory. Rawls (2001: 9, 12) uses IMT as a way of visualising what he calls a state of ‘democratic perfection’, based on principles of ‘society as a fair system of social cooperation’ and ‘citizens as free and equal persons’ in a ‘well-ordered society…regulated by a public conception of justice.’ To try and get to grips with what a just and free society should look like, Rawls believes an agreement must be made as to what ‘democratic perfection’ means in practice, and that this can only be achieved in ideal circumstances within an ‘original position.’ The original position is Rawls’ way of creating a ‘valid agreement from the point of view of political justice.’ This can only be achieved if those present at the original position are ‘free and equal persons…and not permit some to have unfair bargaining advantages over others.’ Therefore, the parties present at the original position, where the lines for a just and fair society will be drawn, are ‘not allowed to know a person’s race and ethnic group, sex, or various native endowments’ — they are under what Rawls refers to as a ‘veil of ignorance’ (2015: 15). Under these circumstances, it is the belief of Rawls, and many of his liberal supporters, that no-one would risk discriminating anyone on the basis of being part of any societal group, as you run the risk of discriminating a group you are in fact part of — thereby creating a vision of society which is both free and equal. Through this ideological vision, Rawls believes that progressive reformers can create a clearly specified principle of justice in their mind for when they seek to make changes in contemporary society (Ypi, 2010).

Both Rawls and those inspired by his work then sought to expand his ideas surrounding the pursuit of justice from there statist parameters and onto the global stage. Rawls’ Law of Peoples (1993) discusses the creation of what he calls ‘liberal’ peoples (or those that aspire to or approximate liberal principles), ‘rogue’ states, and ‘burdened’ states. Rawls (1993: 44) argues that there are only ‘two kinds of well-ordered domestic societies: liberal societies and hierarchical societies.’ To achieve global justice, in Rawls and his supporter’s opinion, there must be an international original position where representatives of each people agree on principles for the international basic structure. However, the principles selected will not be applicable to outlaw/rogue or burdened states as these are states either unwilling or unable to cooperate on the defined liberal terms (Rawls: 1993). This work, built upon by the likes of Michael Blake, looks to determine how liberal states and societies should act in an imperfect world in terms of the promotion of democracy and the ideals they determine as being fair and just (Pitts, 2010).

1.2 The Role and Exclusion of Empire

In terms of liberal theory up to this point — so far so good. Most in society would be in agreement that the promotion of democracy and universal rights based on justice and fairness is a relatively sensible societal vision. However, at the heart of the theory, its advocates lives and its practical history, there is the black mark of empire and colonialism against liberalisms name. The intertwining of liberalism and empire is not only clearly visible in the writings of influential liberal writers, but also within their everyday lives. Even the likes of John Stuart Mill, one of the most influential classic liberal thinkers, and described as ‘the most influential English-speaking philosopher of the nineteenth century’ (Macleod, 2016), had a ‘lifelong career as a well-placed East India company official’ (Pitts, 2010: 217). Whilst Mills did offer some theoretical reflections on colonialism, ‘no major British theorist in the eighteenth or the nineteenth century reflect[ed] the obvious cultural and political gravity that colonialism clearly had as a lived phenomenon’ (Mehta, 1990: 228). Mehta (1990: 438) develops this argument further and is correct in her assessment that liberalism’s long intertwined history with colonialism and empire stand as an embarrassment to ‘the universalistic claims of liberalism.’ This is a narrative confirmed by Pitts (2010: 215) who argues that the ‘key concepts and languages’ of liberalism ‘were imagined and articulated in light of, in response to, and sometimes in justification of, imperial and commercial expansion beyond Europe.’ Liberalism has been used as a justification of empire and has been supportive of imperial domination in the name of progress and a hospitable stance towards capitalism (Parekh, 1994/1995).

To add to liberalism’s crimes, not only does the theory have a dark imperial history attached to it, but the rise of IMT and Rawlsian thinking ushered in the age of ahistorical liberal thought. As Forrester (2019: 49) notes: ‘By the end of the 1970’s…anti-historical arguments were widespread and became fundamental to global justice theory. Exploitation and colonialism [were] cut off from global justice.’ This is a narrative confirmed by Michael Blake (2013) who believes that the connection between colonial exploitation and cotemporary global inequality isn’t worth consideration when discussing the moral choice questions that face liberal states today. Despite his talk of apparent ‘rogue’ and ‘burdened’ states, Rawls fatally omits to mention or reference anywhere in Law of Peoples the legacy that imperialism and colonialism played in the creation of these unwilling to cooperate states. The oversight of colonialism in Rawls’ work means there is no link made between, on the one hand, the capture of land by force, exploitation of natural resources and massacres of natives and, on the other, the emergence of states that are considered ‘rogue’ or ‘burdened’.

