Chapter 6 — Expansionism was always the plan

Brendan Devenney
33 min readOct 13, 2021

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Egypt, Gaza and the Suez Canal

Christopher Mayhew’s first professional exposure was as Undersecretary for Labour Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin.

“I remember clearly [Bevin’s] dislike of Zionist methods and tactics, and, indeed, of the Zionist philosophy itself. He was passionately and unshakably anti-Zionist. He held that Zionism was basically racialist, that it was inevitably wedded to violence and terror, that it demanded far more from the Arabs than they could or should be expected to accept peacefully, that its success would condemn the Middle East to decades of hatred and violence, and above all … that by turning the Arabs against Britain and the Western countries, it would open a highroad for Stalin into the Middle East. On all these points events proved him right …”

(“Publish It Not: The Middle East Cover-Up” by Michael Adams and Christopher Mayhew (Undersecretary for Labour Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin), published in 1975)

The first chapters showed the deviousness, dishonesty and arrogance of zionism that lead to the Balfour Declaration, which stated:

His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

The British, in the full knowledge that this piece of paper was a lie, and that granting zionism it’s wishes would be detrimental to all but zionists, went ahead with it.

After the ethnic cleansing, atrocities committed against Palestinians (Chapter 3), and biting the British hand that fed them for decades, they had turned to the US as their next stepping stone (to be discussed).

The following is an excerpt from an essay by David Gerard Fincham : The Borders of Israel and Palestine.

Chapter XI of the UN Charter states that the occupier (of stolen land) had to recognize that “the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount” and to help them “develop self-government and free political institutions”. In other words, to help the Palestinian people achieve their right of self-determination in their own land.

Israel seriously violated this sacred trust. Making the territory part of Israel prevents its people from developing free political institutions and self-government. The refusal to allow Palestinian refugees to return, the destruction of their villages, and their replacement by immigrant Jews, puts the interests of the Palestinian people below those of Jewish immigrants into Palestinian territory.

Chapter XI of the Charter also applies in the West Bank and Gaza, occupied by Israel in 1967. As the administration there is military, it must also obey the Geneva Conventions. Israel has violated those as well.

Palestine’s right to territorial compensation

Israel’s declaration of sovereign borders on May 14, 1948 was a deception practiced upon President Truman and the rest of the world, designed to elicit recognition of Israel. Israel never had any intention to stick to those borders. Since those days, Israel and its Zionist supporters have practiced another deception: that the border definition never happened.

But, there is documented evidence that they in fact did outline their borders:

“5. Earlier during the day Loy Henderson phoned to ascertain boundaries of new State. Advised that boundaries in accordance with U.N Resolution.”

(14 May, 1948 Eliahu Epstein, Agent of the Jewish Agency in Washington, sent this telegram to Moshe Shertok, Foreign Minister of the “Provisional Government of Israel in Tel Aviv”; Link to text: http://www.religion-science-peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Epsteins-telegram-to-Shertok.pdf )

Just weeks after this telegram was sent, zionism, through Ben Gurion, stated their open aims. That their “word” meant nothing. Again.

“the entire expanse of the State of Israel allocated to us under the terms of the UN resolution is in our hands, and we have conquered several important districts outside those boundaries… we will remain constantly on the offensive, which will not be confined to the borders of the Jewish State”,

(Report to the Provisional Government of Israel by Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Ben-Gurion, 03 June 1948)

The Zionist leadership did not want to define the borders of Israel when they declared independence from the rest of Palestine on May 14, 1948, but were forced to specify borders according to the UN Partition Plan in order to achieve recognition by the USA. The territory captured by Israel outside these borders in the 1948–49 war and incorporated de facto into Israel was obtained by war in violation of the fundamental principles of the UN Charter. Since 1949 Israel has attempted, very successfully, to convince the world that this border definition never happened in order to hide the fact that the captured territory is outside Israel’s declared and recognized sovereign borders and is therefore rightfully part of the territory of Palestine, within which the Palestinian people have the right of self-determination. Although the Palestinian leadership has accepted that Israel can keep this territory in a peace agreement, there is a very strong case for compensation for its loss in the form of a transfer of Israeli territory in the southern Negev to Palestinian sovereignty.

(The Borders of Israel and Palestine, David Gerard Fincham;

Link: http://www.religion-science-peace.org/2014/06/15/the-borders-of-israel-and-palestine/ )

With this typical zionist ploy in mind, that of “ambiguity” that isn’t really ambiguous in the slightest, read how they intended to play their hand for the rest of the century. The “Suez Crisis” is a good jumping off point.

The Suez Canal — a sequence of events

The 1888 Convention of Constantinople declared the Suez Canal in Egypt a neutral zone under British protection. It came into force in 1904.

It was one of the most strategically important points in the world, especially for colonial powers in Europe, and during wartime (shipping of oil, etc. — two thirds of Europe’s oil passed through it).

After the costs of the Second World War had taken its toll on Britain, coupled with its crumbling empire, the Suez Canal was an important link to the (emerging) oil empire.

Egypt and Iraq were seen as vital to maintaining strong British influence in the region.

The Tripartite Declaration of 1950 was a joint statement by the US, Britain and France to guarantee the territorial status quo that had been determined by the 1949 Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements. Developed from discussions related to the armistice, the declaration outlined the parties’ commitment to peace and stability in the Middle East and their opposition to the use or the threat of force. They pledged to take action within and outside the United Nations. to prevent violations of the frontiers or armistice lines. Further, they reiterated their opposition to the development of an arms race.

