An answer to “A Primer for the Perplexed”

In his blog, “The Iran Delusion: A Primer for the Perplexed,” which I first saw on 7th July 2015, Michael J Totten somehow gets so much so wrong it should have been entitled “A Primer BY the Perplexed.”

In the first paragraph he writes, “Hardly anyone aside from the Saudis… seems to recognize that the Iranian government’s ultimate goal is regional hegemony and that its nuclear weapons program is simply a means to that end.”

That dubiously claimed “ultimate goal” aside, this statement holds within it a simple assumption, slipped in without any backing; passed by quickly, but implanted; that Iran has a “nuclear weapons program.”

This assumption is made despite the facts that, firstly Iran has consistently stated that their nuclear research programme is for peaceful purposes; energy, medical etc., and secondly both Iran’s current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, are on record as believing nuclear weapons to be un-Islamic. And in Iran, on matters of faith, it is the Supreme Leader’s belief that matters, and “un-Islamic” will always mean his veto… Add to this, the fact that during 8 years of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran was subjected to six years of general & arbitrary chemical weapon attacks by Iraq; on civilians and troops, without once retaliating in kind, because the Ayatollah, Ruhollah Khomeini, believed that chemical weapons were also “un-Islamic.”

Totten goes on; “The Middle East has five hot spots, or “shatter zones;” really? only five? I would suggest Libya and the Sinai might be a couple more. And why limit the problem to the Middle East? With regard to Daʿesh, troubles in East & West Africa are also linked in. Of course there has never been any suggestion that Iran might be involved in these other locations.

Totten lists his five as; Gaza, the Lebanon-Israel border, Yemen, Syria & Iraq.

He continues; “Gaza, where Hamas wages relentless rocket wars against Israel…” The implication here is that somehow Iran controls Hamas; they don’t. Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza and they have been there since the 1950’s, when Gaza was under Egyptian rule. They are a Sunni Islamist organisation, actually ideologically opposed to all things Shīʿite. Iran, as we all know is Shīʿite, but has in the past, pragmatically following the doctrine of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend,” helped to fund them; but that funding dried up when Hamas declared support for Daʿesh. Even whilst supplying funds, Iran wasn’t controlling Hamas.

Then we get, “The Lebanese-Israeli border, where Hezbollah does the same on a much more terrifying scale…” That, along with Hamas in Gaza, indicates that this is actually all one trouble spot; not two “shatter-zones.” And the cause isn’t Iran; it is the presence of Israel, which was foisted on the region, by the UN, in 1948. Don’t get me wrong; I support Israel and believe that Israelis have a right to exist, peacefully in their own country, within their current borders. But that doesn’t alter the fact that every single other nation in the region, including Iran, would be quite happy to see Israel disappear altogether.

In addition, Palestinians seem to think that they have a right to their own country, exactly where Israel is. Some Palestinian Arabs are prepared to live in Israel, as Israelis; the PLO, Hezbollah & Hamas represent those that aren’t. I’ll return to Hezbollah in a moment…

Totten then looks around to see if he can find somewhere else, where Iran might be involved. Hence; “Yemen, which is finally falling apart on an epic scale…” and which he says has been a “shatter-zone for decades.” So let’s look at the Republic of Yemen…

In the 1960’s Yemen was divided. North Yemen, the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of the Yemen, was ruled by an autocratic king, Ahmad bin Yahya Hamidaddin, who had been on the throne since 1948. He died in 1962 and was briefly succeeded by his son Muhammad Al-Badr; but, as is so often the case, a group of republican Army officers staged a coup, starting the North Yemen Civil War.

