STRATDELA Special #7: Typhon and his keen

13 min readSep 28, 2023

We all have seen US Navy exercise on Bornholm involving fancy (no) new Mk70 launcher. STRATDELA have been preparing a special issue on all things related to the US post-INF GLCM developments for a while, and now is the right time — so behold!

This summer, the US Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) announced that the first launches of Tomahawk cruise missiles from the Typhon missile system by the Army. The same announcement indicated that the SM-6 missile had been launched earlier. Thus the Strategic Mid-Range Fires (SMRF; formerly known as Mid-Range Capabilities, MRC) Typhon became the first US missile system to reach operational readiness, created after the US withdrawal from the Treaty on Strategic Missile Defence.

It was followed by the unmanned Tomahawk “Long Range Fires Launcher” (LRFL), which was adopted by the activated Long Range Missile Battery A, 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division on July 21.
Thus, the first post-INF missile systems were almost simultaneously adopted into service in the USA.

INF vibes

From 1988 to 2019 the US and the USSR and than Russia were bound by the “Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles” better known as the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty. Interestingly, this common English acronym contains an important mistake — the agreement itself does not ban nuclear missiles, but bans all land-based cruise and ballistic missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometres. However, at that moment Moscow and Washington needed to solve the Euromissile crisis, which was caused primarily by nuclear-tipped missiles.

In the second half of the 2010s, the US became concerned about a “new missile gap” due to the confrontation with China. The accusations against Russia of building and deploying a ground-based missile system with a prohibited range cruise missile SSC-8 were used as a reason for breaking the agreement. Probably the ground-launcher variant of the Kalibr cruise missile was the problem, but it is impossible to say for sure, as despite the fact that the SSC-8 has been introduce in service six years ago, no evidence has been presented to the public so far — apart from the presentation by the Russian MoD about 9M729 GLCM.

Launch canister and launcher of the 9M729 missile

However, leading players in the the Trump administration (e.g. John Bolton) openly said that even if Russia eliminated the SSC-8, the US would still leave the INF treaty because of numerous Chinese intermediate-range missile systems not limited by it. Despite the current strained relations with Moscow (and exercises on the Baltic), the deployment of new US missiles is almost entirely focused on the Pacific theater.

Speaking about the modern US GLCM, it is hard to avoid drawing parallels with the Gryphon aka BGM-109G programme of the 1980s. Back then, the decision to create missiles was also largely dictated by the political situation and the need to quickly “restore balance” in a possible theatre.

Although the Pentagon’s interest in creating a ground version of the cruise missile appeared at the turn of 1976–77, it received full-fledged support after the Euromissile crisis began. The final decision to build and deploy it in Europe was made in 1979. The new missile system was created in a hurry —the first launches took place already in February 1981 , in 1982–83 tests with military crews took place. There was a plan to deploy Gryphon in South Korea as well, but it was abandoned at an early stage.

An interesting point was the issue of subordination — the operators of BGM-109G Gryphon were the US Air Force, which created (or restored those that existed in the 1950–60s with Mace and Matador missiles) new units for this purpose: Tactical Missile Wing, which included Tactical Missile Squadron and Tactical Missile Maintenance Squadron. Tactical Missile Squadron was in turn divided into flights. Probably a tribute to aviation tradition, each flight had four Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL) plus 18 other vehicles including two Launch Control Centre vehicles (LCC). The missiles were deployed at airbases.

It was stated that the Gryphon was transferred to the Air Force, not the Army like the Pershing II, because the Army lacked “personnel to maintain cruise missiles”. Given that the Tomahawk was already a modern cruise missile that did not require troop maintenance, it was probably a matter of working out flight assignments for TERCOM — at the time an extremely difficult task. In addition, perhaps it was about the “separation of competences” so important for the US military: BGM-109G was equipped only with nuclear warhead and could reach targets in the whole European part of the USSR, i.e. it was practically a strategic weapon, which in the USA were assigned to the Air Force and the Navy. Quite possibly it could have been transferred to some special land units of the Navy, but at that time the missile was not mastered in the Navy, the deployment of BGM-109G began almost simultaneously with the deployment of the Tomahawk at sea.

The Pershing II, in turn, was a direct development of the Pershing Ia and although it could engage targets in the western regions of the USSR, it basically remained a larger tactical missile. Also, it was not until March 1980 that the Air Force officially selected the AGM-86 ALCM as the strategic bomber missile rather than the aviation version of the Tomahawk and its tactical aircraft version was still under development, so it made sense to give the land-based Tomahawk to the Air Force as well.

