Stored XSS on Edmodo
Today i will be sharing about the exploit i found in Edmodo which could have allowed me to take over the account of any user of my choice.
About the target?
Edmodo is an educational technology company offering a communication, collaboration, and coaching platform to K-12 schools and teachers. The Edmodo network enables teachers to share content, distribute quizzes, assignments, and manage communication with students, colleagues, and parents.
Let’s get started!!!
So I saw a post on twitter where some guys posted about the swag they got from edmodo and I decided to try my luck out probably I might be able to find something. Below I will be talking about one of the bug I found on this target.
I visited the website and signed up as a normal user, I tried playing around the application for a while trying to understand the work flow of the application before creating another account which I will be using for attacking.
After playing with the application for a while, I thought I understood the application and I was set to attacking it which happened to the biggest lie of all time.
Thinking i was set to attack, so I decided to create a new account which I will be using to attack. To sign up on this application, the application takes you through four stages which are:
Stage 1: The application ask you for your email and password
Stage 2: The application ask you for your first name and last name. (This is the vulnerable endpoint)
Stage 3: The application ask you for the school you will be teaching from
Stage 4: The application ask you to link your other social media account with your edmodo account.
In the first stage, I filled in the form as required, i entered my email and password, then I was redirected to the second stage where I was asked for my firstname and lastname, this was where I injected my payload, I used <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> as the firstname and the same as the lastname, luckily for me my payload slipped through without being filtered or rejected by the server, at this stage I was already dancing.
I filled the rest of the forms as required then I got logged in to my account. Upon logging in I was a bit disappointed, I was expecting my payload to be executed in the home page since my first name and last name were reflected their, instead of being executed as a script, they were reflected as a raw text, I checked my profile page probably I might get lucky and my payload will be executed their but still no luck, at this stage I was getting discouraged.
I tried for couple of days to get it work but damn!!, I got nothing, this is where my insufficient reconnaissance showed but I was determined to make it work, as the infosec community always say #TryHarder which is what I did, on one faithful day, I was playing with the application again then I searched for my Account A from my Account B, I found my other Account A and I sent a connection request from my Account B to my Account A and I logged in to my Account A and I accepted the request, I viewed my Profile, I saw I had a new connection, I clicked on the connection tag and Boom!!! my payload was executed.
At this stage I didn’t know how to feel because I have being trying to make this work for days and finally It worked, straight away I reported the bug, I didn’t try exploiting it further because I didn’t want to get a “duplicate report” response and which sadly for me that was what I got.
But it’s good, I did learn something from exploiting the application which is: “Reconnaissance is the key” and “Being persistence pays off”.
Screenshot of P.O.C:
Response from the triage team:
That’s all for now,