Part 1 — The phenomenon of Free Will and Consciousness and their propagation to religion, and values

Gabriel Erez
25 min readNov 12, 2023

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Prologue

In this essay, I will address a few issues: the singular entities level phenomenon — free will and consciousness, and the group level phenomenon — values and culture. The original goal was to address only the ambiguity around the entity-level phenomena by defining them more precisely. Still, since groups are composed of many singular entities, the group-level phenomena — values, culture, and religions were “impacted” by the singular-level phenomenon’s “new” and more precise definitions; therefore, I addressed them as well in the second part.

The phenomenon of free will and consciousness

the free will and consciousness debate and how can be reconciled with determinism is an old polemic issue that I believe the source of it lies in the fact that to manage ourselves in the world, it is essential for us to believe that our subjective perception is coherent with the objective deterministic reality; otherwise, everything, by definition, might be a figment of our imagination. Although we tend to forget the existence of perception as a reality mediator; when we explore nondeterministic concepts such as “free will” and “consciousness,” we must take ‘perception’ into account.

In the essay would like to address the question of what is Free Will and Consciousness under the assumption of determinism. I will address those two issues as what they are — a perceived phenomenon of the deterministic noumena. I will not address those issues from a personal experience point of view. My goal in this essay is to find and describe what are the conditions for phenomena to be categorized as free will or consciousness. Hence, to find definitions of those terms which is not a circular. In other words, My goal in this essay is to find out what the criteria for a deterministic machine are to be perceived by us as if it has free will or consciousness in contrast to finding out which attributes the machine needs to gain to have consciousness or free will.

I plan to achieve this goal first by understanding and describing what phenomena and noumenon, and then by using the “Entity–relationship” model to lay out all the phenomenon subsets of the full phenomena set and finding out which of the phenomena subsets is coherent with what we perceive as free will or consciousness.

What are phenomenon and noumenon?

To define the phenomena of “free will” and “consciousness,” first, we need to establish a precise notion about what ‘phenomenon’ is. To understand what is a ‘phenomenon,’ we also need to understand its opposing concept — ‘noumenon.’

Phenomenon and noumenon are terms used to emphasize the contrast between the events as they are perceived — the phenomenon, and the “thing-in-itself” independent of any perception — the noumenon. In other words, the phenomenon is how each individual perceives the independent noumenon.

Using the floor concept, we can demonstrate the contrast between the phenomenon and the noumenon concepts. A floor, as a phenomenon, is the thing that supports your body when you walk on it; it is the cold thing in case you are barefoot, or it is the safe zone that doesn’t have bushes with snakes in them. On the other hand, a floor, as a noumenon, is a “thing-in-itself” that can be perceived in infinitely different ways.

The phenomenon’s role and its limitations

The fact that the phenomenon realm (bounded to our finite brain’s computational power) is infinitely smaller than the infinite noumenon universe yields several insights about the phenomenon notion:

  1. Since the phenomenon realm is finite due to our finite brain’s computational power, each phenomenon must be “picked” over other infinite numbers of unconceptualized noumenon.
  2. To be “picked,” all phenomena must have a beneficial function to be chosen by some criteria over unchosen noumenon.
  3. For a phenomenon to have beneficial function and criteria, it must be consistent and predictable when interacting with another phenomenon.
  4. For a functional phenomenon to behave consistently and predictably, it must be embedded into an entity with the integrity to be identified and to carry out a connecting thread between those predictable events. The entity is a phenomenon as well, with the Specific beneficial function to be the identifier and “Integrity carrier” For the general beneficial function.
  5. Since the entity’s function is to be the identifier vessel of its general functional behavior, then the identifier and its behavior have a one-to-one relationship; therefore, the entity’s function behavior can be attributed to itself. Changing the entity’s integrity will change its functional behavior.
  6. For the entity phenomenon to have integrity over time, it must be detached from subjective perception — the phenomenon realm; on the other hand, it must be anchored in the objective reality — the noumenon realm. Since phenomena, by definition, cannot be noumenon, phenomena are only being perceived as noumenon.
  7. For phenomena to be successfully perceived as noumenon, the perception has to be, up to a certain satisfying level, consistent over time,
  8. Even though there is no inherent requirement for phenomena to be consistent over time, the fact that phenomena are the “tools” that we use to handle ourselves successfully in the world indicates that our perception is, up to a certain satisfying level, consistent over time.
  9. Even though there is no inherent requirement for phenomena to be identical between different perceives, the fact that we communicate successfully, indicates that our perception is, up to a certain satisfying level, similar between us. It goes without saying that this shared presentation also indicates that we share sufficiently similar criteria for choosing phenomena from the noumenon realm.

