A working paper on the new transaction procedure in French competition law

A new working paper co-authored with Patrice Bougette (Université Côte d’Azur) and Hugues Bouthion-Dumas (ESSEC Business School) devoted to competition law enforcement, especially to negotiated procedures.

This paper deals with the new transaction procedure set by the Macron Law of August 2015. It tackles the issue of fines predictability for firms and its consequences in terms of incentives.

The paper, published in the GREDEG Working Paper Series, is available on Repec

Here is short abstract

The economic efficiency of competition law rules related to the procedures for determining the level of fines depends on the value given by companies to the certainty of the penalty, which may be related to the process and modalities of the settlement procedure. We first discuss sanction predictability and firms’ strategy from two emblematic antitrust cases of December 2015 concerning French telecom operator Orange group. We then detail the French Macron Law enacted on 6 August 2015 by focusing on the enhancement of the settlement procedure that gives more predictability to the firms. Lastly, we show why companies seek for more predictability through bargaining favoured by the new legal arrangements.