To understand the true nature of why there are states which have gone ‘rouge’, you cannot begin by setting aside the long history of European economic and imperial domination. If one wanted to learn about how we can create a globally just society, I would point them towards ‘Open Veins of Latin America’ by Eduardo Galeano (1997), before asking them to dabble with Rawls and his IMT colleagues (as Hugo Chavez did through gifting Galeon’s book to President Obama [Clark, 2009]). There are historical, imperial and economic reasons, which did not simply end with 21st Century decolonialisations, that have led to the creation of an unequal and divided global politics, something IMT, and by extension liberal thought, fails to grasp. This is why I am in complete agreement with Goodhart (2018: 9) when he argues: ‘I find IMT unhelpful in addressing real-world injustice.’

1.3 Liberalism and it’s Racial Oversights

The critical oversight with regards to the history of empire and imperialism in liberal theory, and its impact on achieving global justice, also leads to liberalism offering very little with regards to the historical and contemporary issues surrounding race. Racial prejudices are a constant within the history of empire and imperialism, and therefore have strong links to liberalism as a political theory and ideology. The biggest racial oversights with regards to liberalism certainly come from IMT scholars with their anti-historical approach. Clearly an ideally just society would be free of racism, but as Goodhart (2018: 41) points out, ‘this kind of idealisation affects our ability to recognise, theorise, and combat structural racism.’ Whilst no-one would advocate for a racist society in the original position, this thinking doesn’t allow for a deeper analysis for how race has been ingrained into the very fabric of society and human history. Without hearing from those that have suffered at the hands of racial injustice it is impossible to successfully define what true justice looks like. The words of W. E. B. Du Bois (1989: 4) inadvertently dismantle Rawl’s veil of ignorance when he wrote: ‘it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others…shut out from their [white] world by a vast veil.’ Du Bois highlights that people of colour are, in various ways, shut off from the white world and suffer a range of disadvantages as a result. Therefore, through seeking a defining vision of justice through masking the unequal treatment of specific racial groups, Rawls and fellow IMT theorists are silencing the experiences of these groups and therefore blocking a route towards true justice.

These racial oversights strike at a core issue as a whole with liberal theory and its universal principles. The advocation of a world without racism is of course praiseworthy, but not being racist is very different to being an anti-racist — and it is anti-racism that is required in the pursuit of justice for all peoples. This is a topic that has been excellently covered by the likes of Ibram X. Kendi (2019) and Reni Eddo-Lodge (2017), with both writers converging on the idea that ‘colour-blindness’ is simply not the antidote to ridding society of racism. The scars of racism, and by extension empire, run deep throughout the world, so simply claiming there are universal rights amongst humans is simply not enough to correct centuries worth of wrongs. Take the signing of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 for example — after a history of slavery, civil war, Jim Crow and segregation, discrimination on the basis of race or colour was outlawed in the U.S. However, after over 300 years of physical and metaphorical chains, on top of all of the societal impacts that come with that, equality is not simply achieved with one piece of legislation. On paper white people and communities of colour in the U.S are equal — in reality Flint, Michigan (with a black population of over fifty percent) have limited access to clean drinking water; black people are twice as likely to be in poverty in comparison to white people (The Economist, 2019) and despite only making up twelve percent of the US adult population, black people make up thirty-three percent of the sentenced prison population (Gramlich, 2019). IMT scholars and various liberal theorists fail to understand that ‘racism…and white supremacy, have not been the exception but the norm’ (Mills, 2017: 53) in society. To understand how we can create a just world we must first address the social, political and economic injustices that have been carried out throughout history — something liberalism continually fails to grasp.

1.4 It’s the Economy, Stupid

Liberalism’s oversights begin with empire, take a trip through race and arrive at the complete failure by liberal thinkers to discuss the role the economic system and the prevailing mode of production has on the lives and freedoms of all mankind. Early thinkers like Locke (1967: 2) talk about the natural state of men being that of a ‘perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions.’ In researching this piece of work, I found that the continual talk of freedom without due care or attention given to the economic system guiding society is one of liberalism’s fatal flaws. It is simply not true that humans have the ‘perfect freedom to order their actions.’ There is a reason the opportunities in life will be different for a child born tomorrow in Mali and one born in the U.K. There is a reason that the life opportunities would still be different if you are born in Kensington Palace Gardens or Grenfell Tower, two locations in the same London borough and only 1.6 miles apart. These reasons are heavily based on the legacy of empire, race and the economic system. Having the freedom to do something and having the financial ability to afford it are two completely different things. For example, the right to an education is one thing, but having the right to send your child to a private school to get an educational advantage comes back to the ability to pay.

