I enjoyed the article. In my opinion, this is a very coherent comparison of the respective roles of the Marines and the Army — and of circumstances that could call upon them to jointly operate. Without intending to be critical of what you wrote, I think there is also another important dimension that affects how the services fully define their roles. As I see it, the underlying context for what you have written here is the “conventional” context of services operating in countries against established, country-sponsored forces. The objective is to defeat the opposing forces and, in so doing, to defeat the offending country. In that context, forces capable of deploying rapidly and sustaining a position for a period of time until heavier forces can be brought in and more robust logistics capabilities can be established fit clearly into the visions you have described. But when the offending force is not state-sponsored and doesn’t allow itself to be pinned to a relatively fixed position (like somewhere inside a specific country), the concept of getting in somewhere quickly to establish a beachhead to prepare for the introduction of heavier forces doesn’t work so easily. The visions that the Army and Marines establish for this kind of situation probably need to be defined differently. What should the visions for the Marines and the Army be in situations where the introduction of heavy military forces doesn’t make sense and the need for the lighter forces from these two services to sustain themselves extends far beyond expected time limits established for “conventional” enemies?