The gist of the abovementioned insights is that all phenomena have a function to be chosen over other unchosen noumena and be perceived as having integrity; yet, Phenomena have no “real” integrity since they are the result of our perception. The relative consistency of our perception between different beings over time, made us believe that our prescription represents the noumenon realm.

We can use an ‘orange tree’ phenomenon to demonstrate the “phenomenon insights” listed above. Since we, as the perceiver, depend on calories for survival, we choose to conceptualize phenomena with a “calories providing” function, and we share these criteria among us.

The production of oranges phenomenon has the function of providing calories. To interact with the “producing oranges” phenomenon, this phenomenon needs to be embodied into an orange tree as the thread between the ‘producing oranges’ phenomenon events. We act as if we believe that the orange tree exists outside our prescription in the “real world.” Since oranges only grow on an orange tree, we believe that the orange tree is the reason for the growth of the oranges.

Free will and consciousness

At this point, after we establish notions about the ‘phenomenon’ concept and the ‘noumenon’ concept in general, we can explain the controversy around the “free will” and “consciousness” phenomena and start to define them.

The controversy around free will and consciousness

The source of debate around free will and consciousness arose from the following points:

  1. We perceive free will as an indeterministic phenomenon.
  2. We act as if we believe that our perception is coherent with reality.
  3. The reality’s noumena are deterministic.
  4. Free will can’t be indeterministic and deterministic simultaneously.

Clearly, we can reconcile the contradiction with the fact that phenomena are only believed to be coherent with noumenon, but it’s not.

Free will and consciousness definition

At this point, after reconciling the free will phenomena “contradiction,” we can use the phenomena’ general requirements and boundaries as a guideline to define the special-case phenomena — free will and consciousness.

Following the “Genus–differentia” defining methodology, each term’s definition is formed by the term’s containing set — the genus, and how it differs from other member subsets of the same set.

Since free will and consciousness are phenomena, they are contained in the phenomena’ complete set. Since all phenomena are functional, and since functionality rises only from events interacting with each other, then all possible permutations of “relations between events” will describe the complete phenomena set. Each permutation is a subset of the entire phenomena set. In this case, by definition, free will and consciousness will be correlated with one subset or will be contained in them. Since free will and consciousness are relatively abstract phenomena, I will make an educated guess that free will and consciousness are relatively direct descendants of the phenomenon set. My next step will be to lay out all “relations between events” permutations and look for those that correlate with free will and consciousness.

Phenomena representation as “relation between events”

The “black box” representation

To lay out all “relations between events” permutations, I will choose to represent the events as an input and an outcome, and the relation between them as a black box. In other words, My goal is to find out when a deterministic black box will be perceived as if it has free will or consciousness

Since each element in the “input, black box, outcome” threesome has an infinite number of options, it will be impossible to lay out their infinite number of permutations. We can overcome the “infinite options problem” by abstracting each one of the infinite “relations between events” phenomena permutations into one of the following four phenomena ( not noumenon ) “Entity–relationship” model permutations:

  1. one-to-one relationship subset — for each type of input, the black box will produce only one type of outcome.
  2. one-to-many relationship subset — for each type of input, the black box will produce more than one type of outcome.
  3. many-to-one relationship subset — for different types of inputs, the black box will produce, each time, one type of outcome.
  4. many-to-may relationship subset — a black box can produce more than one type of outcome for the same types of inputs, and it can produce the same type of outcome for the different types of inputs.

Since the “relationship between two entities” describes the entire phenomena set, We can be sure that none of the “relations between events” phenomena permutations are left out.

Black box and Entity-To-Entity Relationships

Now, we can start to try to correlate each subset to a particular phenomenon. The one-to-one relationship, where for each black box the outcome is entirely determined by the input, will be perceived as deterministic. On the other hand, subsets 2–4, the not one-to-one relationships, will be perceived as nondeterministic and will be nominees to be correlated with free will or consciousness subsets. In the following part, I will review the one-to-one deterministic subset and point out how it fits with the phenomena requirements. Then, I will review the 2–4 subsets and correlate them with free will and consciousness.

