Mind-body problem — solved

Mind-body dualism is a problem that ultimately stems from incorrect categorization. I would like to show this below using a simple equation.

The mind-body problem describes an apparent contradiction between physicality and consciousness, in which on the one hand there is physicality in the form of physical connections, and on the other hand there is consciousness in the form of a philosophical attribution.

If you write this down as an equation, the physical connection is on the left side and consciousness is on the right side.

It goes: Neurons x neurons (physics) = consciousness (philosophy).

You can see at a glance that such an equation makes no sense because different languages ​​are used on both sides. It’s kind of like saying apple = pear.

Imagine that a stimulus hits the eye and is transmitted to the brain. There it is associated with patterns and triggers an afferent stimulus that leads to movement of the extremities.
Exactly this process, which is described here biologically, can also be described psychologically or in some other way, namely: I see something, think about it and run away.

Both are exactly the same, just in a different language and using a different perspective.
Would one now come up with the idea of ​​wanting to derive the second description from the first or of wanting to see a causality between the two? Of course not. But that’s exactly what you do when you ask how thoughts arise from neurons or, more generally, how mind arises from matter.

Physicalists get rid of this problem by simply eliminating the right-hand side of this “equation” and claiming that there is no consciousness at all. If you ask what sensations are, it is said that these are perceptions that the physical body produces, which in turn creates the problem.

A similar approach applies to the question of how decisions are made. The common answer is that the physical brain makes decisions and then communicates them to conscious experience, as claimed in the Libet experiment. The entire complex process of decision-making with doubts, considerations, revisions, planning, etc. is simply reduced to a physical process, which as such should already provide the explanation.

For understanding: I am describing an ontological concept of consciousness here that answers the question: what is consciousness in principle.

The above equation, if written down correctly, should read:

Neurons x neurons (physics) = consciousness (physics).

However, this equation would be ‘wrong’ because, on the one hand, physics deals with inanimate nature and, on the other hand, does not provide any terms with which consciousness could be described. This is precisely the shortcoming of Tononi’s integrated information theory, whose (physical) concept of information makes no distinction between living and inanimate nature and thus opens the door to panpsychism.

Let’s get to biology. The above equation should read:

Neurons x neurons (biology) = consciousness (biology).

What can biologically based consciousness mean here? If we argue purely biologically, then consciousness must stand in a historical series, starting with the first single-celled organisms. Single-celled organisms don’t just move around the world purely randomly; otherwise they would hardly be able to survive. The above-mentioned intention is nothing other than an orientation system. In single-celled organisms this takes the form of ‘orientation’ based on physical and chemical gradients. If one extrapolates this phylogenetically, it means that what can be called consciousness also serves the orientation of the organism, only on the basis of nervous systems. At the same time, these nervous systems generate an arousal or arousal that the individual organism perceives as an experience (qualia) and which can be measured as an observer.

You can now use various models to describe and concretize this excitement. We are still on the biological level here. For example, the physical theory of dynamic systems could be transformed into a biological model in which consciousness could be described as an attractor, the physical concept of information (not Shannon!) in connection with information or structure density describes the same dynamic ‘center’ or evolutionary graph theory can be described as an orientation walk within possibility spaces, information gradients cause top-down regulation, etc.pp.

On this basis, neuroscientific approaches that can lead to a convergence of the different concepts of consciousness can now be classified as medical terms (conscious vs. unconscious), psychological (conscious vs. subconscious) or neuropsychological (attentive vs. relaxed).

Without such an epistemological categorization of consciousness, one moves into the area of ​​complete arbitrariness and indeterminacy. It also turns out that consciousness — as well as life in general — cannot be described with any physical model. Biological terms are necessary that form a basis for any kind of specification.

Both evolutionary epistemology (Vollmer) and genetic epistemology (Piaget) follow a similar approach.

The mind-body problem is not about a real relationship, but rather a linguistic one. Behind this lies, on the one hand, a widespread dualism, which, on the other hand, has reached the status of an ontology. The linguistic separation seems to legitimize the real separation. This separation is so familiar to us that we take it for granted and only try to legitimize or deny it in some way, depending on our epistemic convictions.

So if a relationship is to be established between physics and philosophy or physiology and psychology (behavior), the terms used must be given the same name; a common denominator must be found. Only then can the firing of certain neurons with a certain psychological state be meaningfully paraphrased without leading to profound misunderstandings or ideological preliminary decisions.