The royalists were supported by Saudi Arabia, (mostly with weapons and financial aid, but also with military forces), Britain and Jordan; whilst the republicans were backed by Egypt. Egypt provided the republicans with weapons and financial assistance but also sent a large military force. Israel covertly supplied weapons to the royalists in order to keep the Egyptian military busy in Yemen and make Nasser less likely to initiate a conflict in Sinai. In 1968, after six years of civil war, the republicans won and formed the “Yemen Arab Republic.” [No Iranian involvement there; but a great deal of Saudi interference supporting a fellow dictatorial monarch]

At that time South Yemen consisted of Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia. The Aden Emergency occurring concurrently with the revolution in the north led to the British departure from Aden, and in 1967, the south became an independent socialist state, officially known as the “People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen.” [No Iranian involvement there either.] The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen had backing from the Eastern Bloc, but the Yemen Arab Republic in the north, had few international backers at all.

Relations between the two new countries were never great, and they seriously came to blows in 1972. That war, in which the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen was actively supported by Saudi Arabia, [but, in which Iran played no part whatsoever] ended in negotiations brokered by the Arab League. It was during these negotiations that the idea of eventual unification was first mooted. In 1978, Ali Abdallah Saleh became President of the Yemen Arab Republic.

After several years of strife, both between north & south, and within the south; the two countries were unified as the “Republic of Yemen” in 1990. Saleh was named as President and the President of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen,) Ali Salim al-Beidh, became Vice-President.

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saleh opposed military intervention from non-Arab states. As a member of the United Nations Security Council for 1990 and 1991, Yemen abstained on a number of UNSC resolutions concerning Iraq and Kuwait and voted against the “use of force resolution.” That angered the U.S. and others, and as a result Saudi Arabia expelled 800,000 Yemenis in 1990 and 1991. [No Iranian involvement there, either]

Despite unification there were still tremendous difficulties between north and south, which resulted in yet another civil war in May, June and July 1994. The armies of the north & south had never been fully integrated and although actively supported by Saudi Arabia, with arms, funds & troops, the army of the south was defeated. [No Iranian involvement there, either]

In the 1999 Presidential election, Saleh became Yemen’s first directly elected president, winning 96.2% of the vote. It’s worth noting that, however bent this might have been, it was an election. [And without any Iranian involvement!]

In 2000, al-Qaeda in Yemen attacked the USS Cole in Aden, killing 17 US naval personnel. The al-Qaeda-Yemen connection goes back to the foundation of the organisation. Yemen has always had powerful Islamist and jihadist movements. In the 1980s thousands of Yemenis joined the Afghan jihad against occupying Soviet forces and most returned home emboldened and militarised. Unlike most of their Middle Eastern counterparts, but just as in Saudi Arabia, Yemeni returnees were welcomed home with open arms by the Saleh regime.

In the early 1990s when bin Laden, whose father was born in Yemen, set up al-Qaeda in Sudan and then in Afghanistan, he heavily and personally recruited Yemenis whom he trusted. By 2000, AQ had been operating in Yemen, mainly targeting the Zaidi Shīʿites in the north, for some time, with overt Saudi support; this support began to dwindle that year, when AQ began operating in Saudi Arabia as well.

The Shī’a insurgency in Yemen began in June 2004, when dissident cleric Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, head of the Zaidi Shīʿites, launched an uprising against Saleh’s government. The rebels stated that they were “defending their community against discrimination” and government aggression. The government claimed that the Houthis were seeking to overthrow it and to implement Shīʿite religious law. So while Saleh had his hands full with the Houthis in the north, against whom he had Saudi assistance; he faced attacks by AQ, operating under the cover of a Socialist secessionist movement, in the south. Neither side mentioned any Iranian involvement with the Houthis then. Perhaps it is worth mentioning at this point, that Zaidis, though Shī’a, are of the “Fivers” sect, not “Twelvers,” which is the Shī’a sect of Iran.

In the 2006 presidential election, held on 20th September, Saleh won with 77.2% of the vote. His main rival, Faisal bin Shamlan, received 21.8%. So, once more Saleh was elected President and sworn in for another term on 27th September.

An AQ suicide bomber killed eight Spanish tourists and two Yemenis in the province of Marib in July 2007. AQ carried out a series of bomb attacks on police, official, diplomatic, foreign business and tourism targets in 2008. Car bombings outside the U.S. embassy in Sana’a killed 18 people, including six suicide bombers in September 2008.