(A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Background to the 1956 War, p. 123)

In October 1951, the Egyptian government unilaterally abolished the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the terms of which granted Britain a lease on the Suez base for 20 more years. Britain refused to withdraw from Suez, after which grew an escalation in hostility towards Britain by Egyptians.

On 23 July 1952, after years of instability and alleged corruption, there was a military coup that removed King Farouk and installed Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Immediately after the coup, Israeli officials began sending Nasser messages through various mediators, in order to begin negotiations toward a peace treaty with Egypt. In addition, a number of individuals from different places began to take on the mission of fostering peace between the two neighbors

(Secret channels: The inside story of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, M. Heikal, 1996, p. 91).

According to author and Nasser’s biographer Said Aburish, Nasser created a secret team in 1953 whose goal was to reach an Egyptian–Israeli peace agreement. The team, led by Abdul Rahman Sadek — an Egyptian diplomat who served in France — and Colonel Sroat Oqsa — a military attaché at the embassy — secretly made contact with Israeli representatives in the French capital. The Israelis responded positively to the offer, and the two parties began to engage in covert communications, which lasted through the years 1952–1955.

(Nasser: The Last Arab, Said Aburish, 2004, p. 50)

These secret talks were confirmed by Mossad chief Meir Amit.

(Head to Head, Meir Amit, pp 204–205)

During the early fifties, the US focused on Egypt as the “key to the Near East” (they were to stage a coup in Iran around this time too). They envisioned Egypt as the leader of the Arab version of NATO (Middle East Defense Organization — MEDO). The US had also attempted to unite the empirical forces and Arab nationalists against the Soviet Union.

(Burns, William J. (1985). Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955–1981)

Even Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was on record as saying that the Arab states were “more fearful of Zionism than of the Communists” after a visit there in 1953.

(Gaddis, John Lewis (1998). We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, pp167–168)

And there was very good reason for them to fear these cut throats after the massacres in Palestine just 5 years earlier. And the fact that they hadn’t let up.

Ariel Sharon

Sociopath Ariel Sharon and his Unit 101, formed by Ben Gurion during the early fifties, acted with the same cold tactics as nazi anti-partisan militias and the SS during the Second World War, where entire populations were subject to mass killings at the hint of rebellion. Many times these mass killings were carried out with zeal for no real reason whatsoever.

On 18 June 1950, Sharon’s commander, Moshe Dayan, had lain out clearly the zionist policy towards Palestinians in the Knesset (not that he needed to — the slaughterhouse in Palestine that lead to the Nakba is proof enough):

The method of collective punishment so far has proved effective… There are no other effective methods.

(Benny Morris, Border Wars. Page 177)

Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, collective punishment is a war crime. Dayan made his statement just a year after these laws were passed.

This mentality continues to this very day. Nothing has changed. Another quote from an IDF chief chaplain (a spiritual leader!) repeated this mantra twenty years later:

When our forces come across civilians during a war or in hot pursuit or in a raid, so long as there is no certainty that those civilians are incapable of harming our forces, then according to the Halakhah they may and even should be killed … Under no circumstances should an Arab be trusted, even if he makes an impression of being civilized … In war, when our forces storm the enemy, they are allowed and even enjoined by the Halakhah to kill even good civilians, that is, civilians who are ostensibly good.”

(Central Region Command of Israeli Army (Chief Chaplain), Israel Shahak. Jewish History, Jewish Religion — The Weight of Three Thousand Years. P76)

In August 1953, Ariel Sharon formed a special commando force, Unit 101, under the command of Moshe Dayan, head of the Operations Dept. of Israel’s Army.

Sharon, personally, slit the throats of sleeping Egyptian soldiers. He bitched out one of his officers for not killing two old Arabs when they had the opportunity. Sharon laughed as a junior officer tormented an old Arab and then shot him at close range. Sharon ordered his men to ambush and kill two Jordanian women on their way to a well. This is just a small sample of the caliber of the man.

(Israeli Caesar, by Uzi Benziman; Arabs and Israel for Beginners, Ron David)

In October 1953, the Qibya massacre occurred during “Operation Shoshana”, when Unit 101, under Ariel Sharon, attacked the village of Qibya in the West Bank. At least sixty-nine Palestinian villagers were killed, two-thirds of them women and children. Allegedly “in retaliation” for the murder of a Jewish woman and her two children.

(Wiki)

They carried out a despicable war crime against innocent civilians in a defenseless village.

This wasn’t “retaliation”. This was barbarism.

Israeli forces…destroyed 45 homes and killed 69 people, most of them in cold blood by throwing grenades, including those who attempted to flee for their lives. Many were killed under the rubble of their own homes. Approximately two thirds of those killed were women and children. The soldiers received the following order from then-commander Ariel Sharon: “The intention: Attack and conquer the village of Qibya, with maximum damage to humans and property.”

(Benny Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, pp. 257–276. esp. pp.249,262)

Ben-Gurion actually put the blame on Mizrahi Jews and holocaust survivors (the untermenschen) the next day. In the full knowledge that it was the unit he had commanded Sharon to set up.

Israeli newspapers quoted Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion when reporting [lie upon lie] that the massacre was committed by “settlers living on the border, some of them lived through Nazi concentration camps, while others are immigrants from Muslim countries, where the tradition of revenge is strong… and their patience ran out…. The Israeli government vehemently rejects the outlandish and fantastical versions of the story, which claim that Israeli soldiers took part in the operation against Qibya. We examined the issue, and found that not a single military unit was missing from its base on the night of the attack on Qibya.”

