America’s (Partial) Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Implications for India
India needs to cast its strategic net far and wide
President Donald Trump’s announcement in December 2018 of the withdrawal of half of US troops in Afghanistan is a significant blow to Indian foreign policy and security interests. US troops, which made up the bulk of the NATO presence in Afghanistan, have been the only factor preventing the collapse of the Ashraf Ghani-led government in Kabul, and a return to civil war or complete Taliban takeover. It is critical for the Indian foreign policy establishment to come to terms with the fact that, with the American withdrawal, the days of an India-friendly government in Kabul are numbered.
India’s primary objective regarding Afghanistan remains clear — to prevent the re-emergence of an Afghanistan entirely dominated by the Taliban, which will allow Pakistan to achieve its goal of acquiring “strategic depth” against India, and embolden the Pakistan Army-ISI establishment to catalyze jihadi attacks against India in Kashmir and elsewhere.
Singed by its overt involvement in Sri Lanka in the 1980s, India will be reluctant to get militarily involved in Afghanistan on the side of the Ashraf Ghani government. Moreover, the prevailing geopolitical environment does not augur well for India to engage with other regional states (i.e., Iran and Russia) to arrest the Taliban’s rise, as it did in the late 1990s and early 2000s just before the US invasion of Afghanistan. Iran has been supplying small arms to the Taliban, hitherto its arch-foe, to destabilize the American presence in Afghanistan. This is only like to increase after the latest round of sanctions were imposed on Iran by America in November. Should the Taliban emerge victorious in Kabul, Iran will most likely achieve a form of entente cordiale with it. Russia too has been hosting peace talks with the Taliban this year. Overcoming the bitter experience of having been defeated by the mujahideen in the 1980s (many of whom now form the senior leadership of the Taliban), Russia too will likely accommodate a Taliban-led government in Kabul, so long as the latter does not allow the nascent Islamic State (IS) presence in Afghanistan to percolate upwards towards Central Asia and beyond.
A Taliban-led Afghanistan: Options for India
This leaves India with very few friendly regional states with which it can coordinate a united response to the Taliban’s rise. In the prevailing situation, it can step up military support to Kabul in the form of supplies of lethal military equipment or provide greater training for Afghan armed forces personnel, which it already does in a somewhat limited fashion. It will also have to increase its investment in intelligence — both human and technical — to guard against any attacks on Indian civilians and establishments in the country. On the political level, India will have to play a more proactive role in ensuring the end of factionalism in Ashraf Ghani’s government, divided as it has been after the flawed 2014 presidential election.
Either way, the inclusion of the Taliban in the government in Kabul, either as part of a power-sharing agreement, or a government led by it, is now a foregone conclusion. If this happens, it has to come to terms with a Taliban-led Afghanistan and re-adjust its foreign and security policy accordingly. India faced massive blowback from instability in Afghanistan in the period 1989 to 2001 — from the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1989 to the eventual defeat of the Taliban in 2001, as a Pakistan Army-ISI establishment emboldened by newfound strategic depth in Afghanistan, directed or encouraged terrorism within India. This was the time of the complete breakdown of law and order in the Indian-administered Kashmir valley, rising secessionist violence in Indian Punjab, terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 1993, the Kargil incursion by Pakistan Army irregulars in 1999, the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC 814 in 1999, and the attack on India’s Parliament in 2001.
Other than ramping up its external intelligence and internal security apparatus to prevent an increase in terrorism within the country, India can also route military support to anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan from its fledgling military presence in Tajikistan. This can be coupled with the diplomatic carrot, which is to reach out directly to the Taliban’s senior leadership to reach some form of mutual accommodation in return for promises of diplomatic recognition and developmental assistance. Even though the Taliban derives much of its logistical and tactical support from Pakistan, it should be considered as an independent actor. Its history does suggest that it can take independent decisions. Indeed, recognizing the Taliban for what it essentially is — a group of Islamist/Pashtun nationalists seeking to reclaim their country from a coalition of predominantly non-Pashtun groups supported by the US — will only aid any government trying to enter into discussions with it. India should pursue this carrot-and-stick approach towards the Taliban to wean it away from an overdependence on Pakistan and secure agreement for Afghan territory not to be used for any anti-Indian activities.
An Emerging Multi-Polar World Order: The Larger Takeaway for India
The larger takeaway for the Indian foreign policy establishment from President Trump’s announcement is that a Trump-led America is only too happy to cede its historic leadership role in upholding a rules-based international order. This is only likely to strengthen the two states seeking to challenge the post-war consensus, Russia and China, as well as their respective allies. It is incumbent upon India to work assiduously towards reducing friction with China on the host of issues that currently bedevil relations between the two countries. It also has to move towards re-invigorating its “strategic” relationship with Russia to achieve greater coordination on critical international issues. India cannot rely on the vague promise of security guarantees borne from concepts like the Indo-Pacific or the Quad (i.e., Japan, Australia, India, the US) to shape its foreign policy strategy. On Afghanistan too, India will have to move away from a zero-sum game with Pakistan, towards ensuring that Afghanistan emerges as a sort of neutral “Switzerland of South and Central Asia.” In the face of a fast-evolving multi-polar world moving away from the consensus of the post-war rules-based order, India will increasingly be faced with very tough foreign policy choices in the years ahead.