Relation between events subsets as phenomena

Even though I mentioned it explicitly before, I want to emphasize the fact the following subsets are subsets of the phenomena set therefore, they don’t have the restriction to follow determinism. In other words, if a black box is perceived as if it produces different types of outcomes from the same input, it does not mean that the black box has free will; it only means that it is perceived as if it has free will

Subset 1: one-to-one relationships

The one-to-one relationship phenomena, where for each type of input, the black box will produce only one type of outcome, are perceived as deterministic, and the black box structure carries out the phenomenon’s integrity

The “one-to-one” phenomenon, where the same type of black box produces the same type of outcome for the same type of input, will be perceived as deterministic, and the black box’s particular and predictable behavior integrity is attributed to its structure.

In other words, the functionality of the term determinism is once we observe phenomena such as in subset 1, we can determine that the black box is governed by determinism. Therefore, we can attribute the particular behavior of each black box to its structure. Since the black box’s structure’s integrity is preserved, then its particular behavior will also be preserved, allowing us to predict the black box’s behavior and act accordingly.

Let’s use the car example to demonstrate why subset 1 representation of determinism is aligned with the common notion of determinism. A car is the kind of black box that takes gasoline as input and produces acceleration as an outcome. Thanks to determinism, we can determine how the car will accelerate in relation to how much we step on the gas pedal, and thanks to the car’s structure’s integrity, we can predict how the car will operate so we can act accordingly.

Subset 2 one-to-many relationships

The case of the “one-to-many” phenomenon ( subset 2 ) is the observed phenomenon where the same type of black boxes will produce different types of outcomes for one type of input. In this case, the similarity between the black boxes can be perceived as the results of different instances of the same type of box, or the results of the same exact box interacting with the same type of input at different moments in time. Both of the cases will need to be addressed.

Subset 2 — one-to-many relationships over time — the same black box instance will produce each time a different type of outcome for the same type of input

The one-to-many relationship phenomena, where the same black box instance will produce each time a different type of outcome for the same type of input, are perceived as craziness, and the phenomena does not have any integrity

The kind of phenomenon where the same black box instance will produce each time a different type of outcome for the same type of input, cannot be perceived as a result of determinism since the fixed integrity of the black box’s structure cannot be responsible for the different outcomes for the same inputs; therefore there is a need for a “new kind of integrity” that will explain subset 2 (over time) kind of behavior. At first glimpse, subset 2 (over time) might be perceived as what we refer to in philosophy as ‘free will’ a “spark” that allows the black box to “overcome determinism” and “choose” to produce different outcomes for the same inputs, but actually, this kind of behavior is commonly perceived as if each black box is “crazy” or “unstable “ and the inconsistency of black box behavior will be attributed to its lack of integrity.

In other words, The function of the terms “crazy” or “unstable” is that once we observe phenomena such as in subset 2 (over time), we can determine that the black box has some kind of malfunction, and it is unbelievable. Therefore, we cannot predict the black box behavior and act accordingly.

To demonstrate why subset 2 (over time) is aligned with the common notion of craziness and not with the common idea of free will, let’s consider the case of three persons who will react differently when exposed to the same inflicting anger context. The first one will overreact ( but still inside the accepted norm), the second will underreact ( but still inside the accepted norm), and the third will randomly underreact or overreact but with the same intensity as the first two. In this case, the third-person behavior of producing random outcomes for the same input will not be considered as a result of ‘free will’ but as crazy behavior, even though each one of the reactions, by itself, is considered to be inside the norm.

Reconciliation of random behavior with Determinism
Subset 2 (over time) is a phenomenon; therefore, its random behavior can be nondeterministic and detached from its structure. Yet, each phenomenon subset is a conceptualization of the noumenon subset, which can not violate determinism. Therefore, there is at least one deterministic noumenon mechanism that produces behavior that might be perceived as random. Nonlinear systems are the systems that can produce this kind of behavior.

Nonlinear systems are systems that, for small changes in the input, due to a chain of deterministic causal events, the differences in the outcome will be unproportional to the differences in the input. If the differences between inputs are imperceivable, then a nonlinear deterministic black box will produce outcomes perceived as random and nondeterministic. The “Butterfly effect” describes a nonlinear deterministic system where an imperceivable butterfly flapping its wings in one place can cause a tornado in another place. In other words, a nonlinear deterministic noumenon can produce a nondeterministic phenomenon that might be perceived as random.