In January 2009, the Saudi and Yemeni al-Qaeda branches merged to form Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is based in Yemen, and many of its members were Saudi nationals who had been released from Guantanamo Bay. Saudi Arabia worked hard to get their nationals repatriated from Guantanamo, and then expelled most of them into Yemen. Also in 2009, Saleh released 176 al-Qaeda suspects on condition of good behaviour, but this was ignored and their terrorist activities continued.

The Yemeni army launched a fresh offensive against the Shī’a insurgents in 2009, assisted by Saudi forces. A new ceasefire was agreed upon in February 2010. The Shī’a rebels accused Saudi Arabia of providing support to AQ and other Salafi groups to suppress Zaidism in Yemen.

At the same time, US Special Forces and the CIA were carrying operations, including air & drone strikes, against AQ.

In 2011, the ridiculously misnamed “Arab Spring” arrived in Yemen. Mass protests, stirred-up by various Islamist groups, just like those witnessed across the Middle East, eventually forced Saleh to step down. In a deal arranged by the Saudis, under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council, power was handed to the unelected Vice-President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. Under this deal Saleh got immunity from prosecution, and his son, General Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh kept a strong hold on a large part of the army.

In February 2012, AQAP claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on the presidential palace which killed 26 Republican Guards on the day that President Hadi was sworn in. AQAP was also behind another suicide bombing which killed 96 soldiers in Sana’a three months later. In September 2012, a car bomb attack in Sana’a killed 11 people, a day after a local al-Qaeda leader was reported killed in the south. In 2012, there was a “small contingent of U.S. special-operations troops” and an “unofficially acknowledged” CIA presence in Yemen, in response to increasing terror attacks by AQAP on Yemeni citizens.

The central government in Sana’a remained weak, staving off challenges from southern separatists and Shī’a rebels as well as AQAP. The Shī’a insurgency intensified after Hadi took power, escalating in September 2014 as anti-government forces led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi arrived in the capital and forced Hadi to agree to a “unity government.” Under increasing Houthi pressure, that government resigned en masse in January; and Hadi fled; first to his home-town of Aden & then to Riyadh. At this time all US personnel also left the country.

On 26 March, Saudi Arabia announced “Operation al-Hazm” and began indiscriminate airstrikes on targets in Yemen; and announced its intentions to lead a military coalition against the Houthis, whom they claimed were being aided by Iran, [a claim for which no evidence has been seen, and which is denied by both Iran & the Houthis] and began a force build-up along the Yemeni border. The coalition included UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, and Pakistan. [All Sunni nations] The United States announced that it was assisting with intelligence, targeting, and logistics. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would not rule out ground operations.

Currently, in Yemen, Houthis are fighting against the Daʿesh, Al Qaeda, and Saudi Arabia. The US supports the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen against the Houthis, but many in US SOCOM reportedly favour the Houthis, as they have been an effective force opposing al-Qaeda and recently Daʿesh. The Guardian recently reported; “The only groups to benefit from the war dragging on are the jihadis of Islamic State (Isis) [Daʿesh] and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the latter’s most powerful franchise, who are likely to gain influence amid the chaos. Isis has claimed recent, bloody suicide bombings in Houthi mosques and Sana’a when it once had no known presence in the country, while AQAP has continued to seize territory in eastern Yemen unhindered by American drone strikes.” Of course Saudi Arabia was well aware that their blatant bullying bombing of the Shīʿite Houthis would help the Sunni-Salafist AQ & Daʿesh; they are Sunni-Salafist themselves.

So, contrary to Mr Totten’s views, though there have been unproven, and denied claims of Iranian involvement in recent events in Yemen; there is abounding evidence of “pernicious” Saudi involvement and interference in Yemen, at every stage of its history, over the last fifty years!

Totten then moves on to his last “shatter zones”, briefly stating; “Syria and Iraq have merged into a single multinational shatter zone with more armed factions than anyone but the CIA can keep track of.” Thus blithely admitting his own ignorance and his assumption that we all share it; we don’t.