Rawls (2001: 5) builds on this thinking writing that the fabric and structure of society is formed through ‘a fair system of social cooperation from one generation to the next.’ His work, through concepts such as the overlapping consensus and local, domestic and global justice, all revolve around the idea that what is deemed as just and fair in a society comes about by that very society deciding what it just and fair. Rawls appears to claim, almost like the concept of the Overton window in political terms, that the basic structure of society, and what you can and can’t do within that society, comes about through a process of social cooperation over time. Reasonable people, therefore, are bound to this basic structure and act accordingly. Again, there is no discussion at all regarding how all of this is affected by the prevailing economic system that is in place, and how society’s structure is a reflection of people’s relationship to the mode of production. There is no thought given to the fact capitalism fails to create reasonable people, but forces society to tear itself apart in the name of competition. Rawls even writes (2001: 11) that the basic structure may, for example, dictate that parents ‘must respect the rights of their children and cannot…deprive them of essential medical care.’ Tell that to the twenty-seven and a half million people in the U.S without health insurance due to economic forces. Universalistic claims of freedom are weightless without proper discussion about economics, people’s relationship to land, their labour rights and who owns the means of production.

2. The Liberal World Order

So, what does this mean for the liberal world order that we now find ourselves in? I argue that the liberal world order, which took formation as part of the post-World War II settlements, is now facing several existential crises due to the inherent inequalities and oversights that are baked into liberalism as an ideology. According to some of its proponents, the liberal world order is an international system based on the ‘universalisation of western liberal democracy’ and, in Fukuyama’s opinion, was successful ‘in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives’ such as Communism (Fukuyama, 1989: 3, 4). The world order is also discussed in the context of the U.S being the hegemonic power within this order and, as a result, providing the role of ‘guarantor of the liberal world order’ and its various rules and institutions (Ikenberry, 2017: 2). Now for many it is a laughable suggestion that the U.S guides the liberal world and looks to bring peace, prosperity and democracy to the world considering its history of overthrowing democratically elected governments (Iran 1953, Congo 1960, Chile 1973); its complete disregard for the international law (Iraq 2003, Guantanamo Bay 2002, Obama Drone Strikes 2008–2016); and its multiple war crime accusations (My Lai 1968, No Gun Ri Massacre 1950, Bagram Prisoner Abuse 2002). However, in justifying these clearly illiberal actions and methods, the U.S and other liberal institutions that make up the world order fall back on liberal theory.

Take for example the work of Michael Blake, who relies heavily on the framework Rawls lays out in Law of Peoples for how liberal states should react when faced with the irrational actions of rogue and burdened states. As Morefield (2019: 190) points out, advocates of the liberal world order put a lot of emphasis on global justice theory in their justification of their world view, creating ‘a discourse about liberal identity that is then used by foreign policy pundits to justify political practices that are essentially imperial.’ Blake takes Rawls’ Law of Peoples and argues that that the world is populated by anti-liberal states and the only way ‘already committed’ liberal states can coerce burdened and rogue states into some form of cooperation is through ‘the use of dangerous tools’ (2013: 84). This framework then allows liberal states to flex their financial, military and political muscles in order to force illiberal states to change. Never mind the fact that historic use of these dangerous tools and have led to an ‘unequal, dangerous and unfair [world] in the first place’ (Moorefield, 2019: 193), it again means liberal theory provides cover for empire. Whilst this empire is different in its nature, liberalism and global justice theory is used to justify numerous invasions of ‘illiberal states’ (The UN’s Responsibility to Protect); the creation of strong external borders to keep ‘illiberal populations’ out (EU’s Fortress Europe), and financial imperialism (IMF loans).