(How the Israeli media covers massacres: Lessons from 1953, John Brown, 972 Magazine, October 18, 2014)

Benny Morris estimated that in the years from 1949 to 1956, between 2,700 and 5,000 Palestinians were killed by the Israeli Defense Forces, police, and civilians along Israel’s newly created borders — most of them unarmed refugees who tried either to return home or to harvest their crops. Nobody was ever charged.

(Israel’s Border Wars, Benny Morris, 1997)

Of course zionists couldn’t be trusted. Ever.

The US, Egypt and the Lavon Affair

US Ambassador Jefferson Caffery saw the continued British military presence in Egypt as outdated and viewed Nasser’s Revolutionary Command Council in a highly favourable light.

(Thornhill, M. T. (1 September 2004). “Britain, the United States and the Rise of an Egyptian Leader: The Politics and Diplomacy of Nasser’s Consolidation of Power, 1952–4”, p900)

In May 1953, John Foster Dulles asked Nasser to join an anti-Soviet alliance. Nasser refused saying that the Soviet Union had done nothing to Egypt while Britain had been Egypt’s aggressor for the previous seventy years.

(Gaddis, John Lewis (1998). We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, p168)

Dulles advised Eisenhower that the Arab states believed “the United States will back the new state of Israel in aggressive expansion. Our basic political problem … is to improve the Moslem states’ attitudes towards Western democracies because our prestige in that area had been in constant decline ever since the war”. The immediate consequence was a new policy of “even-handedness” where the United States very publicly sided with the Arab states in several disputes with Israel in 1953–54.

(Neff, Donald (1981). Warriors at Suez : Eisenhower takes America into the Middle-East, pp43–44)

Where Eisenhower drew a line was at Nasser’s requests for arms. The US Congress had already bought the zionist narrative and didn’t want a strong neighbour to Palestine which was openly anti-zionist (as Nasser was).

(Burns, William J. (1985). Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955–1981, pp16–22)

Which raises the question of how zionism was given a free run in British and more so, in US affairs for decades. And just as we saw with British intrigue and pigheadedness when forcing the predicted zionist nightmare on to Palestine, US intelligence knew that this entity was acting against their apparent interests at home and abroad, yet did nothing. Which has to mean that the CIA, FBI and Israeli intelligence were on the same page, but running multiple parallel narratives both in private and in public (to be discussed).

In this case, zionism was blatantly running against Eisenhower’s foreign policy as regards the Arab nations, but they were very much in tune in many other areas, as we’ll see in the coming chapters.

In the midst of “peace talk attempts”, on 2 July 1954, an Israeli “sleeper” cell in Egypt detonated bombs at a post office in Alexandria. And on 14 July, it bombed the libraries of the US Information Agency in Alexandria and Cairo, and a British-owned theater. The Jewish perpetrators were arrested.

The commander of the army at the time, Lt. Gen. Moshe Dayan, described the plan, after it had failed, in a November 1, 1954, meeting of the IDF General Staff. “The goal was to interfere with the [British] withdrawal from the Suez by taking actions that would seem to have been done by the Egyptians and would create tension between the Egyptians and the English,” the IDF Archives memo from the meeting shows.

(New revelations in Lavon Affair raise more questions than they answer, Mitch Ginsburg, Times of Israel, 12 May 2015)

The Egyptian trial began on 11 December 1954 and lasted until 27 January 1955; two of the accused (Moshe Marzouk and Shmuel Azar) were condemned to execution by hanging, two were acquitted, and the rest received lengthy prison terms.

Winston Churchill and the World Jewish Congress publically appealed for their lives. Why would Churchill do this after what zionism had done to Britain in Palestine (and would shortly do in the coming years)?

These appeals failed. On October 26, 1954, a gunman had shot at Nasser as he delivered a speech in Alexandria. Nasser’s government blamed the Muslim Brotherhood. Thousands of its members were rounded up. Of those put on trial, six were sentenced to death and seven others were sentenced to life imprisonment. How could he possibly exonerate Jewish zionist extremists while condemning Muslim extremists to death?

The Muslim Brotherhood had been formed in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. It had enormous power behind the scenes in monarchical Egypt, playing politics at the highest level, often in league with King Farouk against his political opponents, including the left, the communists, and the nationalist Wafd Party. In 1937, at Farouk’s coronation, the Brotherhood — in Arabic, the Ikhwan — was enlisted to provide “order and security.”

In the 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood initially coexisted with Nasser after he took power. Gradually, however, Nasser sidelined the group. By 1954 Nasser and the Brotherhood were at war and they twice tried to assassinate him.

There’s evidence that London spies may have collaborated with the Brotherhood against Nasser.

By then, the group’s chief international organizer and best-known official was Said Ramadan the son-in-law of founder Hassan al-Banna. Ramadan had come to the attention of both the CIA and MI-6.

There exists a photograph that showed Ramadan with President Eisenhower in the Oval Office. By then, or soon after, Ramadan had likely been recruited as a CIA agent.

(Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (American Empire Project) Hardcover — November 3, 2005, Robert Dreyfus)

There were close ties between Ramadan and various Western intelligence services:

“By the end of the decade, the CIA was overtly backing Ramadan.”

From its early days, the Brotherhood was financed generously by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which appreciated its ultra-conservative politics and its virulent hatred of Arab communists. Hermann Eilts, who served as US ambassador to both Saudi Arabia and Egypt, said that he once encountered Hassan al-Banna in the offices of the Saudi deputy minister of finance in 1948. “He used to come to Saudi Arabia for money,” Eilts said.

