The current discourse over the reunification of North and South Korea focuses primarily on the political and economic barriers that prevent integration between the now segregated states. This diminishes the importance of their common — and disparate — cultural histories. At the socio-cultural level, reintegration may not be possible, as the effects of globalization on the Korean Peninsula have led to the rapid evolution, and fragmentation, of disparate Korean identities. Exploring the ideological paralysis over Korean history will help to clarify modern confusion over what it means to be Korean, and will illuminate the cultural paradigms that continue to amplify this division.
Brief Overview of the Political Division of Korea
The Korean peninsula existed as an independent kingdom since its unification in 688. Following its occupation (1905) and then colonization (1910) by Japan, the country was eventually liberated by allied Western powers at the end of WWII (1948). The peninsula was then divided into separately controlled and administered jurisdictions. Borders were demarcated loosely along the geographic 38th parallel. The southern and northern segments of the peninsula were placed under American and Soviet control, respectively.
Korean Ethno-Nationalism
Ethnic Nationalism developed in Korea as a response to the Japanese-imposed protectorate (1905), when the invading forces attempted to unify the Koreans by way of persuading them of their shared racial stock. In a sense, Korean ethno-nationalism can be understood as a reactionary intellectual movement against failed assimilationist policy. This policy was largely based in Japanese efforts at ridding the peninsula of Korean culture and heritage. A major text written during this period, New Reading of History (1908) by Korean independence intellectual Shin Chae-ho, exemplifies the growing ideological shift towards Korean Ethno-nationalist historiography, and follows the history of Korea spanning the mythical Dangun era to the fall of Balhal in 926CE. The Japanese occupation catalyzed the invention and diffusion of a reactionary Korean historical narrative. This narrative centered on an idealized and militaristic conception of Korean identity that positioned their forced subordination as a historical injustice towards a superior people. Coined by this, the term “minjok” or “Korean people” were portrayed as a warlike race that had fought for Korean identity, declined, and was in need of reinvigoration.
Korean conceptions of ethnically grounded nationalism found narrative commonality with the Axis states, particularly Germany and Japan. At the conclusion of WWII, popular discourse in those states shunned emphases on ethnic homogeneity as a reaction to their defeat. In contrast, post-war North and South Korea embraced an ethno-nationalist identity. At this point in time, North and South Korea were ostensibly a singular entity, having only recently been liberated by the Soviet Union and United States, respectively.
In essence, the Japanese occupation of Korea served as a catalyst to the modern notion of Korean ethno-nationalism. The early half of the 20th century served to incubate the belief in a racially defined Korea, which extended into the development of a shared political, social, and cultural premise. When the country was liberated by the two soon to be hostile states, this narrative developed along two different ideological pathways.
Globalization and S. Korean Society
Foreign relations have been critical to South Korea’s contemporary national identity; this concept can be extended to argue that these foreign relations have largely informed its current (and continued) development. International relations theory, especially dependency theory, is critical to the underlying perspective being used to analyze the modern South Korean identity. At its core, the theory refers to the position that resource flows from underdeveloped, “periphery” states, to a “core” group of wealthy states, enriching the former at the expense of the latter. The “Three dependency thinking” then can be understood as the fixation on the successive subservience of South Korea to China, Japan, and the United States that proliferates South Korean political culture (and by extension, national identity). This term will be used accordingly to describe this phenomenon.
Korean history, in this paradigmatic orientation, is, has been, and will continue to be, derailed by intrusive foreign actors. Understanding the ideological paralysis over historical interpretation helps explain current ambivalence over Korean identity. Broadly, the narrative of this identity is underpinned by “historical regret laced with a wishful pursuit of idealistic absolution”. Still South Koreans are split over matters central to what their nation represents and the implications that extend from that both domestically, and internationally.
These contradictions in public discourse over national identity can be understood in the context of how Korean citizens currently, and historically, have characterized the constituent states held within its dependency paradigm. Specifically, this pertains to the evolution of identity following the end of militaristic rule in 1987, with the democratization of the country following the June Struggle. From the beginning of the Sixth Republic of Korea, the failed negotiations
with North Korea over the 1988 Olympics, the end of the Cold War in 1989, and to the ensuing impoverishment of North Korea, the South Korean public has had a tumultuous modern history of national identity.
