Global Distribution/Saturation of Advanced Authoritarian Technologies
City police/law enforcement departments with surveillance capacities most associate with US government Fusion Centers, 90.26% of world nations use at least one kind of AI surveillance technology, how many Cloud Data Centers does Google build in GCC Nations after Saudi Arabia…
Preface:
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Global Distribution/Saturation of Advanced Authoritarian Technologies
“Authoritarian AI Surveillance” tech like facial recognition, smart city and predictive policing tech are more widely adopted/distributed then most likely’
City authorities and law enforcement departments in major US cities may be far more powerful/well connected then you may believe.
The same could very well be true for major cities in 14/9/5 Eyes nations
If you or those close to you could be construde as a problematic element, such as an activist, the authorities within these cities way be way more dangerous then you recognize.
Corporations in your home nation, even if that nation is the United States, may be able to exert far more influence over your rights/privacy, over local/state authorities, then you’d be comfortable considering….
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2019 study found that 176 of 195 nations utilized at least one form of AI surveillance technology, whether that was facial recognition, smart city or predictive policing tech:
Facial Recognition Systems
“Biometric technology that uses cameras (still images or video) to match stored or live footage of individuals with images from databases. Not all systems focus on database matching; some systems assess aggregate demographic trends or conduct broader sentiment analysis via facial recognition crowd scanning.”
Smart Policing
“Data-driven analytic technology used to facilitate investigations and police response; some systems incorporate algorithmic analysis to make predictions about future crimes.”
Smart City
“Cities with sensors that transmit real-time data to facilitate service delivery, city management, and public safety. Often referred to as “safe cities,” they incorporate sensors, facial recognition cameras, and police body cameras connected to intelligent command centers to prevent crime, ensure public safety, and respond to emergencies. Only platforms with a clear public safety focus are incorporated in the index.”
Near Future: China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” Will Push Global Adoption of AI-Surveillance Tech by this World’s Nations to Nearly 100%
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10/2021 report began describing “AI surveillance” as “Authoritarian AI Technology”, stating that developing nations identify AI technology as a “means of economic development to help determine a nation’s relative standing in the global technology race rather than as a geopolitical or ideological preference.”
Developing nations value affordability/accessibility over an AI provider’s ideology; these nations are extremely unlikely to care very much if the provider of a the most affordable/accessible AI technology available to them originates via an authoritarian regime or not.
This is one reason China has successfully expanded its global influence via its “Belt and Road Initiative”; 126 countries/29 international organizations, including established democratic nations (Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands) have signed cooperation agreements to participate in 3000+ projects that are listed under the BRI umbrella, some 60% of which are underway.
“Belt and Road Initiative” is already seeing the exportation of China’s surveillance/population control technologies to nations like Pakistan, Zimbabwe, etc.
For example: reports say that China has installed surveillance infrastructure similar to that which is used in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region across multiple Pakistani cities
.CloudWalk, a Guangzhou-based tech startup that’s received considerable funding via China’s government, has a strategic cooperation framework agreement with Zimbabwe to build a national facial recognition program as part of the “Belt and Road Initiative” .
Zimbabwe’s national facial recognition program is primarily meant to improve security/law enforcement within the nation. Movement through Zimbabwe’s airports, railways and bus stations will be monitored using a facial-recognition database integrated with biometric tech.
And here is where my concerns come in:
“BRI countries are not all investment destinations without complications — some have social conflicts, civil unrest and incipient insurgencies. As more Chinese companies invest in these weak states, security concerns are growing, with an increasing number of attacks on Chinese worksites and workers. Moreover, even if BRI sites are well guarded, they remain dependent on the host country’s security situation. Several BRI countries are politically unstable and could potentially suffer widespread civil unrest that would devastate BRI investments.”
“China is supporting numerous “safe city” projects to improve security within Pakistan’s major urban centres by providing soft, low interest-rate loans and urging the involvement of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Safe-city projects have effectively installed much of the Xinjiang digital security system across numerous Pakistani cities, including Islamabad, Peshawar, Lahore, Quetta, Karachi and Gwadar.”
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/belt-and-road-means-big-data-facial-recognition-too
China is introducing surveillance/population control tech to various unstable, insecure areas to help provide some measure of security/safety.
My concern is that these technologies could be left behind/abandoned in areas that are historically prone to instability, civil unrest, social conflicts, etc.
