Artisanal mining cooperatives in Eastern DRC: saviors or exploiters?
by Jorden de Haan*
Artisanal miners living in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are forced by the government to organize into cooperatives, as a consequence of formalization of labor policies. International donors and NGOs, national and provincial governments, CSOs and even the private sector all have jumped on the bandwagon to promote and empower miners’ cooperatives. But do the latter indeed take the form of a savior, or do they rather sustain a historical system of exploitation of labor? A recent field study in South Kivu demonstrates how the interplay between historical power relations and formal institutions has transformed cooperatives into an instrument allowing economic, political and customary elites to continue exercising power and exploiting miners economically.
Several authors have documented the vital importance of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) for individual livelihoods as well as regional development in the DRC (e.g. Geenen, 2015; World Bank, 2008). Nevertheless, ASM is also associated with negative health, environmental and social effects and, particularly in South Kivu, with ‘conflict minerals’ due to its ongoing links with non-state armed groups that are active in the Great Lakes Region. Concerns about such negative effects have triggered a range of policy interventions (e.g. Dodd Frank Act section 1502, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-affected and High-risk Areas) at the international and the national level in an attempt to formalize the sector.
At the lifting of a six-month ban on all artisanal mining activities, proclaimed by President Kabila in September 2010, miners were allowed to mine again, but only in ‘Artisanal Exploitation Zones’ (AEZs) and only on the condition that they organize into cooperatives (Ministère des Mines, 2010). The alleged vision for cooperatives is that they should ideally evolve into semi-industrial operations in order to — in the words of a representative of the Ministry of Mines — ‘‘promote the emergence of a Congolese middle class that can contribute to local development’’.
Presidents of cooperatives subscribe to this vision, although they don’t have a coherent strategy on its realization in practice. Moreover, this vision does not appear to incorporate the full interests enlisted by the government. Indeed, the Minister of Mines also mentioned that cooperatives make miners “more manageable”, and one president of a cooperative adjudicated the creation of cooperatives as a way to “increase the control by the state through taxation”. It seems then that the Congolese state pushes the creation of cooperatives as a mechanism to increase its control over the mineral sector, an argument that has been made before with respect to the promotion of large-scale mining (Geenen, 2015).
The power paradox
Ever since their emergence during the Industrial Revolution in the United Kingdom, cooperatives are ideologically meant to empower workers through political representation, with the aim of increasing their bargaining position vis-à-vis traders and the government (Cooperatives Europe, 2013). Paradoxically, the cooperatives in this study seem to do the opposite. In many cases, miners were not involved in the selection of their leaders; they barely participate in cooperative meetings; and they receive virtually no training, tools or safety equipment. More problematically, many miners are not aware of their right to be represented, as was reflected by several miners:
“I did not know that I had the right to influence the cooperative”
“I think that the management is a personal matter, so we cannot blame anyone’’
A closer look at the cooperative leaders’ backgrounds reveals their identities as political, customary, religious and economic elites. As such, many have taken the creation of a cooperative as an opportunity to gain access to mining titles. In Walungu for example, the most powerful leader is the president of COMIANGWE (‘Coopérative Miniére et Agricole de Ngweshe’), who is at the same time the wife of the king of Ngweshe, a chiefdom in Walungu territory. The king’s power, which results from his customary position as manager of the land, is thus perpetuated in the management of the mining cooperative.
The distribution of revenue
Taking a power-laden relational approach to institutions and poverty, which I both perceive as social constructions and manifestations of a negotiation of power, I argue that this distribution of power is proportionally reflected in the distribution of revenue. As a demonstration, let us consider the value chain for 1kg of cassiterite (an ore from which tin is extracted) for a particular cooperative of our case study.
Whereas there is no space to enter into detail here (as Dr. Geenen and I do in a recent research article — De Haan & Geenen, 2016), I would like to highlight just three points:
1. The miners, who often work as much as 12 hours per day or night, performing harsh physical work under hazardous circumstances and without adequate tools and safety equipment, earn only around 22% of the domestic price after deducing all costs.
2. Yet, when we consider the other actors in the value chain, there is not one actor that visibly benefits disproportionally from this exploitation. Rather, the miners’ small revenue is mainly caused by the taxes that are levied by actors such as SAESSCAM (the administrative service of the Ministry of Mines), the Mwami (the customary king), and the cooperative.
