Hamas 2.0
1 September 2024
It is becoming increasingly clear that, without direct military intervention by a third party, Israel will sooner or later achieve its ultimate objective in Gaza and the West Bank — the total ethnic cleansing of Palestine. Senior officers in the IDF have now admitted that this was always the real purpose of the military operation they launched in the aftermath of 7 October, notwithstanding the many spurious claims about fighting terrorism and eliminating Hamas. Israel has long wanted to drive the remaining Palestinians out of the Occupied Territories altogether and, by annexing these regions, complete its mission of creating a “Greater Israel.”
And yet this will not be the end of the war. Hamas has already been seriously weakened by the ferocious battles in Gaza, and it is hard to know how much of it will remain by the time the guns fall silent there. What is much clearer is that, however big the losses it suffers in the current phase of the war, Hamas will not be completely eliminated. If history is anything to go by, a stronger and more powerful Hamas will emerge from the ashes of Gaza. Call this Hamas 2.0.
Algeria
It is the history of Algeria, in particular, that suggests such an outcome. The fluctuating fortunes of the Front de libération nationale (FLN) during the eight year War of Independence provides useful lessons on how a resistance movement can turn a short term defeat into long term victory. Although the IDF has gained the upper hand for now, in the longer term the war in Gaza is likely to prove to be a blessing in disguise for Hamas — although, as Winston Churchill remarked of his electoral defeat in 1945, “at the moment it seems quite effectively disguised.”
In the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Algiers in the autumn of 1957, things did not look good for the FLN. No one could doubt that the Paras had scored a major victory for the French army — the first clearly definable one of the war. Some commentators even went so far as to speak of a Dien Bien Phu for the FLN. Their leaders had been rounded up and their fortified base in the Casbah completely dismantled. It was now clear that their military wing, the ALN, was too weak to face any direct military confrontation with the French Army, dealing a serious blow to its reputation among the Muslim population and leading to a consequent loss of indigenous support. The FLN realised that the war could no longer be won inside Algeria. And yet this realisation paved the way for their final victory.
With their operational capacity within Algeria severely crippled, the FLN was forced to reconsider its strategy. The leaders who had escaped the French dragnet, along with those who remained in exile, convened in secret to reassess their position. It became evident that the future of the struggle lay not in direct confrontation, where the French military’s superior firepower would always prevail, but in a more sophisticated and multifaceted approach. They needed to transform the war into a broader, international struggle that could undermine France’s moral and political standing on the global stage.
The turn to international diplomacy
As a result, the FLN began to prioritise international diplomacy as a crucial front in their war for independence. They sent emissaries to newly independent African nations, to the Arab world, and to the halls of the United Nations, where they garnered sympathy and support by framing their struggle as part of the broader decolonisation movement then sweeping across Asia and Africa.
The FLN’s representatives skillfully presented the Algerian conflict as not merely a local insurgency but as a legitimate national liberation movement fighting against colonial oppression. They highlighted the brutal tactics used by the French military, including torture and summary executions, and juxtaposed these with the FLN’s demands for self-determination and national sovereignty.
The global tide was turning against colonialism, and the FLN successfully positioned itself at the forefront of this movement. By 1958, their efforts had paid off as they secured significant support from the Non-Aligned Movement and the Afro-Asian bloc. The FLN’s diplomatic campaign also began to resonate within France itself, where intellectuals and activists, disillusioned by the ongoing conflict and its moral implications, started to voice their opposition to the war.
The shift to guerilla warfare and psychological operations
On the ground in Algeria, the FLN adapted its tactics. Rather than seeking large-scale engagements, they returned to the strategies of guerrilla warfare — hit-and-run attacks, sabotage, and assassinations. They focused on disrupting French administrative control and creating an atmosphere of instability that made Algeria increasingly ungovernable.
The FLN also recognized the power of psychological warfare. They sought to erode the morale of both the French troops and the European settler population in Algeria, who began to feel increasingly isolated and vulnerable. The conflict shifted from the streets of Algiers to the remote mountains and deserts, where the FLN’s knowledge of the terrain gave them an advantage.
Meanwhile, within France, public opinion was beginning to shift. The war was becoming increasingly unpopular, particularly as reports of the French military’s use of torture and other brutal tactics began to leak out. The FLN, through its international allies, ensured that these stories reached a global audience, further tarnishing France’s image and increasing pressure on the government to seek a resolution.