As a result of American and Western imperialism, justified through apparent ‘liberal’ theories and ideals, the third world and the global south are increasingly either turning their back on the west or intentionally trying to attack it. Western meddling in the Middle East through regime changes, various wars and a series of economic strangleholds have, particularly since the 1990s, led to a groundswell in support for terrorist groups that have taken their anger out on the west (September 11 Attacks, Manchester Bombings, 2015 Paris Attacks). This trend has run in parallel with the rapid development of China, which has seen more and more states from around the world seek their help in funding development projects. China, a state that would be generally regarded as illiberal amongst liberal scholars, has stepped in where the World bank has failed and through the Belt and Road Initiatives is funding development project across the global south, the third world and in developing countries (Yongnian, 2016). The country has been on record saying it wishes to lead a rebalancing of power between developed and developing nations (Jisi, 2012), something the liberal world order clearly has never been interested in. Whilst Chinese motives are most certainly up for a debate, there is a reason it has seventy countries signed up to the Belt and Road Initiative (Chatzky & McBride, 2020). The turn towards alliances with ‘illiberal states’ can also be seen within the ‘liberal’ European Union, with many Eastern European countries creating closer economic and diplomatic relationship with Russia (Buckley & Olearchyk, 2013).

As well as a third world/global south rejection of the New World Order, many liberal states are now seeing movements grow within their borders which are rejecting liberalism as an ideology. This can be seen most clearly through the election of reactionary politicians around the world (Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, Mattoe Salvini) and the rejection of liberal institutions e.g. Britain and other member states’ agitations against the EU. These shifts against the liberal word order have come about due a series of crises, starting in the most part with the 2008 financial crash. The 2008 financial crisis showed the complete false nature of liberalism universalistic claims and the idea all people were free and equal was seriously questioned. Whilst western populations were forced to undergo austerity measures, and any rejection of said measures being forcefully rejected by the established order (e.g. Greece and SYRIZA), the super-rich were completely unaffected, and nine years later the richest one-percent still owned half of the worlds wealth (Neath, 2017). The result of this has been a significant backlash against the established order, seen most clearly in the US’ rejection of Clinton’s ‘America is already great’ mantra (Collins, 2016) and the knockback of David Cameron’s 2015 ‘Better Together’ EU referendum campaign.

These significant rejections of the established order are perfectly explained through the work of Antonio Gramsci, who spoke of a common sense that governs the way that most people in society tend to think, which in turn informs the dominant ideology in a particular society (1995). However, he also argues that people have a good sense with regards to their own lived experience and what they can see is happening in society with their own eyes. Therefore, when a gap begins to emerge between the prevailing common-sense narrative and peoples lived experiences e.g. we’re ‘better together’ when the UK child poverty rate is soaring (Inman, 2020) or ‘America is already great’ when forty-million Americans require food stamps (Watson, 2019), there is a potential for people to think about change. What has manifested itself since 2008 is, on the one hand, support for a form of change based on building movements of working-class solidarity against an exploitative capitalist system; and on the other hand a form of change that has successfully channelled this anger into a reactionary view of the world (usually as an attempt by elites to continue the exploitative capitalist system). As a result, liberalism today finds itself being attacked on several fronts, much like the circumstances following the Wall Street Crash of 1929, which pushed many in society towards communist ideals, and as many if not more to fascist ones.

3. Conclusion

In conclusion, to answer the question ‘Is liberalism obsolete?’ is a difficult one. It is clear the liberal world order, and the ideological framework that sustains it, is facing existential threats from a number of fronts. What I have sought to outline is that liberalism’s history, values and ideological framework are exclusionary and discriminatory. In turn, this exclusionary nature has shaped and guided the formation of the liberal world order, which is now facing existential crises on domestic, international and intranational stages. However, I am unsure a sto whether these crises will be enough to render liberalism, and the liberal world order, as ‘obsolete.’ Advocates of empire, imperialism and the post-World War II settlement have used liberalism to justify the actions of apparent ‘liberal’ states and organisations. For centuries liberalism has provided cover and ideological legitimisation for the worst excesses of capitalism and imperialism, both domestically inside liberal states and on the international sphere. Therefore, I believe liberalisms fate is intrinsically tied to that of capitalisms, which as an economic order has been shaking since the 2008 financial crash and is coming under serious pressure again as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak. People’s lived experiences are at odds with the universalistic values of liberalism, and therefore leading to rejections of the liberal status quo all around the world. Liberalism in its current incarnation is already being rendered obsolete, but the theory’s incredible ability to adapt to developing circumstances will most likely lead it to either accept tenants from the political left (a rebalancing of the economic power towards the ninety-nine percent), or a shift towards adopting values of the political right based on a reactionary politics, in order to survive. Sadly, it appears so far that the ruling elite, and their liberal world order, is shifting towards the right, rather than the left. As a result, liberalism may find a way to survive, but in a different format.

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