History of corruption in Latin America: the limits
Despite the academic discussion on the word corruption’s anachronism, the idea of ‘limits’ is essential to connect those abstract ideas with, the practical instances of real corruption-like conducts and, with the present-day political discussion on the matter. As professor Kris Lane states in his 2015 article, “stop thinking whether corruption was or was not there, or if it was part of the period’s culture. Instead, he insisted on browsing for the limits to the system flexibility in specific cases in particular geographies”. In other words, by studying particular cases we can define when the regime set the parameters of what was acceptable and unacceptable under the system particular rules. Because it is there where we can appreciate the use of real power and its consequences. Thus, we can trace back today’s behaviors to the enforcements or lack thereof and its links with the present dynamics.
By exploring the limits of the colonial negotiation of illicit activities, we can appreciate corruption in this period, and by using these examples, we might establish connections with the present time.
Corruption or negotiation of the urban order.
As presented above, the term corruption has been used more to disqualify a concrete behavior than to understand the relationships between power and society. The crimes and practices that we identify as corruption today could have been seen and experienced differently during colonial times. In this regard, Diego Pulido and Arnaud Exbalin present an interesting argument to understand the practices bordering on illegality of day-to-day negotiation in colonial Mexico City.
In their article, Una negociación del orden? Corrupción political en la Ciudad de México, 1798 y 1849*, the authors use the case of Jose Conejo, a white criollo, who was selected Alcalde de Barrio in 1794 to explore how police officials were enforcing the laws of the empire and thought about their role and objectives in this office. In this work, the authors focus on the phenomenon of police “corruption” to understand a larger issue: the widespread money-infused negotiations to maintain order, particularly in the urban setting.
The Alcaldes de Barrio were officials chosen by the Viceroy, as a result of the Bourbonic reforms, to help in the policing and minor justice functions in the city neighborhoods. Although the post did not offer salary, it gave the functionaries authority symbols. As the authors argue, the pro-bono nature of the position insinuated that the functionary might be allowed to gain rents by using its special prerogatives. There were legal limitations on the Alcaldes de Barrio rent-seeking prerogatives, which were often enforced at pleasure by the colonial authorities.
Whereas the word corruption was not written in the legal codices, by the year 1794, there were “anti-corruption” regalement for police corps, mainly to prevent briberies or agasajos related to the emission of passport or transit permits to move throughout the city. As the authors explain, the charges in Mr. Conejo’s accusation covered the use of private houses as prisons, explicitly prohibited by law. His response to such accusation was that he used private houses, to demonstrate that the individual was married and had a productive life while releasing the administration of the burden of having another person in prison. Thus, discretionally negotiating the use and applicability of the law in the urban setting.
Nonetheless, while the prisoner was arrested, the judicial transcription indicated that some prisoners claimed that they were forced to work with no remuneration. It is safe to assume that the totality of the prisoners’ wages was paid to Mr. Conejo. Using the State power to private benefit was accepted as long as the officer respected the norms and the unwritten limits and balances (Pietschmann, 2013). Another allegation was that Mr. Conejo repeatedly accepted bribes from the accused to avoid prison or public judgment.
Four conclusions the author extracted from Mr. Conejo’s trial. First, the word corruption was never used in the judicial process against Mr. Conejo, favoring the term “abusos,” which did not always involve monetary settlements. However, it could mean something similar. Secondly, the abuses were often perpetrated on the vulnerable or marginalized groups of the colonial period, such as young, elderly, or widows in the lower cast of Mexican society, which were more easily intimidated by the authorities hence quickly extracting money. Third, most of the abuses were committed at night, which made the actor more susceptible to abuses because the bribery required some blurriness and opacity. Lastly, Mr. Conejo was never charged with any crime but rather he was simply dismissed from his post.
The article’s significance is found in the framework that the author develops to understand police-level “corruption” as a mechanism to negotiate the urban order. Thus, contributing to avoid unnecessary anachronism and adding more nuances of the practical understanding of corruption-like behavior. Nevertheless, the idea of avoiding the law through in situ negotiations seems to have endured until this day, affecting the region policing dynamics in many fronts. For instance, according to the 2018 annual public opinion survey Latinobarometro, two-thirds of Latin Americans mistrust the police, considering it as the second most corrupted institution after the political establishment.
As the authors demonstrate the limits of the public and private sphere were almost nonexistent in policing as in most of the areas of Government. However, there were several cases where such limits were enforced when trespassed. As Jean-Claude Waquet affirmed, “Speaking of corruption is, first of all, speaking about money**” and there were few scandals as sensible to the King’s ears as the Great Potosi Mint Fraud of 1649.
* Arnaud Exbalin Oberto y Diego Pulido Esteva, “¿Una negociación del orden? Corrupción policial en la Ciudad de México, 1798 y 1849”, Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura 46.2 (2019): 35–57.
**Stuart B. Schwartz, Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and its Judges, 1609- 1751, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973; George D. Winius, The Black Legend of Portuguese India: Diogo do Couto, his contemporaries, and the Soldado Prático. A Contribution to the Study of Political Corruption in the Empires of Early Modern Europe, Nueva Delhi, Concept Publishing, 1985.