Subset 2 (over time) — gist
The kind of nondeterministic phenomenon, where the same black box instance will produce each time a different type of outcome for the same type of input, is a conceptualization of a deterministic nonlinear noumenon that is perceived as if the black box is “crazy” or “unstable.” The inconsistency of black box behavior will be attributed to its lack of integrity, and we cannot predict black box behavior and act accordingly.

Subset 2 — one-to-many relationships for different instances — different instances of the same type of black box will produce different types of outcomes for the same types of input

The one-to-many relationships for different instances phenomenon — where different instances of the same type of black box will produce different types of outcomes for the same types of input, are perceived as Free Will, and the black box will carry out the phenomenon’s integrity

The kind of phenomenon, where different instances of the same type of black box will produce different types of outcomes for the same types of inputs, cannot be perceived as a result of determinism since the same structure’s integrity of different black box instances cannot be responsible for to produce different outcomes from the same inputs. Also, since each black box instance will produce each time the same outcome in a consistent manner, then we also cannot attribute this behavior to craziness. Therefore, there is a need for a “new kind of mechanism” to explain the case where each instance has consistent and particular behavior but different behavior from his fellow instances.

This “new kind of mechanism” detached from the structure is what we refer to as ‘free will,’ and the integrity of each instance’s consistent particular behavior will be referred to as a result of their own consistent and particular will.

In other words, The function of the term ‘free will’ is once we observe phenomena such as in subset 2 (different instances), we can determine that each instance has free will. Therefore, we can attribute each consistent and particular behavior of each instance to its own will. The integrity of each instance’s ‘will’ is consistent; therefore, the instance’s behavior is predictable in a manner that we can act accordingly.

To demonstrate why the subset 2 (different instances) representation of ‘free will’ is aligned with the common notion of ‘free will’, let’s consider the case that we want to buy a birthday gift for someone. We would try to buy something that this person likes, which means that person likes some things over others things as a result of his own ‘free will,’ but it also indicates that the person’s ‘free will’ keeps the same choice over time. If that person, each time, reacts differently to the same gifts, it wouldn’t be considered as a manifestation of ‘free will’ but as an “unstable personality” as in the previous subset — subset 2 (over time).

As we can see, there is a gap between the notion of the term ‘free will’ in philosophy and the actual common notion that we use in our daily lives. In philosophy, we refer to ‘free will’ as the “power” to overcome determinism, but as we saw, this kind of behavior will be considered “crazy” behavior. In our daily life, ‘free will’ will be the “freedom” of each instance’s behavior to be detached from its common shared structure with other instances.

The personality concept is a good way to demonstrate that we use the term ‘free will’ to indicate consistency in choices and not randomness. Each unique personality reflects the consistent behavior of each individual, and each personality is defined by the sum of their free choices. Hence, the free choices are also consistent in time. So again, ‘free will’ is the mechanism that enables integrity and consistency in the behavior and not, ironically, the opposite of what we tend to think of as ‘free will’ — a random behavior.

Furthermore, we give the ‘free will’ attribute not only to humans but also to machines. Consider the case of ten identical cars that consume ten liters of gasoline every hundred kilometers. Even though we cannot explain why the car consumes ten liters and not eleven liters, as long as the gasoline consumption is predictable, we would attribute this consumption to the car structure. If one of the ten identical cars will consume, consistently, twelve liters of gasoline instead of ten for the same distance, then, for lack of a better explanation, we will say the car “loves to drink gasoline,” as if the car has ‘free will’ to choose her gasoline consumption. Since the car ‘free will’ is consistent and detached from its consistent structure, we use the car’s “free will” as the integrity source of its consistent gasoline consumption so we can predict it and act accordingly.

Reconciliation Free Will with Determinism
As subset 2 (over time), also subset 2 (different instances) is a non-deterministic phenomenon. As such, it is a conceptualization of a noumenon subset, which can not violate determinism. Therefore, there is at least one deterministic noumenon mechanism that produces behavior that might be perceived as ‘free will.’ Systems that have “error propagation” are the systems that can produce this kind of behavior.

