Unjustified Aggression: The Illegal 2003 Iraq War
“Designed” Evidence leads to an Unlawful IRAQ ATTACK
Unjustified Aggression: The Illegal 2003 Iraq War
“Designed” Evidence leads to an Unlawful IRAQ ATTACK
This paper will discuss three official documents and juxtapose them to draw final liability conclusion.
Who has to pay the liability bill?
1. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) October 2002. A pre-war WMD risk profiling of Iraq’s WMD:
2. The Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, commonly known as the Duelfer Report, presented by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). This report was released on September 30, 2004. The report concluded that Iraq had destroyed its stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and had not restarted its nuclear weapons program after the 1991 Gulf War. It was authored by Charles Duelfer and presented by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). There was no threat of WMD at all. All the so-called evidence was unjust.
3. The Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence, 9July 2004
4. Juxtaposition of Prewar Risk Assessment and Iraqi Reality
WMD Risk Profiling — Assessment of Iraq’s WMD Pre-War 2003
The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs outlines five major points of risk, each with multiple sub-points detailing specific threats and capabilities. Here is a detailed breakdown of the key points of risk expressed in the document, including the sub-points:
À Chemical and Biological Weapons
- Iraq has maintained and expanded its chemical and biological weapons programs.
- Capabilities to produce agents like mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX.
- Rebuilt facilities and developed mobile production units to evade detection.
- Estimated stockpile of at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of chemical warfare (CW) agents.
- Large-scale, redundant, and concealed biological warfare (BW) agent production capability, including mobile facilities.
À Nuclear Weapons
- Actively pursuing necessary materials and technology for nuclear weapons.
- Acquisition of high-strength aluminum tubes and other dual-use items suggests reconstitution of uranium enrichment efforts.
- Potential timeline to develop a nuclear weapon could be as short as several months to a year if sufficient fissile material is acquired from abroad.
- Without foreign fissile material, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until 2007 to 2009.
À Missile Programs
- Exceeded UN range limits with ballistic missiles.
- Developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) capable of delivering WMDs.
- Likely retained a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with ranges of 650 to 900 km.
- Deploying new SRBMs like the al-Samoud and Ababil-100, capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km range limit.
À Denial and Deception
- Vigorous denial and deception efforts significantly hinder the intelligence community’s ability to fully assess WMD programs.
- Extensive measures taken by Iraq to conceal its activities and capabilities, including the use of dual-use facilities and mobile production units.
À Potential Use of WMDs
- Low confidence in predicting when Saddam Hussein might use WMDs.
- Possibility of preemptive use or as a last resort if the regime’s survival is threatened.
- Potential for clandestine attacks against the US Homeland or regional targets.
- Saddam might use chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents preemptively against US forces, friends, and allies in the region to disrupt US war preparations and undermine the political will of the Coalition.
Each of these five major points includes multiple sub-points, which collectively detail the various risks associated with Iraq’s WMD programs.
À Chemical and Biological Weapons: 5 sub-points
À Nuclear Weapons: 4 sub-points
À Missile Programs: 4 sub-points
À Denial and Deception: 2 sub-points
À Potential Use of WMDs: 4 sub-points
Total number of risk points: 5+4+4+2+4=19 risk points.
Juxtaposition Prewar Risk Assessment vs Tangible Reality
The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs presented a highly alarming assessment of Iraq’s capabilities and intentions. This risk assessment led to the Iraq invasion in 2003 by an Allied coalition. However, the findings from the Duelfer Report and the Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence reveal a stark contrast between the prewar intelligence high-risk assessment as a motive to invade and the reality encountered during the 2003 invasion.
The stark contrast between prewar risk assessments and the reality on the ground underscores the “failure” of the “intelligence” services and the overstatement of Iraq’s WMD capabilities. The NIE’s alarming assessments were totally unsupported by actual findings during the invasion, highlighting the need for rigorous and accurate intelligence analysis and fair trial rules while implementing punitive sanctions.
This almost entirely fictional risk assessment raises serious questions about the intent behind the NIE, suggesting either gross negligence or potential bad faith. Either way, such negligence or criminal intent establishes liability and the obligation to compensate for the damage caused during the war.
This following comparison highlights the total opposition of the absence of any risk of WMD and the wrongly projected high risk by the “intelligence” services with regards to the WMD threat of Iraq. Although the risk absence of WMD, the invasion led to massive damage, casualties, asset destruction, exploitation, war crimes, crimes against humanity, breaching human rights, international law,…
The Duelfer Report and the Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence are distinct documents with different purposes and authors.