Beginning with the first President of the Sixth Republic, Roh Tae-Woo, the nordpolitik policy toward China and Russia softened the previous grip of anticommunism as a rallying cry. Later, under Kim Dae Jung, the Sunshine Policy, officially known as The Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy Towards the North, was developed. In this, the South Korean state sought to restore relations between the North and South Koreas. The policy was centered on three core tenets: (1) No armed provocation by the North will be tolerated, (2) The South will not attempt to absorb the North in any way, (3) The South actively seeks cooperation and promote reconciliation. According to Son Key-Young, the Sunshine Policy emerged ultimately as evidence of evolving South Korean national identity since the Cold War which “ushered in an era of unprecedented confusion in South Korea over whether to define North Korea as friend or foe”
Juche Ideology and North Korea
Juche is a term that literally means “self-reliance”, and describes the ideology developed by Kim Il Sung as a means to purge his political rivals as well as Soviet influence. After being appointed to the position of the communist leader to the newly liberated state by Stalin, Kim Il-Sung sought to establish his own state ideology. Once considered a derivative of Marxist-Leninism, the Juche ideology eventually became distinctly Korean in character. It postulates that the Korean masses are to act as “the Masters of the Revolution” in order to achieve “true socialism”.
To some extent Juche is a reaction to the previous standard of foreign policy for the peninsula during the Joseon period: Sadae, which describes the bilateral relationship between Joseon dynasty and Imperial China. Sadae translates to “serving the great”, and was rejected by 20th century nationalists as both devaluing the ethnic origins of the Korean people and State, as well as subjugating Korean history under a Confucian interpretive framework. Again, this harkens back to the fundamental definition of Juche as “self-reliance”.
More critical to understanding the Juche ideology however, is the Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System, which serves as the standard for the governance and guidance of the North Korean people. It is foundationally critical to the organization of the state around the Kim dynasty.
“We must honor the Great Leader comrade Kim Il Sung with all our loyalty.” (2)
“We must establish strong organizational regulations so that the entire party, nation, and military move as one under the one and only leadership of the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-Sung.” (9)
Unlike the Marxist-Leninism it drew from, which considers improvements in the material conditions of production and exchange as the driving force of historical progress (i.e. historical materialism), Juche considers human beings to be the driving force of history. The Great Leader is considered an extension of the collective and the only legitimate representative of the working class. Citizens of the state were to think through Kim Il-Sung rather than to think for themselves.
“We must give our all in the struggle to unify the entire society with the revolutionary ideology of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung.” (1)
North Korean culture is focused primarily on traditional Korean culture — the shared cultural history of the Korean peninsula and southern Manchuria. Prior to the 19th century there was no strong tendency towards an abstract concept of “Korea” as a nation-state. Inhabitants of the region more closely aligned their loyalties with their village, their families, and their king. Furthermore, Korean elites identified themselves as members of a cosmopolitan civilization centered on China (a Confucian defined Korea peninsula). Consequently, the Juche fixation upon reimagining the narrative of Korean history free from the perceived racial impurity of the neighboring China and Japan is contingent on a false projection of a pre-existing indigenous Korean culture.
Cultural expression in North Korea is meant to inculcate the Juche ideology, and at the point of this paper’s writing, no contemporary underground art movement has been documented in the state. The central state and the Korean Workers’ Party’s central committee controls the production of art, with much of its focus on collective consciousness, the celebration of the Korean nation, and the struggle for the revolution and reunification of the Korean peninsula.
Cultural Disconnect and the Discourse of Reunification
As explained in previous sections, the Korean peninsula has been shadowed by the discourse of reunification since the initial division of the states during the second world war. The perception of political and economic factors being the fundamental driver of discord in the narrative of reunification negates the importance of Korean ethno-nationalism as a barrier to diplomacy. These conflicts of interest in matters of the state are symptomatic of an issue in political attitudes between the two Koreas.