The ‘error propagation’ phenomenon occurs when unnoticeable tiny errors accumulate and propagate to an error bigger than the sum of the original errors. A simple example of ‘error propagation’ is the case of a rectangle factory that manufactures rectangles from 10 cm edges with an error of 1 cm. Because the rectangle’s area is equal to its width multiplied by length, in most cases, the errors will cancel each other, and the rectangle’s area will be approximately around 100 squared cm, but also, every now and then, the area can reach up to 91 or 121 squared cm. This error is significantly bigger than the original 1 cm edges error.

In the previous “free will car” example, the car’s consistent choice to consume 12 liters of gasoline instead of 10 will result from an ‘error propagation’ in the manufacturing factory. The tiny unnoticeable errors in the car parts, every now and then, will propagate into noticeable differences in gasoline consumption from the other car. Since the integrity of each particular car’s structure is maintained, the gasoline consumption will also be consistent over time. In other words, a deterministic error propagation noumenon can produce a nondeterministic phenomenon that might be perceived as nondeterministic ‘free will.’

Subset 2 ( different instances ) gist
The kind of non-deterministic phenomenon, where different instances of the same type of black box will produce different types of outcomes for the same types of inputs, is a conceptualization of an ‘error propagation’ noumenon’s deterministic results, that is perceived as if the black box has non-deterministic ‘free will.’ Since the black box’s structure defects responsible for the “error propagation” are consistent, unnoticeable, and different between instances, then the “error propagation” result will appear consistent, detached from the structure, and different between instances as if each box has its own ‘free will.’ Therefore, we can predict each black box instance behavior by its ‘free will’ and act accordingly.

Subset 3: many-to-one relationships

The “many-to-one” phenomenon (subset 3) is the observed phenomenon where the same type of black boxes will produce the same type of outcome for the different types of inputs. In this case, as in subset 2, the perceived black boxes’ similarity can be the results of different instances of the same type of box, or the results of the same exact box interacting with the same type of input at different moments in time. Both of the cases will need to be addressed.

Subset 3 — many-to-one relationships over time — the same black box instance will produce each time the same type of outcome for the different types of input

The many-to-one relationship phenomena, where for different types of inputs, the same black box instance will produce one type of outcome, are perceived as consciousness, and the black box nature carries out the phenomenon’s integrity

The kind of phenomenon, where the same black box instance will produce each time the same type of outcome for the different types of input, cannot be perceived as a result of determinism since the black box structure cannot be responsible for the same outcomes where inputs are different. Since the behavior is consistent, it cannot be due to craziness. Also, since the behavior is in the black box type level and not at the instances level, it cannot result from free will. Therefore there is a need for a “new kind of mechanism” that will explain subset 3 (over time). This “new kind of mechanism” that enables “detached from structure” behavior is what we refer to as ‘consciousness’ or ‘awareness’ and the integrity of each black box type particular behavior will be referred to as a result of their own consistent and particular nature.

Since the number of the different types of inputs referred to in subset 3 — over time, is a continuous quality, then consciousness (or alternatively awareness) is a continuous feature, and its degree is proportional to the number of different inputs.

In other words, the function of the term consciousness is once we observe phenomena such as in subset 3 (over time), we can determine that the black box has consciousness. Therefore, we can attribute the particular behavior of each type of black box to its own nature, and the integrity of each black box’s nature allows us to predict its behavior and act accordingly.

Even though awareness and consciousness are strongly coupled, we tend to think of awareness as a continuous feature while we perceive consciousness as binary. Subset 3 (over time) can be aligned with the continuous common notion of awareness and with the binary notion of consciousness by adding an arbitrary “consciousness threshold” to the “awareness spectrum” that will sort the consciousness beings from the non-consciousness beings. To demonstrate why subset 3 (over time) representation of consciousness and awareness is aligned with the common notion for both of them, let’s examine the binary case to understand consciousness and also the “continuous” case to understand awareness and the “consciousness threshold” idea.

Even though awareness and consciousness are strongly coupled, we tend to think of awareness as a continuous feature while we perceive consciousness as binary. We can reconcile those two different notions by adding an arbitrary “consciousness threshold” to the “awareness spectrum” that will sort the conscious beings from the non-consciousness beings. To demonstrate why subset 3 (over time) representation of consciousness and awareness is aligned with the common notion for both of them, let’s examine the binary case to understand consciousness and also the continuous case to understand awareness and the “consciousness-threshold” idea.

