Should rights and justice be reserved for humans?

Felix O'Leary
Aug 8, 2017 · 8 min read

To investigate what constitutes a political being is to examine the very nature of politics itself. Rights and justice can be considered the foundations of our society, but the argument surrounding who, or indeed what, is deserving of them has proven to be a point of great contention. By drawing upon theorists such as Rawls and Garrido, this essay seeks to prove that society urgently needs to reassess its belief that rights and justice are reserved solely for political beings. Furthermore, it will argue that doing so would be mutually beneficial for both humans and non-humans alike.

To begin, it is prudent to investigate the origin of modern perceptions of what constitutes a political being. In one of the most famous passages of political theory, Aristotle stated that “man is a political animal” (Aristotle cited in Prokhovnik and Huysmans, 2013, p. 67). His argument stemmed from humans’ ability to use reasoned speech to differentiate between right and wrong, good and bad, just and unjust. He distinguished this from merely having a voice, conceding that animals use their voices to communicate pleasure and pain. The fact that humans can use reasoned speech to share ethics and morals in order to make a household or community is the reason why Aristotle considered them to be political beings. However, it is worth noting that despite being considered as such, not all humans were granted equal rights at the time that Aristotle lived. For example, the right to vote was reserved solely for male citizens; females, children, slaves and foreigners were excluded. This marks an accordance with a historic tendency to deny political rights to those who are considered sub-human or inferior. Upon reaching this realization it becomes necessary to scrutinize Aristotle’s claim that human beings are innately political, as if this were so all human beings would hold political rights. An effective way in which to explain this contradiction is to view the concept of “a political being” through the lens of social constructionism. Social constructionism would argue that politics and political beings do not exist as brute facts of nature; they are simply social constructs. That is, they have been created by humanity through language, interaction and habit. This concept is simplified by a remark made by Mitchel Resnick; “people don’t get ideas; they make them” (Resnick, 2002). The fact that politics is a construct rather than an irrefutable fact of nature is what has enabled the systematic exclusion from the political realm of various human and non-human beings. If politics, and by extension political beings, have been created by humans based on their ability to use reasoned speech, this seems to be an unfair premise upon which to decide that non-humans are undeserving of rights and justice. This demonstrates an important point; that there are two distinct boundaries to consider, the boundary between humans and non-humans and the boundary between political and non-political beings. As this essay will show, it is not merely the argument concerning what it means to be a political being which is under increasing scrutiny, but also the discussion surrounding what it is to be human.

The view offered by Aristotle that only human beings are political animals was later challenged by Bentham. Bentham rejected that the “insuperable line” (Bentham cited in Prokhovnik and Huysmans, 2013, pp. 67–69) separating those with political rights from those without was determined by the ability for reasoned speech and discourse, arguing that a fully grown horse is a “more rational, as well as a more conversable animal than an infant of a day” (Bentham cited in Prokhovnik and Huysmans, 2013, p. 68). This argument further diminishes Aristotle’s claim that man is a political animal, by demonstrating that some non-human animals have greater capacity for rationality than many humans, and thus it is insufficient to draw the boundary for political rights between humans and non-humans. Bentham instead offers his own boundary; one’s race, even one’s species is immaterial to the acquisition of rights — the only factor of consequence is whether the being can suffer. According to Bentham, the capacity to suffer was inseparable from the right to avoid suffering. Furthermore, unlike Aristotle, Bentham viewed the right to avoid suffering as universal rather than being reserved for a privileged few. It is this premise which has served as the basis for many modern day efforts to grant political rights to non-humans, such as The Great Ape Project and the Non-Human Rights Project. However, before investigating these projects further, it is necessary to determine what is meant by the concepts of “rights” and “justice”.

Traditionally, rights and justice have been considered to be political concepts which are only applied to political beings. However, by questioning the nature of political beings, it becomes possible to refute this opinion. In his book A Theory of Justice, Rawls attempts to argue that justice should only be applied to humans. According to Rawls, the defining factor which entitles humans to rights and justice is their perceived morality. Human beings have a sense of justice, an understanding of what is “good”, and a desire to act according to this knowledge. Furthermore, Rawls emphasizes that it is the potential to have a sense of justice that is important, rather than the realization of it. He states “the capacity for moral personality is a sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice” (Rawls cited in Prokhovnik and Huysmans, 2013, p. 75). Rawls uses this point as a justification as to why infants are entitled to justice; they may not yet have developed moral personalities, but they have the potential to do so. However, in making this point Rawls has revealed a contradiction in his argument which challenges the idea that there is a binary divide between those with moral personalities and those without. By stating that humans are entitled to rights by having “an effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice” (Rawls cited in Prokhovnik and Huysmans, 2013, pp. 74–76), Rawls implies that capacity is in fact insufficient, and to a certain extent the realization of one’s moral personality is necessary. Thus, if morality is having a clear sense of justice and acting accordingly, it can be argued that by denying rights and justice to non-humans, human beings become undeserving of them. Upon accepting this premise, it becomes apparent that attempts to exclude non-humans from the community of rights and justice is detrimental to both humans and non-humans alike. Therefore, it must be argued that rights and justice urgently need to be extended to non-human animals. One organisation that seeks to do this is The Great Ape Project.

