Background Report: The Fulani Herdsmen (Part II— Recent Events and Responses)
Previously published November 2016 (Project Cyma)
The current conflict in Nigeria between the Fulani herdsmen and their neighbors stems from a long history of feuding, farming, and herding, and will not easily be resolved. Preexisting communal conflicts have fueled violence as herdsmen turn militant in the face of urbanization, desertification, and the indifference of the Nigerian government to their plight. Fulani violence has taken more lives in the past six months than has Boko Haram, Nigeria’s most prominent terrorist organization, and it shows no signs of slowing in its deadly pace.
RECENT EVENTS
In October of 2014, the government of Nigeria’s Kogi State announced its plans to build an international airport in the town of Lokoji. The airport would bolster the regional economy and create an agricultural hub.(1) It would also monopolize an extensive area of prime grazing land used largely by Fulani Herdsmen. This event and many like it have deprived the Fulani of an essential resource, namely land, and the majority of Fulani militants’ efforts aim to reclaim or repurpose areas for the grazing that is critical to the herdsmen’s livelihoods.
Several Tiv communities in Taraba State’s Gassol Local Government Area were attacked in May of 2016, leaving 12 dead and nearly 20 more injured. Altogether, 13 houses in the communities were burned, and fear was such that military and police forces were needed to reestablish a sense of security in the area.(2) The attacks were all attributed to Fulani militants, and the motivation behind them was clear: the militants intended to resolve by force an old dispute about farming rights in the area. Many recent attacks perpetrated by the Fulani have stemmed from long-standing disagreements, which are likely being finally brought to a head by the increasing desperation with which the Fulani Herdsmen perceive themselves to facing.
On April 5, 2016, Fulani militants killed four individuals in Benue State. On the tenth of the same month, they killed 15 in Taraba. Two farmers were killed the very next day by suspected Fulani Herdsmen, and about 40 were killed in Enugu State on the 25th of the month. There were nearly 60 significant attacks by Fulani Herdsmen in Nigeria from January 2015 to June 2016, and the frequency of such violence is rising. The number of attacks in the first half of 2016 has nearly equaled the sum of attacks in 2015, and governmental actions intended to resolve the situation have as yet had little effect.
It is important to note that, despite common misconceptions, many Fulani are not at all connected with the militants who have been active in Nigeria’s middle belt. While the militants themselves are primarily herdsmen, the majority of the members of the expansive Fula ethnic group are solely pastoralists, without connection to militant violence. Even these peaceful members of the ethnic group, however, are largely viewed with suspicion and anger by the sedentary peoples through whose land they take their cattle, largely as a result of the actions of the ethnic group’s militant wing. This tension between herdsmen and farmers has led to some of the violence on both sides.(3)
Figure 1. Fulani Attacks from January 2015 to June 2016

RESPONSES
In response to the increased frequency of Fulani attacks, many Nigerians have been quick to attribute the violence to ethnic or religious motivations. Though this view appears to be largely unfounded, it is not unexpected. Nigeria has long been plagued by ethnic and religious violence, with Boko Haram drawing upon its bleak reading of Islamic scripture and many rural communities engaging in vicious feuds, so the assumption is reasonable, if not correct. While the true motivation of the Fulani has been revealed as tied to the interests of their cattle, this has not stopped many from citing other reasons for the violence, as well as for the seemingly slow governmental response.
The new wave of Fulani attacks has led to much criticism of the Nigerian national government as well as state and local governments. As noted above, governmental responses have been measured, partially due to the many issues that draw focus away from the Fulani attacks, such as the threats presented by Boko Haram, Ansaru, and the Niger Delta Avengers, but it is likely that other factors have influenced this reaction as well. The situation in central Nigeria is a fragile one, and the Fulani people make up a significant percentage of the population, so the Nigerian government must handle the crisis delicately to protect the interests of all involved.(5)
The most serious criticisms of leadership, however, address not reticence but corruption. The Nigerian military has been accused of failing to act not due to incompetence or patient strategy, but due to partisan ties within the leadership. At least one group of representatives for the Igbo people have accused the military of covering up its failures by imprisoning innocents and blaming impostors for their actions. The most serious accusations, though, have been those directed at President Muhammadu Buhari, himself a member of the Fula ethnicity.(6) Buhari, who has remained silent in the wakes of attacks like the July 11 Benue Attack, has been accused of sympathizing with and even directly supporting the actions of Fulani militants. Others, while declaring him innocent of such motives, have attributed his inaction to the difficult politics of the situation and an overwhelming desire to retain political power.(7) Little evidence suggests that the former is true, while the latter is simply a matter of speculation, but the public, at least in communities often targeted by Fulani attacks, has come to its own conclusions.(8)
