The Houthi Movement in Yemen: From Insurgency to Military Coup, 2004–2014

Dr. Abdo Albahesh

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2004, the Yemeni Arab and international mass media reported the news of the battles that erupted between the governmental forces and AL-Houthi rebel movement. Everyone viewed these wars as a walk to the Yemeni government, which disregard the rebellion and believed that it will settle the battle within hours only. However, the reality of the battle proceeded contrary to the expectations of the Yemeni government. AL-Houthi followers bravely fought several months in the region of Maran Mountain and the army faced a great difficulty to overcome them.

The military defeat of AL-Houthi rebels created considerable discontent and added a strong motive for revenge from the Yemeni government. The killing of its leader Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi created a profound effect to move forward to launching new wars against the government which extended from 2004 to 2010. The rebel movement immensely expanded its strength with each new war against the government until the complete control of Saadah governorate and also parts of Amran governorate.

On February 11, 2011, the peaceful youth revolution erupted against the regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who ruled the country for more than 33 years. This revolution was a golden opportunity for AL-Houthi rebels who took part in the revolution and declared their commitment to revolt peacefully. At times, they were able to earn a lot of social groups, and gain influential supporters in several new provinces such as: Dhamar, Ibb, and Mareb, AL-Baidha, Taiz, AL-Hodeida and other governorates.

AL-Houthi Movement participated in the National Dialogue Conference supported by the UN and the Gulf States. AL-Houthis got 35 seats in the Conference the same as the Yemeni Socialist Party (the third major party in Yemen). AL-Houthi followers used their presence in this Conference to woo Yemeni marginalized political groups such as the Southern mobility and the marginalized people. They strongly defended the South issue, and supported the issues of women and human rights, and raised slogans of civil state, equality and justice. They were open to the secular powers, which enable them to earn popularity and beautify their image in the eyes of the Yemeni people.

At the end of the National Conference and under their alliance with former president Saleh, AL-Houthi followers inaugurated their expansionist war and controlled the areas of Dammaj, Kitaf, Hashid, and then headed to Amran and seized it. They declared three goals of their uprising; to topple the price increase, to topple the government, and to implement the output of the National Conference. After that they besieged Sanaa from all its entrances and seized it on September 21, 2014, and dropped the government and controlled the country. They adopted a hostile media speech against Saudi Arabia, carrying out provocative military maneuvers on its border with Yemen. Then they raided the southern governorates and sent military units to Aden to arrest the president Abd-Rabbo Mansour Hadi, which prompted him to ask for help from Saudi Arabia and Gulf states. Indeed, Saudi King Salman Bin Abdul Aziz, announced the storm operation, on March 26, 2015, to support the legitimate government in Yemen against AL-Houthi rebels. Thus AL-Houthi followers entered Yemen into a terrifying scenario of civil wars, and caused in the maritime, land, and air blockades, as well as the bombardment launched by the Arab alliance against Al-Houthis’ coup which was supported by the forces of the former president Saleh.

THE GROWTH OF HOUTHI MOVMENT AND ITS REBELLION

1.1. Definition and Growth:

Before getting into the details of the establishment of AL-Houthi movement and its development in Yemen, it is necessary to give a scientific and realistic definition of this movement. Such definition will give the reader a deep understanding of AL-Houthi movement, which attracted a lot of religious, political and intellectual discussion. As known, this movement took control of Yemen since September 21, 2014, as an authority imposed itself by military force. Such a military coup was justified, in their media, in a major trick called popular revolution. Now, I believe that it would be very useful to review the definitions made by several researchers who studied this movement, and then to provide the procedural definition of the researcher.

1.2. Defining AL-Houthi Movement:

A definition by Ahmed Mohammed AL-Daghshi. “AL-Houthism is that movement or that intellectual, political and armed organization which declared itself in 1990 under the name of The Faithful Youth Forum, as an educational, cultural and political framework, based on a predominant Zaidi sectarian vision, before the movement has turned into an armed military organization.” (Ahmed Mohammed AL-Daghshi: 2006, 6).

A definition by Ali AL-Sadeq “That movement or that intellectual and educational forum, which announced itself in 1990, under the name of The Faithful Youth, as an educational and cultural framework in the beginning. Then it turned into an armed organization since mid-2004, so that AL-Houthis was its title”. (Ali AL-Sadeq: 2010, 9).

A definition by Huda Al-Maliki “AL-Houthi followers or AL-Houthism or The Faithful Youth (as they call themselves) is a religious movement of a political and ideological organization. They are seeking to get the imamate rule back (the monarchic regime which ruled Yemen before the Republic revolution in 1962). They also adopt the ideas of the Ethna Ashri Shiite group (a Shiite group that believes in the twelve infallible Imams who should rule the Muslim nation after the death of the Prophet).” (Huda Al-Maliki: 2010, 4).

A definition by Abul Ezz AL-Yafii “AL-Houthi movement in Yemen is an intellectual organization and a Shiite movement which is derived from is the Zaidi doctrine (a moderate Shiite group). Its seeds started in the late 1970s. It follows the pattern of (Hezbollah) in Lebanon in terms of faith and politics. AL-Houthi followers absorb the ideas of AL-Rafidhah Shiites (the Ethna Ashri Shiites)”. (Abul Ezz AL-Yafai: 2012).

A definition by Hasan Abdullah AL-Hashedi: “AL-Houthism, in its fact, does not represent the Zaidi sect (referring to Imam Zaid Bin Ali Bin AL-Hussein Bin Ali Bin Ali Taleb). But it can be attributed, in its intellectual roots, to AL-Jarudiah (referring to Abi AL-Jarud Ziad Ben Mondher AL-Kufi, who died in 160 A.H, 776 A.D.)”. (Hasan Abdullah AL-Hashdi: 2014, 3).

Another study defines AL-Houthi movement as “a religious group which has emerged from the framework of the Zaidi doctrine in Yemen. It is named after its founder Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi.” (AL-Houthis, the military truth and sources of support: 2015, 2).

Looking at these definitions, there is a lack of consensus on a certain definition of AL-Houthi movement. This is normal since every researcher has defined this movement from his/her own point of view. But the researchers have differed upon the sectarian nature of AL-Houthi movement. Some of the researchers categorize this movement as part of AL-Ethna Ashriah Shiite movement. Others say that it is deviated from the Zaidi doctrine and joined AL-Ethna Ashri Shiite doctrine as a result of its Zaidi Jarudi faith (which is very close to the ideas of AL-Ethna Ashria Shiite sect), which was followed by Badruddin AL-Houthi. Some other researchers perceive AL-Houthi movement as a Zaidi religious movement emerged purely from inside the Zaidi community and is being led by Badruddin AL-Houthi and his family (one of the most prominent Zaidi religious scholars in Yemen). Therefore, this movement cannot be described but a Zaidi movement.

It is natural that researchers have given different definitions of AL-Houthi movement. Every researcher defined it according to his/her understanding of its nature. The difference in defining this movement is common just like defining any similar issue of a controversial nature. Therefore, I believe that it would be useful to provide more comprehensive and realistic definition of AL-Houthi movement.

Here is the definition by the researcher “AL-Houthi movement is that movement which called itself The Faithful Youth at the outset before it changed its name into Supporters of God. It is a religious armed movement. It is extremist and violent in its nature. It has derived its faith from the dogma philosophy of AL-Khomeini revolution in Iran, which works on the principle of exporting revolution to the entire Muslim countries. AL-Houthi movement is focusing at this time on applying the mandate of AL-Faqih (Muslims must be ruled by religious Shiite scholars) in Yemen and parts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, especially the southern region and AL-Hijaz which contain the Holy places of Muslims (in Mecca and AL-Medina)”.

I did my best to give a clear and realistic description of AL-Houthi movement, not as perceived by researchers, or seen by its supporters, or described by its opponents. I gave a precise definition since I am very interested in AL-Houthi movement. I have closely followed the developments of this movement since 2004 (the beginning of its insurgency and clashes with the Yemeni government), the time which made AL-Houthi movement under media spotlight. Here, we can say that AL-Houthi movement is not much committed to the Zaidi doctrine or to the Ethna Ashri doctrine. Rather it is committed to the ideological thoughts of its founder, Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi, and to the revolutionary approach, which was theorized by AL-Khomeini of Iran. Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi criticized the traditional Zaidi references in Yemen, just like AL-Khomeini’s criticism of the religious references of the Ethna Ashri sect in Iran. AL-Khomeini has invented the theory of the mandate of AL-Faqih to get the Ethna Ashri Shiites out of the bottleneck, enabling them to establish an Islamic state instead of waiting for the emergence of Imam AL-Mahdi (the infallible Imam who is still hidden since the death of his father more than a thousand years ago), according to AL-Ethna Ashri Shiites’ belief.

1.3. A Growth of Al-Houthi Movement:

After the revolution of September 26, 1962, which ended the era of the Zaidi Imams (rulers) in Yemen (changing the regime from monarchy to republican system), the Zaidi Shiite doctrine has retreated and witnessed a big recession. At the same time, the Sunni groups were widely spread in Yemen even in the depth of the Zaidi areas such as Dhamar, Sanaa, Amran, and Saadah. The Muslim Brotherhood movement has intensified its activities in these places, and attracted many of the leaders of the Zaidi tribes, such as the late Sheikh Abdullah Bin Hussein AL- Ahmar. Similarly, the Salafist Sunni group (who exactly follow the way of the Prophet and his companions) has actively widened its presence in these areas, establishing Islamic centers in the depth of Saadah province, such as Dar AL-Hadith in Dammag, which is several kilometers away from the city of Saadah, as well as Dar AL-Hadith in Kitaf region of Saadah governorate near the Saudi border.

The spread of Sunni groups in the Zaidi Shiite areas in Yemen has triggered a reaction from scholars of the Zaidi doctrine to face the Sunni expansion in their regions. Therefore, Zaidi Shiite decided to establish a union of The Faithful Youth in 1986, led by Salah Ahmad Fleetah, one of the students of the Zaidi scholars, Majduddin AL-Muaiadi and Badruddin AL-Houthi. It seems that the Iranian support for Shiites in Yemen stands behind their religious sectarian activities. Many sources mention that the former President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was supporting and encouraging The Faithful Youth Union as a strategy to maintain a balance between Shiite and Sunni Muslim in Yemen, and to also protect the Zaidi sect followers. It is also said that Shiite activities returned only with the foundation of AL-Khomeini Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Moreover, courses and materials about the Iranian revolution and principles were taught by Mohammed Badruddin AL-Houthi to The Faithful Youth Union. Salah Ahmed Fleetah and Majduddin AL-Muaiadi were also teaching religious Zaidi materials. (Nayef Bin Saeed AL-Dosari: 2011, 10).

After declaring the reunification of the Republic of Yemen in 1990, the door for parties and political pluralism was widely opened. Here, the establishment of The Faithful Youth Forum was officially declared. This new forum is an extension of The Faithful Youth Union. This forum includes a variety of religious, cultural, political and athletic activities as well as teaching the art of preaching, acting and interviewing in a daily program of three periods — morning, noon and afternoon. This establishment of the forum lasted four years (1990–1994), according to the opinion of one of the founders of the forum. (Ali AL Qutb: 2015).

Based on the consensus of the resources, Saadah province is AL-Houthi movement stronghold, 240 kilometers away from Sanaa. Saadah province is bordering the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It was the stronghold of the Zaidi Shiite sect in Yemen. It has historic symbols associated with the Zaidi Shiite sect in Yemen since 284 A.H., 898 A.D. Many resources confirm that the Zaidi Jarudi Shiite cleric Badruddin AL- Houthi and his sons have devoted themselves to lead AL-Houthi movement, which is attributed to them and is publically called AL-Houthi movement. It took the name of its founder, Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi, though he himself did not call it by this name. (Sultan AL- Dheeb: 2009).

One of those who have been doing research into the history of this movement said that the forum evolved rapidly and its students reached eighteen thousand in the main center and in other centers in Saadah governorate and other governorates. All of the students are males and belong to the Zaidi areas in Yemen. The forum expanded in a few years to become several centers in a number of Yemeni provinces as follows:

24 centers in Saadah

12 center in Hajjah

6 centers in Amran

5 centers in the capital city of Sanaa

5 centers in AL-Mahwit

5 centers in Dhamar

One center in Ibb

One center in Taiz

It is said that the most prominent founder of The Faithful Youth Forum is called Mohammed Salem Ezzan (who was the Secretary-General of the forum), and his friends; Abdul Karim Gadban, Mohammed Badruddin AL- Houthi, Ahmed AL-Razehi and Saleh Habra. Later on, a difference has happened between Mohammed Azzan and Hussein Badruddin AL- Houthi, who imposed himself and his own thoughts on The Faithful Youth Forum. This difference pushed Mohammed Salem Azzan to leave the forum to Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi since the latter has changed the policy of the forum. Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi has substituted the Zaidi moderate curricula by a violent approach derived from the thought of the Iranian Islamic revolution of AL-Khomeini, which is based on the mandate of the AL-Faqih. (Ali AL Qutb: 2015).

The climate of the political and party pluralism, which was followed in Yemen after its reunification in 1990, has provided an opportunity to the Shiite political powers, which are connected with Iran, to establish two political parties — AL-Haq party and the People’s Forces party. Both of them have been working openly in the political field, and receive full support, coordination and guidance from Iran either publically or secretly. At this stage, the new leader of this movement, Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi, was himself one of the leaders AL-Haq party. But he left the party when he realized that achieving his own aims through parties and political work is not feasible. He wanted to regain the power over Yemen and make it restricted to AL-Hashemite family (relatives of the Prophet), not according to the Zaidi imamate viewpoint, but in a new style — the mandate of the AL-Faqih which is embodied in AL-Khomeini Islamic revolution in 1979. (A group of researchers: 2008, 112).

Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi left AL-Haq party as well as his seat in the Yemeni parliament (1993–1997). Then he went to the Sudan to pursue his M.A. study. After his return, he approached another activity. He joined the leadership of The Faithful Youth in 2000. A program called the Quranic program (referring to the Holy book of Muslims) was then inaugurated. This program included a number of radical Shiite lectures under this title of The Quran Huda (the Holly Book guidance). Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi used to deliver his lectures to the members of The Faithful Youth Forum. These lectures incite hatred towards America and Israel. It seemed that Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi has intended to establish his own movement. He found in The Faithful Youth Forum the appropriate means to achieve his ends. Therefore, he imposed his viewpoints on the activities of the forum. This behavior has disturbed Mohammed Ezzan — the secretary-general of the forum and one of the most prominent founding members of the forum. Mohammed Ezzan had no choice but to freeze his activities completely in the forum. Now, the forum was peacefully submitted to Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi in 2002. This man has changed the curricula and political orientation of the forum towards establishing an extremist religious Shiite movement, largely similar to Hezbollah party in Lebanon. This means that Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi was planning in advance to confront the Yemeni government and other Islamic groups in Yemen (Muslim Brotherhood group, Salafist groups) as well as the tribal powers that oppose AL-Houthi’s project (taking control of Yemen in accordance with the Shiite revolutionary model led by Ayatollah Ruhollah AL-Khomeini in 1979 in Iran). (Houthi followers, military truth and sources of support: 2015, 3).

After Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi has taken control of The Faithful Youth Forum, he showed clearly his new approach and curricula. This approach is very identical to the Iranian Revolution (of AL-Khomeini). It is different from the traditions of the Zaidi sect in Yemen. All these transformations happened in mid-2002. It seemed, at that time, that a difference was erupted in viewpoints between Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi and Majduddin AL-Muaiadi. As a result, Hussein Badruddin moved from Saadah to Marran Mountains (his original homeland), according to some. But I think that Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi preferred to emerge from Marran Mountains for many strategic reasons. First, this place is somewhat distant from the authority of the government in Sanaa. Second, the mountains are more secure and very difficult for the army or security forces to attack. Third, this area is an incubator environment for him and his movement which would strengthen his position in case of fighting the Yemeni government. Now the time has come to announce his opposition to the government. He launched his slogan (Allah is the Greatest, Death to America, Death to Israel, curse on Jews, and victory for Islam). He ordered his students to shout this new slogan after all Fridays’ prayers and in each meeting. (Sadeq Abdul Rahman AL-Sanaani: 2013, 8–9).

As we have seen, AL-Houthi movement had put its first brick in 1986. The success of the Iranian Islamic Revolution led by AL-Khomeini in 1979 had encouraged Shiite in Yemen to establish an identical movement. However, the political circumstances at that time had contributed to slow down the growth, development and spread of AL-Houthi movement. The movement passed through several transformations in its rise. The first one was the establishment of The Faithful Youth Union led by Salah Ahmad Fleetah. Secondly, the establishment of The Faithful Youth Forum led by Mohammed Salem Ezzan. Thirdly, the radical transformation of the movement which was introduced by Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi in 2001. The latter imposed himself as a leader of The Faithful Youth Forum and then imposed his own method (a replica of the Iranian Islamic revolution), including this slogan; “Death to America, Death to Israel, the Curse on the Jews, victory for Islam”. Hussein Badruddin has commanded his followers to chorus this slogan after Friday prayers in all the masjids of Saadah, in the great masjid in Sanaa, and during the meetings and celebrations of the movement. That is why Abdul Karim AL-Khaiwani, a journalist, says: “I named the Faithful Youth led by Hussein AL-Houthi as the slogan group before the Yemeni government called them AL-Houthis”. (Abdul Karim AL- Khaiwani: 2011).

1.4. Al-Houthi movement and its rebellion wars:

It seems that war in Saadah was inevitable no matter how the Yemeni government tried to avoid the military confrontation. AL-Houthi movement could not stop at a certain limit regardless any concession given by the government to them. AL-Houthis are simply seeking something larger than a religious, doctrinal and intellectual freedom, something larger than a political partnership. They want something not less than controlling and monopolizing wealth and power. In fact, AL-Houthis are hiding their intentions under the slogans of their grievance, showing that they are marginalized and banned from practicing their religious rituals and preserving their Zaidi cultural identity. They are also accusing the government of importing AL-Wahhabi doctrine (referring to Mohammad Abdul Wahab, a Saudi religious scholar) from Saudi Arabia to Yemen and impose this doctrine on the Yemeni people instead of the Zaidi doctrine. They justify their rebellion against the government saying that the Republican Yemen oppresses the Zaidi component as part of the previous Imamate regime (monarchy). AL-Houthi followers reiterate saying that the government is targeting AL-Hashemite family, excluding them, marginalizing and depriving them of their rights of citizenship. They maintain that the Yemeni government is targeting the Hashemite families in its political discourse which is charged with hatred. (Sabri Mohammed AL-Darwani: 2013, 7).

In the beginning of 2002, Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi announced his slogans against America and Israel, claiming that America is planning to occupy Yemen under the pretext of September 11th attacks in 2001. He confirmed that the US intelligence is the one which has executed these attacks to justify the invasion of Muslim countries. He also accused the US intelligence of attacking the American destroyer USS Cole off the coast of Aden city in order to find a pretext to occupy Yemen. Therefore he ordered his followers to shout the slogan and write it in the mountains. Besides, he asked the then president Ali Abdullah Saleh to allow Yemeni people to shout against the Americans. Moreover, he accused the Yemeni government of its loyalty to America and Israel. (Hussein Badruddin AL- Houthi: 3/2/2002).

Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi continued his escalation against the government, provoking it by an unacceptable behaviors such as the movement’s preparation to face probable US attacks on Yemen. Also, AL-Houthi followers started to perform religious celebrations in Saadah on the occasion of Eid AL-Ghadir, shooting fires on the air. More than this, they started to show their military strength. Here, the government in Sanaa felt that foreign sides are standing behind this organized movement. The number of the movement training centers exceeded 60 centers. These centers affiliated more than fifteen thousand youngsters spread over eight provinces. (A group of researchers: 2008, 181).

What made matters further complicated is the embarrassing situation experienced by the president Ali Abdullah Saleh himself. In his way to perform AL-Hajj duty (pilgrimage) in Makkah in 1424 A.H., 2004 A.D., the President stopped for a while in Saadah city. He intended to give a speech after that Friday prayer to address the Faithful Youth members in AL-Hadi masjid. He wanted to use a polite and constructive language in order to soften the atmosphere and to avoid any confrontation with AL-Houthis, especially when the opposition — Joint Meeting parties — has been waging a fierce media campaign against the government at that time. However, the Faithful Youth members started to shout their slogans directly on the face of the President after the prayers. They did not give an opportunity for the President to talk to them. As a result, the President angrily left their masjid. (A group of researchers: 2008, 182).

Many events proved that AL-Houthi was preparing for a confrontation with the government. He directed to train his followers, build fortifications, dig trenches, and purchase weapons, under the pretext of confronting the American danger on Yemen. Shiites used this pretext to form armed forces such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shiite Dawah party in Iraq during the war between Iran and Iraq. AL-Houthi conditioned carrying guns an essential condition to accept the youth in his radical armed Shiite movement. Regarding the escalation toward a military confrontation with the government, Hussein AL-Houthi used to talk to his followers about the link between the government and America and Israel, and here people must fight the Americans and Israelis as enemies and fight the Yemeni government as pro-Americans and Israelis. (A group of researchers: 2008, 183).

The Yemeni government started to sense the danger of the ideological discourse of AL-Houthis. Such extremist sectarian discourse is largely similar to the discourse of Hezbollah party in Lebanon. In the beginning, the Yemeni government tried to encompass this movement peacefully, especially since the government was the one which sponsored and supported the split of this movement from AL-Haq party. Therefore, the government started to prevent the movement activities, close its centers, and prevent the spread of its ideas among people. The government continued its campaign to close the shops that sell and distribute any booklets and recorded materials of the movement. More than this the government launched a parallel campaign to detain AL-Houthi followers, because of chanting their hostile slogans to the government. Meanwhile, AL-Houthi followers were getting ready for a military confrontation. They were building fortifications in Marran Mountains and stocking ammunition as well as imposing a heavy guard around their leader Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi. (A group of researchers: 2008, 185).