The rise of internal resistance in France
As the war dragged on, opposition within France grew. Intellectuals, students, and left-wing politicians became increasingly vocal in their criticism of the war. The publication of works like Henri Alleg’s La Question, which exposed the use of torture by French forces, fuelled the growing anti-war sentiment.
By the early 1960s, large sections of French society were demanding an end to the war. Demonstrations and strikes erupted across the country, calling for a negotiated settlement and condemning the government’s refusal to grant Algeria its independence.
Within the French government, divisions also began to emerge. President Charles de Gaulle, initially brought back to power with a mandate to maintain Algeria as French, gradually came to see the war as unwinnable. The financial and moral costs were becoming too great, and international pressure was mounting. De Gaulle began to hint at the possibility of self-determination for Algeria, a position that enraged the settler population and the military but resonated with the increasingly war-weary French public.
The path to independence
By 1962, the FLN’s strategy had borne fruit. The French government, under de Gaulle’s leadership, opened negotiations with the FLN, culminating in the Evian Accords. These accords granted Algeria its independence, ending 132 years of French colonial rule.
The FLN’s ability to adapt to the changing circumstances, to internationalise their struggle, and to maintain the support of the Algerian population despite the military setbacks, ultimately secured their victory. The Battle of Algiers, once thought to be a crippling defeat, had in fact forced the FLN to innovate and evolve, leading to the eventual collapse of French colonial rule in Algeria.
The war had been long and brutal, leaving deep scars on both Algerian and French societies. But in the end, it was the FLN’s understanding that the war could not be won through conventional means that paved the way for their ultimate triumph. The lessons of the Algerian War would resonate far beyond North Africa, influencing liberation movements around the world and marking the decline of European colonial empires.
What Hamas 2.0 can learn from Algeria
The evolution of Hamas will not follow exactly the same twists and turns of the FLN after the Battle of Algiers, and yet the organisation is likely to draw some lessons from the way that the FLN turned a short term defeat into long term victory. Just as the FLN understood that direct military confrontation was no longer a viable path to success, Hamas may also recognize that its survival and ultimate success depend on a multifaceted strategy that goes beyond the battlefield.
Adapting to the reality of military defeat
Hamas 2.0 will likely focus on rebuilding and reorganising its forces, but it will also need to adapt its tactics to the new reality. The FLN shifted from large-scale engagements to guerrilla warfare, which allowed them to continue the struggle despite their weakened position. Similarly, Hamas may focus on smaller, more decentralised cells that can carry out operations with greater flexibility and fewer resources. This would allow them to maintain a presence in Gaza and the West Bank, even if their traditional military infrastructure has been significantly damaged.
Expanding the struggle to the international arena
Following the example of the FLN, Hamas 2.0 is likely to place a greater emphasis on international diplomacy and propaganda. The FLN’s success in garnering international support played a crucial role in their eventual victory. Hamas, too, may seek to strengthen its ties with sympathetic governments, NGOs, and international organisations, framing their struggle as part of a broader movement for justice and self-determination in the face of occupation and oppression.
The use of social media and other digital platforms will be crucial in this effort. While the FLN relied on traditional diplomatic channels, Hamas has the advantage of modern technology, which can amplify their message globally in real-time. They will likely aim to increase international pressure on Israel by highlighting the cruelty of the War in Gaza, the ongoing plight of Palestinian refugees, and the broader issues of occupation and human rights.
Psychological warfare and the battle for public opinion
Hamas 2.0 will likely intensify efforts to erode the morale of both Israeli society and the international community’s support for Israel. The FLN understood the power of psychological warfare, using targeted attacks and propaganda to make Algeria increasingly ungovernable for the French. Hamas might similarly focus on actions that create fear and uncertainty within Israel, while also working to shift global public opinion against Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories.
The potential for escalation and regional involvement
Just as the FLN’s struggle in Algeria had broader implications for France’s empire and its relations with other nations, the conflict between Hamas and Israel could draw in regional and global powers. Hamas 2.0 might seek to exploit regional rivalries and alliances, potentially drawing in support from old allies like Iran and Qatar and building new alliances with Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. This could lead to an escalation of the conflict, with broader implications for the Middle East and beyond.