Reactions to recent events have not been limited to criticism and accusations. Oganiru Ndigbo, or the Igbo Improvement Union, has allegedly filed suit against police and military forces in Nigeria for their failure to protect the people of Nigeria. Other groups, such as the 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative, have looked outside Nigeria for aid in light of the rise of groups like Boko Haram and the increasingly deadly Fulani Ethnic Militia.(9) The Wilberforce Initiative in particular called for U.S. President Barack Obama to appoint a Special Envoy for Nigeria and theLake Chad Region to combat the efforts of such groups. Though neither of these attempts have seen any success yet, they represent the embodiment of a public desire for action.(10)
Though large-scale governmental action has not been forthcoming, the Nigerian government has not been completely silent on the Fulani issue. The Deputy President of Nigeria’s Senate, Ike Ekweremadu, has announced his condemnation of the attacks and has called on his Senate to act. The Governor of Nigeria’s Imo State, Rochas Okorocha, has called for unity and dismissed the ethnic aspect of the crisis, saying that the Fulani violence “is a national issue that also requires national approach to resolve” and that “an ethnic coloration… makes the solution to such problem somewhat difficult.”(11) Furthermore, the police and members of the army have, to some degree, entered the area in an effort to renew a sense of security.(12) While the actions of the government have not put a stop to Fulani violence, the powers that be in Nigeria have not been as complacent in the face of this threat as many assert.(13)
Though the Fulani themselves have largely remained silent about the actions of militant herdsmen, spokespeople representing the ethnic group have on occasion offered justifications and explanations for goings on in the troubled region. In response to a March 2016 attack on multiple Agatu communities in Benue State, the National Secretary of a prominent Fulani organization, Saleh Bayeri, explained that the attacks constituted a reprisal for the death of an important Fulani at Agatu hands. It is important to note that, as part of the attack on Shehu Abdullahi, the important Fulani, the purported Agatu attackers also killed or stole hundreds of Fulani cattle.(14) Later, in May of the same year, a series of attacks struck Buruku Local Government Area in Benue State. While the government initially blamed Libyan herdsmen for the violence, Fulani in the area took responsibility, claiming the attack as a reprisal for the theft and killing of over 800 cattle by Tiv youth in the area.(15)
Apologists for the Fulani cause, like Alhaji Ngelzarma of the Meyatti Allah Cattle Breeders Association, have blamed politicians like former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan for ignoring problems facing the Fulani and disregarding proposed solutions. Sultan Alhaji Abubakr of Sokoto, a regional spiritual leader, called for the people of Nigeria to stop blaming the Fulani for every violent act, acknowledging that, though the Fulani militants were responsible for some attacks, the Fulani “are only after their [own] cattle.”(16) Though the reasons provided perhaps do not adequately justify such violence, they indicate that the Fulani militants may not be the only guilty parties in this conflict.(17)
Recent attacks have demonstrated the growing nature of the Fulani militant threat, and concurrent developments have increased the need of the Fulani for grazeable land. There has been insufficient government action to relieve tensions in the central region of Nigeria, and militants have shown few signs of stopping. All sides in the conflict have their critics and their defenders, and though blame for the violence may lie primarily with the militants, there is plenty to go around. Cooperation between innocent citizens, aggrieved Fulani, and the government will be hard to come by, but the conflict will require multi-level cooperation if it is to be resolved peacefully.
References
- “Nigeria to Build an International Airport in Kogi, by 2016.” Construction Review Online. Group Africa Publishing, 31 Oct. 2014. Web.
- “Soldiers, Policemen Take over Communities over Killing of 12 People by Fulani Herdsmen.” Vanguard News. 09 May 2016. Web.
- Oduah, Chika. “Deadly Nomad-versus-farmer Conflict Escalates.” Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera. Web.
- Burton, Gregory F. “Fulani Attacks: January 2015 — June 2016.” Project Cyma. Web.
- “Nigeria’s Government Must Ensure Balanced Response.” Chatham House. Chatham House. Web.
- “DSS And Nigerian Army: The Existential Dangers Of Security Outfits That Serve Ethnic Interests — News Biafra.” News Biafra. 19 Apr. 2016. Web.
- Awala, Verity. “Reactions Trail FG’s Silence on Fulani Herdsmen Attack on Benue Communities.” Information Nigeria. Web.
- Yusuf, Omotayo. “Fulani Herdsmen Attack and the Foolishness of Playing Ethnicity.” Nigeria News Today. 04 May 2016. Web.
- Newspaper, Punch. “Group to Sue Police Over Fulani Herdsmen Attack.”Sahara Reporters. 01 July 2016. Web.
- “US Lawmaker Pledges to Push for Special Envoy to Nigeria.” World Watch Monitor. 12 May 2016. Web.
- Bolashodun, Oluwatobi. “Ekweremadu Reacts to Fulani Herdsmen Attack in Enugu.” Nigeria News Today. 26 Apr. 2016. Web.
- Mamah, Emeka, Clifford Ndujihe, Chidi Nkwopara, and Chinenyeh Ozor. “Bloodbath in Enugu as Fulani Herdsmen Kill 40.” Vanguard News. 26 Apr. 2016. Web.
- “Soldiers, Policemen Take over Communities over Killing of 12 People by Fulani Herdsmen.” Vanguard News. 09 May 2016. Web.
- Mayah, Emmanuel, Sani Turkur, and Hassan Adebayo. “Why We Struck in Agatu — Fulani Herdsmen — Premium Times Nigeria.” Premium Times Nigeria. The Premium Times, 19 Mar. 2016. Web.
- Okoh, George, and Sunday Okobi. “Herdsmen Attack — We Killed Because Tiv Youths Stole 800 of Our Cows.” All Africa. 16 May 2016. Web.
- Keobke, Alex. “Even Fulani Herdsmen Blame Jonathan.” See Naija. 29 Apr. 2016. Web.
- Aminu, Mohammed, and Hammed Shittu. “Stop Blaming Fulani Herdsmen for Every Attack, Sultan Tells Nigerians.” This Day Live. This Day, 05 July 2016. Web.