3. The problem here is not so much the levying of taxes, even if some of them concern illegal taxes. Rather, the problem here lies in the mere fact that there are virtually no services delivered in return. Since miners do not receive any kind of training, protective equipment and working tools, their production is very little, barely enough to feed their families and to reinvest their money into the mining communities. This perpetuates miners’ relational poverty and hampers ASM’s potential to contribute to local development.
Conclusion
In short, these miners are not paid in proportion to their effort and they are thus being exploited; not by one group of ‘capitalists’ that can be designated as a scapegoat, but rather by the wider institutional system that surrounds South Kivu’s ASM sector. In comparison to the situation before the emergence of cooperatives, the distribution of wealth has not changed significantly. Indeed, given South Kivu’s troublesome past, which includes widespread extortion by armed groups during the civil war, this exploitation is not a new phenomenon. It is rather the continued expression of power by a wide web of elites who have creatively combined historical political, economic and customary institutions with the new institution of a cooperative, and the constellation of this interplay between institutions unfolds as messy as the legislation that enforces its top-down fabrication. Indeed, as cooperatives make miners more visible and therefore more ‘manageable’ by external actors, they seem to be an institution that ‘legalizes’ and legitimizes exploitation. If cooperatives continue to be governed as they are, and evolve towards small-scale mining and start selling to exporters as is indeed envisioned by the Congolese state, an associated capitalization of the ASM sector may further perpetuate this relational poverty, as has also been observed in the Philippines by Verbrugge (2015).
Nevertheless, in light of Nelson Mandela’s observation that ‘‘poverty is man-made and it can be overcome and eradicated by the actions of human beings’’, I call upon policy makers to, together with all stakeholders, thoroughly reflect on their vision for mining cooperatives and the role of the latter within the broader formalization process. While I explain my policy recommendations in more depth in a policy brief (De Haan and Geenen, 2015), I would like to highlight three points for reflection:
1. If the ultimate goal of cooperatives is to improve miners’ socio-economic position by increasing their financial returns so that they can contribute to local development, policy makers should align this vision with a supportive strategy that emphasizes inclusion and poverty reduction, prevents the exclusion of vulnerable actors from the supply chain, and invigorates bottom-up initiatives.
2. If artisanal mining needs to be formalized, a very first step is the creation of more AEZs where miners can operate legally. A second step is to facilitate the creation of cooperatives inside these AEZs, using a bottom-up approach and respecting cooperative principles such as open membership and democratic governance. In order to achieve that, cooperatives also need to work on their organizational capacity building with the support of NGOs and state services.
3. If the goal is to move towards small-scale mining, then cooperatives must be assisted to establish business plans with a clear vision and investment targets, and to access financial capital, technology and knowledge.
- Jorden de Haan is a young professional who is interested in the intersections between natural resource governance, socio-economic development and post-conflict reconstruction. During his studies, he has conducted extensive field research in Sub-Saharan Africa, before obtaining an Advanced Master in Governance and Development at the University of Antwerp. He currently works as a consultant with UNITAR’s (UN Institute for Training and Research) Chemicals and Waste Management programme in Geneva, Switzerland, where he supports governments of conflict-affected countries in good governance of the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector.
References
- Cooperatives Europe, 2013. Cooperatives & fair trade: making supply chains work for small producers. Joint Contribution to the Future EU Strategy on Strengthening the Role of the Private Sector in Achieving Inclusive and Sustainable Development. Cooperatives Europe.
- De Haan, J. S. & Geenen, S., 2015. Mining cooperatives in South Kivu: saviour or extortionist? IOB Analysis and Policy Brief 14, Institute of Development Policy and Management. University of Antwerp, Antwerp.
- De Haan, J. S. & Geenen, S. 2016. Mining cooperatives in Eastern DRC The interplay between historical power relations and formal institutions. The Extractive Industries and Society, 3(3), 823–831
- Geenen, S., 2015. African artisanal mining from the inside out. Access, Norms and Power in Congo’s Gold Sector. Routledge, Oxford.
- Ministère des Mines, 2010. Arrêté ministériel n°0706/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2010 du 20 septembre 2010 portant mesures urgentes d’encadrement de la décision de suspension des activités minières dans les provinces du Maniema, Nord-Kivu et Sud-Kivu.
- Sen, A., 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Verbrugge, B., 2015. The economic logic of persistent informality: artisanal and small-scale mining in the Southern Philippines. Dev. Change 46 (5), 1023–1046.