1.5. The first war:

The situation in Saadah governorate had developed quickly toward a military confrontation between the Yemeni government and AL-Houthis after three soldiers were killed in AL AL-Saifi region (in Saha’ar area) which belongs to Saadah governorate. This incident has provoked the Yemeni government a lot. As a result, the security authorities in Saadah governorate decided to summon Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi to hear his testimony on his relation to these events. But he refused to respond to the authority and rejected its order. The then governor of Saadah, Brigadier Yehya AL-Amari intervened personally and contacted AL-Houthis’ leader trying to convince him to attend and to respond to the order of the government. Similarly, this attempt ended in failure. Hence, the president Ali Abdullah Saleh decided to intervene. He sent a delegation to Saadah to persuade AL-Houthi to come to Sanaa to meet him and discuss the matter personally (with a guaranty to secure him). AL-Houthi replied that he will arrive in Sanaa in his own way, fearing that America and Israel could target him. But several weeks passed and AL-Houthi did not come to the Presidential palace as he promised. At times, the average of attacks against security members in Saadah governorate has increased. Hence, the government decided to send a military campaign to Marran region to bring Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi to justice, accusing him of killing soldiers and security members. Indeed, a military campaign headed towards Saadah on 18–06–2016, and engaged with AL-Houthis in a fierce battle. AL-Houthis fought the battle heroically above the expectations of the government which thought that the battle would take only a few hours. It seemed that the government underestimated the abilities of AL-Houthi movement. The battle took much time than expected which put the government in an embarrassing position before both international and local public opinion. (Aref Ali AL-Amri: 2009).

The Yemeni government had to send military reinforcements to Marran region to strengthen its military effort accompanied by an effective media effort. This media exaggerated what was really happening on the ground, accusing Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi of pretending prophecy, or claiming that he is AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar (the expected ruler of all Muslims) and finally of claiming that he is the Imam (ruler) of Yemen. In fact, the last accusation was correct since Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi is applying the theory of the mandate of the AL-Faqih. This theory pretends that Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi is in charge of ruling Yemen in the absence of Imam AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar. Thus, AL-Houthi is supposed to rule the nation and enjoy the same advantages of Imam AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar including his holiness and sanctity. All Muslims, therefore, must obey AL-Houthi’s commands and must fight his enemies. This is a constant faith of the AL-Houthi and his followers whether they declare it or not (even if they deny their faith). They have absorbed this faith from the thoughts of AL-Khomeini revolution. Meanwhile, AL-Houthi tried to mix things up. He declared his loyalty to the President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the republican system in June26, 2004. He said that the difference between him and the government is resulted from its support to America, Israel and Saudi Arabia. In fact, AL-Houthi was politically dodging; his talk was completely different from what he says in his lectures (that Allah has cursed the unjust rulers). He always asks in his lectures how one should obey those unjust rulers. He also wonders how people fear the President more than they fear Allah. In this way, Hussein AL-Houthi considers the President as unjust and loyal to America and Israel and, hence, cursed by Allah. As we have seen, AL-Houthi believes that people must topple the President. He views the obedience to the President as a disobedience to Allah. (Naif Bin Saeed AL- Dawsari: 2011, 80).

The government of Yemen tried its best to reconcile with Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi. Many committees were sent to convince him to surrender himself in return for stopping the war, but all the tries failed. As a result, the war started again between the two sides. The governmental forces were able this time to progress and control the peaks of Marran Mountains. On August 24, 2004, the governmental forces broke into AL-Houthi’s village and headquarters. Here, Abdullah Eidhah AL-Rezami, one of AL-Houthi movement leaders, asked some of the tribal sheikhs to mediate and find a peaceful solution to surrender himself, in return for stopping the fight. But the army was quick to arrive in AL-Houthi’s stronghold and killed Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi on 09–09–2004. The government officially declared the killing of Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi, the leader of the Shiite rebellion in 10–09–2004. Then, a mediation committee succeeded to convince the second man in command of AL-Houthi rebels, Abdullah Eidhah AL-Rezami, to surrender himself to the government to avoid more bloodshed. (A group of researchers: 2008, 192–193).

After the killing of the rebellion leader Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi, the President asked his father, the Shiite cleric Badruddin AL-Houthi, to come to Sanaa and meet him. AL-Houthi, the father, went to Sanaa and stayed there for more than two months, but he did not meet the President, according to what was declared at that time. However, this meeting was held secretly by the help of Ali Yahya AL-Emad, one of the AL- Houthi leaders, who has certain relations with the President. According to some sources, Badruddin AL-Houthi returned angrily to Saadah, because the government neglected him and did not meet his demands. Whatever the case, the return of Badruddin AL-Houthi and Abdullah Eidhah AL-Rezami was a tactic and plan for some purpose. The government considered that conduct as a violation of the signed truce between the two parties. Anyway, the war revealed a number of important things; AL-Houthi rebel movement proved to be solid on the one hand. On the other hand, the government was strongly convinced that no option other than the military action to deal with AL-Houthi movement. The war over AL-Houthi has shown his penetration in the authority and in the ruling party through AL-Hashemite elements who belong to AL-Houthi family and share with him the same faith. (A group of researchers: 2008, 169–194–195).

1.6. The second war:

The second war broke out between AL-Houthi rebels and the Yemeni government on March 28, 2005. It was erupted after the clashes between army patrols and a group of AL-Houthi in AL-Talh market. Some of AL-Houthi rebels were trying buy weapons from this market. Four rebels were killed and three were injured in this confrontation. Some sources said that in this time, AL-Houthi followers tried to transfer the battle outside Saadah governorate. They launched bomb attacks on government officials, but this attempt failed. The rebels also tried to transform the battle to AL-Jawf governorate. But it failed due to the vigilance of the Yemeni government in that area. In this war, the government used military aircrafts and heavy weapons which led to the displacement of a large number of citizens from the areas of fighting such as (Noshour) and (AL-Rezamat) in Saadah governorate. (A group of researchers: 2008, 197–198).

In an official statement, the Yemeni government accused the Zaidi Shiite cleric Badruddin AL-Houthi, of igniting this war which included 20% of the area of Saadah governorate. The clashes extended to areas of AL-Safraa directorate (such as Noshour, Dhahyan, AL Salem), and to different regions in the directorate of Sahaar (such as AL AL-Saifi, Bani Moaath), and to different parts of Jamaah directorate. The commander-in-chief in this war was the Shiite cleric Badruddin AL-Houthi, a political and religious leader of the rebels, and the leaders on the ground were both Abdullah Eidhah AL-Rezami and Youssof AL-Madani. (Aref Ali AL-Amari: 2009). Although the second war was short, the number of casualties was quite large. More than 470 dead and 2,588 were injured, while the resource losses were 600 million US dollars. The war ended on April 12, 2005. AL-Houthi rebels have received a humiliating defeat. The Yemeni government declared that the army managed to control fully the dens of AL-Houthi rebels. In an interview conducted by AL-A Arabia channel with Yehya AL-Houthi in the place of his asylum in Sweden, he said that the government is targeting the Zaidi people in its campaign and the military operations aimed at killing his father Badruddin AL-Houthi in order to eliminate their morale. AL-Murradha AL-Mohatwari also spoke about a war of termination against the Hashemites and Zaidis. AL-Houthi’s discourse aims at justifying their rebellion against the government and an attempt to win over the Zaidi community in Yemen (estimated to be 35% of the population of Yemen). This discourse is considered a change in the quality of AL-Houthis’ media discourse and the quality of intellectual mobilization. It was noted that the area of military operations expanded in compare with the first war which was confined to Marran region. (A group of researchers: 2008, 200–201).

1.7. The third war:

A third war started between the government and AL-Houthi rebels. According to the official sources, in November 28, 2005, a group of AL-Houthi rebels ambushed a military patrol of three vehicles in the area of AL-Khafji area which belongs to the directorate of Sahaar, near Saadah city. This attack has resulted in killing three soldiers and injuring thirteen members of the patrol. In this war, the clashes extended to include 25% of the area of Saadah governorate: Sahaar, AL-Safraa, AL Salem, Saagin, Haidan and Majzer and other areas. AL-Houthi rebels were led by a new leader, Abdul Malik AL-Houthi, who emerged strongly in this war. His father Badruddin AL-Houthi has become old, infected and unable to lead the movement. It is believed that the father chose his younger son Abdul Malik for this difficult task, despite the presence of his older sons — Mohammed Badruddin and Yahya Badruddin. (Aref Ali AL-Amari: 2009).

This war lasted three months. The government used all types of weapons with a heavy use of helicopters in this war. However, the rebels have gripped mountainous chains of 30 km in length, which means that the strength of AL-Houthis is growing. In this war, some tribes volunteered to fight side by side with the government. The intensity of battles was raised during Eid Al-Adha (Islamic holyday), which was explained by AL-Houthis as a deliberate plan to prevent them from celebrating their own Eid, AL-Ghadir day. This Eid (AL-Ghadir) is celebrated only by Shiites on the 18th of Dhul Hajjah according to the Islamic calendar. Yehya AL-Houthi accused president Ali Abdullah Saleh of beating the drums of war after his return from America. Here, he wanted to delude the public opinion that the president took the decision of war from the Americans. (A group of researchers: 2008, 207).

As a matter of fact, the Yemeni government did not want to fight in this war. It tried to bear AL-Houthis’ provocations and initiate peaceful solutions. So, it had commissioned Brigadier Yehya AL-Shami (just after the beginning of the war) to find a peaceful solution with AL-Houthis. Being a Hashemite and one of the Zaidi Shiite group, the government bet on AL-Shami ability to persuade AL-Houthis and solve the crisis. But AL- Shami’s mediation failed. The government has appointed AL-Shami as a governor of Saadah government at the end of the third war, before he was removed from office on charges of complicity with AL-Houthi rebels. It is said that AL-Shami used to release AL-Houthi prisoners and followed a flexible way with the rebels since he was appointed as a governor in mid-February 2006. President Ali Abdullah Saleh tried to ease the anger of AL-Houthis in this war. He ordered to release AL-Houthi detainees on Saadah incidents. He also ordered to release Mohammed Baduddin AL-Houthi and paid salaries for the sons of Badruddin AL-Houthi. On 28–02–2006, the third war was ended with signing a truce between the rebels’ leader Abdul Malik AL-Houthi and Brigadier Yehya AL-Shami by the government. As a result, the insurgency was ended and the military operations were stopped. (The Yemeni strategic report: 2007, 162–170).

Although the war ended after signing the truce, the situation on the ground was still unstable. AL-Houthis kept on repositioning themselves and storing weapons which means that they were preparing for a new war. Their suspicious activities which contradict the agreement had enforced the government to implement several raids and detentions and clashes with AL-Houthis in mi-2006. In this period, Sheikh Saeed Bin Arfaj and Hussein Saleh AL-Kebsi, mediation committee members, were assassinated. Moreover, Salem AL-Sharif, the security officer of Saadah governorate, and Sheikh Yahya bin Hadi AL-Awjari with three of his sons were assassinated. On the other hand, the Presidential election of September, 2006, was around the corner. The President showed great flexibility toward AL-Houthis because he wanted to run the elections without problems. He went to Saadah in his election campaign and delivered a speech vowing that he will address the consequences of the war and called AL-Houthis to return to their homes safely. It seems that there is a secret deal between the President and AL-Houthis through the governor of Saadah, Yahya AL-Shami. This deal has enabled the government to administer the elections without troubles. Thus, we can say that the third war showed the desire of president Ali Abdullah Saleh not to eliminate AL-Houthi movement since he needs them in the political crisis with AL-Eslah party and the Joint Meeting parties (opposition parties). (A group of researchers: 2008, 210–211).

1.8. The fourth war:

The President granted a general amnesty for AL-Houthi rebels in September 2006. He also gave them large amounts of money and cars as an aid to revive their celebration of Eid AL-Ghadir, which is uncommon to the Yemenis before. However, AL-Houthis made many unbearable provocations to the government. In 9–1–2007, AL-Houthi rebels’ leader Abdullah Eidha AL-Rezami attacked a Saudi company working in the construction of an asphalted road in the eastern city of AL-Dhahran, on the Yemeni borders, on the pretext that the road will be used by the Yemeni government to attack AL-Houthi rebels. As a result, the company stopped its work. In mid-January, 2007, AL-Houthi followers gave an ultimatum to the Yemeni Jews in the region of AL Salem in Saadah governorate, asking them to leave during a period of ten days on the charge of serving the World Zionism. (A group of researchers: Nayef Bin Saeed AL-Dosari: 2011, 82).

On the impact of such provocations, the government had taken precautionary measures. It had mobilized military forces to Madhab area. But AL-Houthis launched an attack on these forces causing a great loss of humans and resources. AL-Houthis also sieged these forces and cut off the supplies to them. This incident angered the President who said that AL-Houthis have crossed the red lines, asking them to hand over their weapons. On their reply to the speech of the President, AL-Houthi rebels began to mobilize their forces in preparation for another confrontation. In this war, AL-Houthi tried to expand the circle of the battle. They launched a violent attack on all the fronts and also opened new fronts around the city of Saadah. Hence, the governmental forces opened fire on the rebels using tanks and heavy weapons. The new clashes took place in many areas: Madhab, AL-Mahadher, AL Ammar, Sofyan and other areas. The intensity of the war was increased with the beginning of February 2007 and included most of the regions in Saadah governorate. Meanwhile, the parliament was reconvened to discuss the situation in Saadah and to listen to the report of the National Security Council concerning the developments of the war there. At that meeting, the parliament has approved to solve the problem with AL-Houthi rebels militarily. The parliament held the government responsible for protecting the religious and national constants of the Yemeni people. But what is most baffling is the absence of the parliament in the previous wars. The President alone was responsible for the management of those wars. I believe that the President wanted to involve the parliament in the responsibility of Saadah wars to give legitimacy of those wars and to free him from any trial or judicial pursuit in the future. (A group of researchers: 2008, 213–214).

AL-Houthi rebels justified their fight against the government, saying that it never committed to its pledges; it continues the detention of AL-Houthi followers, disturbing them and checking them at the military checkpoints. But such accusations do not justify their rebellion against the government. Meanwhile, Zaidi doctrine scholars sent a letter to the President proposing to end the rebellion in Saadah. Those proposals included 19 points; all in favor of AL-Houthi movement. On the top of the list of the Zaidi scholars were the Shiite cleric Mohammed Bin Mohammed AL-Mansour, Hammoud Abbas AL-Muayad, Ali bin Mohammed AL-Shami, Ibrahim AL-Wazeer and Murtadha AL-Mohatwari. Their demands were what is called “the victorious demands”. In this war, the government made constant efforts to gain the support of tribal leaders for its military campaign. Those leaders were Major General Ahmed AL-Ashwal, Chief of Staff, Gen. Mutahhar Rashed AL-Masri, the Deputy Interior Minister, Brigadier General Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmar the commander of the military zone and the north-west and the commander of the 1st Brigade. As a result of the pressure of the battle on AL-Houthis, some have tried to mediate and solve the problem through dialogue. But the President rejected any dialogue with AL-Houthi terrorists. This war was ferocious and 20 thousand volunteers entered the fight alongside the army. This war expanded to cover Amran governorate. Moreover, AL-Houthi elements tried to enter the capital, Sanaa, but they failed. Another development in this war was the appointment of Major General Mutahhar Rashad AL-Masri as a governor of Saadah instead of Brigadier General Yahya AL-Shami. Being one of AL-Hashemite, AL-Shami was accused of helping AL-Houthis in their fighting against the government. But the President defended AL-Shami and appointed him as a governor of AL-Baidha which is far away from Saadah. The war continued until the mid of May 2007 — the time of celebrating the reunification day of Yemen (May 22). The battles were slowed down and there were news about negotiations to end the war and resolve the problem. But with the advent of July, the clashes started again and hence the crisis continued without resolution. This time, Qatar decided to intervene and sent a delegation to discuss how to stop the war. The government wanted AL-Houthis to descend from the Mount of Ezzan whereas AL-Houthis demanded the army to withdraw from Bani Mu’adh. The negotiations stumbled at this point and the Qatari delegation left the country. At the beginning of August, the two sides headed toward reconciliation. The Qatari delegation came again to Yemen for another try to solve the problem but in vain. The month of September passed calmly except some minor clashes. However, the months of October and November witnessed a noticeable escalation of the war. In December 2007, the confrontations between the two sides were intensified and both of them used heavy weapons in the battle. The year 2008 started with a relentless cycle of war in a number of districts and the government started to use air strikes. On February 2, 2008, negotiations held under the personal auspices of Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa AL Thani, the prince of Qatar and his son, Tamim. The two sides have signed an agreement called the procedures document and the executive steps. The government was represented by the late Dr. Abdel Karim AL-Iryani, the political adviser to the President and Saleh Ahmed Habra from the side of AL-Houthis. (A group of researchers: 2008, 222–224).

Generally speaking, the fourth war came to an end after four months and a half of fighting. Both Abdul Malik AL-Houthi and Abdullah Eidhah AL-Rezami have emerged as prominent leaders of the rebels in the war. This war was expanded to include 75% of Saadah governorate. That means AL-Houthi rebels’ force is getting ever stronger. According to some press reports, the total casualties among the army and its tribal allies were as follows; about 500 dead, more than 700 were wounded and more than 120 captives. While, 1,200 personnel from AL- Houthi side were dead. (Aref Ali AL-Amari: 2009).

1.9. The fifth war:

The clashes renewed between the army and AL-Houthis rebels in March 2008. A new war was looming on the horizon. Events were accelerated in the direction of the fifth war after the assassination of Sheikh Saleh Daghsan, Member of Parliament (a representative of the ruling party — General Popular Congress). However, the actual war started in May 2008, when a motorcycle was blown up in front of a masjid in Saadah during Friday prayer. In this accident 18 people were killed and about 70 people were injured, many of them belong to the armed forces. The government accused AL-Houthis of standing behind the explosion, while AL-Houthi followers denied and condemned this crime. The clashes extended to Bani Hushish, north of the capital city, Sanaa. This time, war was waged and spread over Saadah governorate and the northern part of Amran governorate — Harf Sofyan area. This a new development in the field which made AL-Houthi insurgents more powerful than before. It is worth mentioning that the wars which were launched by AL-Houthi rebels against the government between 2004 and 2008, have weakened the army forces, while AL-Houthis have become stronger and gained incomparable determination to fight. (AL-Houthis’ six wars: a historical perspective: 2009).

In this war, the Yemeni government used aircrafts and heavy weapons. The fiercest battles were fought in the area of Harf Sofyan. Despite the intensive fire used by the army on the rebels, the government side could not progress and get back Harf Sofyan area. More than this, AL-Houthi rebels attacked the army camps in AL-Jouf province. Here, it seemed clear in the fifth war that AL-Houthis gained more experiences from fighting the previous battles. They have received well military training which enabled them to open new apertures of war to disperse and exhaust the army. Over the years AL-Houthi followers developed their tactics. They returned to Bani Hushish once again after they had withdrew from it. They also tried to reach Sanaa Airport more than once. The Yemeni government seemed unable to end the battle with AL-Houthi rebels despite its recurrent promises to eliminate them. The reality on the ground is contrary to the promises of the government to Yemeni people. Again, AL-Houthis killed two tribal leaders who were cooperating with the government — Naseeb Hadi and Ahmad Abu Hufash. (A group of researchers: 2008, 226).

Battles were escalated in the mid of June 2008, after AL-Houthis’ leader, Abdul Malik AL-Houthi refused the call of the President to end the rebellion (in his speech on the occasion of celebrating the Yemeni unity day, May 22, 2008). AL-Houthi followers continued to cut off Sanaa-Saadah road. What is new in this war is that the Republican Guard forces entered the war for the first time since AL-Houthi followers started their rebellion. The Republican Guard forces won the battle in Bani Hushish area and succeeded to end AL-Houthis control on this area. While fierce battles were going on, the President announced the cessation of war in July 17, 2008, during his speech on the anniversary of his precedency. However, AL-Houthis continued to attack the army forces in Dhahian, Haidan and Marran mountains during the speech of the President. The announcement of ceasefire by the President was a surprise to all — the Government, the army, the people and even the rebels. It appears that the President was fearing that Saadah problem could turn into an international issue along the lines of the South of Sudan and Darfur. One other thing is that the President was likely fearing that he might be accused of war crimes before the international courts in the future. Therefore, he decided to stop this war from one side. The fifth war ended leaving a big loss in resources and humans — 64 dead and 72 injured in Bani Hushish area from the two sides. In Harf Sofyan, the number of casualties were as follows: 68 dead and 17 were injured from the two sides, dozens of homes were destroyed and nearly five thousands were displaced from their homes. In Saadah, 463 were killed and 656 were injured from the two sides; also 46 civilians were killed and about 20 thousands emigrated from their homes. (A group of researchers: 2008, 229).

1.10. The sixth war:

AL-Houthi followers have benefited a lot from the ceasefire declaration of the fifth war. They have also benefited from the marches of the Southern mobility in the south part of the country. These demonstrations added a big burden on the government which is still fighting AL-Houthi rebels in the north. Another event has served AL-Houthis, the invisible conflict in the power hierarchy between President Ali Abdullah Saleh, on the one hand, Major General Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmar and Sheikh Hamid AL-Ahmar on the other hand. It is said that Major General Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmar and Sheikh Hamid AL-Ahmar were feeding the Southern mobility to topple the President who resorted to use AL-Houthi’s rebellion as a political card against them. It is also said that the President was using AL-Houthis to strike the military camps loyal to AL-Ahmar. The goal could also have been to eliminate AL-Ahmar himself on the hands of AL-Houthis, the same as he used Muslim Brotherhood to beat the Yemeni Socialist Party in the war of 1994.

Anyway, AL-Houthis were able to strengthen their stand in Saadah governorate. They gained large quantities of weapons and military equipment and started to proceed military patrols in various areas of Saadah and on the border with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. More than this, they stretched to the governorates of AL-Jawf, Hajjah and Amran, and tried to possess a port on the Red Sea in the region of Midi. Reports revealed that AL-Houthis sought to purchase a piece of land in Midi with the aim to build a private port to import materials, goods and arms from Iran or from other sides. (Nayef Bin Saeed AL-Dosari: 2011, 87).

The sixth war broke out in August 11, 2009, following accusations by the government against AL-Houthi rebels of kidnapping foreigners. This time, the government listed six conditions to stop military operations as follows:

1.The withdrawal of AL-Houthis from all the mountains they are positioning on.

2.Submitting all the directorates to the government.

3.Lifting the checkpoints they have established on all the roads.

4.Ending cutting off roads and stopping destruction as well as submitting civilian and military equipment they seized.

5.Releasing the six kidnapped foreigners as well as the detained citizens in Saadah.

6.Stopping their interference in the affairs of the local authority.

It was expected that AL-Houthi followers will refuse those conditions. Indeed, they refused these conditions and accused the government of killing civilians. (Hisham Abu AL-Majd: 2013).