Let’s first look at the binary case — an adult human being vs. a ball trying to cross the street. An adult human being trying to cross the street will be able to take, as input, an infinite number of variables like cars driving in different directions at different speed, traffic lights or their absence, darkness, et cetera, and he will produce the same outcome — to be on the other side of the street. Therefore, humans will be considered highly conscious beings. On the other hand, a bouncing ball that will “attempt” to cross the street will have as many different outcomes as there are different inputs. His final destination will depend on the number of cars, the cars’ speed, the cars’ direction, wind, pedestrians, the presence of children, et cetera. Therefore, the ball will be considered as not a conscious being.

And the continuous case will be — a monkey vs. plant that produces calories. A monkey, according to its nature, will be able to take as input fruit, leaves, seeds, nuts, flowers, eggs, and small animals and turn them into one type of outcome — calories. On the other hand, plants, according to their nature, will be able to take relatively minor variations of inputs to produce calories, they will be able to turn their leaves to the direction of the sun, and their root can grow around stones to look for water. They also have a few more “tricks up their sleeve,” but that’s it pretty much. Both the monkey and the plant will be considered as they have an awareness of the environment, but the monkey will be referred to as a conscious being, while the plant, on the other hand, even though it has a degree of consciousness, will fail to pass the “consciousness threshold,” and it won’t be considered as a conscious being.

Another case of subset 3 (over time), which is essential for understanding consciousness, is conceptualization. To understand why conceptualization is aligned with subset 3 (over time) and why it is critical for comprehending consciousness, let’s elaborate on what conceptualization is. If a concept is the “thing” conceived from the infinite universe in our finite mind, then conceptualization is the process of producing a finite number of representations from infinite data. In other words, conceptualization is the process of reducing an infinite number of noumenon into a finite number of phenomena, which means each phenomenon is the outcome of infinite noumena inputs, which is aligned with subset 3 (over time).

To demonstrate conceptualization, let’s consider the forest concept. The forest is a good example because it is relatively easy to grasp the degree to which each forest is infinitely different from the other. First, each leaf is infinitely different from the other; on top of that, each tree is infinitely different from the other; on top of that, the trees’ distribution is infinitely different in each forest. It also goes for the terrain, the animals, et cetera. Yet we can reduce all those differences inputs into one interactable outcome — the forest concept.

Reconciliation consciousness with determinism
Subset 2, as the nondeterministic subset 3 (over time), is a conceptualization of a noumenon subset that has to produce deterministic behavior that might be perceived as consciousness.

This behavior can result from a nonidentical noumena’s outcomes that contain an identical part; those nonidentical noumena’s outcomes can be perceived as identical phenomena outcomes if the nonidentical parts are ignored. We tend to refer to those ignored parts as the by-products (for physical objects) or irrelevant data (for conceptualization). By-products being ignored can be demonstrated by an example of a gold miner. A gold miner can mine gold from different quarries. The outcome, gold, will be perceived as the same since the by-product, the gravel, is being ignored.

Subset 3 (over time) gist
The kind of nondeterministic phenomenon, where the same black box will produce the same type of outcome from different types of inputs, is a conceptualization of a deterministic noumenon where the different outcomes contain similar and different parts, and the different parts are ignored. Those types of phenomena are perceived as if the black boxes have consciousness or awareness, and the integrity of each consistent behavior will be attributed to its own ‘nature’; therefore, we can predict the black box behavior and act accordingly.

Subset 3 — many-to-one relationships for different instances — different instances of the same type of black box will produce the same type of outcome for the different types of input

The one-to-many relationships for different instances phenomena are perceived as each one of them is a special case of consciousness general case.

The kind of phenomenon where different instances of the same type of black box will produce the same type of outcome for the different types of input, does not need a “new kind of mechanism” since it is a special case of the consciousness general case, where each one of the instances “chooses” only subset of input from subset 3 (over time) inputs, and produces the same outcome as the other instances.

To demonstrate why subset 3 (different instances) is aligned with the common notion of a special case of consciousness, let’s take as an example different instances of a monkey, monkey a conscious being that can consume fruits, roots, nuts, meat, et cetera and turn it into calories, but different instances, depended on habitat, might consume, only some subset of the mentioned foods.*

Subset 3 (different instances) gist
The kind of nondeterministic phenomenon, where for different types of input into different instances of the same black box, the outcome will be the same, is a special case of consciousness.

