New page, old problems on the Ankara-Cairo line
“This visit to Egypt took place with the insistent invitation of Mr. Sisi. Most likely, Mr. Sisi will come to Ankara in April or May and pay a return visit. We have deep-rooted ties with Egypt, both culturally and historically. We not only share the same history with Egypt, but also the same sea, and the importance of that sea in the global equation is increasing day by day.”
This is what Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan addressed to media managers after his first visit to Egypt after 12 years. There were references to both the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya and economic relations between the lines of his words. According to some, Erdogan was concerned about sending a message to the domestic public by particularly underlining “Sisi’s insistent invitation” before the local elections to be held in Turkey at the end of March.
While talking about historical unity and deep-rooted ties, it is unclear whether he was referring to Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Pasha, who laid the foundations of the modern Egyptian state on European lines in the early 19th century… The tension between the two capitals has long been a result of Ankara’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which came to power in June 2012 with the presidential elections held after the July Revolution regime of 1952 in Egypt ended on February 10, 2011, and the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi’s one-year rule by a military coup.
It is still remembered that the Rabia sign, used by Muslim Brotherhood supporters to protest the 2013 Egyptian military coup, was transferred to Turkey with the meaning of “One Nation, One Flag, One Homeland, One State”.
Turkey and Egypt now announce that the tension-filled days are behind them and say that relations have normalized.
So, could the rapprochement of the two countries cause a new momentum in the region?
What are the areas of collaboration and the challenges?
What are the highlights regarding trade, energy and security?
What does Turkey’s sale of UAVs and UAVs to Egypt, which has the continent’s largest fleet with 42 armed UAVs in Africa, that is, cooperation in military terms, mean?
Will the Cairo administration now say “Yes” to Ankara’s proposal for joint military exercises, which it has not approached favourably three times before?
Moreover, can the relations between the two countries evolve into a serious partnership in the medium term in the context of military industry?
While developments in Palestine are taking place, what should be expected from Ankara-Cairo relations, which have historically followed competitive policies?
I talked, to a name that follows the region closely and is an expert on international relations and security, Dr. Hürcan Aslı Aksoy.
Aksoy is also the Director of the Center for Applied Turkey Studies at the German Institute for International and Security Policy.
“Turkey gave up on the Muslim Brotherhood”
Relations between Ankara and Cairo deteriorated after the Egyptian army overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood government in 2013. To repair this, diplomatic talks began in 2021. Relations are currently in the full normalization phase. So, is it possible to say that Turkey has completely given up on the Muslim Brotherhood?
Possible. Because, as you know, efforts to get closer to the Egyptian administration started in 2021. One of the preconditions offered by the Sisi government at that time was the silencing of media outlets and television channels supporting the Muslim Brotherhood in Istanbul. They were not shut down, but their voices were muted. Cairo brought this as an indispensable condition. From there, we see that the AK Party government was able to move away from its ideological convictions to get closer to Egypt. Apart from that, as you know, Hamas leaders were also in Turkey in connection with the Muslim Brotherhood. After a while, they were also sent to Qatar. As Turkey becomes isolated in the region and understands the limits of its show of power, the places where Turkey will take a step back are ideological issues… Because what is important — of course, the government already says this — is realpolitik and interest-oriented foreign policy… But this has to be said. We do not have exact figures on how many Egyptian people of Muslim Brotherhood origin live in Turkey, but we know that some of them are Turkish citizens. “There is no such risk for Turkish citizens,” it was said. In other words, there is no difficult situation for Egyptians who have become Turkish citizens. They continue their activities in some way.
“It was called ‘insistent invitation’ to avoid the perception that Sisi was being manipulated”
In his statement to media managers upon his return to Cairo, President Erdoğan said, “Our visit to Egypt took place with the insistent invitation of Mr. Sisi.” The emphasis on “very insistent invitation” draws attention here. Does Erdogan want to give a message to both Egypt and Turkey’s domestic public before the elections?