In this war the government relied on the air force which intensified air raids on the sites of AL-Houthi rebels’ gatherings in the areas of Dhahian, AL-Khabji, AL-Heerah, AL AL-Saifi, Gahr, Marran, AL-Talh, Bani Muadh, Sahar, Haidan, Matrah and other areas. In this war, Saudi aircrafts along with Yemeni warplanes bombed sites of AL-Houthis and destroyed the weapons and military equipment they seized from camps of the Yemeni army through the previous wars. Moreover, Yemeni military units attacked AL-Houthis from inside Saudi lands as a kind of military cooperation between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. This cooperation was the first of its kind in the history of the relations between the two countries. It could be argued that AL-Houthi rebels faced two armies and two states in the sixth war — Yemen and Saudi Arabia. This indicates that AL-Houthi movement has gained a striking force in just a few years. It was clear that AL-Houthi rebels were tightly controlling wide parts of Saadah governorate and a number of military supply ports leading to Saadah city. This confirms that the strength of AL-Houthis was gradually rising with the outbreak of each new war. AL-Houthi rebels have benefited a lot from fighting all these war battles, while the Yemeni government was embarrassed a lot. These wars have negatively affected the army, its prestige and morale. (AL-Houthis’ six wars — historical perspective: 2009).

The sixth war received a great international and regional interest. The news of this war topped newspapers headlines and TV news channel. This military operation was called “the burnt earth”. Secretary-General of the United Nations expressed his concern of the continuation of war in Yemen. The reason for the international, Arab and Gulf attention in this war was because of the direct participation of the Saudi army in this war either on the ground or by using its air force. The Saudi army entered this war after it felt the threat of AL-Houthi movement (which is loyal to Iran in its thoughts, faith, policy and behaviour) on its southern borders. Violent battles took place between AL-Houthi rebels and the Saudi army on AL-Dokhan Mount. The sources said that AL-Houthis had penetrated inside the Saudi land and violent clashes took place between them and units of the Saudi army. During this confrontation, AL-Houthis killed some Saudis soldiers and officers, took many captives, and also looted weapons, military equipment and vehicles. But AL-Houthis withdrew from the Saudi land after Yemeni military units helped the Saudi army in the battles. At last, AL-Houthis were defeated in this war with big losses in resources and humans. That is why Abdul Malik AL-Houthi agreed on the six conditions set by the President at the beginning of the war with an additional condition — the release of the Saudi prisoners and pledging not to attack Saudi Arabia again. On March 20, 2010, President Ali Abdullah Saleh declared the end of “the burnt earth operation”. The President stressed that the cooperation between the Saudi and Yemeni armies has crushed AL-Houthis. He added that external sides encouraged AL-Houthis to attack Saudi territories to send a message to the Saudi government. He maintained that several countries help AL-Houthis financially; by collecting money from Shiites even from Saudi Arabian Shiites. He stipulated that AL-Houthis are dreaming to reestablish the Imamate regime in Yemen. (Nayef Bin Saeed AL-Dosari: 2011, 88–89).

Chapter — II

TRENDS IDEOLOGICAL

AND RELIGIOUS

CELEBRATIONS OF

HOUTHI MOVEMENT

CHAPTER — II

TRENDS IDEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS CELEBRATIONS OF HOUTHI MOVEMENT

2.1. Ideological, Intellectual and Political Trends of AL-Houthi Movement:

Yemen throughout its Islamic history is characterized by the coexistence of two Islamic sects — the Zaidi Shiite sect (referring to Imam Zaid Bin Ali Bin AL-Hussein Bin Ali Bin Ali Taleb, deceased in 122 A.H., 740 A.D.), and the Shafii Sunni sect (referring to Imam Mohammed Bin Edrees AL-Shafii, who died in 204 A.H., 820 A.D). Under the two sects, Yemeni people have been experiencing a life full of political conflict and sectarian differences. Most often, the Shafii majority were ruled by the Zaidi minority. That is mainly because Shafii people tend to peace and quiet life, while the Zaidi ones resort to violence and aggression to dominate the Shafii majority. Many studies indicate that the number of Zaidi people in Yemen does not exceed 35% of the total population. (Ahmed Mohammed AL-Daghshi: 2009, 7).

The ultimate difference between Sunnis and Shiites is about who has the right to govern Muslims after the death of the Prophet Mohammed. The Sunnis consider Abu Bakr AL-Seddiq, Omar Bin AL-Khattab, Osman Bin Affan and Ali Bin Abi Taleb, respectively, as the rightful leaders of the Muslim state after the death of the Prophet Mohammed, while Shiites deny the legitimacy of three leaders — Abu Bakr, Omar and Osman — considering them as usurpers of power after the death of the Prophet Mohammed. Shiites believe that the legitimate leader is the one who was appointed by God and His Prophet Mohammed, Imam Ali Bin Abi Taleb. They claim that Muslims at that time had deceived Imam Ali Bin Abi Taleb and chose leaders who led people astray, and thus diverted Islam from the right path and mixed it with the Jewish faiths. The Zaidi Shiites believe that the leadership of Muslims is confined to Imam Ali Bin Abi Taleb and his sons — AL-Hassan and Al-Hussein. Whereas, the Ethna Ashri Shiite sect sees that the leadership of Muslims is restricted only to AL-Hussein offspring. Anyway, Shiites in general believe that AL AL-Bait group (the Prophet Mohammed, his daughter, Fatima, and her husband Ali Bin Abi Taleb, as well as their two sons AL-Hassan and AL-Hussein) are the ones who must rule Muslims (as one of the Islamic faith origins) . (Adel Nouman AL-Ahmadi: 2007, 25–26).

A debate is taking place in the social, political and media circles, and among writers and intellectuals on the reality of AL-Houthi movement; its faith and its intellectual and political approach. Whatever is said about this movement, it is a Zaidi, Shiite and Jaroodi movement which meets the Ethna Ashri Shiite creed in many ideas. AL-Houthi movement does not hide its loyalty to the philosophy of the Shiite Islamic Revolution in Iran. Also, it does not hide its impression by the personality of the Iranian revolution leader, spirit of Allah, Mustafa AL-Khomeini. This influence is very clear in the lectures of Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi, the founder of AL-Houthi movement (the movement which emerged from the heart of the Zaidi Shiite community in Yemen). (AL-Houthi followers — military truth and sources of support: 2015, 3).

AL-Houthi movement in Yemen, is an extension of a long history of conflict between the Zaidi Shiite minority and the Shafii Sunni majority (which is ruled by the Zaidi Shiite minority). The Shiite imamate rulers (were ruling Yemen before the Republic revolution in 1962) have taken many racial titles; Sayed (Master) which discriminates between AL-Hashemite families and other Yemeni families and tribes. AL-Hashemite families consider themselves nobles and better than the rest of society in the country. These families label themselves “Masters” or “AL-Ashraf”, claiming that they are relatives of the Prophet Mohammad. For this racist reason, they say that they are distinct from the rest of Yemenis (indigenous people of Yemen). (Asheer Orkabi: 2014).

These families believe that they have the right to govern and lead, and Yemeni people must obey and sanctify them. Otherwise, Yemeni people will be regarded as disbelievers, traitors, outlaws or agents for American and Israel. This is a new and old logic of intimidation which has a long history of intolerance and racism. AL-Houthi movement is seen by researchers as a new form of the old style of Zaidi and Jaroodi Shiite. AL-Houthi’s new form is influenced by the view that Shiite minorities must move and carry out the mission, namely, the leadership of Islamic Nation. They believe that God has granted this role to particular relatives of the Prophet Mohammed (descendants of both AL-Hassan and Al-Hussein according to the views of the Zaidi Shiite sect, and to AL-Hussein offspring only according to the belief of Ethna Ashri Shiites). As a result of the pivotal role of the Shiite faith and thoughts in the direction of AL-Houthi movement, the researcher views that it would be useful to shed light on the most prominent features of AL-Houthi movement as well as its intellectual and political trends as follows:

2.1.1The mandate of AL-Faqih and the export of Iranian revolution to Yemen:

Most of the scholars and intellectuals who are interested in the Yemeni political issue realize that AL-Houthi movement won’t have appeared without three things, the theory of the mandate of the AL-Faqih, AL-Khomeini revolution in Iran and its principle of exporting this revolution to Arab and Islamic countries. Without AL-Khomeini Shiite theory, no wars, no rebellion in Saadah, and no military coup would have happened in Yemen. Without Shiite trends and policies, Yemen won’t have witnessed a fierce sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, which is still burning until now. Without such Shiite theory, the Arab Coalition won’t have launched air raids and ground military operations to support the legitimate Government of Yemen.

The death of the eleventh Imam of Shiites, AL-Hasan bin Ali AL-Hadi (called Imam AL-Askari), and the disappearance of his son, the 12th Imam Mohammed Bin AL-Hasan (namely, Imam AL-Mahdi the absentee), have caused Shiites to enter the dark tunnel of the waiting era (or what Shiites call AL-Ghaibah era; absenteeism era). This waiting era (waiting for the absent son, Imam AL-Mahdi, to come out of the tunnel and rule Muslims) is divided into two sections: micro waiting and macro waiting. Othman Bin Saeed AL-Amari announced that he is the door (a mediator between the absentee Imam and Shiites) of the absentee Imam who was absent for his small absence from 260 A.H. to 329 A.H (874 A.D. to 941 A.D.). Then he the fourth door (a mediator between the absentee Imam and Shiites) announced that the Imam will be absent for his big absence, and there will be no contact between the people and him. This notion has led to stagnation in the Ethna Ashri Shiite thought resulting in disrupting Jihad (fighting in the way of Allah) and enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong deeds. Therefore, Shiites had lived centuries dreaming that the Absent Imam will come back and rule Muslims. This kind of thinking had dominated the minds of Shiites until the idea of the mandate of AL-Faqih were applied in Iran. (A group of researchers: 2008, 307–308).

2.1.2. Definition of the mandate of AL-Faqih:

It is an obligation to have somebody called AL-Faqih to lead the nation in the absence of Imam AL-Mahdi until he comes back from his hide. AL-Faqih is expected to meet all the requirement of the leader, who is able to establish the rule of Allah on earth. Imam Ayatollah AL-Khomeini sees that AL-Faqih (the greatest religious scholar) is the ruler who should take the status of Imam AL-Mahdi (the absentee) AL-Maasum (the infallible) with some exceptions. AL-Khomeini said that AL-Faqih is the one who has all the requirements to lead (in the time of the Imam’s absence), such as having the potentials and full powers of Imam AL-Mahdi AL-Maasum (the infallible), the ruler, except the duties of AL-Maasum such as the primary jihad as known to AL-Fugaha (Shiite religious scholars). (Mandate of AL-Faqih: 2010).

Spirit of Allah, Ayatollah AL-Khomeini developed his idea (the mandate of AL-Faqih) into an integrated political theory in his book, The Islamic Government. AL-Khomeini used to deliver this theory to students of Shiite religion to convince them, fill up their minds and prepare them to move and rise from their deep sleep. AL-Khomeini says: “this perception of Islam which is cast in the minds of people and the incomplete format of Islam which is shown by scientific Hawzat (religious teaching centers) aims at looting the revolutionary living property of Islam and preventing Muslims from revolting and establishing the government which will provide a decent life for humans.” (Ayatollah AL-Khomeini: 1999, 44).

Ayatollah AL-Khomeini illustrates AL-Jihad (fighting) for the sake of the mandate of AL-Faqih as part of the Shiite doctrine. He says that “the belief in the necessity of founding the government and the command of the executive power is part of the rule of AL-Fagih. Also the struggle for the rule of AL-Fagih is part of believing in the mandate — you go and clarify Islam to people as it is, show the mandate of AL-Fagih as it is, explain the mandate of AL-Fagih as it is, say that we believe in the mandate of AL-Fagih and that the messenger of God had appointed (by guidance of God) a successor to him to rule Muslims.” (Ayatollah AL-Khomeini: 1999, 57).

Ayatollah AL-Khomeini did his best to stir Shiites and provoke their emotions to move toward changing the political regime in Iran, as Imam AL-Hussein Bin Ali did in Karbala. AL-Khomeini addresses the masses of Shiites saying: “Monarchy is the wrong style of governance. That is why AL-Hussein revolted and martyred in Karbala in order to prevent the establishment of this kind of rule. AL-Hussein revolted and called on all Muslims to rebel against the rule of Yazeed.” (Ayatollah AL-Khomeini: 1999, 48).

AL-Khomeini did his best to establish an Islamic government controlled by AL-Fugaha (religious scholars), who would choose one of them as Wali AL-Faqih (a representative of the real ruler, Imam AL-Mahdi, the absentee). The chosen ruler must be obeyed and listened to as if he is Imam AL-Mahdi — the absentee Imam. AL-Khomeini says: “scientific Hawzat (scholars) today in Mashhad and Gum and other places are assigned to work on showing the reality of Islam and explaining its principles. People do not know Islam. So, you have to present yourselves, your predecessors, your Imams (leaders) and your Islamic government.” AL-Khomeini urges Shiites to topple unjust governments, and then establish fair and just states to serve people. “Reason and Islamic Law do not allow non-Islamic or anti-Islam government to rule. Every non-Islamic System is carrying polytheism since its governor is AL-Taghoot (the tyrant devil one) and our task is to get rid of polytheism from our societies and our lives. Hence, establishing Islamic government aims at protecting the unity of Muslims”. (A group of researchers: 2008, 86).

The Iranian Shiite Revolution in 1979 was launched on the basis of AL-Khomeini theory. On this vision, it was planned to export this revolution to the countries of Sunni Muslims, especially where there are Shiite minority, including Yemen. Yemen occupies a high status in the Shiite’s thought. Ethna Ashri Shiite books mention that there is a Shiite uprising in Yemen these days. This uprising is paving the way for the emergence of Imam AL-Mahdi as expected in Shiite doctrine. All Shiite groups believe in the emergence of the absent Imam AL-Mahdi, but Ethna Ashri Shiite is the most clung group on anticipating his emergence. This group claims that in his emergence, the divine promise (Islam domination on other religions) will be achieved. They claim that he will wage a battle against agents of America and Israel in AL-Medina AL-Monawara (the city of the Prophet Mohammad in Saudi Arabia) and defeat them. Then he will fight his second and major battle in Iraq in which he will defeat the agents of America and Israel there. After that he will enter AL-Guds (Jerusalem) and expel Jews from Palestine. Finally, he will move with his army to occupy the West and spread Islam there. Since then, Islam will dominate all other religions. (Ali AL-Kurani AL-Aamli: 2006, 21–22).

Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi was impressed by AL-Khomeini revolutionary method and loved him a lot. AL-Khomeini has become his daily favorite talk and subject in teaching his students, supporters, friends and relatives in Saadah and around it. He adopted the methods of AL-Khomeini in his lectures to students of the Shiite Hawzats (religious schools) and for the Shiite masses in Iran. But the only difference is that Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi did not convey the same meaning of the mandate of AL-Fagih, to his own Zaidi Jarodi sect as clearly as AL-Khomini was explaining to his students. This does not mean that Hussein AL-Houthi did not mention the mandate of AL-Faqih in his lectures. He did it but in a less obvious way than that of AL-Khomeini, because AL-Houthi was fearing that probably the manifestation of the mandate of AL-Faqih, could cause opposition or rejection from Zaidi Shiites who do not believe in it. (A group of researchers: 2008, 88).

From here, AL-Houthi began to attack some Hadiths (sayings of the Prophet Mohammad) that are mentioned in Sunni books which urge people to obey the President of Yemen even if he is unjust. He started to imitate AL-Khomeini way when he was working against AL-Shah of Iran. AL-Houthi incites people against the President and considers him an agent for America and Israel. He says: “lectures of the Ministry of Culture educate people to obey the President. Such lectures contain unacceptable and unbelievable Hadiths. Such Hadiths speak about the necessity of obeying the President even if he is unjust and ignorant (who is not guided by any guidance or not following the right path), even if he takes peoples’ money, and confiscates their wealth for himself and his family. Even though you should hear and obey, be patient and ask Allah what you think is yours and give the ruler Zakah (charity) and taxation.” (A group of researchers: 2008, 88–89).

AL-Houthi continues his incitement against the Yemeni President and other Sunni Arab rulers. He says: “this is something considered a war against Quran (the Holy book of Muslims), paving the way for American’s agents in the region to control us, paving the way for Jews to rule us. But the handout issued by the Ministry of Culture did not stop in the matter of hearing and obeying the unjust ruler, even if he is unbeliever. Hence you can live under the rule of unbeliever. You will see yourself unable to remove the disbelief. So people will just live in order to live. Rulers lie on people, a very terrible lie.” (Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi: 8/4/2002, 17–18). However, AL-Houthi praises the leader of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Imam AL-Khomeini, and calls him the son of Ali Bin Abi Taleb. He maintains, “In pilgrimage, Muslims began to shout against polytheists, on that day they started to return pilgrimage to its Islamic authenticity. When Imam Khomeini — son of Ali, peace be upon him — moved to retrieve the pilgrimage to its authenticity, those who do not want Arabs rushed to prevent shouting that slogan ( Allah is the Greatest, Death to America, Death to Israel, curse on Jews, victory for Islam).” (Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi: 8/3/2002, 6).

AL-Houthi sees that Ayatollah AL-Khomeini was keen to rid Arabs of humiliation, he says, “ Imam AL-Khomeini — may God have mercy on him — is very keen to liberate Arabs and Muslims from the hegemony of the US and the West, and is heading toward eliminating Israel, but all Arab leaders stood against him. Imam AL-Khomeni was a pious ruler whose pray to Allah is not rejected, as the prophet said in his Hadith (talk).” (Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi: 3/2/2002, 3). AL-Houthi appreciates what AL-Khamenei calls America as the biggest devil and is behind all the evils of the world. (Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi: 3/2/2002, 2).

AL-Houthi has adopted AL-Khomeini theory (the mandate of AL-Faqih), inciting his followers to move against injustice. He says: “the field is a field of great conflict, people struggle with word, struggle with money, struggle with pen, struggle with sword, struggle with various kinds of weapons they can get, struggle for building the Imams’ leadership (religious Shiite leaders), struggle to destroy enemies of Allah in the way of Allah, because Imams love Allah and Allah loves them; they seek Allah’s satisfaction in their struggle. The greatest nation starts Jihad (struggle) for Allah until victory is achieved on its hands. People are not going to Jihad in order to get rifles, money and other things. However, people in the days of 1962 revolution (in Yemen) were Royals and Republicans at the same time. A man of them goes to Royals and says I am Royal, give me a gun to fight with you, and goes on the second day to Republicans and says I am Republican, give me a gun to fight with you. Such people are mercenaries who want living (as the Royals and Republicans themselves described them). However, other people are eager to strive and fight in the way of Allah, and they fight against enemies with their property and their selves. They do not fear any kind of blame or warning because they had reached the point of not fearing death, not fearing those who threaten to kill them, or those who would ridicule them for imposing themselves on death. But because they are fighters in the way of Allah and are looking for martyrdom”. (A group of researchers: 2008, 92).

AL-Houthi incites against his opponents whom he considered opponents of Islam. In his lecture, The Scream in the Face of the Oppressors, he said, “When we talk about this issue and the necessity to have a stand, do we feel a sense of fear in our depths? From who? Of course many are afraid of talking about America and Israel, Jews and Christians. But who we fear from? Is any one of you afraid of America? No. Is any one of you afraid of Israel? No. From who do you feel afraid? Who is the one you feel afraid of when talking about America or Israel, when cursing Jews and Christians. If we feel deeply in ourselves that we are afraid of the government, we are witnessing in our depths that this government is a guardian of the Jews and Christians. In the soul lie facts and seeds of the person, and there, be the seeds of freedom.” (A group of researchers: 2008, 93).

Here, we find that AL-Houthi incites his followers to rebel against the government which is an enemy of Islam since it is an agent and loyal to America and Israel. This is similar to AL-Khomeini style, who instigated the Iranians to revolt against AL-Shah (of being an agent for America and Israel and an enemy of Islam). AL-Houthi really admires the revolution of AL-Khomini. He tries to import this revolution to Yemen. AL-Houthis are sharing the same ideologies and objectives of AL-Khomini. (A group of researchers: 2008, 93). Iran as an imamate reference (Shiite leadership), has clear objectives. It is planning control all the Islamic land based on the mandate of AL-Faqih. On their part of the plan, AL-Houthis aims at seizing Yemen and the Arab Peninsula, especially Mecca and Medina (where the holy sites of all Muslims). Both, Iran and AL-Houthis believe that they are the ones who must control the Holy sites in Saud Arabia considering Saudi rulers as enemies of Islam and agents of America and Israel.

Imamate is confined to the house of the Prophet (relatives of the Prophet) Like other Shiite movements, AL-Houthi movement believes in the divine right of the relatives of the Prophet to rule Muslims and lead them in all fields of life (political, religious and economic, cultural, social, military and educational issues). This divine right is limited to the descendants of both AL-Hassan and AL-Hussein according to many Shiites groups (such as the Zaidi group), but the Ethna Ashri group believes that the right to rule is limited to the descendants of AL-Hussein only. Apart from the subsidiary differences between Shiite groups, they all agree on the imamate of Ali Bin Abi Taleb and his children from his wife, Fatima Bint Mohammed (the Prophet), and no right for any other Muslim to rule Muslims. AL-Houthis strongly believe that it is Allah Who has chosen the relatives of the Prophet to rule Muslims. This is mentioned in the lectures of Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi (the movement founder). He focuses on the eligibility of Imam Ali Bin Abi Taleb and his children from Fatima to lead Muslims (on a racist basis). (Nayef Bin Saeed AL-Dosari: 2011, 37).

According to Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi, Yemeni people must be led by the relatives of the Prophet whose titles are AL-Sayed (Master) for males and AL-Sharifa (the Pure woman) for females. However, in fact, such racist titles are not given by Allah. Hence, Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi builds his theory on the view that the relatives of the Prophet are pure and other Muslims are stained with shame, saying: “Didn’t we say in another setting that pride is ours since relatives of Mohammed are our model not those who are stained with the shame of opposing the Prophet of God (God’s blessing upon him), of doing mistakes, of bad behaviour and bad attitudes.” (Nayef Bin Saeed AL-Dosari: 2011, 37).

Through the theory of Imamate (the right to rule), Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi is trying to prove the legitimacy of his movement to rebel against the Yemeni government and to uproot it; “to restore the right to its owners and the sword to its scabbard”. He means that the right of descendants of Ali to rule Yemen for the last thousand years (before the revolution of 1962). He addressed his followers that “although Imam Ali died before 1400 years, we are still under his mandate. If people are ruled by any other party rather than the mandate of Ali, the problem will continue and the solution will be lost. We Shiites must understand that we must not allow ourselves to be loyal to those who have demolished this nation.” (Hoda AL-Maliki: 2010, 13).