He continues, “What do these shatter zones have in common? The Iranian government backs militias and terrorist armies in all of them.” That intentionally gives the impression of Iranian fingers in many pies; whereas in fact there are three such pies; Syria/Iraq, Israel and Yemen. In Yemen, the Houthis are fighting Daʿesh and al-Qaeda. The Israel-Lebanon border is currently quiet. In Syria/Iraq Iranian backed Shīʿite Militias and Hezbollah are fighting Daʿesh and al-Qaeda, on the ground. Along with the Assad regime Syrian army & the Kurds, they are the only forces that are. That appears to me to be a “good thing.”

Totten then quotes Kaplan, who writes, “The instability Iran will cause will not come from its implosion, but from a strong, internally coherent nation that explodes outward from a natural geographic platform to shatter the region around it.” Yes, Iran’s release from the isolation caused by 36 years of largely unjustified international sanctions will cause some changes in the region. But the fear that it will “Shatter the region around it” is unfounded. The Saudi nose will, no doubt, be put-out-of-joint, but they’ll have to learn to live with that. The abomination that is Saudi Arabia has held sway in the region for too long. It’s no coincidence that 15 out of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudi; that al-Qaeda and Daʿesh share exactly the same mediaeval form of Islam as the Royal House of Saud or that it has been mainly Saudi & Qatari money that has, and still does fund them both.

Totten continues; “Iran and its Islamic leaders have played an entirely pernicious role in the Middle East since they seized power from Mohammad Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1979, stormed the US Embassy in Tehran, and held 66 American diplomats hostage for 444 days.” The fact is that, due to sanctions and boycotts, Iran has played very little role in the Middle East at all, in comparison to that played by Saudi Arabia; and as I’ve described above, that’s “pernicious”!

The fact that they “…seized power from…” the brutal dictator that was “…Mohammad Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1979,” and substituted his rule with a form of democracy, would have been applauded, if they had been Sunni Muslims; it’s the fact that they are Shīʿite that sticks in the regions’ craw.

Then we come to the real problem, as far as Americans are concerned; they “…stormed the US Embassy in Tehran, and held 66 American diplomats (well, a few US Marines and CIA as well,) hostage for 444 days.” First it was a bunch of students that entered the US Embassy, and took the hostages. The Iranian authorities took over when they recognised that they it was an opportunity to make the US look weak & helpless, and it worked; and that is something that the US has never been able to forgive. But you have to remember that the US (and the UK) had been meddling in Iranian affairs for years before that, and at the end of the day, nobody died!

Totten goes on, “In 1982, they went international.” What does that mean, exactly? It implies that their “…entirely pernicious role…” had been internal until then. I assume therefore he is referring to the creation of a written constitution, approved by national referendum; allowing for free elections, under non-gender specific universal suffrage; religious freedom; a written penal code; and other such “pernicious” things unheard of in virtually any other Middle Eastern State.

Totten explains that “…International…” bit like this; “When the Israelis invaded Lebanon to dislodge Yasir Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Army, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders forged a network of terrorist and guerrilla cells among their coreligionists in Lebanon’s Shia population. Hezbollah, the poisoned fruit of these efforts, initially had no name. It was a hidden force that struck from the shadows. It left a hell of a mark, though, for an organization of anonymous nobodies when it blew up the American Embassy in Beirut and hit French and American peacekeeping troops — who were there at the invitation of the Lebanese government — with suicide truck bombers in 1983 that killed 368 people.”

