Limits of the Realist Analytic Frame
On May 21, 1994, the Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY) declared itself “an independent sovereign state,” separate from the Republic of Yemen (ROY) (Proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Yemen, 1994). It waged a military campaign against the ROY until July 1994, when rival forces captured Aden, the DRY stronghold.
Realist theory explains international relations in terms of anarchy, self-interest, power, relativism, and self-help. It views war as the ultimate arbitrator of interstate disputes. The realist worldview explains elements of the 1994 Yemeni civil war, but it paints an incomplete picture. Constructivist theory helps explain how civil society and state leaders shifted the conflict.
Realism, Applied
For realists, power is the currency by which states maximize their security. Power manifests in multiple forms, be it military, economic, diplomatic, or popular. Great powers may pursue dominance as hegemon of a region or global system, and lesser powers may form alliances as a mitigation technique. In the Yemeni civil war, the ROY and DRY vied for political hegemony.
On May 22, 1990, South Yemen, based in Aden, and North Yemen, based in Sana’a, unified to form the Republic of Yemen (Hurd, 1994). Sana’a housed the new unity government, becoming Yemen’s internationally recognized political center, while Aden claimed to be its financial center. Global Security (n.d.) describes the unification as “coerced.” Unity was short-lived. Aden asserted that Sana’a sought to marginalize it and on May 21, 1994, declared itself the Democratic Republic of Yemen, “an independent sovereign state” separate from the Republic of Yemen (Proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Yemen, 1994).
In the words of Lord Palmerston, there are “no permanent enemies or permanent friends… only permanent interests” (in Art: 3, 2017). DRY’s split from the ROY suggests its identity as a sovereign political unit, and its unique interests, were not lessened by a cosmetic attempt at Yemeni unity. Indeed, the New York Times attributes the civil war to “differences over power-sharing” (Associated Press: “Fighting Threatens Union of North and South Yemen”, 1994).
Realists note the centrality of relativism and self-help in an anarchic international system characterized by the simultaneous pursuit of self-interest. A state’s power, and its subsequent position in the international order, depends on the power of other states. In the 1994 Yemeni civil war, the ROY-DRY distribution of power and resources was roughly symmetric and did not predict a clear victor. A Yemeni observer remarked Aden had a “very, very severe shortage of human resources but a tremendous stock of arms” (Whitaker: “Northern Yemenis ‘will attack Aden in two days’”, 1994). Foreign observers noted “neither side was likely to win but if one side did gain the upper hand it would be the south” (in Whitaker: The Birth of Modern Yemen, 2009). Sana’a had 12,000 more troops than Aden, but tribal and ideological cleavages hampered their unified mobilization. Meanwhile, the south benefited from foreign training and funding and superior equipment (Whitaker: The Birth of Modern Yemen, 2009).
In the buildup to Aden’s 1994 declaration of independence, it became clear that the largest Yemeni oil reserves lay in the south. The DRY housed one-sixth of the Yemeni population and one-third of its oil stocks; it was also rumored south Yemeni exiles had $25 billion in Saudi banks (The Guardian: “Fragile union at mercy of outside forces”, 1994). Large oil reserves tipped the economic-military power balance in Aden’s favor and emboldened it to contest the ROY. As Hurd (1994) states, “Suddenly the north no longer appears to be the south’s economic savior, but rather an economic drag.” Oil reserves also raised Aden’s prospects of rallying international support. It envisioned itself becoming an “oil statelet” like its richer Arab neighbors (Hurd, 1994).
Realism thus explains the 1994 Yemeni civil war as a competition between relatively symmetric powers vying for dominance in a shared territory. Aden’s increasing economic and military power threatened Sana’a, the ruling political power; meanwhile, Sana’a’s clout threatened Aden’s gains.
For realists, war is “the final and legitimate arbitrator of disputes among states” (in Art: 3, 2017). War mobilizes all resources at a state’s disposal, and the ensuing winner-takes-all competition identifies the most powerful actor. Accordingly, military clashes between the DRY and Sana’a expanded, continuing until July 8, 1994, when Sana’a captured Aden, capital of the secessionist DRY. Aden’s strategy of waging a protracted war “expensive in terms of men and money” for the north failed (Hurd, 1994). Sana’a’s bid to capture southern strongholds succeeded. A lieutenant from the Republic of Yemen said, “They surrendered all their armor, air force, cannon, everything.” Separatist leaders fled to neighboring countries such as Oman (Associated Press, 1994). In the 1994 Yemeni civil war, the ROY used raw military strength to bring about the destruction of the rival DRY. It is a textbook example of realists’ stress of the zero-sum nature of warfare and international power struggles.
According to realists, states are the only political actors in an anarchic international arena; there is no higher force to admonish deviant behavior or ensure compliance with international norms. The 1994 Yemeni civil war bolsters realists’ claim. International calls for a cease-fire were lackluster and had little material impact. In one episode, neighboring Arab states attempted to mediate the conflict and succeeded in getting Aden and Sana’a to sign a Document of Pledge and Accord; it failed the next day as northern and southern forces exchanged gunfire.