Of course, that’s for sure. Since 2021, Turkey has tried to improve its relations with different regional actors. Among these, the fastest was with the United Arab Emirates. However, as you know, the United Arab Emirates was accused of being behind the coup attempt in 2016. Apart from that, relations were gradually established with Saudi Arabia after the Khashoggi case. The most difficult were Egypt and Israel. After the chargé d’affaires was determined with Egypt in 2022, the Egyptian Foreign Minister said, “Not unless we agree on Libya” in the previous stage of full normalization. This meant that, in layman’s terms, the rule of thumb was actually on the Egyptian side, in Cairo. Ankara took the necessary steps for this. It was Ankara that pushed for normalization. Of course, the government is very capable in this regard. In other words, it uses foreign policy as an important trump card in domestic politics. Of course, Mr. Erdogan knows this.
He said he wouldn’t even shake Sisi’s hand or talk to him. Naturally, some of the public will say, “He went to Sisi’s feet, visit him personally” Erdoğan probably doesn’t care much if the opposition says this. But perhaps he might have said, “He was very insistent, that’s why we went,” in case he might get a reaction from his electorate or other conservative, Islamist, pious parties such as the Future Party, the Felicity Party, and the Re-Welfare Party. He first went to the United Arab Emirates and then to Egypt. The United Arab Emirates is probably also involved here. Especially because of the Palestine-Israel, or rather Hamas-Israel conflict… Therefore, regional actors need to talk more often and take steps on this issue.
“Egypt’s historical role in the Palestinian issue has been revealed”
Speaking of Palestine, this was one of the priority issues on the agenda at the last meeting of Erdogan and Sisi. President Erdoğan said, “Our coordination with Egypt will contribute to the peace and stability of the region.” The two countries’ perspectives on the Palestinian cause probably differ, right? When considered based on organizations in Palestine…
Certainly. If we see Hamas as the continuation of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is the organization that the Sisi regime will never accept. Historically and politically, Egypt is already one of the main actors in the Israel-Palestine issue. Negotiations and ceasefires between the two groups, that is, between the two sides, have always been made thanks to Egypt. You can guess that; Just as Turkey is an important actor that can make decisions on Syria, the main actor that can do this where there is conflict on its border is Egypt. I guess just as Cairo does not want a new conflict in the northwest, in Idlib, apart from the military operations Ankara is carrying out in the Kurdish regions, Egypt does not want the Palestinians who have gathered in Rafah to enter. There are different reasons for this. First of all, Egypt has been in a serious economic crisis for a long time and the Sisi regime has not been able to change this much. It receives investment from abroad, but there is serious unrest. Especially after the Ukrainian War, Egypt is in trouble with high inflation and high food prices. Therefore, apart from talking about the security issue and conflict, what brings Ankara and Egypt together is, of course, economic issues…
“Even when the two countries were not talking, trade continued”
It is stated that some of the trade between the two countries will be carried out in mutual local currencies. Again, there are agreements signed to expand mutual trade volume…
Even though Cairo and Ankara were not talking to each other, economic relations continued. When we look at the numbers, when you consider the entire African continent, Turkey’s largest trade volume is with Egypt and this is not surprising. Historically, Turkey is a country that has trade with North African countries. It is just now opening up towards Central Africa and the south of Africa. These are the policies of the last 10 years… But Egypt is the largest market in Africa, due to its surface area, and a market that Turkey is closely interested in. Economic relations continued even during the height of conflict and hostility. Now the two sides will look for ways to trade more. For example, companies in Turkey supply cotton from Egypt. We know that there are very serious investments from Turkey. Apart from that, economic cooperation through mutual agreements, or rather deepening, is very important.
“Military equipment will deepen economic cooperation”
Are military agreements a part of this?
Yes. The military agreements we have observed in Turkey’s foreign policy in recent years are a part of economic cooperation. This is the sale of unmanned aerial vehicles… As you know, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan said in an interview with A Haber that Egypt is interested in UAVs.
In the last 4–5 years, the number of UAVs and other military vehicles that Turkey has sold to different African countries is quite high and is increasing rapidly. You can also see this in the reports of SIPRI, which is of Swedish origin. One of the main branches of deepening Turkey-Egypt economic cooperation will be military equipment.
Will Turkey be invited to the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum?
While we are talking about cooperation mechanisms between Turkey and Egypt, there is also a cooperation mechanism between Egypt, Southern Cyprus and Greece. Cairo will host these two countries at a summit soon. About four years ago, six countries rivalled Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean; We see Egypt, Israel, Greece, Southern Cyprus, Italy, and Jordan. These countries formed the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. Do you think that the rapprochement between Ankara and Cairo could lead to possible cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, or even, according to some, the motivation to participate in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum? Although Turkey is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Israel is also included in this formation, although it is not a party.