I wouldn’t want to see technologies like these in the hands of some local warlord, tyrant, dictator, etc., where its put to use controlling/oppressing/terrorizing local populations.
The BRI has approx. 3000 projects planned.
I’d hate to find out these surveillance/population control technologies litter/mark the path of this initiative’s travels, left behind to be used by whatever slaver stumbled upon them.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/belt-and-road-means-big-data-facial-recognition-too
The Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC) nations are already oppressors, but in a few years, we may need a word like ‘super oppressors’ to describe Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)…
The report below states that the autocratic monarchies comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), also known as The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have long had an interest in technology as a means of digital oppression to protect their own interests.
Yet even beyond just using technology as a tool to control dissent/maintain power, it seems at least some of the GCC countries are also betting on the tech sector to help drive the economic development they need to diversify their hydrocarbon-dependent economies.
PLEASE NOTE: I didn’t want to reference another Carnegie Endowment for International Peace study/report, but this last one is to important to pass up; especially in light of recent events I’m about to describing…
Now, it would make sense for many of the GCC nations in to invest in tech; these investments could allow at least some of the nations in to diversify their nation’s economies while also gaining greater capacity to control dissent/maintain power, conduct foreign disinformation campaigns, etc.
I’d imagine all (or at least most) of these nations can financially afford the infrastructure a company like Google could bring to/build in their nation; surely, the most likely obstacle stopping a company like Google from working with a nations like Saudi Arabia, is Saudi’s hideous human rights records…
Google recently announced it’s building it’s first Google Cloud Data Center in Saudi Arabia; specifically, the data center will be built in Dammam, Saudi’s sixth-largest city; the data center will be operated in partnership with state-owned Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest producer of oil.
Incidentally: Saudi Aramco’s involvement largely ensures Saudi Arabia, and more specifically, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, will almost certainly do whatever he wants with this data center.
Google originally established the agreement with Saudi Arabia in December 2020: “Google Cloud will now deploy and operate a Cloud region in Saudi Arabia, while a local strategic reseller, sponsored by Aramco, will offer cloud services to customers, with a particular focus on businesses in the Kingdom.”
Before we move on, we need to take a quick look at Saudi Arabia’s human rights issues/international controversies since Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman came to power:
The US Justice Department charged two former Twitter employees with spying for Saudi Arabia. These former employees were accessing company data to locate user information that would allow Saudi Arabian authorities to discover the identiy of dissidents using the platform.
This incident marked the first time US federal prosecutors publicly accused the Saudi Arabia of running agents in the United States.
In 2015, one of two former Twitter employees (a Saudi citizen named Ali Alzabarah) was accused of accessing the personal information of more than 6,000 Twitter accounts/users on behalf of Saudi Arabia.
One of those accounts belonged to prominent dissident Omar Abdulaziz; you’ll see/hear this name again soon.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1215836/download
Saudi Arabia used spyware from Israeli firm NSO Group to conduct surveillance against journalist Jamal Khashoggi before he was assassinated and dismembered by agents acting on orders from Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
Incidentally, Omar Abdulaziz was close friends with Jamal Khashoggi
Omar Abdulaziz is a Canadian permanent resident/Saudi dissident; heis smartphone was targeted with a fake package delivery notification, which then infected Abdulaziz’s device with NSO’s Group’s Pegasus spyware.
Analysis of the attack run by Citizenslab attributed the attack to an operator linked to Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia targeted an Amnesty International staff member with NSO Group Pegasus malware during a week where the organization was campaigning for the release of six women’s rights activists detained in Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia arrested multiple Women’s Rights Advocates, May 2018:
Loujain al-Hathloul
Human rights activist, jailed and put on trial for her activism
Aziza Yousef
Human rights activist, put on trial for her activism
Eman al-Nafjan
Human rights activist, on trial for her activism
Saudi Arabia arrested multiple Women’s Rights Advocates, June 2018
Samar Badawi
Human rights activist, jailed and on trial for her activism
Nassima al-Sadah
Human rights activist, jailed and on trial for her activism
Remember the two Twitter employees who were charged by the US Department of Justice with spying for Saudi Arabia?
Information they gathered allowed Saudi authorities to identify citizens who used Twitter as a means to anonymously discuss/criticize the government.
Abdulrahman al-Sadhan was one of those indiviuals who Saudi Arabian authorities identified; he received a 20-year prison sentence for his online criticism in April 2021.