In the intellectual and cultural document of AL-Houthis dated 10/02/2012, he confirms the eligibility of the imamate and presidency in the sons of Ali Bin Abi Taleb (AL-Hassan and AL-Hussein and their descendants). He stipulates that, “the ruler after the messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him) is his cousin (the prince of Believers), Ali Bin Abi Talib, then AL-Hasan and AL-Hussein, and then their sons such as Imam Zaid, Imam AL-Qassem Bin Ibrahim, Imam AL-Hadi, Imam AL-Qasem AL-Ayani and Imam AL-Qassem Bin Mohammed and then those Imams who follow their method. Guidance, surviving and safety from error is to uphold two classes, the Book of Allah (the source of guidance and light), and the smaller class, relatives of the messenger of Allah (the guides of nation) as a parallel to the Book until the day of judgment (Almighty told me the two classes will not depart until they come to AL-Hawdh — a pool of purified water specified only for righteous people on the day of Judgment), and they are the Arguments of Allah on earth. The promotion of virtue and prevention of vice, fighting unjust rulers, and standing against the oppressors are of the greatest religious duties imposed on all people. People must be loyal to Awlia Allah (pious people who are beloved by Allah) and must fight the enemies of Allah such as leaders of disbelief, America and Israel and their supporters who stand against Islam and Muslims.” (Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi and others: 24/03/2012).

AL-Houthi document adopts the approach of the racist Imamate. This means that AL-Houthi movement explicitly declares the coup on the republican system in Yemen; on the Yemeni Constitution and democracy, which allow any Yemeni person to compete for the post of President and enable the political parties to take power through free and direct elections. This document clearly reflects that both AL-Houthis and AL-Zaidis have the same ideas and visions. They view that the leadership is confined to the descendants of Ali Bin Abi Talib. The document was written by Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi and signed by a group of Zaidi jurists — Hussein Yehya AL-Houthi, Abdul Rahman Shaim, Hussein Magdedin AL-Muaidi, Ali Ali Masoud AL-Rabedhi, Mohammed Mohammed AL-Mansour and Hamoud Bin Abbas AL-Muaiad. This document is a clear message to the Yemeni political parties that all groups of Shiites are united against their historical enemies — Yemeni tribes and Sunni groups — which reject the right of Shiite Imams to rule the country.

It seems that the idea of Imamate is deeply rooted in the culture of AL-Houthi family. Dr. Qassem Salam, Secretary-General of the Arab Socialist Baath Party, mentions that Badruddin AL-Houthi claimed Imamate (his right to rule Yemen) during the reign of Imam Yahya Bin Hamid AL-Deen, but Imam Yahya put him in jail until he stopped this claim. After the revolution of September 26, 1962, Badruddin AL-Houthi alleged Imamate again and launched a fierce war against the Republic in Saadah governorate, but the Republic triumphed over AL-Houthi and his followers at that time. So AL-Houthi was enforced to abandon the idea of Imamate at that stage. (Qassem Salam: 2011). All these events clearly revealed the tendency of AL-Houthi family to apply AL-Khomeini Shiite theory in Yemen by force as a way to achieve their political ambitions.

In his speeches, Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi, the current commander of AL-Houthi movement, used to mention the Imamate. Accordingly, mandate and Imamate are synonymous which give one meaning — the divine right of AL-Houthi family to lead Yemeni people, guide them in various public life. Abdul Malik AL-Houthi’s speeches emphasize Imamate as a divine principle: “leadership is one of the most important principles in Islam, the Holy Quran included this principle and gave it the utmost importance. Imam Ali (peace be upon him) is introduced in the text of AL-Ghdir (a place where Imam Ali was appointed as a successor of the Prophet to lead the Islamic nation). Imam Ali was introduced to this nation, as a student of the Prophet Mohammed. Imam Ali really embodies the complete and high model in our life; a trustee model that connects between the nation and its Prophet (prayers of God be upon him and his relatives). Imam Ali is a great model in the school of Islam (in its course, symbols, sanctuaries and values). Imam Ali (peace be upon him) is introduced by the Messenger of God, in many religious texts, to this nation including his high qualifications of faith. Imam Ali represents the fullest believer who can do this important role (ruling the nation) after the departure of the Prophet (God’s prayers be upon him). Imam Ali embodied the complete belief and perfection, among the nation of Mohammad, at all levels (principles, ethics, values, science and knowledge level), and at the level of the required qualifications that suite the nature of the major responsibility (ruling the nation).” (Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi: 13/10/2013).

We note that Abdul Malik AL-Houthi speaks about the leadership of Imam Ali Bin Abi Taleb as a central pillar in reforming and guiding the Islamic nation to the right path. AL-Houthi asserts that this nation is doing wrong and skewing the right path. AL-Houthi faith entails that if Muslims want to be connected with God and his prophet Mohammed, they must choose the rulers from the descendants of Imam Ali, i.e. selecting AL-Houthis in Yemen as leaders being the sons of Ali Bin Abi Taleb. Accordingly, Yemeni people must hear, obey and submit to AL-Houthi. AL-Houthi deems that ruling nation is a right given by Allah.

AL-Houthi’s claim of his right to rule Yemen people means an absolute control over Yemeni people, which completely contradicts the principles of justice, freedom, human rights and equal citizenship. It also contradicts the Yemeni constitution, the laws and regulations in force, the options of democracy and political pluralism, the elections and national partnership between the political powers. It is known that AL-Houthis are lying to us. Now they are speaking about justice, freedom, democracy and human rights. But after taking power, they will turn over these slogans, exert dictatorship, inclusiveness, injustice and tyranny. They will use their claims of the divine right to rule people and apply their theological illusions, which are exceeded by the human mind for hundreds of years.

On the basis of what is mentioned above, we can say that AL-Houthi family is absolutely an Imamate even if they hide their faith for political considerations. It is clear that Badrddin AL-Houthi was the first Imam of the family. The second imam was Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi, the founder of AL-Houthi movement, who was killed in the battles of the first war against the government in 2004. The third Imam is Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi, the current commander of AL-Houthi movement. According to AL-Houthi faith, those imams enjoy the powers and functions of the infallible Imam (AL-Mahdi) and the Prophet Mohammed, except one thing (they are fallible) — according to the theory AL-Khomeini (mandate of AL-Faqih), which AL-Houthis try to apply in Yemen.

2.1.3. AL-Houthi Followers and AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar:

AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar is the 12th Imam according to the faith of the Ethna Ashri Shiites. They claim that his name is Mohammed Bin AL-Hasan, son of Imam №11, AL-Hasan AL-Askri. His surname is AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar (the absentee Imam). According to Shiite faith, he is guided (Mahdi) by God and is expected to appear in order to change the world. He was born in Shaaban 15, 255 A.H. corresponding 29/07/869 A.D. His father died when he was only five years. He disappeared directly after the death of his father by an order from Allah. The Ethna Ashri Shiites claim that he is still alive, and he will appear when Allah give him a permission. He will be authorized to spread justice and true guidance on the earth after it is filled with oppression. AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar recognized by the entire Islamic doctrines, the Sunnis and the Shiites. But the Sunnis do not give any importance to him and his expected appearance. However, the matter is different to Shiites, particularly the Ethna Ashri group. All Shiites are eager to his emergence. They have great hopes on him to fill the earth with justice and light. That is why many Shiites name their sons Mahdi (as a good omen). (Ali AL-Kurani AL-Aamli: 2007).

AL-Houthi movement in Yemen is a Shiite movements largely similar to Hezbollah militia in Lebanon, led by Hassan Nasrullah. It is obvious that AL-Houthi movement is much influenced, in its faith, by the issue of Imam AL-Mahdi. It is also influenced by the theory of AL-Khomeini, the leader of the Shiite Revolution of Iran, which is based on the mandate of the Imam of all times — Imam Mohammed Bin AL-Hasan AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar. Several studies mention that Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi brought to Yemen (during his visit to the city of Qum in Iran) a large number of this book, The Era of Emergence, by the Shiite author Ali AL-Kurani . After his return to Saadah, he started to distribute copies of this book to his followers. That is why the government accused Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi of allegedly calling himself AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar. (Sultan Bin Barak Bin Ayedh AL-Otaibi: 2014, 85).

The government had proved the impact of AL-Mahdi creed on AL-Houthis. The security forces found a document with one of AL-Houthi followers, named Fares Musfer Salem, who resides in Saqain, a district in Saadah governorate during the first war. This document is a pledge of allegiance to Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi as the absolute leader and the real AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar. The document reads: “I witness that Mr. Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi is the argument of Allah on earth in this decade. I pledge allegiance, before Allah, to Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi, I will hear and obey him as a ruler; fight those whom he fights and be at peace with those who stand with him. And he is AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar who will fill the land with justice as it is filled with injustice. He showed us the right path to survive, and clarified the Book of Allah to its best. We ask Allah to resurrect us with him in the Day of Judgment.” (Ahmad Ayedh: 2016).

The book of The Era of Emerging by Shiite cleric, AL-Qurani, shows the period in which Imam AL-Mahdi is supposed to appear as alleged by Shiites. The author speaks about a series of events and regional and international developments, which are considered global preparations for the emergence of AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar. According to AL-Qurani, the most prominent events are the preparing revolutions such as AL-Khomeini Shiite Revolution in Iran and Al-Yamani revolution in Yemen, particularly in the capital of Sanaa. The author allocates a full chapter on Yemen’s role in the incidents that would lead to the emergence of Imam AL-Mahdi. This vision confirms that a severe conflict, chaos and killing will happen in AL-Hejaz (part of Saudi Arabia) until the appearance of AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar in Mecca. People there will pay homage to him as a ruler and will support him. In the meanwhile, Al-Yamani will be the first one, among the owners of banners (army leaders), who will pay homage to him. Al-Yamani will fill the political vacuum in AL-Hejaz area. (Ali AL-Kurani AL-Aamli: 2006, 12).

It seems that AL-Houthi movement had been highly affected by the contents of this book, The Era of Emerging. It was also influenced by the way and style of AL-Khomeini Shiite revolution in Iran. This book speaks about Yemen and its role in facilitating the emergence of Imam AL-Mahdi. The book praises the Yemeni revolution and its leader AL-Yamani, who is called Hussein or Hasan, son of Imam Zaid Bin Ali Bin AL-Hussein Bin Ali Bin Abi Taleb. The book tells that AL-Yamani is coming out of the village of Karah, in Khawlan Bin Amer region in Saadah governorate, whose banner (army banner) is the nearest to the truth (which supports AL-Mahdi). The author praises the commander AL-Yamani, describing his banner as the banner of Hoda (guidance). Some believe that Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi thought himself AL-Yamani (who is mentioned this book). As a result, he rushed out to have the honour of being AL-Yamani who will pay homage to the Imam AL-Mahdi and receive guidance from him. This honour inspires every Shiite believer who is eager to meet Imam AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar — not less in Holiness than the prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him). (Ali AL-Kurani AL-Aamli: 2006, 117).

AL-Qurani keeps praising the role of AL-Yamani revolution in supporting AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar. He says that AL-Mahdi will rely on the Yemeni and Hejazi people during his appearance in Mecca, and most of his military forces will be Yemenis. The book also speaks about the role of AL-Yamani and his followers in supporting Imam AL-Mahdi in the battle to control Iraq. As the book narrates, AL-Yamani will enter Iraq and defeat AL-Sufiani army, an agent of the Americans and Israelis, with the help of the Iranian army. Then AL-Mahdi heads to AL-Sham (Syria) where AL-Sufiani had mobilized all his forces; but Imam AL-Mahdi and his Yemeni and Iranian army will win this battle. (Ali AL-Kurani AL-Aamli: 2006, 119). Details are mentioned in this book about the decisive battle between Imam AL-Mahdi army and AL-Sufiani army which is backed by the Jews and Christians. This great battle will happen in the area of Akka in Palestine to Antioch in Turkey coastline, and from the Sea of Galilee to Damascus and Jerusalem. In this battle, divine anger will down on AL-Sufiani army, on Jews and Christians, then Muslims will kill them. Even if one of them hid behind a rock, the rock will call Muslims; come and kill this Jew. The divine victory will come down on Imam AL-Mahdi who will enter Jerusalem.” (Ali AL-Kurani AL-Aamli: 2006, 16).

Such ideas would probably have affected AL-Houthis. They say that the events and changes that are happening today on the Arab land, are divine preliminaries for the emergence of Imam AL-Mahdi. It also seemed that Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi was influenced a lot by these prophecies, and thus he rushed to raise the slogan (Allah is the Greatest, Death to America, Death to Israel, curse on Jews, victory for Islam). He believed that this banner is the banner of guidance mentioned in the book (the era of emerging). He also believed that he is Imam AL-Yamani, who will come out in Yemen will fight against the government and win the war. Then he will enjoy the privilege of meeting Imam AL-Mahdi and take instructions from him. Finally, it is worth mentioning that this faith in Imam AL-Mahdi AL-Muntadhar is pure Shiite faith especially AL-Houthi ones.

2.1.4. The attitude of AL-Houthi followers towards AL-Sunnah doctrine:

AL-Houthis’ attitudes towards AL-Sunnah doctrine is part of the Shiites attitude in general as a result of the historical conflict between the Sunnis and the Shiites. Both groups hate and insult each other. This conflict started after the death of the Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him), and worsened with the pass of time.

AL-Houthi movement in Yemen is a new version of the Shiite extremists led by Ayatollah Ruhollah AL-Khomeini of Iran. It is known by its extremism and intolerance toward the Sunni Islam and Sunni Muslims. Badruddin AL-Houthi, the spiritual father of AL-Houthis, speaks frankly about the corruption of AL-Sunnah doctrine because they were repeating the word Amen after reading Al Fatiha (the opening section in Quran) in their prayers. He asserts that no one from the scholars of AL AL-Bait (the relatives of the Prophet of the prophet) did so in their prayers. Therefore, AL-Houthi attributes repeating the word Amen to AL-Nwasib (Sunni Muslims) whom he calls enemies of the Prophet and his relatives. He also considers saying Amen in prayers as an evidence of the wrong deeds of tyrant and untruthful people (Sunni Muslims). (A group of researchers: 2008, 64).

Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi, is no less strict than his father in the attitude toward AL-Sunnah. He shares the same doctrine with his father (Shiite Zaidi and Jaroodi doctrine which is very close to the Ethna Ashri Shiite creed). Moreover, he has become Shiite hardliner against Sunnis, and against their historical leaders such as Abu Bakr AL-Seddik, and Omar Bin AL-Khattab, Osman Bin Affan, Mu’awiyah Bin Abi Sufyan and other Caliphs of Bani Omiah, Bani Abbas, AL-Ayubis and the ottomans and, in general, all of the Sunni leaders in the past and present. Hussein AL-Houthi directs his arrows towards the Sunni symbols, considering Mu’awiyah bin Abi Sufyan as an evil of Omar Bin AL-Khattab and Othman Bin Affan is an evil of Abu Bakr Al Seddiq. AL-Houthi focuses in his hatred on Omar Bin AL-Khattab, considering him the planner of the whole process — the pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr in the saqifah of Bani Saedah (their house) after the death of the Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him), which made Abu Bakr the ruler of the then Muslim State. Hussein AL-Houthi sees putting Abu Bakr in power was a big mistake and a coup against the relatives of the Prophet, especially Imam Ali, who was supposed to take the lead. According to AL-Houthi, Imam Ali was the legitimate Imam since he was recommended from God and His Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him). (Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi: 8/1/2002).

Hussein AL-Houthi continues his attack on AL-Sunnah followers targeting their symbols, describes the pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr AL-Seddiq as an endless evil. He stresses that Muslims still suffer from the effects of that Pledge; Muslims are still suffering from putting Abu Bakr AL-Seddiq in power after the death of the Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him). He describes the precedency of Abu Bakr as a big catastrophe which caused all Muslims’ problems. AL-Houthi accuses the Sunni symbols of killing Fatima Bint Mohammed (Peace be upon him), daughter of the prophet of Islam. He says that she died coercively not because of losing her land of Fadak (Shiite claim that Omer Bin AL-Khatab took her land) but because Nation of Islam is ruled by a partner to the Jews and Christians. He also accuses the Sunni successors of the Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) of violating Quran, disobeying the Prophet Mohammed and insulting Islamic nation. As a result, AL-Houthi deems loyalty to the Sunni symbols such as Abu Bakr, Omar and Osman, is a desecration of God, since they do not deserve to rule Muslims. Hence, according to this view, it is not proper for Moslems to obey Sunni leaders or even pray to them (as they pray to Mohammed and his relatives). (Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi: 13/1/2002).

Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi continues his fierce attack on Sunni people, accusing them of killing Ali Bin Abi Taleb and his sons. He compares those who killed Ali and his sons with the Jews who killed their own Prophets. He does not differentiate between Sunnis and Jews. AL-Houthi accuses Sunnis of trying to distort Quran. If not Allah had saved the Holy Quran, Sunnis would add Suras (sections) to Quraan different from what came from Allah (section of Mu’awiyah, section of Aishah, section of Abu Bakr, section of Osman). AL-Houthi moves to another chapter of accusations against Sunnis. He accuses Sunni scholars of taming Muslims for the Jews. He describes Sunni jurists as bad scholars because they use Quran and Islam as a means to serve the Jews and Christians. They tame Muslims for America and Israel under the pretext of preserving the unity of Muslims and the obedience to Presidents and kings. These jurists are the jurists of evil in the eyes of AL-Houthi. (Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi: 17/1/2002).

AL-Houthi attacks the Sunni symbols and mocks their leaders. He focuses in his offensive attack on the personality of Omar Bin AL-Khattab and the foreign policy he adopted in fighting the Roman Empire in the north-west of the city of AL-Madinah AL-Munawarah and the Persian Empire in the north-east of the AL-Madinah AL-Munawarah, at the same time. Although Omar Bin AL-Khattab achieved a historic miracle and stunning victories on the two fronts, the Roman Front and the Persian Front. Omar Bin AL-Khattab had fully crushed the Persian Empire and managed to seize AL-Sham (the Levant) and Egypt and took them from the hands of the Romans. But Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi is still mocking Omar and Sunni armies who fought in these battles. He describes them as hypocrites, sluggish, laggards and retarded, inactive people in fighting in the days of Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him). In the views of AL-Houthi, they gave up, left and slowed out in their fight during the time of the Prophet in the battle of Tabuk, but they ambitiously rushed in fighting the war during the succession of Omar Bin AL-Khattab. AL-Houthi describes Islamic victories at the time of Omar as a black point in the history of Islam, and it is better not to praise those breakthroughs. What happened, according to AL-Houthi, was a big loss to Islam because of Omar. If Ali Bin Abi Taleb was the leader, Islam would have been predominant. AL-Houthi believes that Omar Bin AL-Khattab and his companions are the ones who softened Muslims of today, made Muslim nation underdeveloped and backward. (Abdullah Mohammed AL-Sanaani: 2006, 122–125).

AL-Houthi goes on in his extremist views and sectarian hostile against Sunni people and their leaders especially their political symbols, describing them as people of shame since Jews do not fear them. According to AL-Houthi, Jews fear Shiites only, particularly relatives of the Prophet and sons of Ali Bin Abi Taleb. AL-Houthis have always been chanting the courage of Ali Bin Abi Taleb, his strength and experience in combat, his strictness with Jews in the battle of Khyber. However, AL-Houthis repeat, on all occasions, that Abu Bakr AL-Seddiq took the banner on the first day of the Battle of Khyber but escaped and fled the Jews. On the second day, Omar Bin Al-Khattab took the banner but he also escaped fearing the Jews. Here, the Prophet had raged at them and gave the banner on the third day to Ali Bin Abi Taleb, who fought bravely and killed Marhab — one of the bravest Jewish Knights. Then he progressed toward the Jews’ strongholds and opened their fortresses and hence achieved the victory of Muslims against Jews. Through this story, AL-Houthi wants to say that Abu Bakr and Omar were cowards. This description can also be applied to Sunnis in general. Moreover, he wants to say that relatives of the Prophet, namely sons of Ali Bin Abi Taleb are the bravest ever, and this description can be applied to Shiites in general. (Abdullah Mohammed AL-Sanaani: 2005, 94).

AL-Houthi is increasingly showing his anger and hatred toward Sunnis in general. He does not distinguish between the rulers or the ruled. According to him, all are negligent, conspirators with America and Israel against Islam. He says that the majority of Sunnis did not do anything against America and Israel. However, Shiites (Hezbollah party of Lebanon) tormented Israel, raised the flag of Islam and forced Israel to escape from Lebanon. In the meanwhile, Sunnis were only spectators and did not do anything against Israel. AL-Houthi goes on in his indignation on Sunnis. He compares between Sunni leaders and one Shiite leader only who won the battle against Israel. Sunni regimes, he says, are loyal to America and Israel. He accused them of taming or submitting the throats of Muslims to Americans and Israelis. (Nayef Bin Saeed AL-Dosari: 2011, 72 and 73).

AL-Houthi’s view of the Sunni communities is full of hatred, irony and contempt. This view is overloaded with accusations against Sunnis of being agents of the Jews and Christians (loyalists to America and Israel). He says that they are responsible of all the disasters that happened to Muslims throughout history. AL-Houthi’s propositions would lead to violent clashes between Sunnis and Shiites. They could establish a long sectarian war between Shiites and Sunnis since Sunnis will not surrender to Shiites after all these provocations. Shiites are targeting many of Sunnis’ vital interests, their institutions and charity associations, not to mention muzzling their mouths, confiscating their properties, closing their centers, preventing them from practicing their activities, arresting them and killing many of them. All of these kinds of oppression constitute a strong impetus to stimulate Sunnis to avenge AL-Houthi Shiites when given the opportunity. This means that Yemen is heading toward a long-term sectarian civil war.

2.1.5. The attitudes of AL-Houthi followers towards America and Israel:

AL-Houthi Shiite Movement was founded on a religious, intellectual, revolutionary and extreme basis. It is based on the strong hostility and excessive hatred against Jews and Christians in general, and against America and Israel in particular. Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi justified the foundation of this religious, armed and extremist Shiite movement because of what he called the conspiracies woven by Jews against Islam, and the US-Israeli interventions in Muslim countries. He claims that Americans and Israelis are preparing to attack Yemen. In response, he prepares to face this possible invasion, through restructuring an armed, religious and extremist organization full of enmity and hatred to the Americans and Israelis.

The slogan of AL-Houthi movement reflects the hardline position and hostile to the Americans and Israelis. The slogan says (Allah is the Greatest, Death to America, Death to Israel, curse on Jews, victory for Islam). AL-Houthi followers also raise another slogan; (boycott American and Israeli goods), though there is no US and Israeli goods in the Yemeni markets, and there is no commercial relations between Yemen and Israel. But AL-Houthis insist on lifting the slogan in their celebrations, in their political, religious, cultural activities, perhaps for hidden objectives. Such objectivities are political propaganda to mobilize the masses to support AL-Houthi movement, or at least to accept AL-Houthi rebellion on the government. (Maisar AL-Sardiah: 2015).

