Dom’s Comms: Week 6— OOP
Let’s explore the FA Cup loss to Chelsea, which deservedly provoked more positive reactions than negative ones. In fact, I would suggest that the Championship club gave a better account of themselves than their Premier League counterparts, as they controlled large periods of the game at Stamford Bridge with, or without, the ball.
This article will explore the positive(s) and outline what Leicester City did to compete with Chelsea.
As the title suggests, I want to initially focus on the game's out-of-possession (OOP) elements, which when you reflect on the possession statistics (as Leicester held an estimated 40.2% share of the ball), saw the Foxes spend an abnormal amount of time, by this seasons standards, OOP.
Despite this, Leicester actively defended the opposition half and looked to limit the availability of passes into their half. It could’ve been easy to sit deep and prioritise defending the box, but the more advanced players were tasked with initiating presses high up the pitch and attempting to cause a “high turnover”.
I’ve created a visualisation, below, that highlights the categorised “high defensive actions” (defensive actions attempted in the opposition’s defensive third), which incorporate fouls, tackles, blocks, and interceptions. Both clubs attempted 11 actions in the opposition’s third before Callum Doyle’s red card in the 73rd minute.
While this chart suggests that both teams attempted the same number of “high defensive actions”, 54.5% of Chelsea’s were illegal (fouls) and weren’t as poignant vs. Leicester’s proportion of only 36.3% being fouls. Intensity-wise, and also the result of high turnovers did favour the away side.
Interestingly, 5 of the 11 defensive actions (45.5%) that the Foxes attempted in Chelsea’s defensive third were blocks. Cast your eyes over to Chelsea’s plot, and they didn’t attempt a single block in Leicester’s defensive third. If you examine the pressing system, and also the triggers OOP, you can see how Enzo Maresca was able to manufacture blocks into turnovers.
It wasn’t a surprise, but the OOP shape saw Kiernan Dewsbury-Hall step into the first line of the press creating a de facto 4–4–2 shape. His positioning, often closer to the other midfielders, would then adjust on a pass into Chelsea’s RCB (Axel Disasi). This was the pressing trigger.
In short, Leicester’s OOP system, or press, can be reduced to a few key points…
- Allow the GK to have possession, but cover one of the two CBs (most of the time, they’d cover Chelsea’s LCB [Trevor Chalobah]).
- Force Chelsea to pass into “open” CB (most of the time, Disasi).
- Trap the defensive-right side of the pitch, going man-to-man around the ball and also aggressively pressing Disasi once he receives.
- Limit options to pass into, squeeze the space to stop a carry through the press, and force him to make a decision.
- Either tackle, intercept, or as the Foxes did very well on the day, block the next action and win a high turnover.
I’ve provided a still frame here, which shows the intensity and productivity of the first line of the press, which was the crucial component of turning the ball over high up the pitch. Initially, Robert Sánchez sits on the ball, with Patson Daka (covering Chalobah) and KDH ready to activate on the trigger.
As the pass goes across the box, KDH steps into the first line and creates a “pressure zone”, as a radius around his positioning. This is supported by Daka, who steps into a position that can cover both his primary OOP focus (Chalobah) but also cover the primary passing angle for Disasi to keep possession (Sánchez).
This is the trap. Disasi can’t play back towards his goal-keeper, Daka is ready to pounce on a backward pass, while the pass into Malo Gusto would be pressurised by Stephy Mavididi. Whilst this is happening, Dewsbury-Hall is applying pressure too, suffocating him.
In the end, under pressure, Disasi gambles on a clearance which is blocked by KDH. This was a frequent path for entering the final third for Leicester, using a high press to convert an OOP phase into a possession sequence.
Below, I’ve attached a birds-eye view map of this pressing system to illustrate the effectiveness and, importantly, the idea Maresca outlined. This occasion sees Doyle step into the midfield to intercept a pass through the lines.
The reason for showcasing the sequence in this fashion is that I can also highlight the high defensive line. An incredibly important element of the pressing system. By playing high you squeeze the pitch, because Chelsea can only play ahead of the defensive line, which forces the game to be played in a tighter area.
Inevitably, if Leicester City were to score, it would come from their dominance in the OOP phase. Albeit, the own goal from Disasi — who had been targetted as the trigger for the entirety of the game until that point (51st minute), wasn’t a reliable goal source, it was a complete anomaly. But, it was a by-product of the excellent system they’d adopted.
However, this isn’t to say there weren’t flaws. Chelsea had chances, that stemmed from the proactive and brave shape the away side utilised. If The Blues could play through the initial press and connect, they found themselves in favourable 1-on-1’s with a fairly undynamic, Leicester defensive line.
I won’t provide annotated examples but think back to Raheem Sterling’s big miss in a 1-on-1, or the sequence that ended with Abdul Fatawu committing a foul on the Englishman, which resulted in a penalty kick. Step back a couple of passes, and it wouldn’t take much to convert deep Chelsea possession into a high % chance, as the Foxes committed to a high press underpinned with a high line.
That’s a lot of highs, non quite as high as Stephy Mavididi’s goal. Which, in a fixture filled with goals, was the best of the lot. Not that his carry before his shot was of a particularly long distance, but it still highlights the value of being able to beat an opponent — in a 1-on-1 — and the inherent upside that has in elite modern football.