Duelfer Report
The Duelfer Report, officially titled “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,” was authored by Charles Duelfer and presented by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). This report was released on September 30, 2004, and it detailed the findings of the ISG regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. The report concluded that Iraq had destroyed its stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and had not restarted its nuclear weapons program after the 1991 Gulf War. It also noted that Saddam Hussein intended to preserve the capability to resume WMD production once UN sanctions were lifted[1][2][3][4].
Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence
The Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence, often referred to as the Phase II report, was released by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This report focused on the prewar intelligence assessments and the administration’s use of that intelligence in the lead-up to the Iraq War. The report concluded that the Bush administration had made significant claims that were not supported by the intelligence, and it criticized the intelligence community for its failures in accurately assessing Iraq’s WMD capabilities[1][2][3][4].
Key Differences
Authors and Contributors
- The Duelfer Report was authored by Charles Duelfer and the Iraq Survey Group, while the Senate Report was produced by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
Focus
The Duelfer Report focused on the actual state of Iraq’s WMD programs post-invasion, whereas the Senate Report examined the prewar intelligence and how it was used by the administration.
Conclusions
The Duelfer Report concluded that Iraq had no active WMD programs at the time of the invasion, while the Senate Report highlighted the discrepancies and misrepresentations in the prewar intelligence used to justify the invasion.
Citations:
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_Survey_Group
[3] https://www.loc.gov/item/2008354011/
[4] https://irp.fas.org/congress/2004_rpt/index.html
Actual Juxtaposition of Prewar Risk Assessment and Iraqi Reality
The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs presented a highly alarming assessment of Iraq’s capabilities and intentions. However, the findings from the Duelfer Report and the Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence reveal a stark contrast between the prewar intelligence and the reality encountered during the 2003 invasion. This comparison highlights significant discrepancies and raises serious questions about the accuracy and intent behind the NIE.
Prewar Risk Assessment (October 2002 NIE)
1. Chemical and Biological Weapons
- NIE Assessment: Iraq has maintained and expanded its chemical and biological weapons programs, with capabilities to produce agents like mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX. Estimated stockpile of at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of chemical warfare (CW) agents. Large-scale, redundant, and concealed biological warfare (BW) agent production capability, including mobile facilities.
- Reality: The Duelfer Report concluded that Iraq had not restarted its chemical or biological weapons programs after the 1991 Gulf War. No stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons were found[1][2].
2. Nuclear Weapons
- NIE Assessment: Iraq is actively pursuing the necessary materials and technology for nuclear weapons. Acquisition of high-strength aluminum tubes and other dual-use items suggests reconstitution of uranium enrichment efforts. Potential timeline to develop a nuclear weapon could be as short as several months to a year if sufficient fissile material is acquired from abroad.
- Reality: The Duelfer Report found no evidence that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. Iraq had not acquired the necessary fissile material, and its nuclear program remained dormant[1][2].
3. Missile Programs
- NIE Assessment: Iraq has exceeded UN range limits with its ballistic missiles and is developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) capable of delivering WMDs. Likely retained a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with ranges of 650 to 900 km.
- Reality: The Duelfer Report confirmed that Iraq had retained some missile capabilities but did not find evidence of active WMD delivery systems. The missile programs were not as advanced or threatening as the NIE suggested[1][2].
4. Denial and Deception
- NIE Assessment: Iraq’s vigorous denial and deception efforts significantly hinder the intelligence community’s ability to fully assess its WMD programs. Extensive measures taken by Iraq to conceal its activities and capabilities.
- Reality: The Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence highlighted significant intelligence failures and the impact of denial and deception. However, it also noted that many of the NIE’s assessments were not supported by the underlying intelligence[1][2].
5. Potential Use of WMDs
- NIE Assessment: Low confidence in predicting when Saddam Hussein might use WMDs but suggests he could employ them preemptively or as a last resort if his regime’s survival is threatened. Possibility of clandestine attacks against the US Homeland or regional targets.
- Reality: The Duelfer Report found no evidence that Iraq had the capability or intent to use WMDs during the invasion. The threat of WMD use was significantly overstated[1][2].
Key Findings from the Duelfer Report and Senate Report
1. No Active WMD Programs: The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) found no active WMD programs or stockpiles in Iraq at the time of the 2003 invasion. Saddam Hussein had not restarted his nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons programs after the 1991 Gulf War[1][2].
2. Strategic Intent: Saddam Hussein maintained the intellectual and technical capacity to restart WMD programs if sanctions were lifted, but there was no active pursuit of these programs[1][2].