The slogan is an idea to gather people around AL-Houthi movement, and attracts those who carry enmity and hatred for America and Israel. This slogan is rooted to 1979, the beginnings of AL- Khomeini revolution in Iran, who raised the slogan “Death to America, Death to Israel, death to Shah, death to those who oppose the mandate of AL-Faqih”. Such slogan has had its profound impact in the conscience of Iranian people, and then extended its influence to Shiite conscience throughout the Islamic world (in Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Kuwait, Pakistan and the eastern part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), where there are Shiite gatherings. This means that AL-Houthis derived their slogan from AL-Khomeini revolution with some amendments to it to cope with the social and political environment of Yemen and the political developments in the region. (Duaa Sweidan: 2015).

AL-Houthi followers are trying to introduce Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi, the founder of the movement, as a savior of Muslims from the evil of America and Israel. They say that Hussein AL-Houthi sensed the danger of Israel and America on all Muslims. In his reply to the US President, George W. Bush, after 2001, he said: “We should be in the camp of Islam, not in the camp of atheism”, (Duaa Sweidan: 2015). Also, AL-Houthi decided to repeat the slogan as the weakest faith on the face of the American campaign on Muslims in Afghanistan. Since then the slogan was heard for the first time in Jan. 17, 2002, in Imam AL-Hadi masjid in Marran region, Saadah governorate. AL-Houthi claimed (that day) that the slogan contradicts the Americans’ plans, and disclose the Americans’ lies regarding their allegations of democracy and human rights. (Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi: 17–1–2002).

AL-Houthi followers firmly believe that Israel is a cancerous gland which must be uprooted from the region, just as Ayatollah Ruhollah AL-Khomeini said. Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi supported the suggestions of AL-Khomeini that America is the biggest devil and Israel is a smaller one. AL-Houthi says that America and Israel are two sides of the same coin. He believes that he is in war with America and Israel, and that this war is not new, but rooted in the wars of the Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) with Jews. The conflict with America and Israel in the doctrine of AL-Houthi is an eternal conflict. He says: “we want to fight America and Israel. We want to face the enemies of God. They are moving inside the Islamic countries and now they are on the coasts of our country. We want to encounter them. We know that all Muslims are targeted; America and Israel are plotting against Islam and Muslims”. (Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi: 17–1–2002).

Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi views that Zionism is plotting against Muslims for 100 years, and Israel is insulting and killing Muslims. Hence, the duty of Muslims is to curse Jews as Allah, His messengers and pious people do. Muslims accordingly must know what Jews and their supporters are doing. AL-Houthi accuses Jews of plotting to control the pilgrimage sites and occupy Mecca as they occupied Jerusalem. He confirms that America is heading the global coalition against terrorism; and terrorism according to the Americans is Jihad which is mentioned in Quran (Arab leaders signed to omit the word Jihad from Quran). He confirmed that Americans fabricate excuses to strike those who oppose them — Shiites. AL-Houthi also assures that Jews know their real enemy and know who constitutes a real risk to them, namely, Shiites of Hezbollah, the Islamic Republic of Iran. He describes Jews as enemies, malignant, plotters and malicious since they use Christians as tools. America became a tool in the hands of Jews to beat any region they want under the pretext of fighting terrorism, especially relatives of the Prophet Mohammed. AL-Houthi accuses Jews of trying to spoil the minds of Muslims in order to weaken the Islamic nation. (Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi: 17–1–2002).

AL-Houthi mentions that Shiites and the relatives of the Prophet are the ones who are fully aware of the Jewish schemes to eliminate Islam. He addresses Shiites to move and confront the Jewish danger and do not fear America and Israel. He orders his supporters to shout against America and Israel. AL-Houthi asks Shiites in Yemen to be the initiators in shouting the Shiite slogan. AL-Houthi used all the means available to convince Shiites in Yemen to shout against America and Israel. Jews are cursed in Quran, and they deserve to be cursed as a revenge for the Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him). AL-Houthi says that Shiite slogan is an attitude towards the Americans and Israelis, who are trying to degrade the nation of Islam and distort its religion and culture. He also accuses the Americans and Israelis that they want to govern Arab countries and controls their outlets and wealth. Hence, AL-Houthi stresses the importance of raising the awareness of the slogan and to be ready to confront what he called enemies of Allah, America and the Israel. (Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi: 16.11–2002).

AL-Houthi stresses on opposing America and Israel, as a religious duty, since they are enemies of the Islamic nation and enemies of Allah. AL-Houthi incites his followers to US ambassador in Sanaa. He describes his moves as suspicious, accusing him of practicing pressure on the Yemeni government to force AL-Houthis to stop shouting their slogan. AL-Houthi believes that the slogan is frightening America and Israel, undermining their plans and impedes their movements inside Yemen; the Americans are trying to spoil the Yemeni society through the creation of bars in Sanaa, in Aden and in different Yemeni cities. All that aims to spread wine publically in Yemen. AL-Houthi says that the Americans seek to withdraw the weapons from the Yemeni market, and disarm Yemenis to make it easy to control the wealth of Yemen and control everything. He confirms that America is looking for excuses to interfere in Yemen. They are the ones who blew up the U.S. destroyer Cole on the shores of Aden, blew up the French ship on the coasts of Hadramaut. They are the ones who are exploding in Sanaa and other places to find excuses to intervene in Yemen. AL-Houthi confirmed that the slogan protects Yemeni society of being agents for America and Israel. Because when Yemeni people shout against American and Israel, no one would dare to be an agent for them, and hence. (Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi: 16.11–2002).

AL-Houthi incites his supporters to fight the Americans and the Israelis, and to sacrifice themselves and their money to fight the Americans. Otherwise, America will use them in its own wars. It is a consistent policy of the Americans and Israelis to make Muslims kill each other. AL-Houthi ensures that shouting the slogan is an easy and effective weapon and can be used by everyone. It does not cost anything but to shout in a minute or two, once or twice a week. He says that shouting the slogan is a declaration of enmity towards the Americans and Israelis. He adds that it is God Who ordered to fight such enemies, not only to shout against them because anyway these enemies will fight Muslims whenever they have the required potentials. AL-Houthi views that Muslims should fight Jews and Christians until they are enforced to pay taxation (a divine order mentioned in the holy Quran). (Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi: 16.11–2002).

AL-Houthi warns Yemeni people in general and his supporters in particular of Americans and Israelis and their sinister plans against Yemen. He argues that Americans support and use AL-Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Yemen, in order to intervene in these countries under the pretext of fighting terrorism. While, in fact, they are the ones who created AL-Qaeda and used it as an intelligence tool to intervene in Yemen and other Muslim countries. It is Jews who are running America and are behind all the evil and mischief in this world. Jews are the strongest among people in enmity to Islam and Muslims; They do not want Muslims any good. AL-Houthi commends Ayatollah AL-Khomeini in the strongest terms, because he was heading to eliminate Israel but Sunni Arabs stood against. Therefore, AL-Houthi considers America, Israel and Sunni Arab governments as allied against Shiites who want to liberate Arabs and Palestine from the American and Israeli hegemony. AL-Houthi accuses Arabs, especially Yemenis, of being shallow in their vision, since they are deceived by Israelis’ fake truces, negotiations and reconciliation (fake peace and peace slogans). AL-Houthi asserts that America would deceive Yemenis by the fake promise of building modern government if they kept silent and stopped raising and chanting the slogan (as it did with Afghans). AL-Houthi is pride of his enmity to America and Israel and thinks that he is doing the right thing. He deems the friendship with the Americans and Israelis a betrayal of Islam and Quran (disobeying God and His Prophet Mohammed, Peace be upon him). (Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi: 16.11–2002).

The current commander in chief of AL-Houthi movement, Abdul Malik Badruddin, shares AL-Khomeini’s hostile attitudes towards America and Israel. He adopts the same approach of AL-Khomeini, the same approach of his father Badruddin AL-Houthi and his brother Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi. Abdul Malik is convinced that the takfiris (AL-Qaeda, Islamic State, Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists and their supporters from Sunni groups) are part of the Israeli plan which targets the Arab region. He considers these groups as criminal tools driven by America and Israel. He also views that the Saudi government produces and funds terrorist groups to serve Israel and America. These groups, according AL-Houthi, are drowning the Islamic nation in internal conflicts and wars (saving Israel of any danger). He speaks about the close cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and between Israel and what he calls takfiri groups. AL-Houthi confirms that Israel is the greatest evil in the region. AL-Houthi defends the Iranian intervention in the Arab region, saying that the Iranian revolution has created a popular awareness in the Arab world against Israel. It is the right policy of AL- Khomeini revolution which adopts hostility toward Israel and supports the Palestinians and Lebanese against the Israeli occupation. AL-Houthi claims that Israel has encouraged the Saudi regime to attack Yemen and destroy it, since Israelis deem Yemeni people as more dangerous on Israel than the Iranian nuclear program. (Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi: 10–07–2015).

AL-Houthi continues his verbal war on Israel. He considers Israel as unjust and conceited state which relies on the open support of the U.S., on the complicity of the Arab governments, and on Arab civil conflicts and sectarian wars. AL-Houthi claims that such conflicts and wars are planned by the US and Israeli intelligence. As a result, he incited Muslim masses against Israel asking them to revive the Palestinian issue and spread hostility to Israel and America (by organizing demonstrations, activating the boycott of American and Israeli goods). He also urges Muslims to support and fund Palestinian fighters (the ones who can make a real victory against the Israeli occupation). AL-Houthi followers celebrate the occasion of AL-Quds world-day every year (on the last Friday of Ramadan), according to the Islamic calendar. In this day, their leader, Abdul Malik AL-Houthi delivers a public speech in which he pours his anger on America and Israel. He incites Muslims to free AL-Quds from the Israeli occupation. AL-Houthi followers stage demonstrations in the Yemeni cities after Fridays’ prayers, chant hostile slogans to America and Israel. This occasion became a Shiite annual occasion, enacted by their spiritual leader, Ruhollah AL-Khomeini. (Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi: 25–07–2014).

2.2. The Celebration of Shiite Religious Occasions:

With the rise of AL-Houthi movement, its extension and deployment (its military growth and political strength), the current generation in Yemen witnessed, for the first time in their lives, the celebrations of Shiite religion. These occasions are linked to the Islamic Hijri calendar; the Prophet Mohammad’s Birthday, AL-Ghadir day, Ashura day, the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Zaid bin and AL-Quds World day. It is worth mentioning that these occasions are celebrated by the Ethna Ashri Shiites (Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Shiites in Iraq and Iran). This confirms that AL-Houthi Shiites are influenced by these Ethna Ashri Shiite groups. Besides, AL-Houthis added the celebration of the martyrdom of Imam Zaid (taken from the Zaidi sect heritage), which is no celebrated by the other Shiites groups. (Amal AL-Saifi: 2014).

AL-Houthi movement revive several religious ceremonies for political goals only, not for the sake of Allah or love of Mohammad, AL-Hussein and AL-Quds, as they claim. Politics is a dirty game and AL-Houthis are more excellent and brilliant in this game than their historical opponents — Sunnis. AL-Houthis are so smart in employing religious occasions politically. They gather people in their religious occasions, and use media very well to serve their goals. They exploit occasions to show the grievance of their religious symbols and to collect money from merchants, businessmen and general public. AL-Houthis also use these occasions to entreat and win Yemeni masses to their side. Moreover, they invest their occasions to spread their thoughts and ideas among the masses to make such ideas familiar and acceptable to Yemeni people. It is also clear that AL-Houthis are using these activities to show their strength and deliver a message to the Yemeni political parties, the region and also to the world. (Mustafa Hassan: 2014). Here, I believe that it would be useful to shed light on the most prominent events which revived by AL-Houthi followers along the Islamic Hijri year, as follows:

2.2.1. The Prophet’s birthday memory:

It is the day on which the Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) was born, Rabee AL-Awal 12, the elephant year, corresponding 571 A.D. So many Muslims, Sunnis and Shiites celebrate this day, but AL-Houthis have their special way of celebration. They decorate the streets and residential districts with green and white colors, and also stick Shiite slogans on the walls of houses, on the governmental buildings and automobiles. They also gather in the public squares in the big cities such as Sanaa’s and Saadah. They provide the squares with big screens and speakers of high capacity in order to listen to the speech of their leader Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi. They allocate yards for men, and other yards for women, because AL-Houthis do not allow gender-desegregation. About tens of thousands of AL-Houthi movement supporters are gathered in the allocated squares in different cities such as Sanaa and to Saadah at the same time to celebrate this day which lasts from afternoon to dusk. Perhaps one of the most prominent thing in this occasion is AL-Houthi’s speech. He speaks about the importance of the birth of the Prophet, who led mankind out of the darkness of disbelief to the light of Islam. AL-Houthi always asserts the need to follow the example of the Prophet Mohammed and his path. But he exploits this occasion to send political messages to his opponents as well as his allies and friends. The crowds at these squares repeat slogans against America and Israel and pro-Hezbollah and Iran and Shiites everywhere. AL-Houthi followers recently added shouting slogans against Saudi Arabia and Islamic Sunni parties. (Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi: 23.12–2015).

2.2.2. The anniversary of the Eid AL-Ghadir:

AL-Houthi followers annually celebrate AL-Ghadir Feast on Dhu’l-Hijjah 18, of Islamic Hijri calendar. All Shiite sects believe that the prophet Mohammad had selected Ali Bin Abi Taleb as his successor to rule Muslims; a leader and guide for them. Shiites claim that in this day, the Prophet Mohammed had addressed his followers in the 18th of Dhu’l-Hijjah, in the tenth year of his Hijrah (his trip from Makkah to AL-Madinah), in the valley of Khumm, near a water stream between Mecca and Medina (during his return from his farewell pilgrimage, accompanied by tens of thousands of Muslims). Shiites say, in this day, the Prophet said, those who follow me must follow Ali Bin Abi Talib and those who stand against Ali stand against me too; Oh God, support who stands with Ali and fight who fights Ali. Shiites consider that occasion a clear pledge of allegiance to Ali Bin Abi Taleb from Allah and His Messenger, to become Muslims’ ruler after the death of the Prophet. This is a pure doctrinal Shiite celebration, because Sunnis do not recognize this feast and falsify Shiites’ claim that the Prophet Mohammed had chosen Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib as a leader after his death. Therefore, AL-Houthi followers celebrate this day to prove their presence and consolidate their faith, in order to legitimize their movements and activities. They want to prove that it is AL-Houthi who should take power in Yemen since he is a descendant of Ali Bin Abi Taleb. (Muadh Ahmed: 2015).

This feast celebration starts from the night of Dhu’l-Hijjah 18. AL-Houthi followers intensively shoot fireworks in the sky over Sanaa city and Saadah. The manifestation of joy continues until the morning. AL-Houthis’ movement leader, Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi delivers his public speech speaking about the greatness of this occasion and the importance of the mandate in the life of Muslims. He believes that the mandate (the political and religious leadership) is confined to Ali Bin Abi Taleb his offspring. AL-Houthis’ movement leader finds himself qualified for this role at this time. He used to send political messages during his speech. He always reiterates that when Islamic Nation went away from its real leaders (relatives of the Prophet), it was dominated by America and Israel, and their agents in the region (such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries and Islamic Sunni groups). (Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi: 13.10–2013).

2.2.3. The anniversary of Ashura:

It is the tenth day of Muharram according to Muslim Hijri calendar. In this day, AL-Hussein Bin Ali Bin Abi Taleb (the grandson of the Prophet Mohamed, peace be upon him) was killed in the battle of Karbala on Muharram 10, 61 A.H. corresponding 12–10–680 A.D. Therefore, Shiites consider this day a day of grief and consolation. It is the day of mourning the death of Hussain; Shiites beat themselves out of the severity of sadness. Millions of Shiites arrange marches in the Iraqi city of Karbala, also in Lebanon, Iran, Bahrain and Yemen. They glorify AL-Hussein and his self-sacrifice to the religion of Islam, and curse Yazid Bin Muawiyah, and all those who participated in the murder of AL-Hussein in the strongest terms. AL-Hussein is the third Imam at various Shiite sects, born on Shaaban 5, in the fourth year of the migration, corresponding 626 A.D. (Saleh AL-Kerbasi: 2007)

After AL-Houthis have grown and become stronger, Yemen witnessed the revival of the occasion of Ashura. AL-Houthi followers march in huge demonstrations in the capital of Sanaa and other main cities, raising slogans, Labaik ya Hussein (Oh Hussein, we are here at your service). They employ this occasion to arise enthusiasm amongst Shiites in Yemen and push them to rebel and sacrifice just as AL-Hussein Bin Ali did in Karbala did. These rituals are largely similar to these of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian and Iraqi Shiites. (Mustafa Hassan: 2014).

One of the most important manifestations which are held by AL-Houthi followers in this occasion is the speech of Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi, in the evening of Ashura, which receives great interest from Shiites in Yemen. They consider this speech as a source of inspiration and guidance for them. AL-Houthi usually starts his speech by greeting peace on AL-Hussein, then on Ali Bin AL-Hussein. After that AL-Houthi speaks about the horror and the size of the disaster, which has happened to Muslims as a result of the killing of the Prophet’s grandson (AL-Hussein) by tyrants and oppressors. AL-Houthi offers condolences to Shiites on the occasion of the martyrdom of AL-Hussein, to the degree which makes the follower of the Speech imagined that AL-Hussein was just killed two or three days ago, not before more than 1370 years ago. The truth is that AL-Houthi is deliberately provoking sectarian fanaticism. He is in war with Sunnis and the most he needs is to spark anger and resentment among Shiites towards Sunnis. AL-Houthi is linking in his speech between what happened in Karbala at that time and what is happening now in Yemen. He sees himself in the position of AL-Hussein and his opponents in the position of Yazid Bin Moawiyah. (Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi: 25.10–2015).

Most often AL-Houthi launches attack on Arab and Islamic governments, describing them as agents, betrayers, dirty tools of the criminality and tyranny of Yazid (which is represented nowadays by America and Israel). AL-Houthi takes advantage of this occasion to condemn America and Israel which dominate the wealth of Islamic Nations, control them and spoil their sanctuaries (according to AL-Houthi Speech). This type of political propaganda makes AL-Houthi an Islamic hero in the eyes of those who are deceived by his speech. AL-Houthi exploits this occasion to convince others that his program is the only solution for all the problems of the Islamic Nation. AL-Houthi wants all Muslims to embrace the thoughts of AL-Khomeini to escape from the Israeli-US domination. In clearer words, AL-Houthi wants all Muslims to become Khomeini Shiites and believe in the leadership of AL-Khomeini to release them from the domination of America and Israel. AL-Houthi also recalls the history of the sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites (the battles that took place between Muslims at that time). This is a speech of war preparation against Sunnis in Yemen. He described the war launched by Saudi Arabia as a US war. This war, he said, is decided by America and its ally — Israel. AL-Houthi says he is determined to face his enemies, whatever the sacrifice is. He says that he follows the path of AL-Hussein; the path of fighting the tyrants, arrogant and unjust. (Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi: 25.10–2015). It is clear from his speech that the main objective behind celebrating Ashura is to gather Shiites and mobilize them against their Sunni opponents. It is a golden opportunity to inflame Shiite enthusiasm, to aggravate them, and to push them into the battles and civil war in Yemen.

2.2.4. Anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Zaid:

It is the martyrdom of Imam Zaid Bin Ali Zain AL-Abidin Bin AL-Hussein Bin Ali Bin Abi Taleb, who was born in the city of Madinah, 75 A.H., corresponding 694 A.D. Imam Zaid Bin Ali was brought up in the arms of his father and his brother Mohammad AL-Baqer. They taught him Islamic faith. He was martyred on 2–2–122 A.H., corresponding 7–1–740 A.D. (AL-Murtada Bin Zaid AL-Muhatwari AL-Hassani: 2014, 5). In the era of the Omayyad Caliph Hisham Bin Abdul Malik, Imam Zaid was known for his strong enthusiasm and revolutionary ideas against Omayyad rule. He gained support of people and majority of AL-Alaween (who are loyal to Ali Bin Abi Talib) chose him a ruler. But his revolution failed and ended by his death in Kufah city in Iraq. His followers have founded a Zaidiya state in Tabarstan, AL-Dleim land and Iran, which was ended after a short period of time. Then, Imam AL-Hadi Yahya Bin AL-Hussein established another Zaidiya state in Yemen, which continued until the revolution of 26/9/1962. (Sultan Bin Barak Bin Ayedh AL-Otaibi: 2014, 10).

The celebrating of this is unique to AL-Houthi Shiites. Other Shiite communities do not recognize the lead of Zaid Bin Ali. However, AL-Houthi followers found themselves obliged to celebrate this anniversary because they are living in a Zaidiya sect environment (a social incubator for AL-Hputhis). Therefore, they had to revive this occasion to win the hearts of Zaidi people and to gain their loyalty. AL-Houthis managed to make them revolutionary, intolerant and extremist movement. Such movement adopted violence and rebellion and hence cannot live peacefully with other political forces or with other doctrines especially Sunni groups. AL-Houthi movement seeks to control the political scene in Yemen along the lines of AL-Khomeini’s revolution in Iran.

Although Imam Zaid was killed in Safar 2, 122 A.H, AL-Houthis celebrate this occasion at the end of Muharram every year according to the Hijri calendar. AL-Houthi followers raise red flags labeled “those who love life live humiliated” — a phrase said by Imam Zaid during his revolution against Caliph Hisham Bin Abdul Malik. AL-Houthi followers gather in large halls in the capital of Sanaa or in the squares and camps which are erected specially for such celebrations (provided with large screen and speakers of high-capacity and quality). Hence the public can see and hear AL-Houthis’ lengthy speech. In this occasion, he focuses on the grievance of Shiites (as well as that of the Prophet’s relatives). He describes the revolution of Imam Zaid as an extension of the revolution of Imam AL-Hussein (grandfather of Imam Zaid) and an extension of the principles of Islam. AL-Houthi narrates that Imam Zaid has lined great lessons in his sacrifice, glory and pride for generations to come. Likewise, Muslims are required to sacrifice and get rid of the tyranny and oppression of America and Israel. AL-Houthi stresses that Islam is not just worshiping rituals but a revolution against injustice and tyranny. In his speeches, AL-Houthi always draws a picture in the minds of people that leading Muslims is a religious monopoly on his family. This means that no individual Muslim, other than the descendants of Ali Bin Abi Talib, is entitled to rule Muslim nation. This reflects the extreme racist culture they adopt, which does not have any relevance to humanity. (Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi: 06–11–2015).