Both the North and South interpret the other’s ideological development as an arborescent distinction from their core perception of the goals of Korean ethno-nationalism. The cultural divide in integration exists as a central barrier to North-South Korean relations, and this can be seen in the failure of North Korean defectors in South Korea to thrive. At the political-economic level, these migrants are perceived by their Southern counterparts as being on average physically inferior, poorly educated, and less likely to have useful skills due to significant differences in resource acquisition and distribution. Culturally, due to the nature of the Juche ideology organizing North Korean society, defectors find themselves overwhelmed by a lack of community, as their former lives were intricately managed and their actions dictated by a state-wide bureaucracy. The concept of individual choice does not exist to North Koreans, as the orientation of their perspective falls entirely on their concept of what is good for the “Korean people”.
In this way, it can be observed that, broadly, North Koreans subscribe to an arborescent interpretation of Korean identity. South Koreans and North Koreans are connected, in this view, by the legacy of Korean ethnonationalist historiography. While segregated along state lines, South Koreans remain ethnically Korean according to the ruling ideology of North Korea. This ethnic uniformity is the nexus of the unitary rallying cry for the reunification movement among the North Korean people. However, the capitalist, and individualist nature of South Korea is viewed as an arborescent corruption of the perception of Korean ethno-nationalism as per Kimilsungism. This is at odds with reunification dialogues with the South simply because the southern state does not view itself as an arborescent deviation on a “core” concept of this ethnically defined identity, and its constituent people.
These rifts are further exacerbated by growing generational divides in public opinion; South Koreans emphasize dividing distinctions towards their Northern peers to a far greater degree than in the reverse case. Only 21% of South Koreans viewed the North as being “one of us”, while 26% simply view them as “neighbors”. Worse yet, 22% view North Koreans as being an “enemy”.
Discussions over reunification are complicated by the political and economic compromises it would necessitate. These complications are centered on the terms South Koreans believe necessary and appropriate conditions of unification. Over fifty-seven percent (57.1%) of South Koreans believe that reunification must occur under South Korean policy and state organization, while the remaining 41.5% believe that a federation must be created so that the two states can exist as separate polities under one nation.
While the older generation identifies closely with North Koreans on an ethnic level, and consequently a national one, much of the younger generation has grown inured to notions of common identity. Consequently, the ostensible predicate conditions of a unified “Korean nation” have increasingly eroded as South Korea has globalized. Many college-aged South Koreans more closely identify — both ethnically and culturally — with their Western counterparts. The narrative both in support of a Korean federation, and broadly informing perspectives common among older Koreans, emphasizes ethnic commonality as the basis of a future Korean state. Significant cultural, linguistic, aesthetic, and ideological differences are subservient to traditional projections of ethnicity. However, young South Koreans have grown to view these distinct manifestations of society as being more critical to defining their national identity than a common history. They view the disparate paths taken by the two states as illustrative of their distinction. Namely, while previously functioning as one nation, the direction taken by the North has become so far removed from the “South Korean national identity” as to become culturally alien to them. Despite retaining the same ethnic origin, young South Koreans experience a stronger sense of national unity between themselves and Korean-Americans, than they do North Koreans This can ultimately be attributed to the dominant perception of Juche/Kimilsungism as an antiquated, and regressive era of Korean society — and subsequently the primacy of cultural over historical association among young Koreans.
Conclusion
Should the narrative structuring the reunification discourse be more open to scrutiny by the opposing party, perhaps the growing cultural distinctions hampering the creation of a unified Korean nation will render themselves insignificant. The nucleus of reunification politics is the disparate ideation of Korean identity — one that is defined by history and one that is defined by development. Rigid commitments to tradition and history, and the identity-defining significance of a shared past are necessarily in tension with a prospective emphasis on development and progression as defined by the standards of historically foreign entities. North Korea’s emphasis on its historical narrative and South Korea’s emphasis on its developmental narrative effectively synthesizes the complexity of any future Korean unification.