All Abdulrahman al-Sadhan’s family/friends have heard from him since his arrest in 2018 is two brief phone calls.
In 2018, Saudi Arabia arbitrarily arrested 13 women’s rights activists for demanding equality/defending human rights in the Kingdom; these included Loujain al-Hathloul, Samar Badawi, Nassima al-Sada, Aziza al-Yousef, Iman al-Nafjan and Maya’a al-Zahrani.
For the first three months of their detention, several women activists endured torture, sexual abuse, as well as other inhumane treatment. They were held “incommunicado” (not allowed to talk/communicate with others), in solitary confinement ,with no access to family/friends or lawyers.
Nassima al-Sada was held in solitary confinement for approximately one year in al-Mabahith prison in Dammam.
On March 1, 2019, Loujain, Iman, and Aziza were among 11 women activists brought to trial before a Criminal Court in Riyadh; the court session was closed: no diplomats, journalists, etc. were allowed to attend. Several women activists face charges related to contacting foreign media, other activists and international organizations like Amnesty International.
Some were also accused of “promoting women’s rights” and “calling for the end of the male guardianship system”.
Following the court session: Iman, Aziza and a few other women activists, including Dr Ruqayyah al-Muharib, Amal al-Harbi, Dr. Hatoon al-Fassi, Dr. Abir al-Namankani and Maysaa al-Mane’a were temporarily/provisionally released, though they continue to face trial/remain at risk of being sentenced to prison.
In July 2019, Nassima al-Sada and Samar Badawi were also brought to trial to face similar charges related to their activism.
November 25, 2020: after approx 9 months detention without trial, Saudi authorities resumed court proceedings.
December 2020 saw Nassima and Samar sentenced by the Criminal Court while Loujain was sentenced by the Specialized Criminal Court (SCC) which tries terrorism-related cases and is often used by Saudi authorities to silence critical voices.
February 10, 2021: After suffering torture, incommunicado detention, solitary confinement and harassment, Loujain al-Hathloul received a conditional release. She remains under “probation” and a travel ban.
Samar Badawi, Nassima al-Sada and Maya’a al-Zahrani remain in prison.
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2018/06/saudi-arabia-free-women-human-rights-defenders/
I believe there’s a good chance that within the next five to ten years, Google will build Google Cloud Data Center’s in most, if not all of The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf nations.
Google had to know about all of the human rights abuses listed above us; yet they still did business with Saudi Arabia.
Organizations like Access Now, the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic sent letters to Google’s concerning its Saudi Arabia Cloud Data Center project; these letters were also signed by over 30 watchdog and activist groups.
Google’s response was mechanical/expected; its amazing that they still pretend to give lip services to human rights when they must know what this Cloud Data Center is going to be used for, at least partially.
I have a strong feeling this region of the world is going to become an exponentially more oppressive, cruel place in the near future, which is really saying something all things considered.
Amazon Ring:
Exponential growth of Amazon Ring’s surveillance capacity = Exponential growth of Amazon Ring’s influence over local/state authorities
#CyberpunkisNow has been using the map above to track growth of ‘Neighbors by Ring’ participation by US state/local authorities (police, fire/rescue, etc.) since 2019.
The 10/30/2019 dated map can be found at the link below:
https://twitter.com/hackermaderas/status/1189513539599454211?s=20
Participation of United States local/state authorities in Amazon’s ‘Neighbor by Ring’ is likely a solid means to track the adoption of Amazon Ring surveillance tech by state for a couple of reasons.
For one, those authorities participating in the program must assign department personnel to shill/advertise Ring products to their local communities.
“Ring asked police officers fill certain roles before it entered into a partnership with the police department. These roles — which include “Partnership Point of Contact,” “Press/Media Coordinator,” “Social Media Coordinator,” “Investigative Coordinator,” and “Community Relations Coordinator” — had job descriptions defined by Ring.”
The job descriptions in the image above are shown below:
Per image above:
“Ring donated 15 free doorbell surveillance cameras to the Lakeland Police Department, and created a program to encourage people to download its “neighborhood watch” app, Neighbors. For every Lakeland resident that downloads Neighbors as a result of the partnership, the documents show, the Lakeland Police Department gets credit toward more free Ring cameras for residents: “Each qualifying download will count as $10 towards these free Ring cameras.” A Ring doorbell camera currently costs $130 on Amazon.”
