Paternalism

Paternalism refers to interference with a person’s liberty for his own good. It imposes a perception of good on someone; it is not considered paternalism if it enforces/ensures a good that is already desired by the people whose good it involves. In this case the law is just helping someone achieve his goal. Furthermore, there are different types of paternalism because the person whose good is involved is not always identical with the person whose freedom is restricted. The first type, “pure” paternalism occurs when the person whose freedom is restricted is the same as the person whose benefit is involved. An example of this would be making suicide illegal. “Impure” paternalism occurs when the person whose freedom is restricted is not the person whose benefit is involved. This may sound similar to the harm principle, but it is different because “impure” paternalism addresses instances where there is active participation from the victim. An example of this kind of paternalism would be placing restrictions on cigarette manufacturers to limit the production and distribution of cigarettes. Overall, Dworkin defines paternalism as the use of coercion to achieve a good which is not recognized as such by those persons for whom the good is intended. A person can irrationally not recognize his own good by either mistaking his values or mistaking the facts, so Dworkin attempts to find a justification for using paternalism to protect an individual’s own good.

Some argue future-oriented consent as a justification for paternalism, which states that one’s later acceptance or appreciation of a previous restriction on one’s liberty justifies that previous restriction. However, Dworkin rejects this justification on the grounds that restrictions can shape what one appreciates later. Therefore, the later appreciation is not a valid justification for the previous restriction. Instead of this future-oriented consent, Dworkin argues that preserving one’s future freedom provides valid justification for paternalism. Dworkin believes paternalism should work as a sort of “social insurance policy” that ensures an individual’s wide range of options in the future.

Lastly, Dworkin places some restrictions on paternalism. First, he claims that there is a heavy burden of proof on the maker of the law appealing to paternalism to justify why that law is necessary and permissible. Also, he emphasizes that if there is an alternative way of accomplishing the desired end without restricting liberty, then society must accept it even though it may be costly. Dworkin recognizes that a restriction on one’s liberty a serious matter, especially when it prevents someone from acting oneself as one wishes.

Overall, I believe that Dworkin puts forth a persuasive argument on what exactly paternalism is and when it is permissible to use paternalism as justification for restrictions on liberty.