Subset 4 many-to-many relationships

The kind of phenomenon where a black box can produce different types of outcomes for the same type of inputs, and it can produce the same type of outcome for the different types of inputs, is the general case that contains all the first three special cases subsets: one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-one; therefore there is no need for “new kind of mechanism” to explain subset 4. Subset 4 will be perceived as if the black box has free will, consciousness, and a degree of “craziness.”

To demonstrate why subset 4 is coherent with the common notion of free will, consciousness, and a degree of “craziness,” let’s use, for example, the case of a hybrid car. A hybrid car “knows” how to switch between gasoline and stored electricity and transform it into a “ride” as if it got consciousness. Thanks to “error propagation,” some cars will act out as if they “love” gasoline as if they have “free will,” and sometimes, we will say that the car just went crazy and stopped working until the mechanic will inform us of the car’s structural damage.

Free will and consciousness — gist

Free will and consciousness are phenomena, and as such, we need to inquire about them as what they are — a perception of reality. In this case, free will and consciousness are not required to be perceived as deterministic but only to be functional and have the integrity to carry out that functionality. Following this requirement, we laid out the phenomena set by representing each phenomenon as a relationship between ‘input, black box, and outcome’ and by associating it to one of the four “Entity–relationship model” relationships. The ‘input, black box, and outcome’ representation and the “Entity–relationship model” yield the following insights:

  1. Determinism — The deterministic phenomenon is the phenomenon that is aligned with the one-to-one relationship phenomenon, where for each type of input, the black box will produce only one type of outcome, and the phenomenon functionality is carried out by the black box by the integrity of its structure in a manner that we can predict their behavior and act accordingly.
  2. Craziness — The “craziness” phenomenon is the phenomenon that is aligned with the one-to-many (over time) relationship phenomenon, where the same black box’s instance is producing, at different moments in time, different outcomes for the same type of input. The “craziness” phenomenon does not have integrity and cannot be predicted. The “craziness” phenomenon is coherent with the nonlinear noumenon.
  3. Free will — The ‘free will’ phenomenon is the phenomenon that is aligned with the one-to-many (different instance) relationship phenomenon, where different instances of the same type of black box are consuming the same type of input and producing, in a consistent manner, different type of outcomes. Each black box instance’s particular “free will” phenomenon functionality will be attributed to the integrity of each instance’s particular consistent will, so we will be able to predict their behavior and act accordingly. The “free will” phenomenon is coherent with the “error propagation” of a noumenon.
  4. Consciousness — The ‘consciousness ‘ phenomenon is the phenomenon that is aligned with the many-to-one ( over time ) relationship phenomenon, where a black box produces the same outcomes from the different types of input.

Even though I mentioned it previously and explicitly, I want to emphasize what it means exactly that Free Will and Consciousness are phenomena of our perception and nothing else. A good way to do that will be using the popular question: when does an AI will gain consciousness?

The question “When does an AI gain consciousness?” is fundamentally wrong. This is the case since we don’t have any access to the objective reality. The only thing we can ask about anything, by definition, is when we perceive an object as if it has consciousness. Instead, the proper question should be,” When an object, whether it’s a human or computer, will be perceived as if it has consciousness? The answer will be: We Will attribute consciousness to an object when we will benefit from it and this will happen when an object acts in a nondeterministic, non-explainable and consistent manner. In this case, we would say that the object has consciousness, and its “specific consciousness” will act as the “instruction” for how to interact in a productive manner with this specific object.

The object doesn’t have to be “smart” with AI Capabilities. We attribute consciousness even to simple objects like light-motion sensors. light-motion sensors Installed in our yard will magically light up when we step into the yard. Unless we know how the light motion sensor works, we will ask: “How does the light know that we get inside the yard?” as if the device “knows something” as if it has “consciousness.” Of course, the second we deconstruct the sensor to its parts, and we have a better insight into how it works, then the device will lose its consciousness, but then it also stops acting as a nondeterministic and non-explainable black box.

Those new insights succeeded in reconciling determinism with free will and consciousness, but they also brought with them a new question — is there a relationship between the type of outcome and the degree of consciousness, and if there is, what is the relationship?

The path to finding out the answer to this question brought along many important insights about values, faith, individualism, community, and many other aspects essential to our lives. In the second part of this essay, I will address those issues.

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