(Washington’s Secret History with the Muslim Brotherhood, “A Mosque in Munich”, Ian Johnson, The New York Review, Feb 5 2011)

Moshe Marzouk and Shmuel Azar were eventually hanged in January 1955. And Zionists labeled the false flag attempt a “rogue operation”. Israel’s “rogue operations” are usually highly embarrassing Israeli operations after they are caught. Just as Jonathan Pollard’s industrial scale spying during the eighties, aided by Israeli intelligence at the highest levels was described as a “rogue operation”!

Question: would there even have been a trial if the situation were reversed and Egyptian operatives had bombed zionist controlled Palestine? They were killing innocent women and kids in “retaliation” attacks in Palestine at the time…

The “false flag” operation had failed. And Egypt and Britain came to an agreement.

In October 1954, Britain and Egypt concluded the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954 on the phased evacuation of British troops from the Suez base, the terms of which agreed to withdrawal of all troops within 20 months, maintenance of the base to be continued, and for Britain to hold the right to return for seven years. The Suez Canal Company was not due to revert to the Egyptian government until 16 November 1968 under the terms of the treaty.

(Butler, L. J. (2002). Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World.)

This was a very fair outcome for Britain. Zionists hated it.

Despite the zionist false flag operation, Nasser wanted the talks with zionists to continue after October 1954, when Britain had signed this agreement to withdraw from the canal.

There were new negotiations between the Egyptian colonel Oqsa and Eliyahu Sasson and Reuven Shiloah, who served as chief of the Mossad until 1952 and then was appointed as a diplomatic delegate at the Israeli Embassy in the United States….these contacts were far more comprehensive than those that preceded them.

(H. Carmel, Intelligence for peace: The role of intelligence in peacetime preparation, pp. 70–80)

Or at least Nasser played along. Zionists couldn’t be trusted!

The talks which continued in Paris produced an Israeli–Egyptian document of understanding with four points: the commitment of both parties to act to the best of their ability to prevent incidents at the border, the maintenance of telephone contact (red line) between the parties to resolve issues in real time, the establishment of communication channels directly through their representatives in Paris, and the passage through the Suez Canal for Israeli-bound cargo, on condition that the ship transferring such cargo would bear a foreign flag.

(H. Carmel, Intelligence for peace: The role of intelligence in peacetime preparation 1998, p. 75).

Following the signing of the secret agreement, Nasser agreed to accept an Israeli representative in Cairo to promote negotiations in preparation for a summit meeting between him and the Israeli prime minister Moshe Sharett. Sharett himself confirmed in his diaries (1968) that indeed there were preparations for a secret meeting between him and Nasser.

(Sharett Political journal (Volume III), 1968, pp. 904–905).

Israelophile CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton and ringleader of the Iranian coup, Kermit Roosevelt, would coordinate the mission. In the days before the zionist “Lavon” extremists were to be executed, Sharett was arranging a visit to Cairo.

(Sharett Political journal (Volume III), 1968)

Sharett supposedly cancelled the next step of these talks because of the executions of the zionist bombers. This is Sharett, the prime minister of an entity which doesn’t know the meaning of the word “mercy”, just months after members of Israeli intelligence had tried to provoke retaliation from Britain and the US against Egypt, while secret peace talks were ongoing, and just three weeks from when 37 Egyptian soldiers would be executed by Israeli forces on the outskirts of Gaza.

(H. Carmel, Intelligence for peace: The role of intelligence in peacetime preparation 1998, p. 76–79)

On the other side of the coin, author Said Aburish also claimed that Nasser didn’t trust Sharett. And that he saw him as a weak prime minister. He also claimed that when Ben Gurion, seen as being responsible for the operation, became the Israeli defense minister shortly after the executions, it was the final nail in the coffin for “peace talks”.

(Nasser: The Last Arab, Said Aburish, 2004, pp71–73)

Coupled with the prospect of a probable propaganda drive by the Muslim Brotherhood in the event of Jewish extremists being pardoned while their Muslim counterparts hung, I personally believe that this was the deciding factor. Nasser’s hands were tied. And Zionists knew it.

Just a month after this breakdown in talks, the Americans and British were still trying to secretly broker a deal. “Plan Alpha”. By November 1955, it had failed.

(Bar-On, The gates of Gaza: Israel’s road to Suez and back 1955–1957. 1992, pp. 109–111, pp. 112, 122–123, 138; Oren, Six days of war: June 1967 and the making of the modern Middle East, 2002, p. 28)

In November 1955, the Americans, again through James Angleton, made another attempt at brokering a deal called “Project Gamma”, which began in January 1956.

(Bar-On, The gates of Gaza: Israel’s road to Suez and back 1955–1957. pp. 130–132)

What may have prompted the American push was the Soviets supplying large quantities of of weapons to Egypt in September 1955 through Czechoslovakia.

(“The Collapse of Project Alpha,” Shimon Shamir, 1989)

In Britain, the increase of Soviet influence in the Near East was seen as an ominous development that threatened to put an end to British influence in the oil-rich region.

(Adamthwaite, Anthony (1988). “Suez revisited”. International Affairs. p450)

France and Israel

During a visit to London in March 1956, French premier Guy Mollet warned British PM Anthony Eden about the Islamic and Soviet threat that he faced in Egypt because of Nasser (Nasser was an atheist and Britain used the “Islamists” to contain Arab nationalism!).