Let’s consider the situation in Lebanon, at that time. In 1975, following increasing sectarian tensions, a full-scale civil war broke out in Lebanon. The Lebanese Civil War pitted a coalition of Christian groups against the joint forces of the PLO, left-wing Druze and Muslim militias. In June 1976 Lebanese President Elias Sarkis requested for the Syrian Army to intervene on the side of the Christians and help restore peace. In October 1976 the Arab League agreed to establish a predominantly Syrian Arab Deterrent Force, which was charged with restoring calm. In 1982 due to continuing PLO attacks on Israel, from within Lebanon, Israel decided to invade. Without entering into the rights and wrongs of the Israeli invasion, it has to be accepted and expected that the residents of an invaded country will try to fight back. The IDF reached Beirut and began to besiege the city. The Lebanese president called for UN assistance, and a multinational force of US, French, British and Italian troops, with US Naval support, was dispatched, as Peace Keepers, to supervise the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut. I have written before about what happened next, and here I’ll quote me:

“On 19th September, though “Strongly opposed, for a week” by a Colonel Timothy J Geraghty, Commanding Officer of the US 24th Marine Amphibious Unit, USMC; four ships of the United States Navy provided direct naval gunfire support to the Lebanese Army, on a Shīʿite mountain village. And on 23rd September the French conducted an air strike on Shīʿite positions in the Biqāʿ Valley. These actions, Col Geraghty later wrote, “…removed any lingering doubts of our neutrality, and I stated to my staff at the time that we were going to pay in blood for this decision;” sadly, he wasn’t wrong. General Colin Powell (at the time an assistant to Secretary of State Caspar Weinberger) later noted that, “When the shells started falling on the Shīʿites, they assumed the American ‘referee’ had taken sides.” On 23rd October, two truck bombs struck the two separate barracks housing United States Marines and French paratroops, killing 299 American and French servicemen. A previously unknown group calling itself “Islamic Jihad” claimed responsibility for the bombings, but it is generally accepted that this was a Shīʿite Iran/Hezbollah operation, with Alawite-Shīʿite Syrian support.”

That this was a costly and tragic episode for both the Americans and the French cannot be denied, but the blame has to lie with whoever decided, against the advice of local commanders, that it was acceptable for “Peace Keepers” to take sides. It should be noted that neither British nor Italian forces were attacked.

Then we have Totten’s preposterous claim that, “…the only reason ISIS gained a foothold among Iraq’s Sunnis in the first place is because the Baghdad government spent years acting like the sectarian dictatorship that it is, by treating the Sunni minority like second-class citizens, and by trumping up bogus charges against Sunni officials in the capital. When ISIS promised to protect Iraq’s Sunnis from the Iranian-backed Shia rulers in Baghdad, the narrative seemed almost plausible. So ISIS, after being vomited out of Anbar Province in 2007, was allowed to come back.”

Firstly, the Baghdad Government was elected; that it is predominantly Shīʿite, merely reflects the country’s religious demographic; its population is predominantly Shīʿite. That it is supported by Iran is understandable as well. Shīʿites are in a universally persecuted minority in the region; and it is to be expected that Shīʿite regimes will support each other. However the current Baghdad regime is secular, and has already made it clear that it is not an Iranian puppet. For years under Saddam Hussein, the Shīʿites, along with Kurds and other minorities, were treated “…like second-class citizens” and much, much worse; with the happy compliance of the Sunni tribes.

At no time has Daʿesh or al-Qaeda, ever “…promised to protect Iraq’s Sunnis from the Iranian-backed Shia rulers in Baghdad,” And finally ISIS did not exist in 2007, when it was supposedly “…vomited out of Anbar Province…” The group I prefer to call Daʿesh, did not claim to be “al-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah fī al-ʻIrāq wa-al-Shām,” meaning “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL), or “Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham.” (ISIS) until 8th April 2013.

Totten’s extraordinary claims continue; “Most of Iraq’s Sunnis fear and loathe ISIS. They previously fought ISIS under its former name, al-Qaeda in Iraq.”

Quite simply, they don’t and they didn’t. Sunni’s generally have not fought Daʿesh; they have either accepted their rule, or run away. Many Sunnis actually support them. That they, “…fear and loathe the central government and its Shiite militias…” isn’t surprising; for many years they were in a position to subjugate the Shīʿites; now they aren’t, the boot is on the other foot and that hurts.