Mobilising support within the Palestinian population
One of the most significant challenges for Hamas 2.0 will be to maintain and even increase its support among the Palestinian population both within Israel and in the diaspora. Just as the FLN had to navigate the complex social and political landscape within Algeria, Hamas will need to address the needs and concerns of Palestinian Israelis, as well as those in the diaspora. This might involve a combination of services, political advocacy, and military resistance, aiming to position Hamas as the primary representative of the Palestinian cause.
The FLN’s ability to unify various factions and present a coherent vision of independence was key to their success. For Hamas, this could mean finding ways to reconcile with other Palestinian factions, including Fatah, to present a united front against Israel. It might also involve rethinking their political platform to appeal to a broader base, including more moderate Palestinians and those who may have been alienated by Hamas’s past actions.
One scenario for the future
Let’s assume that Israel succeeds in killing or driving out the remaining 5.4 million Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank, leaving the Israeli military in possession of an uninhabited wasteland. Gradually, the rubble will be cleared away and Jewish settlers will move in. The remnants of Hamas will retreat to Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, where they will be given shelter by Arab governments that no longer have any incentive to cooperate with Israel. Due to the ongoing threat posed by these Hamas bases, the IDF will continue to maintain a heavy presence in the newly conquered territories, bolstered by support from Shin Bet. The IDF will strengthen measures it has already put in place, such as the so-called logistics road linking Israel and Gaza City, which has become like the border of the buffer zone between northern and southern Gaza. This road is equipped with two military posts on the Gaza shore and near Salah al-Din Street, with both posts equipped with air-conditioned rooms and sleeping quarters for soldiers similar to those in the West Bank. In addition, the establishment of the port in an area south of Gaza City indicates that the measures taken are not for the short term but may remain effective in the long term. The cost of maintaining such a strong military presence will be very high, both in human and financial capital, not to mention the cost of reconstruction and of providing services to the new settlers. There could be no more talk of a two-state solution.
In its war with Hamas 1.0, Israel assumed that the greatest threat to its existence came from outside. Ironically, the coming decade will show that the real danger lies within. Jewish Israelis have always assumed, rather complacently, that the growing population of Arab Israelis will always accept their exclusion from the political and cultural heart of Israeli society. But this is a dangerous illusion, similar to the historical blindness of Israeli society to the growing resentment in Gaza and the West Bank before the First Intifada. But whereas the two Palestinian uprisings that broke out in 1987 and 2000 exposed the weakness of Israel’s control over its apartheid territories, their threat to the existence of the state was negligible compared with the threat that is increasingly posed by the frustrated Palestinians living within her borders.
Hamas 2.0 will not need to carry out any more incursions like that of 7 October 2023. They will instead shift their efforts towards stiffening the resolve of the Palestinian Israelis and preparing them for what looks increasingly like an inevitable uprising in the Arab Galilee. And while this is all too predictable, it will no doubt come as a complete surprise, just like the equally predictable attack on 7 October. Israel will, of course, respond in exactly the same way — with iron-fisted repression. This, and not the current conflict in Gaza, is likely to be the decisive turning-point for the existence of Israel in the Near East. Within a few years of the Great Uprising in Galilee, the great experiment will be over, and the state of Israel will be no more.
The long war ahead
While the future of Hamas remains uncertain, the lessons of the FLN suggest that even in the face of significant military defeat, a resistance movement can adapt, evolve, and ultimately achieve its goals. Hamas 2.0 may emerge as a more resilient and strategically sophisticated organisation, one that understands the limits of military power and the importance of diplomacy, psychological warfare, and international support.
However, this also implies a prolonged conflict with no easy resolution. Just as the war in Algeria dragged on for years, the struggle between Hamas and Israel could continue for another decade, with periods of intense violence alternating with attempts at negotiation. The outcome of this conflict will depend not only on military actions but also on the ability of both sides to adapt to changing circumstances and to shape the narrative of the conflict in the eyes of the world.
One thing seems clear, though; Hamas will win in the end. The most optimistic forecasts suggest that Israel can survive for at least twenty more years; more realistic estimates give it no more than ten. Either way, the writing is on the wall for the Zionist utopia.
