In your article you explain that the Russian airforce is in all probability using a counter-value strategy, like the one used against the chechnian rebels. Decapitation strikes are therefore not regarded as the centerpiece of this strategy, so why would anyone allocate intellegence resources for this task? The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown us that decapitation strikes only work for the short period of time needed to replace the commander. It has failed to make any difference in the long run. The Taliban has lost the majority of their ‘original’ commanders and they are still fighting and gaining ground. I believe the Russian strategist have rightly decided not to follow this strategy.

You also stated that rebel reinforcements were allowed to move in to Allepo unharrased. While this might provide some problems on the ground in a short period it’s likely Allepo is going to fall into government hands eventually. Allowing a few thousand troops into the pocket results first and foremost in increased logistical problems for the rebels and remaining civilians whilst their actual fighting power isn’t greatly increased.

In my opinion this will prove to be an effective if very brutal strategy.