In 2006, Francisco Garrido proposed a resolution to the Spanish parliament, which implored both Spanish law and the United Nations to recognise the rights of Great Apes. Under the resolution, Great Apes would be afforded protection from “maltreatment, slavery, torture, death, and extinction’” (Singer cited in Prokhovnik and Huysmans, 2013, p. 85). The resolution has proven to be a point of great contention which has been criticized simultaneously for going too far and not going far enough. A number of justifications have been put forward in support of this resolution. Firstly, Great Apes qualify for rights under many of the requirements previously outlined. For example, they demonstrate clear and apparent instances of culture; they form long-lasting relationships and grieve when a loved one dies. They have shown themselves to be intellectual by demonstrating the ability to remember long sequences of signs and by showing rudimentary language skills. Perhaps most relevantly, Singer argues that the Great Apes “display a sense of justice, resenting others who do not reciprocate a favour” (Singer cited in Prokhovnik and Huysmans, 2013, pp. 85–86). When judged by the standards outlined by Aristotle and Rawls, the Great Apes undoubtedly qualify as political beings. Moreover, by some standards they may even qualify as human. Singer argues that to label the Great Apes as animals is to imply they are closer genetically to the majority of the animal kingdom than they are to human beings. This is not the case; in 2003 a group of scientists led by Derek Wildman proposed to the Proceedings of the National Academy of Scientists that chimpanzees are so genetically similar to humans, they ought to be included in the genus Homo (Singer cited in Prokhovnik and Huysmans, 2013, pp. 85–86). With this in mind, it seems that the boundary between political and non-political beings and the boundary between humans and non-humans are both more fluid than originally thought. Further to this, it becomes important to question the relevance of these boundaries in relation to rights and justice.

A further criticism of the Great Ape Project is that it fails to provide an answer to the question of responsibility. That is, if Great Apes have certain legal rights that are protected by the law, do they also have to accept a level of responsibility for their actions? This premise was exemplified in the case of Frodo, a chimp who attacked and killed a human child in Tanzania. In response to both this case and the prospect of legal rights for Great Apes, David Jones asked “If, as they believe, humans who violate the rights of apes should be prosecuted, are the rules to apply in reverse?” (The Daily Telegraph, 2nd February 2002). It would, of course, be possible for Frodo’s case to be tried in court, with a human representing his interests. The idea is jarring and some may argue that a human could never truly know an animal’s thoughts, but as Stone argues “corporations cannot speak either; nor can states, estates, infants, incompetents, municipalities or universities. Lawyers speak for them, as they customarily do for the ordinary citizen with legal problems” (Stone cited in Prokhovnik and Huysmans, 2013, pp. 81–85). In a modern day example which plainly demonstrates the livingness of this idea, the same premise is applied in the protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL). The DAPL is an oil pipeline which is proposed to run beneath the Missouri river, but is protested against by the native Standing Rock Sioux tribe. The tribe “fears that the pipeline would contaminate their water source and destroy sacred sites” and in response have appointed themselves “water protectors” (Wong, 2016). While the Sioux inevitably want to protect their water supply, they also see the water as sacred and feel the need to protect it against any possible infringements on its wellbeing. Thus, it becomes apparent that an inability to communicate does not serve as a disqualification from rights and justice. However, in the case of Frodo it can be argued that this premise is irrelevant. The Great Ape Project proposes the extension of basic human rights; freedom from slavery, freedom from torture, the right to life. These rights are unconditional and inalienable. They do not accord any amount of responsibility, and so to question why Frodo is deserving of basic rights but not accountable in a court of law is to miss the point entirely. Frodo’s right to life should not be called into question regardless of any situation which may occur. This view underpins the Great Ape Project; it is Garrido’s belief that “anything which can suffer should be protected from that suffering” (The Open University, 2008). This concept, which has been argued by Bentham and continued by Garrido, is a stark demonstration of a living political idea.

The argument that rights and justice are political ideas which are solely reserved for political beings is erroneous and immoral. It has been used systematically to exclude humans and non-humans alike from the political realm, using flailing arguments based on perceived differences to maintain relationships of dominance and subservience. However, upon inspection it fails to justify its existence. The boundary between humans and non-humans is not binary and the boundary between political and non-political beings does not hold its shape when investigated. Upon recognizing the irrelevance of these boundaries the only viable option is to cast them out and acknowledge that, to both humans and non-humans, they do more harm than good.

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