AL-Houthi considers those who compete with him and his family in political or religious and even in secular issues, are criminals, astray, tyrant and aggressors. He frightens common people from supporting his enemies, which will bring them the discontent of Allah and hence losing oneself in this world and the hereafter. AL-Houthi ensures that the duty on Muslims is to advocate him, follow and obey him because he is a son of the messenger of Allah. In his latest speech, AL-Houthi accused AL Saud (sons of Saud, rulers of the Saudi state) of deviation from Islam and denied them any relevance to Islam because of their alliance with America and Israel. He also attacked Sunni scholars, accusing them of assisting unjust and tyrant rulers. The biggest problem is that AL-Houthi speaks of injustice and tyranny and he is not aware of the crimes he and his group are committing against their opponents. In such occasion, AL-Houthi used to employ revolutionary concepts, glory, dignity and freedom in his speeches in order to touch the feelings of the masses. He often reiterates the same concepts, ideas and phrases in his speeches. In most occasions, his speech becomes more important than the occasion itself whether people realize this truth or not. (Abdu Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi: 06–11–2015).

2.2.5. The anniversary of AL-Guds World day:

It is the last Friday of Ramadan in accordance with the Islamic calendar. It is a special day for Palestine, celebrated by Shiites in response to the call of Imam AL-Khomeini, four months after the success of the Iranian Islamic revolution in 7–8–1979. AL-Khomeini has announced a general appeal to all Muslims to make the last Friday of Ramadan as the Day of solidarity with Palestine. He considered this day as an occasion for vulnerable people to express their existence and to face their oppressors. In a statement issued by Ayatollah AL-Khomeini in this occasion, he warned Muslims of the danger of Israel and invited them to celebrate this day and stand with the legitimate rights of Palestinians. AL-Khomeini emphasized that AL-Qus World Day is an expression of rejecting the occupation of Palestine and a call to release it from Israeli tyrants. (Mohammed Abdel Fattah: 2013).

The call of Imam AL-Khomeini to all Muslims to commemorate AL-Quds World Day was rejected in the Arab and Islamic countries of Sunni majority. Moreover, this call increased the anger and resentment against AL-Khomeini in the Sunni circles. Sunni Muslims hate AL-Khomeini who is a symbol of Shiites’ sectarian fanaticism and awful racism. In States with majority Shiite or where there is a certain proportion of Shiites, this occasion witnesses huge public marches and ceremonial manifestations such as Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria. Shiites are keen on celebrating AL-Quds World Day to meet the call of Imam AL-Khomeini (Shiites’ inspirational leader who awoke them from their deep sleep). Sunni people believe that AL-Khomeini wanted to make a strife between the Arab peoples and their rulers rather than liberating Palestine. Therefore, there is a considerable debate among Sunnis and Shiites on the celebration of AL-Quds World Day. (Muslim Mohammad Gawdat AL-Youssef: 2016).

Yemen witnessed the celebration on this occasion in the past few years, which coincided with the rise and spread of AL-Houthi movement. AL-Houthi movement exerts great efforts to revive this occasion, by printing pamphlets, posters and banners on the eve of the last Friday of Ramadan. AL-Houthi movement followers gather from all the regions they live in, and come to listen to a public speech delivered by the movement leader. In his speech, he confirms the importance of supporting oppressed Palestinians, AL-Aqsa Masjid and Holly places. AL-Houthi used to attack the Security Council, the United Nations and Arab governments for neglecting the Palestinian issue and doing nothing against Israel. He urges the Islamic nation to take responsibility to free Palestine from the Israeli occupation. He calls people to go out to the streets and squares to demonstrate against the Israeli occupation. He also focuses on the importance of generalizing discontent and hostility against the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian and Lebanese people. (Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi: 25–7–2014). AL-Houthi followers go out in huge public marches to support the Palestinian people and condemn Israeli crimes against them. In these marches, AL-Houthis used to shout their slogan; death to America, death to Israel and curse on Jews. They call for the liberation of Palestine and the boycott of Israel. All these activities clearly show the extent to which AL-Houthis adopt AL-Khomeini Revolution in Iran.

CHAPTER — III

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL

RELATIONS OF AL-HOUTHI

MOVEMENT

CHAPTER III

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF AL-HOUTHI MOVEMENT

3.1. The Relations of AL-Houthis Movement with Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah:

All through history, the relations between Arabs and Iranians are characterized by tension and conflict in most cases, due to the clear difference between the two nation in terms of language, culture, traditions and ethnicity, in addition to the border problems and areas of conflict. Ideological disagreement increases the tension and animosity between Arabs and Iranians; a large majority of Arabs embrace Sunni Islam, while the majority of Iranians embrace Shiite Islam. In the modern age, Iran occupied AL-Ahwaz Arab state in 1925, and then occupied three Emirate islands in 1971. Now, Iran is openly intervening in the affairs of Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. (Omar Khalifa Rashed: 2014, 1).

With the fall of AL-Shah and the success of AL-Khomeini Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the Iranian Arab relations entered a new phase of political tension. Iran started to export its revolution to the Arab world through exploiting Shiite minority, and moving them against their governments and the interests of their countries. Iran uses these Shiite minorities, under sectarian religious slogans, as a tool for its regional expansion and influence on the Arab States. Now the day has come, Iran announces that it controls four Arab capitals, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, and Sana’a. (Omar Khalifa Rashed: 2014, 1).

The relationship between AL-Houthi movement and Iran shows the new policy of Iran which is based on the principle of exporting its revolution. This relationship goes back to 1979, the date of the success of AL-Khomeini Islamic revolution in Iran. Some studies mention that Saadah city witnessed demonstrations supporting the Iranian leader Ayatollah AL-Khomeini just after his revolution in 1979, but these demonstrations were suppressed by the Yemeni government. The Zaidi people in Saadah look to AL-Khomeini revolution as a divine gift to rescue the dignity of the Islamic world. The sources indicate that the first orderly Shiite move began in 1982, by the Zaidi Faqih (religious scholar) Salah Ahmad Fleetah, who then founded The Faithful Youth Union in 1986. At times, Mohammad Badruddin AL-Houthi was teaching a course on the principles of the Iranian Islamic revolution to young students. Interior Minister Rashad AL-Alimi stated before the parliament that AL-Houthi movement started its activities in 1982, and that its cells were formed between 1983 and 1984 with the support of Iran. He added that this movement started to implement its terrorist acts in Sanaa and Saadah at that time. (A group of researchers: 2008, 111).

With the advent of 1990, events had been accelerated in the Middle East, in the interest of AL-Houthi movement; the Iranian Iraqi war stopped, the hostile attitude of the Yemeni government against Iran ended, the supreme guide of the Iranian Revolution, AL-Khomeini, died in 1989. All of these led to a change in the Iranian policy toward the Arab and Islamic counties depending on a soft method for exporting the revolution rather than the violent method. AL-Houthi movement benefited a lot from the reunification of Yemen which allowed the establishment of political parties. The Zaidi activists exploited this climate of freedom to come closer with Iran and build their joint political project. They established two Shiite parties — The Right Party and Union of Popular Forces. Mohamed Salem Ezzan also established The Faithful Youth Union of Shiite orientations with the support of Iran. (A group of researchers: 2008, 112).

The depth of the relationship between AL-Houthi movement and Iran is obviously illustrated in the lectures of Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi, the movement founder, who praises Iran and Hezbollah as ideal examples and sources of pride. In a related context, AL-Houthi considers pilgrimage to Mecca as an opportunity for the Iranians to broadcast the meanings of pride and dignity to the whole Islamic nation. Accordingly, pilgrimage is seen as a season to threaten Israel and America. This tone suggests that there is a hidden Houthi Iranian plan that aims to control Mecca and Medina. They believe that Mecca and Medina are sacred religious centers which belong to their grandfather (the Prophet Mohammed), and AL Saud (rulers of Saudi Arabia) have nothing to do with these Holly places. Therefore, Iran and AL-Houthis believe that they are the ones who have the right to run Muslim Holy Places. AL-Houthis blindly follow the Iranian faith and thoughts to the extent that they believe that the Governments which AL-Khomeini call over will fall (Governments which helped Iraq in its war against Iran from 1980 to 1988). It is worth mentioning that AL-Houthis believe that Imam AL-Khomeini was fair whose pray is not rejected by God. (Adel Nouman AL-Ahmadi: 2007, 176–177).

Practically the Iranian relationship with AL-Houthis was getting clearer through the Iranian support which aimed to increase AL-Houthis’ morale, providing them with the Iranian Iraqi war films and the killing of AL-Hussein as well as films of Hezbollah operations against Israel. A crew of Lebanese and Iraqi Shiites as well as members of the Iranian revolutionary guard assist AL-Houthis in the management of moral guidance. Sources indicate that AL-Houthis’ maneuvers and exercises take place under the supervision of trained personnel and experts from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. (Adel Nouman AL-Ahmadi:2007,177). The strength of the relationship between Iran and AL-Houthis was illustrated through the early secret visit by Hussein Badruddin to Iran in 1986. Abdul Rahim AL-Humran described the atmospheres of that visit as a difficult, and describes AL-Houthi as a revolutionary person who has strained himself since he stayed in Syria more than a month before getting into Iran. He remained 18 days in Iran during which he met with religious figures (Iraqi and Iranian Shiites). He was thinking to engage in Badr legion, which was under the foundation for defending the Islamic Republic of Iran at that time. He also visited the sacred shrines in Iraq in 1990. (Abdul Rahim AL-Humran: 2015). What also confirms the strong relations between Iran and AL-Houthi is the asylum of Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi and his father to Iran in 1994, fearing any angry reaction by the Yemeni government against them, as a result of their support to the Yemeni Socialist Party in the war of 1994. They stayed two years in Iran and received a very gentle hospitality from the Iranian regime (who has an ideological Shiite sectarian relations, and ethnic relations since AL-Houthi belongs to AL-Hashemite family). (Sultan AL-Dheeb: 2009).

Iran seeks to achieve its objectives through spreading the Shiite Islam, applying the mandate of AL-Faqih model formulated by AL-Khomeini. For this purpose, the Iranian regime worked on increasing what is called AL-Hawza AL-Elmiah (religious schools) in the Iranian city of Qum, giving it a greater role in the dissemination of its revolution. Therefore, Iran sought through AL-Houthis to attract many Yemeni students to study in Iranian universities (in AL-Hawzat), in order to use them later to disseminate the message of Iran (its religion, revolution, media, culture and politics). Iran offered (through AL-Houthis) many scholarships for Yemeni students, and encouraged scientific missions and academic visits. It organized educational visits of many Yemeni journalists, writers, intellectuals, lawyers, political activists and jurists. Moreover, Iran supported AL-Houthis to establish scientific symposia, cultural activities, centers and public libraries, various associations of social, cultural and political activity, and also supported the revival of the Shiite celebrations such as Eid AL-Ghadir, the anniversary of Ashura, AL-Quds World Day. (Ibrahim Menshawi: 31–1–2016).

In the field of media, Iran used to support AL-Houthi movement. Tehran, through its cooperation with Lebanese Hezbollah, established and funded a number of satellite televisions, in the southern suburb of Beirut, such as AL-Maseerah, AL-Sahat and AL-Mayadin channels. Iran and AL-Houthis managed to attract Yemeni media figures from different Yemeni provinces to support its scheme to control Yemen and make it under the Iranian influence. The reports indicate that Iran imported 1300 Yemeni media men and trained them in several countries such as Lebanon, Iraq and Iran. However, the Lebanese Hezbollah party has trained most of the media components of AL-Houthis. They were transferred from Sanaa to Beirut to receive training and then return to Yemen to work as correspondents, photographers and editors of the news and press reports as well as working in the fields of technology and software specialized agencies broadcast via satellite, output and surrender in the satellite TV and radio. Moreover, AL-Manar TV of Hezbollah harnessed its cadres for training AL-Houthis’ media professionals and establishing special media means for them. This reveals the extent of cooperation between AL-Houthis, Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah. Besides, there are many other channels that support AL-Houthis such as Al-Manar channel, Aden life, AL-Anwar AL-Oola, AL-Maaref, Fourteen, Euphrates, Beladi, AL-Ghadir, AL-Awhad, AL-Ahd, AL-Masar AL-Oola, AL-Kut, AL-Alam, Taha, Press NTV, AL-Duaa, AL-Wahdah, AL-Mahdi, Al-Serat, Karbala, AL-Salam, AL-Najaf channel, and Najaf, AL-Watan for all, AL-Hujjah, AL-Kawthar, Nahnu, Imam AL-Hussein, AL-Naeem, AL-Zahraa, AL-Thagalin, Imam AL-Redha and AL-Welayah. (Ibrahim Menshawi: 31–1–2016).

The Iranian support for AL-Houthi movement aims at increasing its influence in the region through strengthening the Shiite minority in the Gulf States, Yemen, Iraq and AL-sham. Many reports speak about the Iranian military, materialistic and logistical support for AL-Houthis. In the six wars of AL-Houthis against the Government of Yemen, Iran offered all forms of support for AL-Houthis (arms and money to attract and buy Sheikhs and military commanders of the former regime, to ensure their loyalty to AL-Houthis). Iran concluded other secret deals with regional and international parties to assist the movement in its efforts to take the power in Yemen. (Hadi AL-Sheheri: 2014).

Base on important information received from Sheikh Abdullah AL-Mahdoon, one of AL-Houthi leaders, Iran provides AL-Houthi movement with military equipment and training. He reported that local trainers were trained in Lebanon and Iran on how to collect and construct the pieces of missiles and how to manufacture mines. He added that external experts and trainers from the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah, and AL-Quds legion of Iran supervise local Yemeni cadres. AL-Mahdoon also said that there are several secret centers for manufacturing weapons and many other centers for training. He confirmed that these centers are equipped with modern machines to manufacture all kinds of weapons. Sheikh Abdullah AL-Mahdoon also ensured that the great support (arms and funds) was given to AL-Houthis before the fourth war. He said that AL-Houthis’ leader, Abdul Malik Badruddin AL-Houthi once told him in person that the movement would triumph and Shiites will rule the world. More than this, AL-Mahdoon admitted that AL-Houthis were using American rockets in the war provided by Iran. AL-Houthi leader, AL-Mahdoon, also mentioned that AL-Houthi movement has planted spies in the Yemeni government and also in the opposition parties. He added that AL-Houthi movement in the second and third wars was almost ended if it weren’t given time to reproduce itself through mediations and truces (which gave them the opportunity to gather their forces). (Abdul Nasser AL-Mamlooh: 2009).

AL-Houthi movement depends on multiple sources for armament, including the Yemeni markets. It gained weapons from the army camps during the six wars, particularly the last three wars, as well as the weapons it gained from the Saudi military in the sixth war. However, the Iranian support is the most prominent and most effective, particularly in the difficult phases the movement passed by. Iran was keen to keep its relationship and support to AL-Houthis secret. But the scandals of the Iranian ships loaded with all kinds of weapons revealed the hidden support when the Ceyhan1 and Ceyhan2 ships fell into the clutches of the Yemeni government. A secret report issued by the Sanctions Committee of the United Nations revealed that Iran was involved in arming AL-Houthi movement. The report mentioned that Iranian ships and weapons to Yemen were monitored five times. The report said that the Yemeni authorities seized an Iranian fishing boat in February 2011, while transporting 900 anti-tank and aircraft missiles coming from Iran to AL-Houthis. (Houthi followers military truth and sources of support: 2015, 7). More recently (in 28 March 2016), US naval forces intercepted and seized an Iranian cargo of weapons while it was heading to AL-Houthis. The US Navy confirmed that an Australian warship seized a shipment of weapons on its way to Yemen through Somalia in February of 2016. Besides, the French authorities confiscated another Iranian shipment of weapons coming to Yemen in March 2016. (CNN: 5–4–2016).

Iran sought to strengthen its links with the Shiite minority in all parts of the world in an orderly manner. For now, Iran is focusing on Shiites in the Middle East. Iran has become Mecca of Shiites everywhere; in Egypt, Mauritania, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Arab Gulf, Turkey, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan; all gather under one reference in Tehran; all raise the picture of AL-Khomeini. Yemen is one of these countries that suffers from the hell of sectarian war launched by AL-Houthis on various social strata of Yemen. Iran hosts convertible top personalities of the Zaidi doctrine to the Ethna Ashri doctrine, and provides them with care and protection (hosting them in Iranian satellite channels in Arabic). (A group of researchers: 2008, 279).

Iran tries to keep itself away from the responsibility of its support to AL-Houthi movement. The Iranian government depends on indirect methods to deliver financial support to AL-Houthis; through civil or charitable institutions. Also, drug shipments are sent to Yemen with a view to trafficking or smuggling them into the Arab Gulf countries across the Yemeni borders with Saudi Arabia which is under the control of AL-Houthis. In turn, AL-Houthis are using the proceeds of these drugs to finance their activities. Here, we find a similarity between AL-Houthis and AL-Qaeda in the issue of drug trafficking. Qaeda and Taliban used to export heroin to various countries, while AL-Houthis run drug trade in Arab Gulf countries. Thus, we can say that Iran possesses a real presence in Yemen through AL-Houthi Shiite movement. (A group of researchers: 2008, 280).

The Iranian relations with AL-Houthis reflect the regional dimension of the foreign policy of Iran. The government of Iran seeks increase its presence in the Arab region particularly Yemen (where the Zaidi Shiites constitute between 30–35% of the population). It seems that Iran uses its relations with AL-Houthis as a tool to impose its hegemony on the peoples of the Arab region. On the other hand, this relationship resulted in a political confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. As known, Iran and AL-Houthis are targeting Saudi Arabia, aiming to spread chaos through the Shiite minority inside Saudi Arabia. It is no longer secret that the joint strategic objective between AL-Houthis and Iran is to control the sacred sites in Mecca and Medina. We all heard the Iranian conceit that Tehran controlled Sanaa, the fourth Arab capital after AL-Houthis had entered Sanaa in September 21, 2014. This means that AL-Houthis are considered an Iranian army like Lebanese Hizbullah and AL-Mahdi Army of AL-Quds. The Iranian regime welcomed AL-Houthis’ delegation to the high-level who visited Tehran after the control over Sanaa, and launched 14 weekly flight from Tehran to Sanaa. Now, Iran honors AL-Houthis and speaks about the arrival of Tehran to the coasts of the Red Sea and Bab AL-Mandab. (Mahjoub AL-Zuwairi: 2015, 73–74).

The Iranian relations with AL-Houthi entered a new chapter after the movement had controlled Sanaa city. Iran declared its support to AL-Houthis and applauded its military coup against the legitimate Government, the political process and the national dialog. The Iranian government pledged to continue its endless support to AL-Houthis. The Iranian deputy foreign minister for Arab and African affairs, Hussain Amir Abdul AL-Luhian, announced the readiness of his country to support Yemen in various fields. He added that the air flights between Sanaa and Tehran allows Yemenis to visit religious centers and tourism in Iran, and provides an opportunity for Yemeni businessmen and merchants to purchase goods from Iran. (Abdul Rahim Ali: 03–03 -2015). The President of the National Security of Yemen, General Ali Hassan AL-Ahmadi, insured that five Iranian spy networks were arrested in Yemen, as well as the arrest of an Iranian ships loaded with weapons on its way to AL-Houthis. AL-Ahmadi added that Iran exports terrorism to Yemen and uses AL-Houthi movement to destabilize the security and stability of Yemen. (Mohammed Sanba’a: 14–10–2015).

3.2. The Relations of AL-Houthi Movement with the Ali Saleh:

AL-Houthi movement is mysterious and secretive either in its intellectual and ideological aspects or in its activities and relations with others. For example, the relations of the movement with the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh remained secret for many years until the beginning of 2014. The relationship between Saleh and AL-Houthis is confusing because a similar relationship was existed between AL-Houthis and the classical opponents of Saleh, Joint Meeting parties, which was characterized by cooperation and collaboration against the Yemeni government during Saadah wars and during the revolution of 2011 against Saleh.

In Saadah wars, the opposition parties to Saleh found AL-Houthi movement a historic chance for them. They hoped that this movement could achieve what they could not achieve by democratic means to topple Saleh (who took power in 1978 until the revolution of 2011). Though, the youth revolution succeeded to overthrow him in 2012, Saleh remained a key player in the power from behind. Initially, the Joint Meeting parties (opposition parties) supported AL-Houthi movement politically for the sake of undermining the regime of Saleh. But these parties did not know the subtleties of the secret relations between Saleh and AL-Houthi movement. The movement engaged in battles against the army in Saadah (under a secret agreement with Saleh aimed at eliminating Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmer and his military forces). Hence, we can say that the opposition parties were recently surprised by the behavior of AL-Houthi movement, especially when it became a poisoned cutlass in the hand of Saleh to stab his political opponents.

Saadah wars between AL-Houthi movement and the army were a dirty game played by Saleh and AL-Houthi movement with a view to eliminate their opponents, Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmer and his military forces and the tribal Sunni Sheikhs who support him, the Reform Party, Salafi groups and the tribal Sheikhs loyal to sons of late Sheikh Abdullah Bin Hussein AL-Ahmar. What confirms this plot is the words said by Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi shortly before he was killed: “I have a safe word from the President Ali Abdullah Saleh”. (Ragheb AL-Sargani: Jan 22, 2015). Military sources revealed that a meeting between Saleh and AL-Houthis was held in 2005, one year after the death of Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi. Both parties agreed on a joint action, where Saleh and his regime provide financial and military support to AL-Houthis. Whereas the job of AL-Houthi followers is to finish the military forces loyal to the Reform Party (which represent an obstacle to Saleh and AL-Houthis in the future). AL-Houthis’ spokesman in Germany, Yahya Badruddin AL-Houthi, said in a TV interview that their source of military armament is the Yemeni Ministry of Defense. Some military sources ensure that Saleh agreed to facilitate AL-Houthis’ activities to spread their faith across the country in exchange for their loyalty to him (Saleh) and his eldest son, Ahmed. (Ragheb AL-Sargani: Jan 22 -2015).

The accelerated and successive political developments in Yemen showed the mysterious and secretive relations and alliance between Saleh and AL-Houthi movement. Their political positions in many issues were identical, which brought the two parties together. Some sources said that Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmer was about to eradicate AL-Houthis in the wars of Saadah. But Saleh used to intervene in the decisive moments, issuing orders to stop the war. For example, in the second and third wars, AL-Houthi followers were on the verge of collapse, according to one of AL-Houthi movement leaders, Sheikh Abdullah AL-Mahdoon, a front leader in the directorate of Sahhar. This behavior of Saleh clearly reveals the close relationship between him and AL-Houthis. Likewise, Saleh continued his policy of shuffling cards for the benefit of AL-Houthis in Saadah wars (the negotiations and attempts for peaceful solutions). Information indicate that Saleh malfunctioned the political solution after the first war and appointed a governor loyal to AL-Houthis in Saadah and spent hundreds of millions to gain support of AL-Houthis (such support was used in launching the second war. (Mohamed Badran: 26–03–2015).