Totten goes on “They’d rather be oppressed by “their own” than by “the other” if they had to choose. But they have to choose because Iran has made Iraq its second national project after Lebanon.” They make that choice not because they have to, but because that is their belief; to them Shīʿites are heretics. As for Iraq being some sought of Iranian “…second national project,” to be realistic, it is natural that Iran would want to have some influence within Iraq. They are two of the very few majority Shīʿite nations in the world. They are neighbours. Historically Iraq has laid claim to parts of Iran. This is the first time in decades; perhaps centuries, that there is a real possibility of the two countries maintaining friendly relations.

Totten then quotes a member of the Iraqi Parliament, “All attempts to send arms and ammunition must be through the central government,” Adnan al-Assadi, apparently told CNN. “That is why we refused the American proposal to arm the tribes in Anbar. We want to make sure that the weapons would not end up in the wrong hands, especially ISIS.”

Totten then says, “That may appear reasonable on the surface;” yes, it does and is, on the surface and every which-way-else.

He goes on to claim, “but ISIS can seize weapons from Shia militias just as easily as it can seize weapons from Sunni militias.” er, no; because it never has; the Shīʿite militias do not run away abandoning their arms, uniforms and equipment quite as readily, and with such monotonous regularity as their Sunni counterparts.

Totten then claims, “The real reason for the government’s reluctance ought to be obvious: Iraq’s Shias do not want to arm Iraq’s Sunnis. They’d rather have ISIS controlling huge swaths of the country than a genuinely popular Sunni movement with staying power that’s implacably hostile to the Iranian-backed project in Mesopotamia.” What he doesn’t understand is that Daʿesh is a “…Sunni movement with staying power that’s implacably hostile to…” anyone of any other faith or belief.

But Totten’s claims get even more ludicrous; “ISIS wouldn’t even exist, of course, if it weren’t for the predatory regime of Bashar al-Assad, and the close alliance that has existed between Damascus and Tehran since the 1979 revolution that brought the ayatollahs to power.” Where on earth did that absolute rubbish come from? Daʿesh started in Iraq. I’ve written about this before, too; so forgive me if I quote me again:

“Islamic State (IS), also known by the Arabic acronym Daʿesh, grew from a group called “Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād,” in English “The Organisation of Monotheism and Jihad” (JTJ), which was founded in Iraq, in 1999 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In October 2004, al-Zarqawi swore loyalty to Osama bin Laden and changed the name of the group to “Tanẓīm Qāʻidat al-Jihād fī Bilād al-Rāfidayn,” meaning “The Organisation of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers” or “The Organisation of Jihad’s Base in Mesopotamia,” more commonly known as “Al-Qaeda in Iraq” (AQI). Although the group has never actually called itself “Al-Qaeda in Iraq,” this name has frequently been used for it throughout its various incarnations. In January 2006, AQI merged with other Iraqi insurgent groups to form the “Mujahideen Shura Council.” Al-Zarqawi was killed in June 2006, after which the group’s direction shifted again. On 12th October 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council merged with several more insurgent factions, and on 13th October the establishment of the “Dawlat al-ʻIraq al-Islāmīyah,” meaning “Islamic State of Iraq” (ISI), was announced. A cabinet was formed and Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi became ISI’s figurehead emir, with the real power residing with the Egyptian Abu Ayyub al-Masri. Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri were both killed in a US–Iraqi operation in April 2010, and the next leader of the ISI was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who is the current leader of ISIS. On 8th April 2013, having expanded into Syria, the group adopted the name “al-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah fī al-ʻIrāq wa-al-Shām,” meaning “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL), or “Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham.” (ISIS).”

So that’s the origin of Daʿesh; nothing to do with Assad at all.

Totten’s claims then take a particularly worrying turn, when he says; “Syria’s government is dominated by the Alawites, who make up just 15 percent of the population. Their religion is a heterodox blend of Christianity, Gnosticism, and Shia Islam. They aren’t Shias. They aren’t even Muslims.”