(Alexander, Anne Nasser Haus Publishing, 1 Sep 2005, p102; Sirrs, Owen L. The Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910–2009; Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East, Keith Kyle, pp115–117)

Eden had carried a letter bomb in his briefcase for a day not too long before. Sent by zionist terrorists. In fact it was zionism which ran a campaign of terror for years against Britain!

But yeah, those Islamists..

Remember the people who had warned that bending to zionist demands would create this situation? The only reason Israel played along with “peace talks” was the prospect of receiving arms to match the Soviet deal with Egypt. Nothing else.

During this time, the Algerian War of Independence had started (1954). Naturally, Arab nationalist Nasser supported their revolution financially, vocally and in helping set up arms deals. The French colonizers were no different from Egypt’s British colonizers, although the French proved far more brutal.

Of course Israel found a kindred spirit with the far right French colonialists.

Mossad had begun working with the French in Algeria in 1953.

(The Tacit Alliance, Crosbie, 1974, p107)

The Israelis had assisted the French in the Algerian war of independence between 1954 and 1962. Then, when Algeria was finally independent and sought admission to the UN, only Israel voted against it.

“When in 1961 the OAS (Organisation armée secrète) was created, it was a natural development that Israel, as keen on [French retention of Algeria as a colony] as the OAS themselves, should lock themselves into the [OAS].”

(Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi. The Israeli Connection — Who Israel Arms and Why. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), pp. 44–45)

Some of the most ardent supporters of the OAS in Algeria were Jews….a Jewish branch of the OAS was created.

(Alexander Harrison. Challenging DeGaulle: The OAS and the Counterrevolution in Algeria. (New York: Praeger, 1989), p. 67.)

[The OAS] attracted hotheads including some Jews who belonged to Irgun Zvai Leumi, the Israeli underground military organization. They were recruited by the OAS as specialists in clandestine warfare.”

(Paul Henissart. Wolves in the City: The Death of French Algeria. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970), p. 346.)

Zionists want more war

In 1956, following another visit to Paris by Peres, France agreed to totally disregard the Tripartite Declaration, and supply even more weapons to Israel.

(Neff, Donald (1981). Warriors at Suez : Eisenhower takes America into the Middle-East. pp234–236)

Israel again playing on the fears of nations to get what they want. But they were now going to step their game up.

During the same visit, Peres informed the French that Israel had decided upon war with Egypt in 1956. Peres claimed that Nasser was a genocidal maniac..(and) wanted a war before Egypt received even more Soviet weapons, and there was still a possibility of victory for the Jewish state. Peres asked for the French, who had emerged as Israel’s closest ally by this point, to give Israel all the help they could give in the coming war.

(Warriors at Suez : Eisenhower takes America into the Middle-East. pp 235)

Peres labeling Nasser a “genocidal maniac”….

France and Britain had been skirting around going to war or doing something with Egypt, but Israel made their play and acted as the catalyst.

British PM Anthony Eden bit the bait too. He reportedly said:

“Nasser was our Enemy №1 in the Middle East and he would not rest until he destroyed all our friends (edit: did he actually count Israel as being a “friend”??) and eliminated the last vestiges of our influence…. Nasser must therefore be … destroyed.

(Mason, Edward & Asher, Robert The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1973, p. 6)

Eisenhower strongly opposed British-French military action and again tried a peaceful solution.

(Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953–1960, Isaac Alteras, Ch7–8)

It was no surprise that given all of the intrigue, arming of Israel and possibly getting wind of Israel’s plans with people who had tagged Egypt along in fake “peace talks”, that Nasser seized the Suez Canal (which was in his own country!) on July 26, 1956. He had also looked for US financing for the Aswan Dam which didn’t look likely. He announced that all assets of the Suez Canal Company had been frozen, and that stockholders would be paid the price of their shares according to the day’s closing price on the Paris Stock Exchange. That same day, Egypt closed the canal to Israeli shipping. Egypt also closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.

(1956: Egypt seizes Suez Canal, BBC Archive)

Remember that Egypt had made a generous deal with Britain over the Suez Canal. And that Israel and France were plotting a war against him. And that shareholders in the Suez were to be compensated in full.

Britain was approached by France and told of the Franco-Israeli plot in October 1956.

There was an agreement made between Britain, France and Israel called the “Protocol of Sèvres” in October 1956 — a grandiose name for what was essentially a colonialist plot. The basic idea was for Israel to invade Egypt, capturing the Suez Canal, and then for France and England to “intervene” and demand that both Israel and Egypt stay away from the Suez and for it to be placed under their “protection”. As per usual, Israel’s Ben Gurion had other ideas. While Britain and France were having kneejerk reactions to the threat to their “empires”, Ben Gurion wanted to create one of his own:

He presented a comprehensive plan, which he himself called “fantastic”, for the reorganization of the Middle East. Jordan, he observed, was not viable as an independent state and should therefore be divided. Iraq would get the East Bank in return for a promise to settle the Palestinian refugees there and to make peace with Israel while the West Bank would be attached to Israel as a semi-autonomous region. Lebanon suffered from having a large Muslim population which was concentrated in the south. The problem could be solved by Israel’s expansion up to the Litani River, thereby helping to turn Lebanon into a more compact Christian state. … Israel declares its intention to keep her forces for the purpose of permanent annexation of the entire area east of the El Arish-Abu Ageila, Nakhl-Sharm el-Sheikh, in order to maintain for the long term the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Eilat and in order to free herself from the scourge of the infiltrators and from the danger posed by the Egyptian army bases in Sinai. … “I told him about the discovery of oil in southern and western Sinai, and that it would be good to tear this peninsula from Egypt because it did not belong to her, rather it was the English who stole it from the Turks when they believed that Egypt was in their pocket. I suggested laying down a pipeline from Sinai to Haifa to refine the oil.”