The six wars between Saleh and AL-Houthi movement (2004- 2010), have clearly shown the secret cooperation between the two sides. A military officer close to Saleh narrates that the first war began because of a personal dispute between Saleh and Hussein Badruddin AL-Houthi. Saleh wanted to discipline Hussein AL-Houthi, the founder of AL-Houthi movement. Saleh sent six military crews to arrest him and bring him to Sanaa. But Hussein AL-Houthi refused and set the war which ended by his death. Saleh used this event and requested a meeting with the leaders of the rebellion in Sanaa. Resources indicate that Saleh gave them lots of money and released their prisoners. Here started the threads of the secret relationship between Saleh and AL-Houthis as allies and friends in the shadows; of course against their mutual opponents. They agreed on the elimination of Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmer and his 1st Brigade. The latter was considered as an obstacle in the way of transferring power to the eldest son of Saleh, and stands a stumbling block on the way of spreading AL-Houthi faith in the country. What corrected this information is the reports published by WikiLeaks site. These reports mention that the national security of Saleh identified misleading coordinates of AL-Houthis’ military site to be bombarded by the Saudi warplanes during wars of Saadah. But when the Saudi army examined the given information, they found out that the site is the headquarters of Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmer. This shows that Saleh was willing to get rid of Ali Mohsen in these wars. In addition, Yemeni press opposing Saleh published information about the meetings between the Commander of AL-Houthis, Youssef AL-Madani, and Ahmad Ali Abdullah Saleh during fierce battles in Saadah wars. (Mohamed Abdul Malik: 03–05–2015).

The policy of the former president Ali Saleh was as he described: “dancing on the snakes’ heads”. He used to use others as cards in the political game over the period of his reign. He built strong relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and used them in eliminating the Yemeni Socialist Party. He also built good relations with the Sunni Salafi groups to support him in presidential elections. In the meantime, he was keen to establish good relations with the Zaidi group, especially the Hashemite families, through sharing the government with them. At last, Saleh hurried to establish a relationship with AL-Houthi movement after its appearance (as the new political Zaidi sect), and used them in “the six wars” to weaken his opponents in the army and to kill the most efficient officers. Saleh was providing AL-Houthis with weapons, ensuring not to defeat them in the battles (through stopping the war whenever the army was about to win). (Yassin AL-Tamimi: 06–02–2015).

With the passage of time, new secrets about the alliance and close relations between Saleh and AL-Houthi movement are unfolding. Many leaders who participated in Saadah wars disclosed some secrets of the war. They said that the war was used by Saleh and his aides to achieve specific goals, adding that when the army was about to eliminate AL-Houthis, direct orders were issued from Saleh to stop the fighting and withdraw immediately from the areas of the battles. This scenario was repeated several times since the first war until the last war in 2010. Brigadier General Thabit Jawas the commander of the military campaign in the first war in 2004, revealed some secrets of the war which exposes the alliance between Saleh and AL-Houthis. Brigadier Jawas said that that military supply of food, clothes and weapons were given to AL-Houthis before arriving to the army. He confirmed that modern weapons and ammunition were sent to AL-Houthi rebels in Maran from the stores of the army in Nugom Mountain. Jawas added that Saleh loves wars and was keen to create problems between a region and another. He maintained that Saleh is the one who brought AL-Houthis from the scratch and did not want to exterminate them in the first and second wars. Instead, Saleh sent Jawas orders to stop the war and withdraw. Jawas also said that he arrived in the first war to the lair of Hussein AL-Houthi and fought with him personally. Hussein AL-Houthi shot him in his right leg, lest Jawas’ guards opened fire on AL-Houthi and killed him on the spot. (Salman Askar: 17–5–2015).

After the wars in Saadah, the relationship between Saleh and AL-Houthis became too clear, particularly during the youth revolution in 2011, and beyond. Information indicate that Saleh encouraged AL-Houthi militants to participate in the youth revolution to beat it from inside. AL-Houthis hurried from the beginning to tear apart the unity of the youth revolution through establishing their private deck in the yard of change, which led to violent clashes between them and Youth Revolution members. One of the manifestations dividing the unity of the revolution caused by AL-Houthis, was the Friday Prayer, which was held twice, one belongs to AL-Houthis and the other belongs to the other components of the Youth Revolution. (Salman AL-Amari: 6–4–2015).

It should be emphasized that the accession of AL-Houthis to the revolution with the support of Saleh deprived other categories of Yemeni society of joining the revolution, especially those who have suffered from AL-Houthi movement. It seemed that the revolutionary forces committed a big mistake when they allowed those who committed crimes against the people of Saadah, and against the army, to join the national components. It is said that the revolution provided AL-Houthi movement with a political cover to move freely and implement its political agenda. (Riyad AL-Ahmadi: 8–5–2012). Sources confirm that several meetings were held between a number of AL-Houthi leaders and Republican Guards commander, Ahmad Ali Abdullah Saleh in the capital Sanaa, since the outset of the revolution. Saleh agreed to enable AL-Houthis to seize five governorates (Saadah, Al Jawf, Amran, Marib and Hajjah), in order to stab the revolution from behind. Some sources spoke about running joint operations by AL-Houthis and Republican Guards from a building in the center of the capital Sanaa during the revolution of 2011. (Sadeq Abdu Rahman AL-Sanaani: 2013, 20–21).

The Youth Revolution contributed in disclosing the secrets of the alliance between Saleh and AL-Houthis. Saleh issued his commands to Saadah governor, Taha Hajar, to deliver the city to AL-Houthis, who, in turn, appointed a new Governor, Fares Mannaa, the weapon merchant close to Saleh. It seemed that most of AL-Houthi leaders were leaders in the party of Saleh, or having close relations with his elder son, Ahmad, the commander of the republican guard at that time. One of the unequivocal evidences that prove the relations between Saleh and AL-Houthis, is the torture practiced by AL-Houthis against Saleh’s major opponents such as Sheikh Hamid AL-Ahmar and his brothers, and the political activist Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Tawakul Kerman as well as the leading political activist in the Reform Party, Mohammad Qahtan and all those who led the youth revolution and contributed to the removal of Saleh from power. This indicates that AL-Houthi movement is not just an ordinary ally to Saleh but a repressive device to terminate his political opponents and competitors. (Abdullah Abu Ghaith: 19.10–2014).

Talking about the secret relations between Saleh and AL-Houthis, sources say that Saleh used his brother in law to coordinate between him and AL-Houthis. One of the leading figures in the system of Saleh visited Iran several times to establish alliance between Saleh and AL-Houthis and to set plans that enable AL-Houthi to control the northern governorates by the help of Saleh (financial, military and logistic support). A qualitative development was noted in the media discourse of Saleh; leaders close to Saleh praised AL-Houthi movement, commended the armed militias and welcomed its control over the governorates. They described AL-Houthi militias as the savors of Yemenis from the terror of AL-Qaeda, the Islamic State and Muslim Brotherhood. Media of Saleh used to support AL-Houthis’ expansionist policy which added a new proof of the close alliance between him and AL-Houthis. (Ragheb AL-Sargani: Jan 22 -2015).

The secret alliance between Saleh and AL-Houthi movement can be seen through their political and media performance as well as their compatible attitudes. Both sides focused their hostility against the Reform Party, accusing it of stealing the revolution of February11, 2011. The two sides adopted a joint discourse toward the crucial political issues, such as refusing the Gulf initiative, describing it as a US, Gulf and Israeli intervention in the affairs of Yemen, despite the fact that it was Saleh who requested that initiative. Both of them refused the results of the national dialog conference and rejected the Territories, considering the restructure of the army as an external occupation of Yemen. Saleh did his best to facilitate AL-Houthis’ control over Saadah governorate and other areas, enabling them to seize army camps and heavy weapons. There was a convergence between the political symbols of the Shiite parties with Saleh, despite the fact that those political symbols were part of the opposition parties and part of the revolution which removed Saleh from the presidency of Yemen. (Nasser Yahya: 26–1–2013).

Saleh and AL-Houthis played a joint role after Saleh had stepped down, spreading unrest across Yemen. They aimed to thwart the national accord government headed by Basendwah, and to thwart the President Hadi. The Washington Post reported that Saleh gave up authority in 2012, but remained in playing an essential role in the disturbances in Yemen through his relations with AL-Houthis, which forced the Security Council to take sanctions against Saleh and his son Ahmad and some of AL-Houthi leaders. The newspaper also reported the views of the political analyst Abdul Ghani AL-Iryani who said that: military officers loyal to Saleh started to train AL-Houthi fighters at the time Hadi took the power in 2012. These officers took part in AL-Houthi’s operations to control Sanaa in 2014. Saleh convinced a number of the Zaidi clans leaders in the north to work with AL-Houthis during their incursion in Hashid areas, Amran, Hamdan, Bani Matar, Khawlan, AL-Himah and Arhab. (Washington Post: 15–2–2015).

The control of AL-Houthi movement over the country was resulted from the strong alliance between Saleh and AL-Houthis. Sources mentioned that supporters of Saleh who camped in the field during the revolution of February 2011, were recruited and integrated into the Republican Guard led by his eldest son. They helped AL-Houthis in their war against Salafists in Saadah. And then they moved to break into Amran and Sanaa, until they controlled the whole country. It was impossible for AL-Houthis to achieve all these triumphs without the help of the army and the tribes loyal to Saleh. Brigadier General Muhsin Khusroof mentions the names of the most prominent leaders in the Party of Saleh who introduced AL-Houthis to Amran governorate: Sheikh Hamid Julaidan, Sheikh Mabkhout AL-Sheikh, Sheikh Mujahed AL-Haidari, Sheikh Saif Muhammad AL-Ghuli and Sons of Sheikh Mujahed Abu Shawareb. (Abdul Malik Mohammed: March 5, 2015). The relationship between Saleh and AL-Houthis was strengthening with the passage of time according to the developments of the political events in Yemen. A British writer, David Hurst, unveiled a secret deal held between the eldest son of Saleh, and the Iranians in Rome in May in 2014. The son of Saleh guaranteed not to object AL-Houthis’ entering to the capital Sanaa. This means Sanaa was handed over to AL-Houthis on a golden platter. (David Hurst: 2014).

On May 10, 2015, Saleh openly announced his alliance with AL-Houthis in a televised speech aired by his own TV channel, Yemen Today, from the site of his ruined home in the capital Sanaa. He was not in the house when it was bombed by Saudi warplanes. At 10:00 on the same day, his channel aired a brief speech in which he denounced targeting his home and condemned the war launched by the Arab alliance led by Saudi Arabia against him and AL-Houthis, and declared his alliance with them, describing AL-Houthis as defenders of Yemen. (Ali Abdullah Saleh: 10–05–2015). He repeated announcing his alliance with AL-Houthis against those whom he called AL-Wahhabin and mercenaries, intending the President Hadi, his legitimate government and their supporters, and Sunni groups fighting AL-Houthis in Taiz, AL-Jawf, Marib, Shabwa and other regions. Saleh praised the Iranian government since it stands in solidarity with him. In the meantime, he attacked the Arab coalition States, considering them invaders of Yemen. He conditioned their withdrawal from the Yemeni lands before any negotiations for peace in Yemen. Saleh expressed his sectarian attitudes overtly; he praised AL-Houthis creed and the Zaidi sect, and attacked the Sunni Wahhabi doctrine. Saleh defended his relationship with AL-Houthis and Iran, and described this relationship as natural. Saleh praised the Iranian people, describing them as Islamic people. This suggests that there was a joint plan between Saleh and AL-Houthis and Iran which is apparently targeting the security of Yemen and Arab Gulf countries headed by Saudi Arabia. (Ali Abdullah Saleh: 08–01–2016).

CHAPTER — IV

AL-HOUTHI MOVEMENT FROM

REVOLUTION TO MILITRY COUP

CHAPTER — IV

AL-HOUTHI MOVEMENT FORM REVOLUTION TO MILITRY COUP

4.1. Al-Houthi Movement and Its Particiption in Revolution and Dialogue:

Similar to the Arab spring revolutions which swept through the republics of military Arab dictatorships (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria), the youth revolution in Yemen broke out on February 11, 2011, seeking to topple the regime of Saleh who ruled the country for 33 years. AL-Houthis hurried to take part in this revolution with all their strength and popular mobilization. This revolution was a golden opportunity for AL-Houthis to get out of their isolation in Saadah governorate and spread all over Yemen. It was an opportunity to transform this militia to a revolutionary, peaceful and civilian movement. Hence, they introduced themselves in the squares of the revolution as a civilian stream which calls for justice and civil rights of citizenship. AL-Houthi movement exploited the revolution of February 2011, to integrate into the fabric of the society, through adopting revolution slogans that aim to topple the regime peacefully. This was an attempt to convey a message to all, that AL-Houthis have abandoned their violence and rebellion (which led to their political and social isolation over nearly ten years.

AL-Houthi movement appeared as one of the components of the Youth Revolution against the regime of Saleh. AL-Houthis’ participation in the revolution, has enabled the movement to intervene in the affairs of the country and penetrate into its social fabric, especially the northern part. AL-Houthi followers devoted their efforts to spread their faith outside the borders of Saadah governorate, especially within the hardline communities which stand firmly against AL-Houthis’ faith and their violent culture such as Taiz, Ibb, Hodeida and the capital Sanaa, through their participation in the sit-in squares in different Yemeni cities. (Adel AL-Selwi: 23–2015–3).

AL-Houthis were keen to take part in the Youth Revolution to implement their own aims and political agendas, not out of faith in the principles of the revolution, or to contribute effectively to the achievement of the desired political change. Sources mentioned that AL-Houthi movement deliberately deceived the Yemeni crowds in general, and the demonstrators in particular, by showing that the movement senses peoples’ concerns and aspirations in the political change. AL-Houthi followers sought to suggest that their literature is consistent with a civil state, based on the values of equal citizenship, freedom of expression and social justice. But the bitter truth is that AL-Houthi movement is religious, racial, tyrannical, and unjust. AL-Houthi believe in their divine right to rule Muslims, just as the Lebanese radical Shiite party, Hezbollah. They just derive their thoughts from AL-Khomeini theory of the mandate of AL-Faqih. (Adel AL-Selwi: 23–2015–3).

The February revolution added a big development to the structure and organization of AL-Houthi movement, as the new stage requires. AL-Houthi movement started to depend on the popular civil side and media more than the military action it had adopted during its wars against the government in Saadah governorate. The movement was lacking the required organizational regulations relevant to its civil side. However, with regards to its military side, the movement was organized well with an absolute obedience of armed elements to movement leaders, especially to its supreme commander Abdul Malik AL-Houthi. Some sources confirm that AL-Houthis changed their name into Ansaru Allah (helpers of God) after the sixth war of 2010, in application to the Quranic holy verse (you who believe be helpers in the cause of Allah). It was said that this name was an imitation to the name of the Lebanese Hezbollah. It seems that Iran chooses very carefully labels for its Shiite movements in the Arab countries. The new name of AL-Houthi movement reveals its development since its evolution. It was called The Faithful Youth Union at the outset, then The Faithful Youth Forum, after that the slogan group, and finally Ansaru Allah Movement. (Mohammed AL-Nohmani: 8–4–2010).

In the midst of its rapid developments, AL-Houthi movement founded the Political Bureau of Ansaru Allah headed by Saleh Habra and established organizational committees in the revolution squares, especially in Sanaa, Aden, Taiz, Ibb, Dhamar, Hajjah, Saadah and AL-Hodeida. Then, it established information, educational, student and cultural offices, and academic meeting as well as many other bodies and centers during the revolution of February11, 2011. AL-Houthis renamed the Political Office to be the Political Council of Ansaru Allah and appointed Saleh AL-Sammad a president of the Council instead Saleh Habra. Saleh Habra disappeared from the political scene since that time. He was the second leader who was excluded from the movement in addition to Sheikh Abdullah Eida AL-Rezami.

Iran pushed AL-Houthis to take advantage of the change that swept Yemen in 2011. Therefore, AL-Houthi followers tried to show themselves helpful and searching for alliances in the light of the new political situation that is taking place in Yemen. Iran and AL-Houthis came to realize that the social environment in Yemen is non-AL-Houthis incubator, and that no sympathy for them in the military and security enterprise except from the Hashemite elements. It was clear that the great majority of the military and security forces were loyal to the former president, Saleh. A few months after the revolution in Yemen, the Arab Gulf countries intervened, at the request of Ali Abdullah Saleh, to resolve the political crisis of Yemen. They suggested an initiative which gave Saleh a way out of the crisis i.e., to hand over power to his deputy Abd Rabboh Mansur Hadi, who will head a transitional period of two years. But the surprise was that AL-Houthis refused to sign the Gulf initiative by inspiration from Iran, which insists that AL-Houthis in Yemen should take the same role of Hezbollah in Lebanon (disabling any political agreements between the political components of the Lebanese). (Mahjoub AL-Zuwairi: 2015, 73).

AL-Houthi followers took part in the National Dialogue Conference, despite their refusal to the Gulf initiative. This shows that they are opportunistic and duplicitous in dealing with the political development in Yemen. AL-Houthi movement is pragmatic; benefit is its sole engine and the main element that controls its political decisions. AL-Houthi followers got 37 seats in the National Dialogue Conference, which began in March 2013, and continued until January 2014. (Mahjoub AL-Zuwairi: 2015, 73).

AL-Houthi followers justified their participation in the National Dialogue Conference, saying that they took part in this dialogue because it meets the objectives of the revolution of February11, 2011, not because it is an item within the Gulf initiative. But this justification remains weak and unconvincing. Anyway, AL-Houthis joined the National Dialogue Conference, as a political entity on behalf of Ansar Allah, and provided their views concerning the solutions to all the Yemeni issues and problems: Saadah problem, the problem of the Southern part of the country, state-building and good governance. To solve the problems of Saadah and the issue of the South, they asked for issuing a constitutional declaration by all political forces that allows them to perform their sectarian rituals. All of AL-Houthis’ behavior in this stage is considered a political schizophrenia, so to speak, which raised doubts about the movement. It seemed that this movement seeks to exploit their presence in the tables of the dialogue to abort any success of the dialogue. On the other hand, the movement uses its presence in the dialogue as a pass for its legitimacy. As known, the movement lack the legal capacity which grants the right for political work in accordance with the constitution of Yemeni. AL-Houthi movement refuses to turn into a political party, and insists on staying an armed Shiite movement like AL-Qaeda and other Islamic movements. (Abdul Hakim Hilal: 31–10–2014).

AL-Houthis boycotted the early presidential elections which was held under the Gulf initiative, which resulted in the election of Abd-Rabbuh Mansur Hadi as a consensual president of Yemen for two years (a transition period for the National Dialogue, the drafting of a new constitution on the basis of the output of the National Dialogue, the referendum, as well as the formation of a government of national reconciliation, under the chairmanship of the opposition). AL-Houthi followers opposed the new government headed by Mohammad Bassandawa, and opposed the new president Abd-Rabbo Mansour Hadi. However, they came closer to the former president Saleh. During the transitional phase, AL-Houthi movement continued to attack the Gulf initiative considering it as an interference in the affairs of Yemen. They described this initiative as a Saudi agenda than an initiative to solve the dilemmas of Yemen. (A group of researchers: 2015).

AL-Houthi followers participated in the National Dialogue Conference with a range of educated and open cadres, including nine women, some of them are liberal, under the name of Ansaru Allah movement. AL-Houthi followers sought to support the South mobility and advocate the south issue. They presented visions in line with the view of the leftist and secularist parties. They demanded the construction of civil and fair State (authority of law and order). Many of AL-Houthi members who participated in the National Dialogue Conference were assassinated like Sheikh Abdul Wahed Abu Ras, who was wounded and three of his companions were killed. Also, Dr. Abdul Karim Gadban was assassinated; while Dr. Ahmed Sharafuddin was assassinated during the period of the Conference, which gave AL-Houthis popular and political sympathy which helped them later. AL-Houthis objected to some of the output of the National Dialogue Conference. They refused forming the territories and felt that it is a conspiracy against them (as a sectarian component representing the Zaidi area in Yemen). They refused to sign the document of implementing the output of the National Dialogue Conference. Moreover, they demanded to form a new government which represents all the parties and giving them the same percentages they were given in the National Dialogue Conference. But no one heeded to AL-Houthis’ demands and objections. As a result, they decided to lead a coup against the revolution and the transitional political process as a whole. (Sadeq Abdo: 2014).

AL-Houthi movement has achieved many political gains during their participation in the revolution of 11 February 2011, through its own youth group (AL-Smoud youth) in the yard of change in Sanaa and the other revolutionary squares in the Yemeni cities. AL-Houthis identified themselves as a revolutionary component and won the sympathy of people everywhere, which added new supporters to their movement in many Yemeni provinces. The revolution of February11, 2011, enabled AL-Houthis to expand intellectually, militarily and politically. It was clear that AL-Houthis found themselves obliged to participate in the revolution, but for their special objectives, not for the objectives of the revolution itself. They were welcomed by the other political forces in the revolution, in the hope that they will contribute to achieving the political change. The other revolutionary forces earnestly encouraged AL-Houthis to move forward in their transition to a political and cultural movement in accordance with the principles and norms of the political organizations; with the objectives of the revolution, and with the Constitution and the law and democratic system in Yemen. (Riyadh AL-Ahmadi: 8–5–2012).

AL-Houthi movement has benefited a lot from the revolution of February11, 2011. The ruling regime fell apart after the resignation of a large number of its members and their support to the revolution. The support of General Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmar for the revolution was a fatal blow to President Saleh. Military units loyal to AL-Ahmar and the armed tribes supporting him, formed a deterrent force against Saleh, and encouraged people to flock to squares. Meanwhile, many areas witnessed a bloody military clashes, particularly in Sanaa and Arhab, Taiz and AL-Baidha. These clashes exhausted the other parties, while AL-Houthis were stretching out smoothly in Saadah, Hajjah and AL-Jawf as well as in the rest of the Yemeni governorates. AL-Houthi followers were keen to attract the greatest number of the Hashemite young people from various governoratesand spreading them among young people in the revolution squares. They started to incite against the youth of the revolution and demonstrate against the other parties and the organizational committee in the arena, shouting different slogans including “correcting the path of the revolution”. They worked on exploiting the feelings of desperate young people and the differences between the main parties in the country to attract new supporters and redirect the wheel of the revolution to their benefit. The revolution squares were safe places for AL-Houthis to expand and penetrate among the revolutionaries. They were able to recruit many cadres and youth capabilities to revive the Imamate dreams on the Iranian style (the mandate of AL-Faqih). (Riyadh AL-Ahmadi: 8–5–2012).