Somewhat following the US experience, in the USSR the SSC-X-4 Slingshot also entered service with the Air Force, as far as can be judged from limited information.

Nowadays, however, the US sees the land-based Tomahawk as an exclusively non-nuclear weapon, and the transfer of the “long arm” to the Army and the Marine Corps as an increase in their capabilities in multi-domain operations. They have the support of the Navy in developing a new missile for themselves.

Typhon development

The second time the decision to develop the GLCM in the US was made was probably sometime in the second half of the 2010s. Since 2017, accusations against Russia over its deployment of a similar system, the SSC-8, have intensified. We have to admit that the relevant NATO cartoon was very convincing.

Typhon can be traced back to the same year 2017, when the NDAA 2018 included the “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 2017” including SEC. 1243 (c ):
DEVELOPMENT OF INF RANGE GROUND-LAUNCHED MISSILE SYSTEM.-.
(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROGRAM OF RECORD.-The Secretary of Defence shall establish a program of record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, including research and development activities with respect to such a cruise missile system

Following the formal termination of the INF Treaty by the Trump administration, demonstration tests of what we can now clearly recognise as an early Typhon prototype were conducted in August 2019.

Despite the obvious similarities in technical solutions and the programme’s roots, it is officially stated that the specification was generated “from a blank piece of paper in July 2020” when “the Army conducted a strategic fires study that identified a capability gap”, and the the Army’s RCTTO awarded production contract to Lockheed Martin (Lockheed Martin’s Rotary and Mission Systems) in November 2020.

Thereafter, news on the progress of the system was rather scarce, although its concepts were published several times. The first battery of the system, then called Mid-Range Capability (MRC), was handed over to the Army in early December 2022 for military testing.

On June 27 operators of the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) successfully demonstrated the launch of a Tomahawk Typhon prototype. SM-6 missile was tested earlier. So the system declared operational.

Prospects for Typhon deployment

Under current plans, the U.S. Army plans to receive one Typhon battery per year for at least the next three years, but will likely continue beyond that. For the time being, these batteries, one at a time, will be part of the geographically deployed MDTFs:
1st — Indo-Pacific. In fact US west coast. HQ — Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington.
2st — Europe. Germany. HQ — Clay Kaserne in Wiesbaden (U.S. Army Garrison Wiesbaden).
3st — Indo-Pacific. HQ — Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.
4st — Artic. In fact — Alaska. Might be replaced with another Pacific oriented one.
5st — Reserve. US homeland.

Thus, Typhon is probably planned to be deployed in Europe in 2024 and in the Pacific islands in 2025. With respect to the 3rd MDTF, the fact that the headquarters structure will be in Hawaii does not mean that missile batteries will be permanently located there as well. In any case, these are highly mobile units and their deployment primarily reflects issues of subordination to the respective regional commands of the Army and the military as a whole.

The first three MDTFs are already actively engaged in international exercises, so far primarily by EW units, but command and staff level exercises are probably joined by missile units as well. In the near future we should expect constant exercises with missile launches in other countries around the world.

As for missiles, the Army has already procured 90 Tomahawk in FY2022–23 and plans to procure 242 by FY2028 including 58 in FY2024. Interestingly, the Army is currently the top buyer of Tomahawk as their total production is now 90 missiles per year, including Navy and Marine Corps purchases.

The Navy appears to be considering procuring a containerised version of the Mk.41 standard launcher, the Mk.70 Mod.1 Expeditionary Launcher. In September 2022, it was shown in an exercise in Europe as a “modular SM-6 launcher system” mounted on a truck trailer. Visual differences from the Typhon include the launcher being lifted in the opposite direction, but it is unclear if the container can be mounted differently. It is also likely that the Mk.70 has a different battery composition, perhaps the launchers require external power. The Navy’s plans for the Mk.70 are unclear, and it may be the basis for the Guam missile defence system, but we also saw those in Denmark with what looks like a convoy protection/convoy interdiction mission. According to existing information, Typhon is closely related to Mk70, but the Mk70 itself can be deployed as a stand-alone container, including on vessels.

Mk70 in what looks like an IAMDS mission on LCS

LRFL

As part of the reform of the Marine Corps, which was to become more mobile and Pacific-oriented to the Pacific theatre, the proactive developments of Oshkosh, which it has been conducting since the mid-2010s, have come to the fore. Namely the ROGUE (Remotely Operated Ground Unit Expeditionary) Fires concept — creation of various artillery platforms on the basis of the JLTV vehicle (Oshkosh received production contract in 2015 and plans to maximise its use). Given the limited dimensions of the Humvee replacement, the platforms were proposed to be remotely operated. Concepts back in 2018 showed ROGUE Fires with barrel artillery systems, GMLRS, Hero-120 loitering munition etc.