(The Protocol of Sèvres,1956: Anatomy of a War Plot, Avi Shlaim, pp509–530; Fortress Israel: The Inside Story of the Military Elite Who Run the Country, Patrick Tyler, p105; Defending the Holy Land, Zeev Maoz, p70)

The CIA were aware of the plans to attack Egypt.

(Britain, Israel and Anglo-Jewry 1949–57, Natan Aridan, p167)

The attack began on 29 October 1956. The operation aimed at taking control of the Suez Canal, Gaza and parts of Sinai. Jordan was expected to ally with Egypt, so their border was watched and a curfew implemented for people living there.

This was when the Kafr Qasim massacre occurred.

48 Palestinians were killed. 19 were men, 6 were women (one pregnant) and 23 were children.

Border Policemen carried out the massacre in Kafr Qasim on October 29, 1956, the first day of the Suez Crisis. Forty-eight men, women and children were murdered, including a pregnant woman. Her fetus is counted in the village as the 49th murder victim. They were shot to death when they returned from their day’s work, unaware the village had been put under curfew a few hours earlier, due to tension with neighboring Jordan.

Those involved in it were court martialed, convicted and some sentenced at first to long prison terms…. But the convicted parties’ sentence was soon commuted by the chief of staff, they were pardoned by the president and released from jail. The most senior defendant, Col. Issachar Shadmi, commander of the brigade in charge of the area, was sentenced to a symbolic fine of 10 pennies for exceeding authority.

In 1986, 30 years after the massacre, Shalom Ofer, one of the convicted soldiers, said in an interview to Ha’ir: “We were like the Germans. They stopped trucks, took the Jews off and shot them. What we did is the same. We were obeying orders like a German soldier during the war, when he was ordered to slaughter Jews.”

(60 Years After Massacre, Kafr Qasem Doesn’t Want an Apology From the Israeli Government, Haaretz, Ofer Aderet, Oct. 28, 2016)

Just five days later, on 3 November 1956, more massacres ensued.

275 men were executed after an Israeli raid on Khan Yunis and its refugee camp.

(UN report: https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6558F61D3DB6BD4505256593006B06BE )

A mass grave was uncovered later that contained the bodies of 40 bound Palestinian men.

(Palumbo, Michael. Imperial Israel. 1990. Bloomsbury Publishing. p32.)

Israeli soldier Marek Gefen was serving in Gaza during the Suez Crisis. In 1982, Gefen, having become a journalist, published his observations of walking through the town shortly following the killings. In his account of post-occupation Khan Yunis, he said, “In a few alleyways we found bodies strewn on the ground, covered in blood, their heads shattered. No one had taken care of moving them. It was dreadful. I stopped at a corner and threw up. I couldn’t get used to the sight of a human slaughterhouse.”

(Sacco, Joe. Footnotes in Gaza. p118)

Nine days later on November 12, the Rafah massacre occurred.

The Rafah massacre occurred on November 12, 1956, during Israel’s occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Protectorate. The Palestinian version maintains that all resistance had ceased when the killings took place. IDF soldiers rounded up male individuals over fifteen years of age throughout the Gaza Strip in an effort to root out members of the Palestinian Fedayeen and the Palestinian Brigade of the Egyptian army. Israel proclaimed that the civilian population would be held collectively responsible for any attacks on Israeli soldiers during the occupation, which lasted from 1 November 1956 to 7 March 1957. Dozens of summary executions took place of Palestinians who had been taken prisoner, and hundreds of civilians were killed as Israeli forces combed through areas like Khan Yunis. Calculations of the total number of Palestinians killed by the IDF in this four-month period of Israeli rule vary between 930 and 1,200 people, out of a population of 330,000.

(“A Thin Black Line”, . Haaretz. 11 February 2010; L’accomplissement des prophéties, vol.3 of La Question de Palestine, Henry Laurens, Fayard, Paris 2007, pp.500–501, 762)

111 were killed during Israeli raids. The vast majority were POWs. A war crime.

On October 31st more war crime massacres were carried out by zionists.

Israeli soldiers under Ariel Sharon’s command massacred scores of Egyptian “prisoners of war” who were actually civilian workers (49 in total).

Paratroopers found two large tents with civilian Egyptian workers and took them captive. Two days later, they moved out toward Ras Sudar and killed their prisoners.

General Arye Biro… tells of a prisoner who had escaped into the desert with bullet wounds but returned to the Israeli soldiers rather than die of thirst. “I’m not responsible for the enemy’s stupidity, and surely he very quickly found himself together with his friends,”

In another case, Biro and Shaul Ziv, a colonel in the army reserves, described firing hundreds of bullets into a truck full of civilians on the road to Ras Sudar.

“It was simply shocking,” Ziv said. “When they opened the back of the truck, the bodies poured out one on top of the other. . . . I couldn’t stand the thought that we shot these people without a battle.”

Biro added: “There were 56 men on the truck. Six remained alive after the first [round of] fire. They too ‘went to sleep’ later on.”

A third incident, in which chained prisoners were massacred at Ras Sudar, was documented by the United Nations after the war, and Israel was asked for an explanation at that time. Eytan reportedly was reprimanded but never tried or formally punished.

Biro denied in the article that Eytan was even reprimanded, saying: “After all, it was really my mistake. I mean, not the shooting of the prisoners, but the fact that I forgot to unchain their hands after they were killed and before we cleared off.”