It looks like Amazon Ring is trying to create some kind of feedback loop: Citizens download the ‘Neighbors’ app in hopes they or someone else will wins a free device. Police have to shill Ring products for the department to participate in ‘Neighbors by Ring anyway, but the more Ring tech is out in the community, the more access to surveillance/footage they may have potentially.
“The result of Ring-police partnerships is a self-perpetuating surveillance network: More people download Neighbors, more people get Ring, surveillance footage proliferates, and police can request whatever they want.”
Two, the big draw of authorities participation in ‘Neighbors by Ring’ seems to be greater access to the tech’s surveillance capabilities, such as access to a portal which allows police to more easily identify/reach out to individual citizens/businesses using Ring tech to request video access, etc.; description of that the Ring Law Enforcement portal below:
Authorities must sign a confidential agreement to participate in the program, which Amazon Ring often tries to leverage toward some pretty questionable aims; it seems unlikely that local authorities would put themselves in such a disadvantageous position if local citizens/businesses didn’t have tech in place that those authorities could leverage to their benefit.
For example, law enforcement in multiple US cities (such as Miami, Florida for example) have given Amazon access to the city’s Computer Automated Dispatch (CAD)/911 data, ‘crime data’, including specific addresses associated with crimes, etc., sometimes for access to the Ring portal mentioned above:
Some other issues surrounding Amazon Ring surveillance tech to consider:
Evidence points at US police departments using Ring surveillance footage as a means to conduct surveillance against protests (such as Black Lives Matter protests against police violence):
Lack of transparency: Amazon Ring refuses to say how many users had video footage obtained by police:
https://techcrunch.com/2021/06/08/ring-police-warrants-neighbors/
Amazon has helped police convince people to hand over their Ring camera footage:
Amazon told a US Senator that once law enforcement have been given access to video footage via Ring products, they can keep that videos forever and share it with anyone, even if the video includes no evidence of a crime:
Pilot programs giving authorities direct access to Ring customer live stream data have already taken place in the US:
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/11/police-will-pilot-program-live-stream-amazon-ring-cameras
Where these types of surveillance are concerned, there are two final points worth remembering:
One: You don’t have to own tech like Ring to be put under surveillance by it; a neighbor’s Ring doorbell camera facing the front of your home/driveway will can keep you under surveillance just as ell.
Two: While US federal access to various company’s data have legal constraints attached to them, there are methods to circumvent those; for instance, governments buying data for use in surveillance directly from the private sector, circumventing legal checks/balances in play, has become a popular tactic.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/04/26/constitution-digital-privacy-loopholes-purchases/
Then, there’s the fact that in countries like the US, historically, courts (like FISA/FISC/FISCR) have granted US government authorities/agencies access far more often then they deny them that access:
https://epic.org/foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court-fisc/
Then there are programs we only learn about occasionally, like Operation Whistle Pig in the US, which gives US federal authorities access to the nations most sensitive databases, with seemingly little oversight, to seemingly disrupt the activities of those pushing for greater government transparency (for instance, journalists):
Please Note: I suspect many police/law enforcement departments in major US cities have similar surveillance capabilities, federal relationships, etc., to what the LAPD has. I wouldn’t be surprised if every police/law enforcement department in the United States 10 largest cities were quite similar to the LAPD.
I’d be surprised if most 14/9/5 Eyes allied nations weren’t running similar surveillance programs as the LAPD, coordinated by that nations equivalent of federal authorities alongside their version of a fusion center.
The US allies, whether those allies be 14/9/5 Eyes or UKUSA, constantly seem to share ideas between each other where running surveillance against their own citizens are concerned.
And that is exactly my point: the surveillance capabilities/technologies the LAPD are using in mass are terrifyingly powerful…there was really no need to fully enumerate their surveillance capabilities, yet.
The New, More Powerful Fusion Centers: City Police/Law Enforcement Departments in Major US Cities
Recent work by the The Brennan Center for Justice via FOIA requests gained access to information concerning the surveillance activities of the Los Angeles Police Department, which are expansive beyond what this work is intended to convey.
Frankly, the deeper I look into the surveillance capabilities of major US cities and those of their police/law enforcement departments, the more I think the capacities/capabilities of these cities/departments resemble those of US government fusion centers.
My gut tells me the surveillance capabilities of major ‘smart’ cities cities like Los Angeles, combined with its police/law enforcement personnel, probably rival some of the US government’s domestic Fusion Centers.