Yes. Not including Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum was a wrong decision from a regional perspective. Because you are creating a regional formation and excluding the most important country in the region, which has a long coastline on the Mediterranean. This was wrong from a geopolitical perspective. However, Turkey was excluded due to the conditions of the period and its aggressive and militarist foreign policy. There is now normalization between Egypt and Turkey. On the Eastern Mediterranean energy issue, both Israel and Turkey were trying to get closer on this issue until October 7. But there is a problem.
Countries in the region were dreaming of sending the gas extracted from there to Europe. This is forgotten. There is a severe green transformation project in Europe. And how much energy and natural gas will it need to come from the Eastern Mediterranean in the long term? I mean long-term, of course. Not now. He needs it right now. So, as Russia continues its war in Ukraine, we know that it is very costly. We know it will take many years. Until this system is established, will Europe need the energy coming from here or not? It is debatable. Already the war in Ukraine continues. Everyone in Europe is looking at Washington right now. What will happen if Trump is re-elected? How will we ensure our security? Therefore, while scenarios were being discussed on how to end the conflict there, the Israel-Hamas conflict began in the region. Therefore, the Eastern Mediterranean issue goes further back in current discussions. Therefore, when we look at it from an energy perspective, I do not think there will be any progress there. But of course, inviting Turkey there could be a good message.
“Egypt will not leave Athens aside just because its relations with Turkey have normalized”
So, while Europe is talking about the Green Deal, the RePower EU plan, and building its future on renewable energy, is the Eastern Mediterranean being left in the background, not in the short term but in the long term?
Yes. It remains in the background, but at the same time, I do not think that Egypt will completely put aside its relations with Greece and Southern Cyprus because of Turkey. Because when you look at the 1990s, Egypt-Turkey relations were quite normal. Since Egypt and Turkey are important actors in the region, there has always been a rivalry. This is something that happens in large regional countries. I’m not saying it’s a superpower.
You say two countries in the race for regional leadership…
Yes, there were always Egypt and Turkey in the race for regional leadership. Egypt suffered serious blood loss after the Arab Spring uprisings. We heard less about Egypt because its economic situation was very bad. Who were the countries we heard about most? Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates… They have a position arising from being economic powers and they are making serious foreign policy moves regarding the region. They make themselves important actors in different conflict environments and are also influential in regional decisions. As you know, Egypt went further back. However, with the Israel-Palestine issue, the importance of Egypt emerged again. They have agreements with Greece and Southern Cyprus. The agreements they make are not only economic and/or political, they also conduct military exercises. Therefore, I do not think that the improved relationship will be put aside in the normalization process with Turkey. However, I don’t think it will be risked. If you remember, when there was serious tension between Greece and Turkey in 2021, while drilling was being done off the coast of Cyprus, relations with Egypt were also very bad. There could be an agreement there. News such as “Egypt was persuaded” was reflected in the press. But then the tension between Athens and Ankara deepened. Compared to Greece and Cyprus, Egypt is in a better position to reach an agreement with Turkey on the maritime border issue. But, as I said, it will not put aside the security and economic relations it has developed in recent years just because its relations with Turkey have improved.
“Libya is the litmus test of Ankara-Cairo relations”
On the other hand, there is the Libya issue. Well, it wasn’t talked about much, but Egyptian President Sisi said, “We have declared our agreement regarding the integrity of the two countries regarding Libya, and we will bring the relations to a better level” in his meeting with President Erdogan. The parties support different groups in Libya. This has already been known for quite some time. The two countries also want to solve the political problem in Libya. Will Libya pose a problem? Or can integrity be achieved? How will the problem there be overcome?
Think of Libya as a litmus test for Turkey-Egypt relations. Because at the end of the day, Turkey and Egypt support different actors. There they became closer to each other than in previous years. While Turkey supported the government in the west, Egypt supported the parliament in the east. After the Berlin Conference, the two sides went to other actors and held meetings with them. A moderate situation emerged. So I think that’s what Sisi said. You know, if both sides start talking to the other side, maybe there will be a rapprochement there.
