Again, it depends on how your philosophy of consciousness. I view it as subjective sentience. Repeatedly stating that “We simply have not solved the hard problem of consciousness, so pretending like we had with pseudoscientific hand waving is just intellectually dishonest” after I’ve acknowledged that there are still missing pieces several times is a straw man argument. There is scientific consensuses on some of the minimums required for what neuroscientists typically refer to as consciousness — minimums bivalve lack. There is research indicating how it evolved, the benefits driving its evolution, why those benefits are not always needed, etc.
“Even if they showed conscious states were were the result of some physical property in ANY particular system it still doesnt show that particalar physical property is nessessary for consciousness in ALL systems.”
It’s apparent your arguments are philosophical in nature, and I can understand why that conviction would lead to your conclusions and that’s fine. The philosophical debate about the definition or source of consciousness is still ongoing, and I’m not interested in arguing various philosophical stances of what consciousness means or whether the term should apply to some assumed hypothetical alternatives that would shake the field of neuroscience. My interest is only in deducing which animals are capable of subjective sentience in the way decades of neuroscience and ethology research performed throughout the animal kingdom have addressed. Perhaps I hadn’t adequately considered the various philosophical claims to the term “consciousness” and should have instead stuck with sentience, like Peter Singer.
So yes, maybe plants, fungi, bacteria, bivalves, and even non-living viruses possess some philosophical definition of consciousness, but not the one used by biologists nor sentience. If the systems in bivalves were evidence of sentience, there would not be much ground to stand on in claiming that plants are not sentient.