3. Intelligence Failures: The Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence concluded that the October 2002 NIE was a total failure, with almost all judgments not supported by facts. The intelligence community’s assessments were flawed and led to the creation of inaccurate materials that misled government policymakers[1][2].
4. Analytic Tradecraft: The intelligence community was criticized for poor analytic tradecraft, including a failure to adequately explain uncertainties to policymakers and a tendency to succumb to “group think,” where untested assumptions were accepted without sufficient scrutiny[1][2].
5. Impact of Administration Statements: The Senate Report noted disagreements on the impact of statements made by senior members of the Bush administration on the intelligence process. The second phase of the investigation further explored this aspect[1][2].
À Consequences of the Iraq War
The invasion of Iraq in 2003, based on the fictional NIE, led to grave consequences
1. Civilian Casualties: Estimates of civilian deaths range from 200,000 to 1,000,000, highlighting the severe human cost of the conflict[3][4][5].
2. Sovereignty Breached: Iraq’s sovereignty was significantly compromised during the occupation[6].
3. Oil Market Concessions: Western companies gained significant concessions in Iraq’s oil market during the occupation[7].
4. Debaathification: The policy of debaathification led to the dismantling of Iraq’s administrative and military structures, contributing to instability[8][9].
5. Abu Ghraib Torture: The Abu Ghraib prison scandal revealed severe human rights abuses by US personnel[10][11][12].
6. Asset Damage and Reconstruction: The war caused extensive damage to Iraq’s infrastructure, necessitating a huge budget for reconstruction, much of which was funded by Iraq through oil sales[13].
7. Large-Scale Corruption and Bribery: The reconstruction process was marred by large-scale corruption and bribery[13].
8. Reconstruction Contracts: Three American companies — Halliburton, Bechtel, and Parsons — were awarded major reconstruction contracts. These companies outsourced much of the work to subcontractors and held significant profit margins. For example, Halliburton’s subsidiary, KBR, was criticized for overcharging and inefficiencies[13].
9. Cash Disappearance: Billions of dollars in cash, often in $100 bills, disappeared within days. The total value of the missing cash is estimated to be around $12 billion[13].
10. UN Bribery: It was almost “customary law” to bribe the UN with a 15% fee for granted contracts[13].
11. A non-exhaustive list.
À Conclusion
The stark contrast between the prewar risk assessment and the reality on the ground underscores the significant intelligence failures and the overstatement of Iraq’s WMD capabilities. The NIE’s alarming assessments were not supported by the actual findings during the invasion, highlighting the need for more rigorous and accurate intelligence analysis. The almost entirely fictional risk assessment raises serious questions about the intent behind the NIE, suggesting either gross negligence or potential bad faith and criminal intent. Such negligence and/or criminal intent establish liability and the obligation to compensate for the damage caused during the war. Who are we going to hold resposable? Who is going to pay the bill? A high price is already paid by the Iraqi people, upon today still.
Motives for the illegal push for war
Exploitation and maintaining USD supremacy. Just like Ghadaffi, Saddam Hussein wanted to emit its own currency and dedollarize, also his oil business was nationalized pre-war. During and after the war, western oil companies were doing business. Also the reconstruction went almost entirely ito 3 major American companies. The bribery was committed on a massive scale, which can have beneited the invading powers. Just like the opium and heroïne production spiked from quasi 0% in 2001 under the taliban in Afghanistan to almost a monopoly position worldwide, with a marketshare of 95%. Who had the logistics? The intel? The connections? The lift of capacity? Or could all this happen under the eyes, radar and gunpoint of the allied forces without consequences, so the insurgents could arm themselves? It reminds me of the UK, flooding China with opium during “the opium wars” and also of the drug traffick of the UK to Iran — according to professor Roy Cassagranda –, in order to secure a 85% share in the Iranian oil production. When the democratic elected Mossadeggh wanted to nationalise the oil sector, he was put out of power by the dynamic and democratic duo, the USA and the UK. Other, non-elected leaders were installed and business could go on as usual.