He is right when he says the Alawites make up only 15% of the population, but the claim that; “Their religion is a heterodox blend of Christianity, Gnosticism, and Shia Islam. They aren’t Shias. They aren’t even Muslims,” is straight out of the Salafist-Sunni Daʿesh propaganda handbook; in which they say that anyone of a different sect; in “…not even a Muslim.”

Alawites, also known as Alawis are a religious group, centred in Syria, who follow a branch of the Twelver school of Shī’a Islam. Alawites revere Ali (Ali ibn Abi Talib), the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammed, and the name “Alawi” means followers of Ali. The sect is believed to have been founded by Ibn Nusayr during the 9th century. So, yes they are Shī’a and they are Muslims.

Totten then returns to what is happening in Yemen; and Saudi Arabia’s apparent fears of the Shī’a Houthis winning there. He points out that, “…not only is the border there porous and poorly defined, but that part of Saudi Arabia once belonged to Yemen. The Saudis conquered and annexed it in 1934. Najran is almost identical architecturally to the Yemeni capital, and you can walk from Najran to Yemen is a little over an hour.” He asks, “Will the Houthis be content to let Najran remain in Saudi hands now that they have Iranian guns, money, power, and wind at their back? Maybe. But the Saudis won’t bet their sovereignty on a maybe.” Immediately forgetting what he’s just told us; that that part of the Kingdom isn’t theirs anyway; maybe they should give it back to Yemen…

He the points out that, “Roughly 15 percent of Saudi Arabia’s citizens are Shias. They’re not a large minority, but Syria’s Alawites are no larger and they’ve been ruling the entire country since 1971. And Shias make up the absolute majority in the Eastern Province, the country’s largest, where most of the oil is concentrated.” What he implies there is that Saudi Arabia is afraid that its thoroughly downtrodden and persecuted Shī’a minority, which isn’t allowed its own mosques, will try to take over the country; Seriously?

Totten goes on to say, “The head-choppers of ISIS are problematic for obvious reasons. Their leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, said, “I’ll see you in New York,” to American military personnel when they (foolishly) released him from Iraq’s Camp Bucca prison in 2004. But the Iranian-led Resistance Bloc has behaved just as atrociously since 1979 and will continue to do so with or without nuclear weapons.”

I can’t disagree with the first part of that; Daʿesh is a major problem; they are Salafist-Sunni scum that the world would be better without; but the only people who have behaved “…just as atrociously…” are the members of the current Salafist-Sunni regime in Saudi Arabia, where people are still beheaded for rape, apostasy, atheism and sorcery; yes, the last person to be publicly beheaded for being, “…found in possession of talismans,” was executed in 2012!

Finally Totten writes, “We don’t have to choose between ISIS and Iran’s revolutionary regime. They’re both murderous Islamist powers with global ambitions, and they’re both implacably hostile to us and our interests. Resisting both simultaneously wouldn’t make our foreign policy even a whit more complicated. It would, however, make our foreign policy much more coherent.”

Firstly, Iran’s regime is no longer revolutionary. They had their revolution in 1979, and developed a governance system, which works for them. It includes a form of democracy, enmeshed with a codified form of Shari’a. Remembering that Muslims believe that Shari’a, God’s Law, takes precedence over all man-made law, I would suggest that it is as close to genuine democracy as any genuinely Islamic state is ever likely to get.

The Iranian government is no more “revolutionary” than the US government. Both were born out of revolution; both have a written Constitution; it’s just that one chose to separate itself from its religion, the other didn’t. Oh, and Iran has never laid claim to any “…global ambitions.” Strangely this whole deluded diatribe began with a reference to Iran’s aim of “Regional hegemony”; but by in end it became Iran’s “Global ambitions.”

The only way in which US, or Western foreign policy might become “…more coherent,” would be to bring Iran back into the International Community and accept Iran, and other Shīʿite forces as allies against Daʿesh, and if that means treating the murderous, dictatorial, Salafist-Sunni Saudi regime with the scorn it deserves; so much the better.

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