Whither the Liberal Order?

Notes from Stockholm China Forum

Authored by GMF Fellow Amy Suddart and originally posted here.

We’ve started the second day of Stockholm China Forum with back to back sessions on the G20 summit in Hangzhou and the Obama administration’s “rebalance” to Asia. The broader theme across those sessions has been about the models and values upon which the West’s relationship with China is built, and the framework within which it operates.

Was there even a liberal order to begin with?

Much of the Obama administration’s policy has been directed toward defending and building upon the liberal order: global cooperation on the basis of democracy, rule of law and open markets. For Europe and the United States, a shared commitment to that order has been the fundamental underpinning of the transatlantic relationship.

China, however, is an essentially illiberal power: It is not a democracy. As we discussed yesterday, it is not an open economy (although neither is it entirely closed). And while it has tended to be relatively respectful of rule of law, it has been reluctant to expand upon it, and it has tended to stick to the letter of the law rather than the spirit of it. The question then is whether or not the China model is fundamentally incompatible with the liberal order. If that is the case, then why? And is there any alternative path froward for working together?

Evaluating the Obama Rebalance

In its first year, the Obama administration attempted to shift U.S. China policy away from containment and hedging, and toward engagement. That policy shifted again after it became clear to the administration that China was less interested in working with the United States than it was in pursuing its own interests, seemingly to the detriment of a cooperative global agenda. In response to that, the administration articulated a policy of rebalance (né “the Pivot”), an effort to “shape China’s rise”.

At Stockholm China Forum, that policy has received mixed reviews. While empowering for allies in Asia, the economic arm — the Trans-Pacific Partnership — has not been implemented, and the realization of increased military commitments has been slow.

The Project of a Generation

The general consensus between the Chinese, European and American participants here seems to be that the Obama administration could never have been expected to definitively “solve” the problem of how to work with a global China. The real question is really whether his government has been able to move the world in a positive direction, and to create a framework in which progress can continue.

Check back in a couple of hours for analysis of how the Brexit is going to impact European China policy.

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