Plus, police/law enforcement in the LAPD are aided by the local US government Fusion Center anyway.
The Brennan Center for Justice FOIA requests uncovered that the LAPD has been undertaking surveillance across multiple social media platforms with little oversight/constraints; evidence suggests this activity was also undertaken using powerful surveillance tech like Palantir, Geofeedia, Media Sonar, Datamir, etc.
An account on Twitter (@Loganchance) created a thread where they identified/documented many fairly innocuous Twitter posts (‘tweets’) that had been designated as ‘possibly dangerous’ via the LAPD.
The thread is worth looking at to see how dangerous a law enforcement department working with powerful surveillance tools and little oversight can be; especially when most of those surveillance tools appear to be heavily automated:
https://twitter.com/Loganchance/status/1471283566956847106?s=20
Its reasonable to think that because of this activity by the LAPD, persons whose social media communications received these/similar designations could be placed under further, more targeted surveillance, among other things.
This is worth interjecting: in Florida, a combination of la enforcement technologies, including predictive policing tech, have led to the harassment of innocent citizens and their friends/family…
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzeN3b1NTWQ
LAPD surveillance activities, specifically social media monitoring, could see the department working closely with the Joint Regional Intelligence Center, the area’s fusion center. However, there’s no reason to believe that collaboration between the LAPD/JRIC are limited to these activities/types of surveillance.
The JRIC’s own documents states there’s “a strategic alliance between the activities of the LAPD and Local Multi-Agency participation (LAPD, LASD, TEW), State (CA DOJ, “other RTTAC’s”) and Federal (FBI, DHS) authorities”.
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/LA_JRIC_POWERPOINT.pdf
Earlier, I mentioned that evidence pointed at US law enforcement departments using Ring surveillance footage as a means to conduct surveillance against protests like those of Black Lives Matter against police violence.
One of those departments conducting surveillance against BLM via Amazon Ring cams was the LAPD; this isn’t surprising after The Brennan Center for Justice FOIA requests discovered that one of the LAPD’s automated surveillance tools used search terms associated with Black Lives Matter protests, such as hashtags like #BlackLivesMatter, #BlackLivesMatter-LA, #SayHerName, queries like Sandra Bland and Tamir Rice.
Also contributing to LAPD surveillance vs. social media: LAPD personnel are supposed to fill out a Field Interview (FI) card whenever possible. The FI card is meant to document/collect about data anyone an officer comes into contact with.
And since at least 2015, these FI cards have included spaces where LAPD personnel can ask, then record, people’s email/social media accounts…
It seems like Los Angeles police department leadership has directed its officers to collect social media/email account information from every civilian they interview, including individuals who aren’t arrested/accused of a crime.
How many FI cards do you suppose LAPD personnel generate everyday in a city as large as Los Angeles? How many citizens unwittingly give up their email/social media account data because they don’t know any better?
Remember what I said about the possibility that major cities like Los Angeles may have surveillance capacities/capabilities rivaling some of the US government’s domestic fusion centers based on resources/logistics a department like the LAPD provides?
Then there are other city resources the Los Angeles Police Department can, could and/or probably do leverage toward surveillance to some extent:
For instance , the Los Angeles Department of Transportation is stated to utilize geofencing to some extent, per a California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) investigation into geofencing to protect e-bikes/e-scooters rented to citizens/visitors by various California towns/cities.
Of the geofencing programs listed in the report, the Los Angeles Department of Transportation seems to be one of the most advanced; its infrastructure seems to cover Los Angeles roadways, trails, geographic areas, parking areas, to delineate operational boundaries for pilot programs, etc.
Why do I mention geofencing?
The LAPD’s own document “Data-Informed Community-Focused Policing” seems to point at Los Angeles being divided into various LAPD ‘Areas’. Each of these ‘Areas’ seems to have an Area Crime & Community Intelligence Center (ACCIC) running the various surveillance operations and other fuckery we’ve been looking at.
Each LAPD Area seems to have control over how it shares intelligence with other LAPD Areas. However, LAPDs documents seem to point very strongly towards every Area’s data being either automatically sent or otherwise accessible to the LAPD’s version of COMPSTAT (called LA COMPSTAT) and another ‘special’ departments called CSOC.
The LAPD personnel assigned to each ‘Area’ are responsible for criminal activity/community relations (and other concerns) within that/it’s area and are overseen/managed via LA COMPSTAT.