I’d go as far as to say that it’s the idealistic profile in today’s game. If we reflect on the opening “chapter” of this article, I tried to identify the net positives of a hyperactive pressing system (OOP), but the profile that can dislodge this structure the best is a ball carrier, particularly at an elite level.
Each player (OOP) has an opposition player they’re responsible for marking/covering. If, as a dribbler, you can beat your man there are multiple ripples (as a knock-on effect) that are caused, forcing other(s) to step onto a new player, vacating their own, and chaos ensues.
Two players excelled at carrying the ball for their respective teams on Sunday, KDH for the Foxes and Mykhailo Mudryk for Chelsea. While the Ukrainian only completed 5 “progressive carries”, defined as a carry that is either completed in the opposition's third or moves the ball 10 yards closer to the goal, the average distance gained from his carries was 30.2 yards.
But it was Dewsbury-Hall (24.64 yards p/carry), a consistent outlet for the East Midlands outfit, who was able to drag his team up the pitch with his ball-carrying. One of his carries gained Leicester City 64.36 yards, the longest individual carry of any player in the game.
You can also see the role (IP/OOP) that KDH was entrusted with via his carry map. A lot of the completed “progressive carries” were in a left-midfield location, as he drifted into the wide channel completely unmarked by the restricted double pivot of Chelsea. The space to attack was behind Gusto, particularly for a de facto central player, like KDH.
However, after valiantly fighting back to a level game state, Leicester City made a few very poor micro-decisions that impacted proceedings in a macro way.
To start with, the red card was a crucial changing point of the fixture. In an 11-vs-11 game, the Foxes held momentum and were arguably the more likely team to score a third. But, as the ball ricocheted to Wout Faes, ironically after an excellent progressive carry by KDH, he tried to pass through Mudryk — which leaves a defensive line exposed in transition.
Again, it’s a micro decision. At face value, Faes has limited passing lanes. Maybe he could make a fairly simple pass into Harry Winks, although the #6 is in the Belgian’s blindside as he opts for his next action. Or, perhaps, he could take a touch and try to find one of the other CBs closer to the halfway line? With that said, a slight error on the execution of that pass and this outcome still happens.
Hindsight is wonderful, but Faes is a better footballer than he showcased at Stamford Bridge. This was another instance where his decision-making wasn’t good. He had a 3–4 second window, while the ball was being cleared to his feet, to scan his surroundings and understand the picture, but he was hellbent on finding Yunus Akgün as he exited the Chelsea penalty area.
10 seconds later…Callum Doyle is clipping Nicolas Jackson’s heels and is sent off. Faes, I expect, would accept the blame for that sequence.
But, the player fans have highlighted for “poor decision-making” especially as an on-the-ball threat, was right-sided winger Abdul Fatawu. I made a note mid-game that, in a highly pressured environment such as playing a big game in front of a packed-out Stamford Bridge, probably influenced his decision-making.
He’s a lot more comfortable inverting onto his left foot and he slipped into that comfort blanket, instead of taking his marker, Marc Cucurella, wide and to the byline. It was clear that as a match-up, Maresca favoured the 1-v-1 Fatawu had over the Mavididi on Gusto battle down the left, but his side was unable to convert this into a chance creator.
Maybe even more damning is this visualisation, created by the brilliant Markstats (@markrstats on X/Twitter) through an automated match report script he has created (@markstatsbot on X/Twitter) to provide insightful data in a game-by-game format.
I’ve provided two screenshots from the report, looking at his pass cluster analysis, that chart the 10 most frequently attempted passes dependent on a proxy. Image #6 shows “all” types of passes, while Image #7 shows just the “progressive” passes. A quick glance, as Leicester is on the right side of both charts, highlights a lack of pass attempts from the entire right side of the pitch.
Whereas the Chelsea chart indicates a right-sided build-up preference, in part due to how the Foxes triggered their press and forced Disasi to receive and block his other avenues, it also shows a well-rounded pass chart in the attacking half. The same can’t be said for Leicester.
An unsurprising surplus of passes into the depth of central midfield (aimed for the double pivot), and a cluster of passes into the left half-space — mainly for KDH to receive — you can see how Leicester tried to pass through the pitch. There are a few passes into the right-wing spaces, but upon reception, Fatawu’s decision-making to invert and cede possession was an unfortunate constant for the Championship side.
I was going to write a section on the 10-vs-11 setup that Enzo Maresca opted for to close out the game, but this article is already nearing the 2,000-word mark (with a suggested reading time of 9–10 minutes), so it’s probably best to conclude it here.
In short, James Justin replaced Mavididi and also subsidised the LB role (vacated by Doyle’s red card). His ambidextrous abilities, lend him to a multitude of roles, which is why the coach asked him to play as the wide-CB (left) in build-up or defensive situations, but also as a de facto LWB in latter possession sequences.
His role — both IP and OOP — was the most complex, as he tried to play “as two players” to mitigate the sending-off.
There you have it. A fairly positive performance, that despite conceding 4 goals, illustrates how Leicester City wants to defend against elite opposition. To improve, they’ll require a few better profiles and hope that individual decisions (micro-level) see an uptick to help macro outcomes.
It’s not a result that should worry fans, nor implicate that the Foxes would struggle in the Premier League — if they are to reach England’s top flight next season.
My next article (next week) will be looking into shots, and debating which of Leicester City’s current squad is taking “higher % chances” dependent on the timing/location of their shots. It’s been fun to collect the data and will hopefully split up the international break, ahead of a big game next Friday, away at Bristol City.
