Liveblogging the American Revolution: December 2, 1777: The Decision to Quarter at Valley Forge

Benjamin H. Newcomb: Washington’s Generals and the Decision to Quarter at Valley Forge:

THE CONTINENTAL ARMY’S ENCAMPMENT at Valley Forge in the winter and spring of 1777–78, enshrined in the popular mind as the epitome of suffering borne by dedicated Revolutionary soldiers and officers, has been thoroughly studied as a problem of supply, morale, discipline, and sacrifice. Surprisingly, explanations of how the army came to encamp there are not so thorough….

Washington did not record precisely how and why he made the choice. As with many military decisions, the necessity for secrecy until the operation was complete prevents full documentation…. The commander-in-chief first posed to his generals the question of when and where to quarter the troops for the winter at a Council of War on October 29, 1777…. Minutes of the council record that the matter of quarters was deferred, probably because the British army was still active and the generals were uncertain where the army could encamp to its best advantage. The council at that time may have discussed locations, but not extensively. Washington then asked his generals to address the related question of what ‘measures can be adopted to cover the Country near the enemy and prevent their drawing supplies from it during the Winter?’ Evidently he was quite concerned that, no matter what quartering arrangements were made, the army must maintain some capability of denying the British food, animals, and other supplies, which they would attempt to purchase or seize from the inhabitants of eastern Pennsylvania. There seems to have been no agreement on how to provide coverage, and this matter was also held in abeyance.

Shortly after this council, at the beginning of November, the army took up a strong defensive position at Whitemarsh, a naturally protected hilly spot a few miles northwest of Germantown. Whitemarsh was excellently situated to serve as a base for covering the country against British foraging, for a possible offensive, and for reinforcing the Delaware forts. Here Washington waited to see what the British were planning, and left the question of quarters for later deliberation. During November Howe’s forces secured their hold on Philadelphia by capturing the Delaware River forts and by constructing strong works north of the city. Washington, meanwhile, raised the question of attacking Philadelphia three times in November and early December, and each time the generals in the Council of War voted it down. What seems to have clinched Washington’s determination not to attack was his reconnoitering of the British works on November 25. As he informed his officers, from the west bank of the Schuylkill ‘I had a full view of their left and found their works much stronger than I had reason to expect from the Accounts I had received.’ Because of his observations, Washington now was ready to settle the army in quarters. He probably calculated that it would remain quartered, undertaking no further offensive operations, until spring.

A few days after Washington’s observations of the British lines, on November 30, he summoned a Council of War to discuss winter quarters again. The question was not whether or when the army should take up quarters — all but Brigadier General Count Casimir Pulaski agreed it should, and quickly. The debate was over where….

Whitemarsh had two serious disadvantages. First, as the deputy quartermaster, Colonel Henry Lutterloh, pointed out, wood and comforts were scarce…. [And] Washington… would have to react with full alert to every move of Howe’s forces. As Major General the Marquis de Lafayette put it, in advocating a withdrawal to interior towns, ‘there we schall be quiete, there we can discipline and instruct our troops, we can be able to begin a early campaign, and we shall not fear to be carried into a winter campaign if it pleases General Howe.’ Seven other generals also noted the need to have quiet, not constant alarms. Other than a tacit agreement to go elsewhere, this council came to no conclusion….

Washington, in selecting the location for cantonment, could easily have decided, as he had numerous times before, that the view receiving the largest number of votes from his generals should prevail. The lack of consensus in this instance probably surprised and certainly disturbed the commander-in-chief. After studying the written replies, he realized that the choice was extremely difficult, finding, as he wrote to Joseph Reed on December 2:

“so many and such capital objections to each mode proposed, that I am exceedingly embarrassed, not only by the advice given me, but in my own judgment.”

Washington did not reveal in his letters his own judgment at this point, but it very likely corresponded with the ‘general sentiment.’ He overstated the strength of support for the Lancaster-Reading alternative, probably because it was his preference. This proposal received a plurality of nine votes, two more than did Wilmington. Three of the six major generals favored it. Possibly Washington was influenced by three of the four Virginia generals who voted for it. It appeared at first to offer more comfort for the troops, which for Washington, by all indications, was a major concern….

Reed… helped lead Washington toward eliminating one alternative-cantonment in the Reading-Lancaster area. Reed’s reply reinforced the criticisms of quartering in the backcountry towns that Washington had already encountered. The two objections were, first, that Lancaster and Reading were greatly overpopulated with refugees from eastern Pennsylvania, and second, that the troops would be too distant from Philadelphia and too scattered to protect the eastern part of Pennsylvania from British foragers…. Without doubt Washington was under considerable political pressure not to quarter the troops in Lancaster and Reading…. Washington’s generals had already recorded their opposition to crowding in on the refugees in the backcountry….

Now that Washington deemed unsatisfactory the alternative that had the most support from his Council of War (and which he probably had at first favored), where then to canton the army?…

Wilmington was the choice of almost as many generals (seven) as favored the backcountry cantonment. They saw the small city, twenty-five miles south of Philadelphia, as the best quartering site that was also a defensive post…. Washington apparently agreed that Wilmington was not safe…. He appears to have believed the British would soon invest it…. To Washington’s mind Wilmington was a threatened area, not one secure for quarters…. Nor did Washington care for the plans to divide the bulk of the army and post detachments in an arc around Philadelphia….