Pattern Logic Series, Part IV: The Problem of Universals

In Part I of this series of Pattern Logic, the “problem of universals” was raised briefly, and we now return to it in greater detail here in part IV.

Given its intense ancient and medieval treatment one might assume that the “problem of universals” has been satisfactorily resolved, but as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy review of this topic concludes:

“Clearly, in this sense, the problem of universals is itself a universal, the universal problem of accounting for the relationships between mind, language and reality.”

What is the problem of universals exactly? It pivots around three possible answers to the question of whether universal concepts are more “real” than the mere concepts or words by which we handle them.

For the “realists” the universal comes before, and regardless of, any experience of individual instances. Think Platonic forms. For the “conceptualist” the universal is merely a concept in the mind that follows from the experience of an individual thing. And for the “nominalist”, all there is to a universal is the name that is arbitrarily given to it.

There are some remaining patterns that emerge from ADEPT LION that speak to the modeling these respective positions and that can help to frame the relationships between mind, language and reality.

We can start with a general mapping of these three terms to the patterns that have emerged in our exploration of pattern logic.

The concept of “mind” can map to the workings of the ADEPT LION constructs of shadow and obscure depth.

• shadow depth can map to conscious mind
• obscure depth can map to unconscious mind

The concept of “language” can map to the workings of the ADEPT LION construct of translation nature (which is also referred to as the second consideration).

The concept of “reality” can map to the workings of the ADEPT LION construct of manifest depth.

Looking back over what has already been covered in this discussion of limitation, one can see that we have actually already begun exploring all three of these concepts of mind, language and reality. And importantly, our exploration has presented a model for understanding the relationships between these concepts.

For instance, the ADEPT LION Pools of both Ascription and Description are relationships that consist in a linkage between universals and individuals. Ascriptions represent the instantiation of universals into individuals while Descriptions represent the collection of individuals into a universal. It is interesting to observe that in both of these patterns, the “priors” are both a universal and an individual. In other words, Instantiation and Collection are relational acts that presume the existence of both a universal and an individual in order to occur. So we can’t settle the issue of the “reality of universals” in the acts of instantiation or collection.

Entity consists (in part) in relationally-linked universals and Process in relationally-linked individuals. So initially it looks like entities are only concerned with relating universals in a taxonomy and processes are only concerned with relating individual parts of material things.

But if we concluded that ADEPT entities support a Realist position when it comes to the hard existence of universals, this would only be part of the picture because there are other patterns in which a universal is dependent upon a prior individual!

So, looking back over the initial inventory of limitations presented by pattern logic there are some additional relationships that span this division between universals and individuals. They were grouped as the abstractions, rhemes, and associations.

Abstractions

The abstractions carry a pattern logic interpretation of an equivalence between a given individual and its universal correspondence (Conceptualist) or representation (Nominalist). They also come in both valued (shadow depth) and unvalued (obscure depth) versions.

Abstractions

• OEH|| (Abstraction), OET|| (Assertion)
• SEH|| (Idea), SET|| (Conception)

An example of an Idea might be what you had for breakfast this morning, where this is dependent on the manifest entity which was your actual breakfast. An example of a Conception might be the literal words “what you had for breakfast this morning” which have the referent of this same actual meal. And assuming that there was some unconscious thought of this meal in your head even before I brought it into your consciousness by reading this paragraph, that would be an example of an Abstraction.

Rhemes

The rhemes have the opposite pattern logic interpretation from abstractions in that they express an equivalence between a given universal and its individual correspondence (aether nature) or representation (translation nature). Rhemes are the most direct understanding of the semiotic act of interpreting (mind) an object (reality) in a word (language). Rheme is the Peircian semiotic term for “…understood as representing such and such a kind of possible Object.” We may think of rhemes as the act of “coining a word for a material object”. The nature of perception and its connection to the “material object” of this definition is a tangent that has clearly been of interest to philosophers but we will not further explore this rabbit hole here.

Rhemes

• MEH++ (Distinct), MET++* (Rheme), MET++| (Seme)

An example of a Distinct would be the actual reading glasses that are laying on my desk right now, in that I am asserting this particular pair of glasses as a distinct representation of the universal reading glasses. I am now going to speak “these reading glasses” and in so doing, I have vocalized an individual Rheme. And if I happened to be recording myself, a replay of that recoding of “these reading glasses” would exemplify a Seme.

Associations

The associations carry a pattern logic interpretation of a universal (aether nature) or its representation (translation nature) which is the equating of two given individuals as being the same in value. We will only hint as the potential utility of associations in the process of sense-making or the cognitive act of simplification, but again side step the philosophical rabbit holes for now.

Associations

• OEH== (Association), OET== (Apodiction)
• SEH== (Equation), SET== (Recognition)

From our prior example of Rheme and Seme, which were two instances of my speaking the words “these reading glasses”- one an actual vocalization and the other a recording of that vocalization, then the Equation would be the occasion of conscious awareness when a listener realizes that the original vocalization and the subsequent recording are in fact, the same thing. If they gave this occasion a semantic value like “that’s a recording of Greg talking about his reading glasses”, then that would be the Recognition. If this experience was never given conscious semantic handling, then it would simply remain a subconscious Association.

Summary

So what do we have to say about the Problem of Universals?

• An Abstraction and an Association are universals with prior individuals (yeah Nominalists!).
• And a Rheme is an individual with a prior universal (yeah Realists!).
• And the Obscure Depth variants are just as meaningful (yeah Conceptualists!) without semantic representation as their semantically-represented counterparts in the Shadow Depth (yeah Nominalists again!).

It would seem that everyone has a place at the table in Pattern Logic, assuming that they wanted to make room for each other…

Resolving the “problem of universals” is not the intent here but rather, it is to point out that pattern logic provides a method for the systematic defining of the problem and a means of understanding the inter-relatedness of these different perspectives.

There is more to be said about the introduction of the semiotic terminology of C. S. Peirce within Pattern Logic, and this will be the topic of part V of our exploration. Of particular interest to the Conceptualist and Nominalist position: how precisely, can the interface of thought and language be represented in fixed patterns.