AL-Houthi movement adopted a strategy of three important premises during the stage of the youth revolution in Yemen. The first was an absolute doctrinal; to eradicate their religious opponents such as Salafists in Dammaj and Kitaf. The second was to reduce the influence of the tribal and sectarian opponents, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AL-Ahmer family, the leaders of Hashid tribe, the biggest supporter of the Reform Party. The third was tactical political; to take part in the National Dialogue Conference (which determines the political future of the country), in order to ensure their existence in any political arrangements, and to share their views on the issues raised for discussion within the National Dialogue Conference. (Mustafa Shafiq Alam: 31–7–2014).

4.2. AL-Houthi Military Coup Against the Revolution:

In 2011, Yemeni young people and activists rose up against the regime of Saleh. AL-Houthi followers also announced their support for the Yemeni Revolution. Abdul Malik AL-Houthi started to clone the personality of Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of the Lebanese Hezbollah, both in his appearance on the screens to address the supporters, and the movements of his body throughout speech performance. The president Saleh has recognized the seriousness of the political opposition and its insistence on toppling him and his family just similar to what has happened to President Zinul Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi and President Mubarak of Egypt. Saleh rushed to form a secret coalition with one of the components of the youth revolution in Yemen i.e., AL-Houthi followers, whom Saleh was calling in his speeches, the remnants of the defunct Imamate. It seems that Saleh found himself obliged to ally with AL-Houthis of Iran, because of the pressures which Saleh met from his political opponents; the Joint Meeting parties, the Reform Party, sons of AL-Ahmar and General Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmar.

After the adoption of the Gulf initiative for a political solution in Yemen, and the transfer of authority for compatibility in response to the demands of the revolution, Saleh took advantage of the missing link in the Gulf initiative i.e., ignoring AL-Houthis and not involving them in the new government. AL-Houthis felt that they were fooled by their accomplices in the squares of the revolution. So they decided to take revenge from the new government. Here, they joined secretly the front of the former president Saleh, in their efforts to topple the new government, through a military coup, where AL-Houthis will be the spearhead and Saleh shall be a secret supporter in all fields. (Ibrahim AL-Jabin: 27–9–2014).

As we have mentioned, AL-Houthi followers participated in the National Dialog Conference as an active revolutionary component. But they were excluded from participating in the government of national reconciliation under the pretext that AL-Houthi movement remains an armed movement. AL-Houthis were requested to hand over heavy weapons, form a political party, and hand over the areas they have seized by force to the authority of the state in return for their participation in the government. Those conditions angered AL-Houthis and pushed them to plan for a military coup, exploiting the endless support of the former president Saleh. During the period of the National Dialogue Conference (18 March 2013 to 25 January 2014), a number of AL-Houthi movement leaders were assassinated, which strengthened the desire of AL-Houthis to coup against the revolution. Also, the results of the National Dialogue Conference play a significant role in stimulating AL-Houthis to implement a military coup. They felt that the number of the suggested territories and their borders was against them; as they were seized in a closed territory without resources and natural wealth and without sea outlets with the outside world. Therefore, AL-Houthis objected the output of the National Dialogue Conference, and refused to sign the document of the comprehensive national dialogue. Instead, they demanded the formation of a new government that involves them as their share in the dialogue conference. They viewed that the task of the Government to complete what remained of the transitional stage, but traditional opponents refused this demand, and asked AL-Houthis to hand over their arms and withdraw from areas they seized by force, and to form a political party. These disagreements have complicated the political scene, exacerbated the problem and stepped up the pace of violence in the north. (Maisa Shjaa AL-Deen: 7–4–2015).

At the beginning of 2014, AL-Houthi followers turned to the military escalation directly after the end of the National Dialogue Conference. Their aim was to seize the power by military forces, and beat their traditional enemies — the Reform Party, the Salafist group, the sons of Sheikh Abdullah Bin Hussein AL-Ahmar and General Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmar. (Maisa Shjaa AL-Deen: 7–4–2015). There is no doubt that secret coordination had taken place between AL-Houthis and Saleh who was driven by unruly desire in revenge from those who removed him from power, from those who were behind the attempt to kill him during Friday prayers on 3–6–2011. AL-Houthi movement had opened conflict fronts since early February 2011, to achieve gains on the ground and impose their military control of areas in Saadah, AL-Jawf and Hajjah. In January 15, 2014, AL-Houthi followers swept the directorate of Dammaj and displaced its people — Salafist group. This sectarian crime was the first of its kind in the history of modern Yemen. Then AL-Houthis headed to Kitaf area, the main center of the Salafist group in the north of Yemen. They controlled this area and displaced the Salafists and blew up their religious center. Thus, AL-Houthis got rid of their opponents in Saadah governorate and saved their back. (Adel AL-Selwi: 23–2015–3).

In February, 2014, AL-Houthi followers turned toward Hashid tribe, which represented the backbone of the Republic against the late Imamate regime. Some armed Houthi groups came from Harf Sofyan region heading to the valley of Khaywan and clashed with Hashed tribe which is loyal to sons of AL-Ahmar, but AL-Ahmar fighters retreated. Hence, AL-Houthi followers dominated the valley of Khaywan and advanced to the valley of Danan and controlled it after the collapse of the fighters loyal to the sons of AL-Ahmar (predominantly Salafists, Muslim Brotherhood and soldiers loyal to Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmar). The retreat of these tribal fighters allowed AL-Houthis to control AL-Khamri, Kharif, AL-Jannat, Houth, and AL-Osaimat areas, the stronghold of Saleh opponents. With their control of Hashid, AL-Houthis blasted the palaces of AL-Ahmar in AL-Eshah, AL-Khamri and Habur. They also captured the home of General Hamid AL-Gushaibi, the commander of the brigade 310, and deemed these achievements as divine victories of the vulnerable in retaliation of the tyrants. AL-Houthi speech propaganda deliberately intended to justify their aggressive actions and conceal of the main role of Saleh in facilitating their entrance to Hashid land. Sources mention that AL-Houthi followers entered the rest of Hashid area in agreement with the Sheikhs loyal to Saleh, without a fight such as Bani Suraim, Bani Abd and other regions, in late February in 2014. In the beginning of January 2014, AL-Houthi followers launched a fierce war on Arhab tribe near Sanaa, but AL-Houthis could not control this tribe because of its solid resistance and the battles stopped after the mediation of Abdul Qader Hilal, which led to remove AL-Houthis from the areas of Bani Ali and sons of Abdullah. (Maisa Shjaa AL-Deen: 7–4–2015).

AL-Houthis strength has been increased after its control over Hashid tribe. As a result, they decided to crawl on the strategical city of Imran, the impregnable castle and the garrison of the capital Sanaa. They seized Sanaa through their armed protesters and tents at the entrances of the city. In mid-March, 2014, AL-Houthi followers demanded the resignation of General Hamid AL-Gushaibi, the commander of the brigade 310, Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Dammaj, the governor of Imran, who belong to the Reform Party. The tribes loyal to the former President Saleh gathered to support AL-Houthis. AL-Houthis motives at this time were stronger than ever, since AL-Gushaibi was one of their most bitter enemies in the wars of Saadah, and because he stood against the former president and supported the youth revolution. AL-Houthi followers started to annoy the governor and the commander of the brigade through their armed demonstrations inside the city of Imran, which led to clashes between the brigade 310 and AL-Houthis demonstrators in mid-May, 2014. The clashes continued for several weeks between AL-Houthi militants (supported by tribal and military elements loyal to Saleh), and the brigade 310 (supported by a tribal elements and Islamic militant groups). Those clashes witnessed tribal and presidential mediations but in vain. (Mohammad AL-Fateh: 27–3–2015).

On July 7, 2014, AL-Houthi followers were enabled to enter Amran, and clear the commander of the brigade 310, General Hamid AL-Gushaibi, looting the weapons of the biggest army brigade. Sources say that the fall of the camp 310, and the killing of its leader was due to a big conspiracy attended by Defense Minister and President Abd Rabbo Mansur Hadi, who visited the city of Imran, met AL-Houthis and blessed the work they have done, on the same day of burying the body of the commander of the brigade 310, in the capital Sanaa. The collapse of Imran changed the balance of power in favor of AL-Houthis and the road to the capital Sanaa was opened. AL-Houthis’ enemies were weakened and broken down (the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists, tribes loyal to Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmar, sons of Sheikh Abdullah AL-Ahmar). AL-Houthis were encouraged to continue their conquests supported by their ally, Saleh. They controlled Sanaa province adjacent to the capital. After fierce clashes took place in the area of Hamedan, Bani Mattar, AL-Houthis took control of those areas and blew up the headquarters of the Reform Party, Quran schools and homes of the supporters of Ali Mohsen. (Adel AL-Ahmadi: 27.12–2014).

On July 30, 2014, the national accord government decided to raise the fuel prices, nearly double, at the time the Yemeni citizen were suffering a lot from the rise in prices and the low-income rates. This provided AL-Houthis a golden opportunity to move in the direction of the fall of the capital Sanaa, and the implementation of their military coup. Indeed AL-Houthi followers took the decision of lifting the prices as a pretext to break into Sanaa. Abdul Malik AL-Houthi delivered a speech in which he declared his refusal of the economic measures adopted by the government and demanded the cancellation of these measures, and threatened to escalate steps (what he called the opened options). In this way, AL-Houthi followers presented themselves as defenders of the interests of the Yemeni people, and rescuers from the cruelty of their living conditions. On the following day of his speech, a popular demonstrations wandered the streets of the capital Sanaa, supporting Al-Houthi’s options, demanding to cancel the government decisions. Starting from mid-August 2014, AL-Houthi followers inaugurated a new stage of escalation. They established sit-in camps at the entrances to the capital Sanaa, in Airport Street in the center of the capital. AL-Houthis’ protests were held in conjunction with the violent confrontations in AL-Jouf province between them and tribes loyal to the Reform Party. (Adel AL-Ahmadi: 27.12–2014).

AL-Houthi followers declared their demands in the squares of the sit-in and gave three demands: reducing the prices, toppling the government and implementing the outputs of the National Dialogue Conference. They threatened to escalate the situation if the Yemeni government did not respond to their demands, warning the Government of the consequences of harming the demonstrators. Meanwhile, president Abd-Rabbo Mansour Hadi sent several delegations to Saadah to speak to Abdul Malik AL-Houthi. The President Hadi called for a national realignment in response to the escalation of AL-Houthis, but he did not take any practical measures to protect the capital Sanaa more than sending aircrafts over AL-Houthi camps at entrances to the capital. During the escalation stage of AL-Houthi, the envoy of the United Nations, Mr. Jamal Bin Omar arrived to Sanaa. He met the parties to the conflict, moving back and forth from Sanaa to Saadah trying to contain the situation and find a peaceful solution to the crisis. On September 20, 2014, AL-Houthi followers began to break into the capital Sanaa and managed to control all civilian and military institutions in 21 September 2014, after limited battles in the north of the capital with units of the Brigade 314 which belongs to the 6th military region. On the same day, Sanaa witnessed the departure of General Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmar to Saudi Arabia. Then Jamal Bin Omar met all the political parties of Yemen in the presence of President Hadi and the meeting resulted in signing the peace agreement and partnership, which led to the formation of a new government in succession to the government of Mohammad Bassandawa. (Adel AL-Ahmadi: 27.12–2014).

The fall of the capital Sanaa in the hands of AL-Houthi movement raised questions by the educated elite especially politicians, journalists and researchers, who concluded that Sanaa did not fall but delivered AL-Houthis just as Baghdad was delivered the Iranians. The former president Saleh played a significant role in the delivery of the capital Sanaa to AL-Houthis. It was noted that the camps of the Republican Guard loyal to Saleh and tribes supporting were only spectators to the rapid dramatic developments. But some say that military units loyal to Saleh participated with AL-Houthis in the fall of the capital. Senior politicians in Yemen said that what happened was due to an international, regional and local conspiracy. (Yahya Rassam: 24–9–2014). The president Hadi said later that Sanaa did not fall but handed over to AL-Houthis, confirming that he will not evade his obligations toward the Yemeni people. Hadi said that what happened was a major conspiracy beyond the borders of the country and that it got out of his hand and became in the hands of external forces. He added that big international and regional and local forces plotted to deliver Sanaa to AL-Houthis, as a conspiracy against the homeland and against the transitional political process. It seems to the neutral researchers and those interested in the Yemeni affair that what happened was an organized military coup planned internationally, regionally and locally. (Mohammed AL-Gadhi: 24–9–2014).

Events were accelerated after AL-Houthi control over the capital Sanaa, toward completing steps of the military coup. AL-Houthi followers turned to control AL-Hodaidah province without any resistance except easy battles with AL-Qaeda in some districts in the province. AL-Houthi followers entered the governorates in the center of Yemen, such as Raimah, Dhamar, Ibb and AL-Baidha, in which they fought simple battles with AL-Qaeda in AL-Odain of Ibb governorate. They also went through violent battles with AL-Qaeda in AL-Baidha governorate in which US aircrafts and the Republican Guards forces participated with AL-Houthis (in the area of the AL-Manaseh loyal to AL-Qaeda). On December 14, 2014, AL-Houthi followers controlled the strategic directorate of Arhab and fought violent battles there with the followers of Sheikh Abdul Majid AL-Zendani and Mansour AL-Haneg. On January 14, 2015, AL-Houthi followers kidnapped Dr. Awad Ahmed Bin Mubarak, the Director of the Office of the President Hadi under the pretext that he hinders the peace agreement and national partnership. AL-Houthi followers shot fire on the procession of the Prime Minister Khaled Bahah, after his return from a meeting with President Hadi and Saleh AL-Sammad, the president’s advisor on AL-Houthis. On January 20, 2015, AL-Houthis broke into the presidential palace, and besieged President Hadi at his residence, imposing house arrest on prime minister and some ministers of the Government. On February 6, 2015, AL-Houthis issued a constitutional declaration from the presidential palace in Sana’a which reads: disabling the constitution, isolating president Hadi, dissolving the parliament and forming the authority of the revolutionary committees. On February 21, 2015, President Hadi escaped from the grip of AL-Houthis and fled to Aden. He declared Aden a temporary capital of the country. On March 13, 2015, AL-Houthis reviewed their military strength on the borders with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On March 19, 2015, the forces loyal to President Hadi regained Aden City after violent battles with military units loyal to former president Saleh. These developments in Aden provoked AL-Houthis who moved to Taiz which is still supporting president Hadi in order to attack Aden. AL-Houthis declared the comprehensive war on the military units and the tribes pro-President Hadi. Heavy fighting took place in the provinces of AL-Baidha, Marib, Taiz, Lahj and AL-Dhalee between AL-Houthis and forces loyal to Saleh on the one hand, and the military units and tribes supporting President Hadi, on the other hand. On March 25, president Abd-Rabbo Mansour Hadi transferred to a safe place, after AL-Houthis had controlled the governorates of Lahej, AL-Dhalee and took the military base of AL-Aanad, and reached the outskirts of Aden. On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia declared launching the Firmness Storm operation against AL-Houthi rebels, to support the legitimate Government at the request of the Yemeni president Abd Rabbo Mansur Hadi. (Mustafa Anbar: 26–3–2015).

4.2.1. AL-Houthi Followers and Blowing up the Homes of their Opponents:

AL-Houthi movement in Yemen was unique from the rest of the extremist organizations, in their savage, inhumanity and dirty habit i.e., blowing up the homes of political opponents. Studies indicate that AL-Houthi followers derived this ugly tradition from the Old Criminal Heritage of the Zaidi Imamate in Yemen which was full of the crimes of destroying the homes of enemies, to the extent that it is difficult for the researcher to count the homes and towns and villages destroyed completely or partially by Imams. The sources said that Imam AL-Mahdi Ali Bin Mohammed, invaded Haraz district and destroyed its villages, and ruined Sanaa and Sultaniyah House. It is said that Imam AL-Motawakkel Ismail Ibn AL-Qasem, invaded Sofyan land; killed the people and ruined their homes. It is also said that Imam Ahmad Bin AL-Hussein Bin Qasem invaded the village of Yanaah and destroyed most of the homes, and then moved to Saadah and destroyed it and suppress his opponents in Bani Malek and destroyed their houses. A study mentions that the ancestors of AL-Houthis used to destroy villages, cities including the homes of orphans and widows, cut fruitful trees and ruin the wells and dams, and loot peoples’ money. (Ibrahim Abdu Rahman AL-Olufy: 2014).

AL-Houthi followers repeated the same behaviors of their forebears (political and sectarian violence) with opponents. It has become a deep-rooted culture in their hearts and part of creed that runs in the blood of this family, in spite of the significant developments witnessed by humanity, particularly in the fields of thought, culture and human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy. But AL-Houthis insist on returning to the tyranny of the Dark Ages. Since the advance of AL-Houthi followers from Saadah until their arrival to Aden, they exercised the most heinous crimes ever, blowing up the homes of their opponents. This behavior indicates AL-Houthis’ desire to humiliate their enemies, as well as to terrify those who will resist them. This is also a message to others that they will pay the price if they think likewise. The explosion of the homes of their enemies is a kind of punishment to AL-Houthis’ opponents. Some sources said that 440 houses were destroyed by AL-Houthis from January 2014 until January 2016. (Abdo AL-Bahesh: 24–1–2016).

4.2.2. AL-Houthi Followers and the Recruitment of Children:

The recruitment and use of children in civil wars, is one of the most haunting issue of human conscience. In Yemen, AL-Houthi movement mastered the issue of recruiting children in their holy wars since 2004 so far. AL-Houthis adopted the strategy of recruiting children in special camps, where they are subjected to intensive religious Shiite sessions which make them extremists and very obedient to their leadership and ready to fight for them happily. Beside religious lessons, those children are subjected to military training, to learn the art of war and the use of weapons and other matters required by the rebellions in the field.

Reports indicate that AL-Houthi movement is more than other parties in using children in wars, where children represent one third of AL-Houthi militia fighters. Children are distributed on the fighting fronts and sites, military headquarters and security points. Human Rights Watch Organization said in a report that some of the children, who were employed by AL-Houthi movement were not exceeding the age of 13 years, and that the proportion of child combatants in the lines of the movement represents about one third; mostly from the northern governorates of Yemen. AL-Houthis resort to recruit children, because they are not able to convince the elderly ones to fight for them. It is reported that AL-Houthis used to force families to send their children to fight. Also, poverty plays an essential role in the hunt for the children, throwing them in AL-Houthis’ religious and sectarianism wars. (Khalid AL-Hammadi: 18–7–2015).

Although the international law criminalizes the recruitment of children, as well as the Statute of the international criminal court incriminates the involvement of children in wars, but AL-Houthi movement does not care about this issue. Perhaps because it realized throughout the past years that the United Nations organization condones such crimes and does not punish the perpetrators, which encouraged the movement to continue in the recruitment of children. The minister of human rights of Yemen declared that Yemen has become among States, which tops the list of the recruitment of children and human rights violations. The real problem is that AL-Houthis do not believe in the rights of children, and the consequent tragedies of these child soldiers and their feelings. The Convention of the Rights of the Child, and the Protocol thereto, read that the armed groups in any country, in any circumstances, are not allowed to recruit or use persons under the age of 18 in hostilities. However, the issue of involving children in wars still a concern to the Yemeni society, which threatens the future of the coming generations. (Bashir AL-Mesbahi: 13–3–2016).

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

The research followed a scientific method highlighted all of its aspects and its historical, political, religious and social dimensions. The research reached a group of results as follows:

* AL-Houthi movement is Shiite movement established in a Zaidi Shiite environment and was affected by the Shiite Revolution in Iran on the basis of the mandate of AL-Faqih theory.

* AL-Houthi movement in Yemen is a product of the tide of Iranian Shiite in the Arab countries; a form of exporting the Iranian revolution to countries of the Arab and Islamic worlds.

* The six wars of AL-Houthi rebels were absurd wars between the two wings of the authority of President Saleh, General Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmar. AL-Houthi movement had benefited from the conflicts between these two wings to increase its strength.

* AL-Houthi movement received great military support from the Lebanese Hezbollah in terms of training, experience, manufacture of mines and explosive devices and weapons, and missiles. In the field of information, AL-Houthi movement received unlimited support from the Lebanese Hezbollah.

* AL-Houthi movement follows the steps of the Lebanese Hezbollah in terms of the political trends and intellectual faith and even in terms of the way of fighting and military confrontation.

* AL-Houthi movement is closely linked to the Islamic Republic of Iran in terms of the ideological and religious and political orientations, AL-Houthi movement, like the Shiite movements in the Arab and Islamic world, is loyal to Iran and receive orders from the supreme guide of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

* AL-Houthi movement received financial and political support from Iran. The movement arose under the auspices of Iran. Iran has provided considerable support either in secret ways or openly through Shiite estates and charitable associations. Iran also submitted shipments of arms to AL-Houthi movement. AL-Houthis also received lots of cultural and media support from Iran as well as other forms of support.

* AL-Houthi movement formed a secret alliance with the former President Saleh in the beginnings of Saadah wars. This alliance has been developed to a declared cooperation against the Muslim Brotherhood and General Ali Mohsen AL-Ahmar. Then this coalition was enhanced in the fighting within a unified front inside Yemen and on the borders with the Saudi Arabia.

* AL-Houthi followers participated in the revolution of February 11, 2011, against the regime of President Saleh, but their participation was opportunistic. It was proved later that they have established good relations with president Saleh, and their problem was with the forces of the revolution. Indeed AL-Houthis avenged from those who rebelled against the regime of president Saleh.

* AL-Houthi followers dominated the capital Sanaa, and all other Yemeni governorates with the support of former president Saleh, under a green light from regional and international powers.

* AL-Houthi military coup against the Yemeni government led to a civil and doctrinal war and also led to a comprehensive blockade on Yemen (land and air blockade) and military operations launched by the Arab alliance to support the legitimate Government.

* AL-Houthis pursued a policy of bombing the houses of their opponents to introduce terror in the souls of others, so that no one would dare to resist them in the future. This method was the most abhorrent practices of extremism and terrorism in the twenty-first century.

* AL-Houthi followers committed many crimes after their control of power in Yemen, such as murder, displacement, abductions, and forced disappearance of politicians, journalists and writers, assaulting them and using some of them as human shields in military sites targeted by coalition aircraft.

* AL-Houthis adopted the recruitment of children, using them in its sectarian wars to the extent that one third of AL-Houthi fighters are children, according to reports of local and international sources and eyewitnesses.

ANNEXURES

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