(“Israel to probe deaths of Egyptian POWs in ’56: Sinai: At Cairo’s request, defense officials will investigate general’s claim that scores were shot”, LA Times, August 16, 1995)

Britain and France played their parts by sending an “ultimatum” the next day.

1000 Egyptian civilians are estimated to have died. Most Egyptian casualties were at the hands of the Israelis. While a few hundred military military personnel from the three aggressors died.

(CASUALTIES OF MIDEAST WARS, LA Times Archives, March 1991; Neff, Donald (1981). Warriors at Suez : Eisenhower takes America into the Middle-East — Quotes UN report: “thousands of wounded and dead bodies all over Sanai (sic)”. Neff estimates 4000 Egyptians wounded and 6000 captured or missing in Sinai and a further 900 wounded by the Anglo-French.)

Eisenhower knew that his support for this invasion would be a disaster for relations with the Arab world. And that it might push Arabs to side with Russia (even more).

The Arab and Muslim world did react. 300,000 people in Pakistan protested, ending in the burning down of the British High Commission. In Syria, the government blew up the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline that allowed Iraqi oil to reach tankers in the Mediterranean to punish Iraq for supporting the invasion, and to cut Britain off from one of its main routes for taking delivery of Iraqi oil. Saudi Arabia imposed a total oil embargo on Britain and France (for purely propaganda purposes).

(Pike, Francis Empires at War, London: I.B. Tauris 2009, p. 303.; Lacey, Robert The Kingdom, New York: Avon 1981, p. 315.)

Eisenhower condemned Israel’s refusal to withdraw troops from Gaza and the Sinai. He sought UN-backed efforts to impose economic sanctions on Israel until it fully withdrew from Egyptian territory. Senate Majority leader LB Johnson objected to American pressure on Israel (surprise, surprise).

Eisenhower was “insistent on applying economic sanctions” to the extent of cutting off private American assistance to Israel which was estimated to be over $100 million a year. The Democrat controlled Senate wouldn’t co-operate with Eisenhower’s position on Israel (the Democrat Party was fully infiltrated by zionism by the 1950s — to be discussed).

Eisenhower spoke on TV and radio explaining why Israel’s aggression on Egypt needed to be rejected.

(Divine, Robert (1981). Eisenhower and the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 64–66.)

On 30 October, the Security Council held a meeting, at the request of the United States, when it submitted a draft resolution calling upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind the established armistice lines. It was not adopted because of British and French vetoes.

A similar draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union was also rejected.

On 31 October, also as planned, France and the UK launched an air attack against targets in Egypt, which was followed shortly by a landing of their troops at the northern end of the canal zone.

An emergency special session was convened 1 November. In the early hours of 2 November, the General Assembly adopted the United States’ proposal for Resolution 997 (ES-I); the vote was 64 in favour and 5 opposed (Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France, and Israel) with 6 abstentions.[329] It called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines, an arms embargo, and the reopening of the Suez Canal, which was now blocked.

(Love, Kenneth (1969). Suez The Twice Fought War. McGraw-Hill.pp557–558)

Britain and France agreed to withdraw from Egypt within a week; Israel did not. Even with all of this pressure, Ben Gurion was still claiming that he intended to annex the Sinai Peninsula. Within four months Israel had withdrawn from all occupied areas.

(Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953–1960, Isaac Alteras, p246)

What really put the cat amongst the pigeons and showed how dangerous the situation had become was the Soviet Union’s threat (under Khrushchev) to launch rockets on Britain, France and Israel. And send troops to Egypt. Eisenhower envisioned the beginning of World War 3.

(The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. New York: W. W. Norton. p. 181, Shlaim Avi; Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953–1960, Isaac Alteras, p246; Neff, Donald (1981). Warriors at Suez : Eisenhower takes America into the Middle-East. p403)

Eisenhower said:

“If those fellows start something, we may have to hit ’em — and, if necessary, with everything in the bucket….. If the Soviets attack the French and British directly, we would be in a war and we would be justified in taking military action even if Congress were not in session.”

(Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East. I.B. Tauris., Keith Kyle p458)

The Americans excluded Israel from the guarantee against Soviet attack, however, alarming the Israeli government (!).

(Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953–1960, Isaac Alteras, p246)

The Soviets were bluffing on their nuclear capabilities at that time but the Americans didn’t know. Nevertheless, the words “World War Three” were bandied about.

Again, Britain paid dearly for zionist intrigue. As they had been doing for the previous forty years.

The United States also put financial pressure on the UK to end the invasion. Because the Bank of England had lost $45 million between 30 October and 2 November, and Britain’s oil supply had been restricted by the closing of the Suez Canal, the British sought immediate assistance from the IMF, but it was denied by the United States. Eisenhower in fact ordered his Secretary of the Treasury to prepare to sell part of the US Government’s Sterling Bond holdings. The UK government considered invading Kuwait and Qatar if oil sanctions were put in place by the US.

(Williams, Charles Harold Macmillan (2009) pp. 259–261)

Finally, it was the threat of sanctions that forced Israel in March 1957 to withdraw. Eisenhower threatened that the US would cut off all private assistance to Israel, which amounted to $40 million in tax-deductible donations and $60 million annually in the purchase of bonds. He would also terminate shipments of agricultural products and all military assistance, including deals already in the pipeline. He canceled export licenses for the shipment of munitions or other military goods. The threat of sanctions in the form of a resolution to the UN requiring the termination of all aid to Israel by UN members if it failed to withdraw was also decisive. Similarly, to force the British to pull out, the US administration withheld financial aid and applied an embargo on American oil.