Citations:
[1] Duelfer Report 2004 1_3 NO WMD IRAQ Own Resume 19052024.pdf
[2] 259216899-Iraq-October-2002-NIE-on-WMDs-unedacted-version.pdf
[3] https://www.iraqbodycount.org
[4] https://icoca.ch/case-studies/torture-at-the-abu-ghraib-facility/
[5] https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians/iraqi
[7] https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-05-876/html/GAOREPORTS-GAO-05-876.htm
[8] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War
[9] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Ghraib_torture_and_prisoner_abuse
[10] https://responsiblestatecraft.org/abu-ghraib-scandal/
[11] https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/3/12/iraqs-de-baathification-still-haunts-the-country
[12] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De-Ba%27athification
[13] https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-oil-juhasz/index.html
The sources provided offer a comprehensive overview of the impact and legacy of the Iraq War, 20 years after the US-led invasion in 2003. Here are the key points:
A very good article contemplating 20 years of Iraq war and unrest, aligns with my developed vision:
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/themes/nie.html
À Human and Social Impact
Mass Graves and Genocide: The invasion and subsequent instability led to atrocities such as the genocidal attacks on the Yazidi community by ISIS. Survivors recount horrific experiences, including mass executions and enslavement of women and children[1][4].
- Displacement and Fear: Many Iraqis, like journalist Meethak al-Khatib, experienced displacement and constant fear due to the proximity of US military bases and ongoing violence[2].
- Sectarian Violence: The removal of Saddam Hussein created a power vacuum that escalated sectarian tensions, leading to a civil war and widespread violence, with thousands of conflict events recorded[2].
À Economic and Political Consequences
- Economic Instability: Iraq has suffered from high inflation and economic instability since the invasion. Despite efforts to rebuild, the country continues to face significant economic challenges[2].
- Corruption: The political system instigated by the US, which divides power along ethnic and sectarian lines, has led to rampant corruption, with estimates of stolen funds ranging from $150 billion to $320 billion[1].
À Military and Geopolitical Outcomes
- Failed Justifications: The primary justification for the invasion — Saddam Hussein’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction — was proven false, leading to widespread skepticism and criticism of the Bush and Blair administrations[3].
- Rise of Extremism: The invasion and subsequent chaos amplified jihadist violence, with groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS exploiting the instability to gain power[1][4].
- Geopolitical Shifts: The invasion inadvertently shifted the balance of power in the region, empowering Shia politicians close to Iran and affecting global perceptions of US and UK foreign policy[1][4].
À Lessons and Reflections
- Veterans’ Perspectives: Veterans reflect on the confusion and lack of clear objectives during the invasion, as well as the personal and professional growth they experienced[3].
Public and Political Discourse: The invasion has largely fallen out of public and political discourse in the US and UK, but its consequences continue to affect both nations and Iraq[1][4].
À Conclusion
The Iraq War has left a lasting legacy of human suffering, economic hardship, and geopolitical instability. The invasion’s justifications were flawed, and its execution led to significant unintended consequences, including the rise of extremism and widespread corruption. The experiences of those affected by the war serve as a stark reminder of the importance of understanding and learning from this complex chapter in history.
Citations:
[4] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-64976144
[6] https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/brand/m001k0ch
[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xiAtD_5NFl8
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/themes/nie.html
The above link leads to an article with a lot of citations of persons of the intelligence community reflecting their opinions on the intelligence gathering:
Quotes
David Kay (Former Iraq Weapons Inspector)
- “The difference between the classified and the unclassified version is practically trivial. And there’s no substance.”
- “I think it was a poor job, probably the worst of the modern NIE’s, partly explained by the pressure, but more importantly explained by the lack of information they had.”
- “The appropriate time to do a national intelligence estimate on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction would not have been two weeks before the vote.”
John Brennan (Deputy Executive Director, CIA, 2001–2003)
- “I think there was a feeling within the agency that intelligence was increasingly becoming the meat in the sandwich on this one; that we were being asked to do things and to make sure that that justification was out there.”
- “The tight deadline that it was produced under, I think, was responsible for some of those mistakes and the due diligence that didn’t take place.”
- “At the time there were a lot of concerns that it was being politicized by certain individuals within the administration that wanted to get that intelligence base that would justify going forward with the war.”
Melvin Goodman (Former CIA Analyst)
- “Every key judgment was wrong.”
- “The CIA basically lost its collection capabilities against weapons of mass destruction and against Saddam Hussein.”
- “The fact of the matter is, the CIA didn’t want to produce one. The White House didn’t want one because they didn’t want to allow any venting of whatever opposition there was to what they wanted to be the conventional wisdom on weapons of mass destruction.”
ohn McLaughlin (Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence)
- “It was a document that contained, in my judgment, more grist for debate than people understand.”
- “With hindsight, I think the thing that the NIE could have most included and most benefited from would have been greater expression up in the front of the document of the uncertainties.”