In the medium and long term, Egypt does not want Turkey’s military presence in its western neighbour. In other words, just as Turkey is disturbed by the presence of America, Iran and Russia in Syria and Iraq with massive military operations and sees them as a security threat, in the same way, Egypt is also seriously concerned about the neighbour of a country like Turkey, which has the second largest army in NATO. It will not be happy with its military presence in the long or medium term. Therefore, in these bilateral relations, if, for example, in 10–15 years there is a situation where a single government will be governed from a single place in Libya, or if Libya becomes two separate states divided into two, then the situation may be different. But Libya is a point where Turkey and Egypt cannot agree. I also want to connect Libya to the Eastern Mediterranean again. When you look from Ankara, the issue is the Eastern Mediterranean issue. Turkey is trying to move away from things that would threaten its power and position in the Eastern Mediterranean, and its hand is increasing again. That’s why there are these normalization efforts. It looks at this from both security, energy and regional power perspectives. A similar situation can be said to be valid for Egypt regarding Libya’s security. Therefore, the phenomenon they see wherever they look in the two capitals is different.
“It’s harder to put together what’s broken than to break it.”
Last question. Can full normalization between Turkey and Egypt be sustained? For example, presidential sources in Turkey say that this situation can bring stability not only to the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean but also to the whole world. There is such a statement. On the Egyptian side, the Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Egyptian House of Representatives says; “There is a very positive situation. However, political relations between the two countries are being rebuilt gradually and cautiously.” What does Egypt hope from Turkey? What does Turkey hope from Egypt?
In Ankara’s general foreign policy trend, strategic autonomy is mentioned, and a multipolar world is mentioned in its region. It must be normal to think that every step taken within that framework, in that imagination, is very important for world politics or geopolitics. But as you said, Egypt is cautious. What does this show us? During the period when Turkey was very problematic when Turkey was constantly showing its muscles, that is, when the military presence was constantly showing, serious fractures occurred. As you know, putting a broken thing back together is more difficult than breaking itself, that is, the act of breaking. Therefore, when you look at the countries in the region, when you look at the whole issue of normalization, rapprochement or freezing the conflict, you see that the other side, not Ankara, is always very cautious. We also saw this in the United Arab Emirates. We also saw it in Saudi Arabia. Likewise in Egypt… In other words, Ankara is suddenly talking about how everything can be fixed as soon as possible. There is such a discourse.
The other side, that is, other Arab countries, Gulf countries Egypt, and even Israel until October 7, were like that… They are more cautious… This shows that these countries saw Turkey as a threat for a long time. They see him as an actor who needs to be paid attention to, and therefore they adopt an attitude such as improving slowly and doing certain things after seeing them. But at the same time, there is a serious change in the world right now. We are moving towards a multipolar world. But the places these countries will take are not clear yet. You know what they say (dedicated to the Greek philosopher Heraclitus) “Everything is in flux”, that’s the situation… Therefore, everyone is very cautious. This includes Turkey, of course. What Egypt expects from Turkey is the continuation of relations in terms of economic and security… As for the Gaza issue, if there is to be a ceasefire, it may be considering receiving the support of a country like Turkey in the ceasefire issue. I guess, when you think about 5–10 years from now, Turkey is one of the countries in the region that can invest in the restructuring of Gaza — Ankara always says this — or Turkey is one of the countries in the region that can do business. Egypt may be thinking of something like that. As you know, there were claims that Turkey could receive immigrants from Palestine. (EN: The Directorate of Communications later denied the claim of 500 thousand immigrants) But we know that Egypt does not want immigrants. Because Egypt has a population of over 100 million, hunger is very common and it is not a country with excess production, but a country that exports in certain areas. Therefore, it is a country whose economic situation is not very good and which cannot continue unless money comes from outside. It will be difficult to receive 2 million immigrants. In that respect, Egypt expects that Turkey does not show much of its military power, there is no constant threat, and relations are good, as was the previous relationship dynamic. However, there will be conflicts of interest as well as cooperation. Because the actors in the region sit in different places in the positions they take. Just as there is cooperation in Turkey’s relationship with Russia even if they support different actors, the same can be true for Egypt. Egypt has no military presence in Syria, Jordan or Palestine. In short, it is about how this relationship, which both parties aim for, can be transformed into a “win-win” model. I think that’s being worked on right now. Trade, security, and energy, are the prominent issues. Erdogan already said this. You know, this is called full normalization in the literature. It’s something that comes from history… However, the competition between these two regional powers will continue…
