So, what are our moral responsibilities currently? Our moral responsibilities within ecosystems are primarily limited to endangered animals. We pride ourselves in having brought back animals such as the California Condor (Nijhuis) and the panda. But, I believe we are assisting the wrong endangered animals. We need to become morally responsible by reevaluating our current system of assisting endangered species. Consider the panda, for example. While part of their endangerment stems from habitat loss, their own natural traits seem surprisingly fatal. They eat only bamboo (a virtually nutrient deficient food) despite having the digestive system of a carnivore, leading to sedentary lifestyles because of lack of nutrition, leading to limited social interactions and movement in general to save energy, which finally leads to lower birth rates (both in the wild and in captivity). Why exactly, then, are we throwing millions of dollars (Goodman) into preserving these animals over animal such as, say, the wolf which has a much better chance of survival? (Nijhuis)

The answer is twofold: part of it is contextual and part of it lies in the criteria for endangered species. To begin with, pandas are considered barometers of the Sichuan Valley ecosystem and therefore, we are obligated to save them. However, according to Malcolm Gladwell, the “Power of Context” states that we can ameliorate problems by “tinkering with the smallest details of the immediate environment” (157). Similar to how the transit police of New York virtually cleaned up the transit system and wiped out rampant crime by enforcing petty crimes (Gladwell 157), we must focus on the small details (read: other animals) instead of focusing on the panda. Furthermore, the watershed United States Environmental Species Act provided a heavy-handed law through which conservationists could assist animals with government funding (Brown, Larmer, Thomas, and Wall). However, whilst the amount of animals that could use our help is countless, government funding isn’t. In other countries that have faced this dilemma such as Australia and New Zealand, conservation triage systems are adopted: animals are essentially weighed against one another based on a set of predetermined factors.

Currently in the US, however, no such system exists. Instead of using concrete factors such as the contribution of the animal to the ecosystem or its inherent genetic value, the general public is swayed by, more often than not, by “symbolic value (think bald eagles) or furry, expressive faces (think lemurs and baby seals).” (Nijhuis). Bald eagles and even California Condors provide little economic value to us, but our attaching of intrinsic value makes them a priority in our jaded eyes. While this is but a flaw of human nature, I believe this is morally wrong since we are denying assistance to much more valuable animals based off our own superfluous subjectivity. Therefore, I believe it is our moral responsibility to implement an objective system of conservation triage in order to assist endangered animals. Basic triage theory revolves around four factors: value (genetics, aesthetic, cultural), biodiversity (benefit to other animals), odds of success, and cost (Palmer). By using the four factors, we can identify animals that will ‘give us the most bang for our buck’.

There is, however, a reason that conservation triage has not caught on in the US: it flies in the face of the previously mentioned Environmental Species Act. Accepting a system of conservation triage means we, as stewards of nature, cannot save every species, something that the Environmental Species Act believes it can do. Opponents of conservation triage argue that accepting such a system means acknowledging failure, providing conservation opponents more ammo to bring to the fight (Nijhuis). However, I believe if we blindly continue stumbling down this road simply because we are afraid of failure, we will actually fail. We will have inefficiently spread our funds among animals with very little to no value. If we instead implement a system of conservation triage, we can at least rest with the knowledge that our funds support the best candidates through our four predetermined factors.

While our moral responsibility in conserving animal species requires us to push the envelope more on some animals over others, it is only half the battle. We must also reevaluate our moral responsibility of conserving environments, primarily transitioning from national parks to national “corridors” as coined by author Caroline Fraser (111). Fraser provides a means of extending our moral responsibilities through “rewilding” and its inherent creation of “wildlife corridors”. (Fraser 111-112) Through the study of wolf migration patterns, scientists have been able to determine that many animals will inevitably come in contact with human civilization, which could range from lonely roads to chaotic interstate highways (Fraser 111). These often deadly points of contact with human civilization could be remedied by what the author calls “corridors,” large swathes of land preserved for wildlife alone, Fraser advocates (117).

While the conservation triage systems calls for some animals superseding others, environmental conservation should instead be geared towards a level playing field for all animals. Some may argue the same philosophy could be extended to the conservation triage system, but conservation of animals is limited by the finite pool of funds available. While funding of certain animals provide different returns on the investments, investing in the ecosystem benefits all animals and would restore equilibrium to the playing field as larger animals get the space they need. Our current situation, as seen in the study of wolf migration patterns, has larger animals at a clear disadvantage because of their need for larger environments. It is morally unfair to allow this disadvantage when it clearly should be an equal playing field. Morally, in terms of ecosystem conservation, I believe we are responsible for equalizing opportunities for all animals, thereby justifying the creation of national corridors.

These evaluations of our moral responsibilities towards conservation of endangered animals and environments will allow us to be more morally responsible towards our ecosystem, but they are only intermediate solutions in the long run. The endgame would ideally be developing something akin to what New York Times author Charles Siebert proposes: a “trans-species psyche” of sorts (332). In this “mutually benefiting interspecies culture,” humans serve as an active steward of nature by committing themselves to “move beyond an anthropocentric frame of reference” and effectively become only part of the equation instead of the whole equation (Siebert 332).While the trans species psyche is indeed a tantalizing thought, I believe we should still see it as an ideal to always strive for rather than actively pursue. We should instead focus our efforts on reevaluations of our moral compasses in both species and environmental conservation must occur first. As the old adage goes, a journey of a thousand miles begins with one step. So next time you’re asked, make sure you choose paper over plastic.