The international community’s attempts to intervene in the Yemeni civil war also support realist claims that states are self-interested survivalists whose foremost concern is securing their individual sovereignty and prosperity. Foreign states’ neutrality or alliance with the ROY or DRY did not appear to be driven by a universalistic sense of morality. They were strategic decisions through which the states advanced their individual interests. For example, Saudi Arabia’s support for the DRY can be traced to its aversion to Sana’a. Sana’a’s pro-Iraq stance in the Gulf War threatened Saudi Arabia; its being at the helm of a politically and economically unified Yemen made the threat more salient. Courting support for an Aden-led Yemeni regime would mitigate the threat posed by Sana’a. It would also provide leverage when negotiating the 60-year Saudi-Yemeni border dispute (Hurd, 1994).
Aden successfully courted the support of neighboring Arab states and received “billions of dollars of equipment and financial assistance” (Global Security). But Whitaker (The Birth of Modern Yemen, 2009) attributes the DRY’s defeat in part to its being “over-reliant on help from their supposed allies.” The DRY was not recognized as a sovereign state by international organizations (e.g., United Nations), international publications (e.g., The Guardian), or by individual governments (e.g., the U.S. Department of State). It was rumored Egypt, Syria and Gulf Arab states might recognize the Democratic Republic of Yemen. They did not do so because its secessionist bid seemed increasingly unlikely to succeed (Whitaker, “Rebel Yemeni state ready to fall”, 1994).
Limits of the Realist Frame
The realist analytic framework helps explain the power competition that spurred the DRY-ROY civil war and the international community’s response. But it is overly simplistic in its assumed centrality of the state as the sole actor in international affairs. The DRY secessionist bid and ensuing civil war calls into question the verity of the “state” as a political actor. A more complete analysis of the 1994 Yemeni civil war examines the role civil society and state leaders in shifting the conflict.
With the Proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Yemen (1994), Aden declared itself a sovereign state. Yet its self-determined statehood was not recognized by United Nations or individual governments such as the U.S. Department of State. The episode casts doubt on the rigidity and legitimacy of statehood. How fluid is statehood? Did the DRY come into being upon its formal declaration of independence, or does its lack of international recognition nullify its claim to sovereignty? Had North and South Yemen ever truly existed as a unified “Republic of Yemen,” as legal documents suggest, or had they continued to exist as distinct political units? Realist theory does little to explain the life cycle of a state. Analyzing international relations from the perspective of states, then, becomes fundamentally difficult.
For example, realists might suggest that the 1994 Yemeni civil war decisively ended with the collapse of the DRY. Yet southern secessionist movements continue in Yemen. How could a war continue if one of the states waging it no longer exists? Constructivists, who acknowledge the ability of individuals to affect international relations, might suggest that war is not waged by states but by people. Indeed, after the collapse of the DRY, its deputy prime minister is quoted as having said, “The war is not over. We will regroup and continue the struggle by all possible means” (Whitaker, “Yemeni war ends as rebel leaders flee”, 1994). Despite the collapse of the DRY, the war continues, waged by civil society actors.
A final criticism in the same vein comes from those who suggest the 1994 Yemeni civil war was not the result of competition between the DRY and the ROY but a situational phenomenon spearheaded by the two states’ leaders. Hurd (1994) describes how the personalities of the two leaders of North and South Yemen contributed to the outbreak of the civil war:
Beidh [President of the Democratic Republic of Yemen] saw Saleh [President of the Republic of Yemen] as unresponsive to the south (particularly to the concerns of the Yemeni Socialist Party) and determined to amass as much personal power as possible… Saleh believed Beidh and the YSP held unrealistic aspirations for the south in a unified Yemen.
He continues, “Beidh’s public sulk in Aden… infuriated Saleh, while Beidh’s decision after the signing of February’s failed Amman accord to visit Saudi Arabia, which received Beidh with full honors, rather than return directly to Yemen was seen by many as a slap at Saleh.” Similarly, Whitaker (“Fragile union at mercy of outside forces,” 1994) recalls, “Last August [1993], Ali Salim al-Baid went to Washington, where he met Vice-President Gore without permission from President Salih. Mr Salih was furious… Rarely has one man wreaked so much havoc by doing so little.” Absent of these two leaders and their personal differences, would the 1994 Yemeni civil war have occurred? Realists answer “yes.” Constructivists are less sure.
Final Reflections
In sum, realist theory explains international relations in terms of anarchy, self-interest, power, relativism, and self-help. It views war as the ultimate arbitrator of interstate disputes. The realist analytic framework helps explain the power competition that spurred the DRY-ROY civil war and the international community’s response. But it is overly simplistic in its assumed centrality of the state as the sole actor in international affairs. The DRY secessionist bid and ensuing civil war calls into question the verity of the “state” as a political actor. A more complete analysis of the 1994 Yemeni civil war borrows from constructivist theory and examines the role of civil society and state leaders in shifting the conflict.
Works Cited
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[1] Brian Whitaker is The Guardian’s former Middle East editor.