However, the military is interested in ROGUE Fires as a basis for longer-range missiles — NMESIS (Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System) with two NSM anti-ship missiles was first tested in November 2020 and is now probably preparing to be declared combat-ready and deployed. Such missile systems are planned to be deployed in small garrisons in strategic regions, specifically in the first island chain, to impede Chinese shipping.

But the USMC ambitions do not stop there. In the budget for FY 2023, funds were first allocated for the purchase of 13 Tomahawk missiles. Further, up to FY 2026 it is planned to procure a total of one hundred missiles identical to the Navy’s RGM-109E Block V missiles, and probably even more, as it is planned to procure, as far as can be judged from the budget documents, 48 Long-Range Fires Launcher — NMESIS version with one standard Navy Mk.41 container for Tomahawk.

Interestingly, public statements usually talk primarily about anti-ship missions for LongRange Missile (LMSL) batteries, but official documents are more ambiguous “LRF capability will provide Combatant Commanders with the ability to employ an agile, mobile, land-bases system capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles to complement surface and sub-surface launched missiles”. Given the Tomahawk’s dubious anti-ship capabilities for the mid-2020s, there is some thought that anti-ship, “defensive” missions are just an opportunity to make it easier politically to place missiles near China’s borders.

At the end of July, the 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division activated the Marine Corps’ first long-range missile battery in California. Also in June, the same regiment executed the first live-fire NSM from NMESIS by Marines.

Post-INF and Meta-GLCM

So, there are more and more long-range US GLCMs in the pipeline, and across services. Other countries also follow suit, but Russia somehow lags behind — probably due to higher existing priorities. Nevertheless, ground-launched cruise missiles seem to be back in the game, without explicit nuclear missions this time, but still with high escalatory and destabilizing potential. Some people argue that a replay of dual-track approach might be feasible, but personally I highly doubt it, as this time we have significantly greater number of players at the table, each with their own agenda. However, some sort of unilateral parallel restraint and transparency measures are indeed possible, hopefully we will get there before it is too late.

That’s all for now, feel free to reach out and suggest corrections, edits and updates. Don’t forget to signup to the STRATDELA newsletter!

Addendum

I. Typhon machinery

The Typhon Strategic Mid-Range Fires (SMRF) battery is planned to consist of four launchers (four missiles per launcher), a battery operations centre (BOC), and some support vehicles (generators, reload trailers, etc.).

The launcher is placed on three-axle trailers, with standard Oshkosh HEMTT A4 M983A4 Patriot trucks used as tractors.

Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles are declared as weapons, but there is no reason to believe that it will not be able to use other Mk. 41 standard missiles (LRASM for example). The SM-6 is proposed to be used in a prospective Block IB modification, but its range against ground targets and its role in the complex is still not completely clear.

The launch and reloading of the system has not been demonstrated publicly and the details are unknown at this point (time of preparation for launch, labour intensity of reloading).

The prime contractor for the Typhon programme is Lockheed Martin Corporation. Raytheon’s participation as a subcontractor is required.
The likely production site is Lockheed Martin’s Camden Operations facility (Highland Industrial Park in Camden, Arkansas), where Long Range Fires Production Facility is located (and expanded).

Who knows — those might be the signs of Typhon launcher drift racing

II. LRFL machinery
The USMC Long Range Missile (LMSL) battery is to include 16 Long Range Fires Launchers for one Tomahawk missile each, as well as an unknown number of support vehicles (Leader Vehicle, LRF Command and Control System (C2), and LRF Resupply and Reload System (R2))

The launcher is mounted on an Oshkosh JLTV chassis. Currently, the only missile proposed for this system is the Tomahawk, but due to the use of universal, similar to naval launch containers, it can be other Mk.41 missiles. The prime contractor for the programme is probably Raytheon Missiles & Defense (now RTX), although the extent of their interaction with Oshkosh Defense is unclear.

III. Deployed Typhon unit
1st Multi-Domain Task Force
Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington (familiar place)
Brig. Gen. Bernard Harrington

Based on the attribution of the only exiting photo associated with its Army service, the missile systems are either administratively associated with Redstone Arsenal (Huntsville), Alabama (also familiar from the LRHW research), or, most likely, are now being permanently tested at one of the missile test sites (WSMR?).

IV. Unit deployed with LRFL
Long Range Missile Battery A, 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division
Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base, California.
Battery commander, Captain Justin Hillebrand.
The activation ceremony was held at Las Pulgas, Camp Pendleton, California, the artillery unit will probably be based there as well.