Jewish American organizations tried hard to generate congressional resistance to Eisenhower’s position. On February 1, [1957] Senator William Knowland, the Republican minority leader, protested to [Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles against the administration’s stand. Knowland agreed that the policy might be right in theory, but pointed out to Dulles the domestic political implications and threatened to revolt. Dulles answered Knowland by noting, “We cannot have all our policies made in Jerusalem,” and he justified the American position on the following grounds:

“First, sanctions would be necessary to compel Israel’s withdrawal and a withdrawal was needed to maintain the American position among the Arabs…

“[Second] I am aware how almost impossible it is in this country to carry out a foreign policy not approved by the Jews. [Former sec’y of state under Truman George] Marshall and [first Defense Secretary James V.] Forrestal learned that. I am going to try to have one.

“That does not mean I am anti-Jewish, but I believe in what George Washington said in his Farewell Address that an emotional attachment to another country should not interfere.”

“In spite of further efforts by Israel’s supporters to deflect White House pressure from the Jewish state, Eisenhower did not cave in; so, as the Israeli government began to run out of money, Ben Gurion, on March 5, 1957, grudgingly capitulated. On March 16, Israel withdrew from almost all the territory it had occupied in the Suez offensive.”

Eisenhower had faced down zionism for the past couple of years.

In January 1952 the Truman administration threatened to withhold economic assistance if Israel did not replace its guards along the Jordan river, who were known to be particularly violent, and Israel complied. In 1953, Israel began to construct a canal near the B’not Yaakov bridge which would divert water from the Jordan river into Israel. The canal was being constructed in a demilitarized zone, and violated the armistice agreements. Israel had done something similar in 1951 when it drained another lake that was part of the Jordan River system, and was also in the demilitarized zone. In October 14–15 of 1953, Israel raided the Jordanian village of Kibya. This seemed to be the last straw for the Eisenhower administration. The UN Security Council strongly condemned Israel for the Kibya raid (with no veto by the US) and the State Department confirmed publicly they had suspended the $26 million of allocated Mutual Security Act funds. Israel then agreed to stop work on the diversion canal, and the US approved payment of the funds that were suspended.

(The threat of sanctions worked against Israel in 1956 — and it can work again, Mondoweiss, Jinan Bastaki, July 2014; The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement With Israel, 1947 to the Present Hardcover — October 1, 1992, George W Ball, Douglas B Ball)

Eisenhower laid his cards on the table when Israel tried to play hardball:

Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal? If we agreed that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of international order.

If the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by using force, then we will have destroyed the very foundation of the organization and our best hope of establishing world order. The United Nations must not fall. I believe that in the interests of peace the United Nations has no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions.” — Eisenhower, 1957

(“The Changing U.S. Position on Palestinian Self-Determination and the Impact of the Iran-Contra Scandal” by Sally V. Mallison and W. Thomas Mallison in Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 16, №3 (Spring, 1987), p. 111.)

The Israelis refused to host any UN force on Israeli controlled territory and eventually left the Sinai in March 1957. Before the withdrawal the Israeli forces systematically destroyed infrastructure in Sinai peninsula, such as roads, railroads and telephone lines, and all houses in the villages of Abu Ageila and El Quseima. Before the railway was destroyed, Israel plundered equipment including six locomotives and a 30-ton breakdown crane.

(Cotterell, Paul (1984). The Railways of Palestine and Israel. Tourret Publishing. pp. 100–101.; The fateful triangle : the United States, Israel, and the Palestinians, Noam Chomsky, p194)

Though Nasser in private admitted that it was American economic pressure that had saved him, it was Khrushchev, not Eisenhower, whom Nasser publicly thanked as Egypt’s saviour and special friend.

(Gaddis, John Lewis (1998). We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. p173)

Israel’s ploy to expand territory had serious implications for the “West”.

U.S.-British relations were damaged, and Soviet prestige enhanced. Eden resigned as prime minister, while the British resigned themselves to no longer acting as an imperial power. But Israel sucked the marrow dry.

One of the provisions of the agreement between Israel, Britain and France, the Sèvres Protocol (paragraph six) stated explicitly that “the arrangements of the present protocol must remain strictly secret.”

Ben-Gurion had an explanation for Eden’s refreshing pro-Israel stance, telling a New York Times correspondent in 1968 that “Eden sent over to Paris after the affair in order to have all the original documents destroyed. But he found that I had copies. And I may note that it was only then that he became friendly to Israel.”

Another “British leader” figurehead in Zionism’s pocket.

But it was after this embarrassing Israeli stand down and zionist realization that the US wasn’t going to capitulate to all of their demands (under a Republican President like Eisenhower, anyway) that we can see why the Democrat Party was highly infiltrated by the 1950s, why Israel accelerated its nuclear weapon program (aided by France, by the way), and why a series of future presidents were firmly placed in Zionism’s pocket.

Eisenhower was prevented from serving a third term (by a newly passed law in 1951), so he backed (unbeknownst to him) zionist mafia sponsored Richard Nixon for the 1960 US presidential election against John F Kennedy.

The Americans and French had born witness to how reckless and extreme zionism was when they were prepared to start World War Three for their expansionist goals, but were still prepared to put nuclear weapons in their sociopathic hands.

Eisenhower and then Kennedy in the US, and DeGaulle in France were to be stumbling blocks for zionism in the coming years. But before this period can be touched upon, we have to look back at how zionism had infiltrated the US political system at all levels.

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