- “One of the lessons we learned out of all of this, going back to my earlier point, that it’s probably a lesson learned here, is don’t place so much weight on intelligence in presenting a public case for a major foreign policy decision.”
W. Patrick Lang (Former Defense Intelligence Officer)
- “I thought it was really a lot of nonsense.”
- “So there were a lot of indicators in there, and if you knew everything you knew about Iraq and how badly we had put down their WMD programs in the aftermath of the first Gulf War, the whole thing just looked like nonsense, just absolute rubbish.”
Vincent Cannistraro (Former CIA Counterterrorism Chief)
- “The National Intelligence Estimate, which is classified — only an unclassified version is circulated around — is fatally flawed.”
- “The report, basically, is just dead wrong.”
- “The effect of it is what? It goes to Congress; that’s the evidence for war.”
Tyler Drumheller (Former CIA Operations Officer)
- “I didn’t even know they had drafted the NIE.”
- “The NIE came back because people said, ‘Let’s pull everything together in one place and see what we have.’”
- “If you really are going to go to war and commit people’s lives to that, you want to have a definite view of what you’re doing, and you’d better think about how you’re doing it.”
Paul Pillar (Former National Intelligence Officer)
- “Well, in retrospect, there were certainly significant flaws in it, or it reflected significant flaws in the tradecraft, which mainly had to do with insufficient checking of the credibility of sources, which later were revealed.”
- “The atmosphere in which they were working, in which a policy decision clearly had already been made, in which intelligence was being looked to to support that decision rather to inform decisions yet to be made, was a very important part of the atmosphere.”
Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.)
- “The NIE is the highest level of intelligence product of our community. It represents not one agency, but all of the agencies.”
- “We said, ‘We want to have a national intelligence assessment.’ Tenet was reticent to do that.”
- “Well, what we got three days later was not a redacted version of the original classified report but a wholly new report, which had eliminated all of the conditions and doubts and was a full-scale argument for weapons of mass destruction.”
Lawrence Wilkerson (Former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell)
- “I am somewhat concerned now. To this point I have maintained that no one in the upper echelons of the leadership of this country spun the intelligence in a way that I would find clearly disturbing as a citizen of this country.”
- “If this dissent existed in German intelligence [and] within the American intelligence community, why was it not surfaced during our preparation for the presentation to the U.N.?”
- “Would we have done that with Curveball? Would we have done that with the connection between Al Qaeda and Baghdad? I can’t say, but we never had the opportunity to decide, because we never were presented with those dissents.”
Carl W. Ford, Jr. (Former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research)
- “This began when a foreign intelligence service told us that they had some information coming out of Niger that suggested that they were selling yellowcake uranium — raw uranium that will be processed into nuclear weapons material — to Iraq.”
- “To the best of my knowledge and to the best of the knowledge of the SSCI [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence] from their study, nobody ever bothered to check it out.”
- “Of course, but the problem is that that NIE is the most detailed and authoritative piece of intelligence done in that timeframe. That’s the best that you are ever going to find.”
Richard Kerr (Former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence)
- “All hard intelligence problems are that way. There’s always pressure to say something or to do something different than you’re doing.”
- “I think if a good analyst can’t figure out how to do that, then they shouldn’t be in the analytic business.”
- “Iraq was one of many problems. I mean, it wasn’t even the most important weapons problem. Iran was probably far more important, and North Korea was probably.”
Conclusion
The overall consensus among the intelligence officials and experts is that the October 2002 NIE on Iraq’s WMD was deeply flawed, rushed, and heavily influenced by political pressures. The document’s conclusions were largely incorrect, and the intelligence was used to justify the Iraq war, despite significant uncertainties and dissenting opinions within the intelligence community. The NIE’s production under tight deadlines and the politicization of intelligence led to one of the most significant intelligence failures in recent history.
Dries Braeckman © 20/5/2024
Citations:
[3] https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB129/index.htm
[4] https://carnegieendowment.org/2004/03/25/tale-of-two-intelligence-estimates-pub-1489
[5] https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Chronicles/tracey.pdf
[6] https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/wmd/text/report.html
[7] https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/special_section/iraq_review/pi_jrw/pi_jrw_07.html
[8] https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/national-intelligence-estimates
[9] https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna5403731
[10] https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/themes/nie.html
[11] https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003-09/chronology-bush-claim-iraq-attempted-obtain-uranium-niger
[13] https://irp.fas.org/congress/2003_cr/h072103.html
[14] https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/
[15] https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB129/nie.pdf
[16] https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB129/part11-nie.pdf