It appears that any LAPD Area’s intelligence can be shared with any other Area via LA COMPSTAT and a special department called the Community Safety Operations Center or (CSOC)if they so choose.
I wouldnt be surprised if LA COMPSTAT serves as a sort of central hub receiving data from various data channels/technologies; for instance, I expect LA COMPSTAT receives data from all LAPD Areas via intelligence shared by “Area” personnel intentionally and via administrative processes these Areas must undertake by default.
For example: maybe whenever an Area’s LAPD officer enters a person’s identification data, email/social media accounts, etc., from an F1 card into a computer system, that data is automatically sent to LA COMPSTAT.
I expect LA COMPSTAT also receives data from, or at least has ready/easy access to, many data channels with surveillance value, such as data capture by Los Angeles smart city technologies, infrastructure like city license plate cameras, etc.
“Data-Informed Community-Focused Policing” also seems to confirm that each LAPD Area’s ACCIC/Area Crime & Community Intelligence Center has access to a combination of powerful surveillance/data analytics technologies like Palantir; other LAPD documents suggest each Area’s ACCICs also has access to a sizeable suite of LexisNexis solutions that seem to be implemented via the LAPD’s ‘CrimeMaps’/’Crime Analysis Mapping System’:
“To analyze these data, the Department uses its Crime Analysis Mapping System (CAMS), existing off-the-shelf software like STATA or SPSS and their data platforms, ArcGIS and Palantir. CAMS has been used for over a decade on a daily basis throughout the Department. Through this system, daily crime maps, missions, and statistics are generated. Additionally, CAMS allows crime analysts to query for certain crime elements to detect early patterns (e.g., crime analysts can display robberies and aggravated assaults where a weapon was a firearm).”
Needless to say LAPD’s many Areas, each with their own Area Crime & Community Intelligence Center (ACCIC) capable of running powerul surveillance tech with even less oversight then I imagined that runs analysis on all data collected via all of these Areasinvariably, strategies like this involve surveillance/data collection that effects completely innocent citizens as well.
And thus far, the LAPD doesnt look to be that discerning regarding its surveillance/collection efforts.
https://lapd-assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/data-informed-guidebook%20042020.pdf
Los Angeles ‘SmartLA 2028’ plan mentions the company has been investing in smart city tech since at least 2016:
“This vision is already becoming a reality. As a three-time United States Digital City Winner (2016 -18), the City of Los Angeles has been investing and continues to invest in the infrastructure, digital services, and data tools to be a globally recognized Smart City.”
“Data-Informed Community-Focused Policing” also seems to confirm the departments regular use of surveillance/data analytics technologies like Palantir in the generation of this analysis/intelligence via its central apparatus. Other documents seem to suggest a sizeable suite of LexisNexis solutions is also implemented via LAPD’s ‘CrimeMaps’/’Crime Analysis Mapping System’ as seen below:
https://lapd-assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/data-informed-guidebook%20042020.pdf
“To analyze these data, the Department uses its Crime Analysis Mapping System (CAMS), existing off-the-shelf software like STATA or SPSS and their data platforms, ArcGIS and Palantir. CAMS has been used for over a decade on a daily basis throughout the Department. Through this system, daily crime maps, missions, and statistics are generated. Additionally, CAMS allows crime analysts to query for certain crime elements to detect early patterns (e.g., crime analysts can display robberies and aggravated assaults where a weapon was a firearm).”
http://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/022018/BPC_18-0077.pdf
https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2020/20-1149_misc_02-08-2021.pdf
This is what the LAPDs newest contract to utilize the LexisNexis suite of tools until December 30,2021 allows them to search/identify. I’m curious if some service in the listeded LexisNexis suite of solutions allows the LAPD to automate record/result requests as part of their CAMS/Crime Maps implementation.
https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2020/20-1149_misc_02-08-2021.pdf
Combined with the other surveillance/data analytics solutions available to the LAPD:
I’ve little doubt they could be using automaton to identify as many people as possible as completely as possible; this, based on whatever data points are taken in via various LAPD collection and/or monitoring methods/programs.
For example: LAPD law enforcement officer FI card data, data collection associated with accounts creating ‘possibly dangerous’ social media posts, etc.
Then, for those identified via automated or manual methods, further identification/mapping of some % of the identified’s associations (family, friends, associates, etc.) via automated or manual means; could probably be done largely via automation using other data/records collected, via data from other social media platforms, etc.
