STRATDELA Special Issue #2: The Raider

Dmitry Stefanovich
12 min readOct 4, 2022

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Ho-ho-ho, here comes the second STRATDELA Special Issue! This time we will dive into the story about a beast that will be demonstrated rather soon: B-21 Raider, next generation heavy bomber for the US Air Force and, specifically, a backbone of the air leg (strange anatomy, but anyway) of the US nuclear triad for decades to come.

So, what does Northrop Grumman has for us? The B-21, a twin-engine, low-observable/stealth strategic bomber, is being developed to replace the US Air Force’s aging fleet of B-1B Lancer de-nuclearized supersonic bombers and a small number of expensive and difficult to operate B-2A spirit strategic stealth bombers.

The primary contractor is Northrop Grumman Corporation, which won the LRS-B (Long Range Strike Bomber) competition in October 2015. The aircraft received its index and name at the Air Force Association Symposium in February 2016, at which time the first official concept art was presented.

B-21 concept art presented at the 2016 Air Force Symposium. NB! “the artist rendering is based on the initial design concept”. However, to this day it is probably the most informative image.
For comparison, the first published USAF art of the future B-2A Spirit in the late 1980s. Drawing analogies, we can assume that this time it will also be without fine details (for example in both pictures just no nozzles are drawn), but it is similar.

The “21” index instead of the expected “3” of the naming system is intended to say that this machine is a “twenty-first century bomber”. The name “Raider” was chosen in honor of the famous “Doolittle Raid” operation of April 1942, when a group of B-25 ground bombers took off from the Hornet aircraft carrier and attacked targets in Tokyo. The operation has truly iconic status for American military history and the naming ceremony was attended by the last living veteran of the raid, Richard Cole.

Retired Col. R. Cole (1915–2019) participates in the B-21 naming ceremony in honor of himself and his battle brothers, 2016

Program Origins

Research on the advanced long-range aerial strike platform has probably never stopped in the US Air Force and industry. The decision in 1992, due to the collapse of the USSR, to limit the B-2A series to twenty machines only exacerbated the problem — which for a long time could not get proper attention from politicians, and hence funding. As a result of arms control agreements with Russia, all B-52Gs were dismantled, some B-52Hs, and the B-1Bs were deprived of the ability to carry nuclear weapons (which by the way already had been rudimentary with only the AGM-69 SRAM air-launched ballistic missiles and gravity bombs included in their weapons suite).

Concept programs to develop the shape of the future strategic bomber — or rather a long-range attack platform, began to shine widely in the public eye only since the turn of the century. First of all, it is worth mentioning such studies as “Future Strike Vehicle”, “Quiet Supersonic Platform”, “Long-Range Strike Aircraft”, “Long Range Strike Platform”. They considered completely different ways of solving the problem, from the creation of a strike modification of the F-22A “Raptor” or deep modernization of the B-1B to stealthy, supersonic, hypersonic or even orbital bombers, both crewed and uncrewed.

Lockheed Martin Heavy Strike UAV concept, with FB-22 on the artwork in the background
Northrop Grumman concept of a crewed supersonic bomber, probably under the Future Strike Vehicle program
A later concept of a supersonic, but uncrewed aircraft, also by Northrop Grumman, probably under the Long-Range Strike program

However, probably by the second half of the 2000s the US Air Force decided to abandon the ‘exotics’ in favor of the traditional solution — a low-observable subsonic manned (at least as the first stage — in the future ‘optionally-crewed’ is a possibility) bomber. This, and the eternal conservatism of the military, almost automatically led to the appearance of the aircraft in the form of the B-2A further development.

A model of an advanced bomber in the Northrop Grumman vision. 2007
Reconstruction of the project by the independent artist Josef Gatial

In 2008 the Next Generation Bomber (NGB) competition, which was also born out of the conceptual design program, moved to a stage of an active struggle. An alliance of defense giants Boeing and Lockheed Martin was formed, which together hoped to successfully confront Northrop Grumman, which had unique experience with the B-2A. The deadline at the time was very strict and unrealistic — the first flight had to be made by 2015, the assembly of the first batch had to start in 2016, and deliveries would start in 2018. At that time, the program was even known by the unofficial name “2018 Bomber”.

Boeing/Lockheed Martin advanced bomber concept. 2008

However, they soon had to admit that the deadlines were unrealistic. Interestingly, the talks with Russia on the New START were mentioned as a reason for the delays — it was not worth giving the program a full go until there was clarity about its provisions, besides it could complicate the negotiation process. In 2009–2011 the program underwent a gradual and rather confusing “re-branding” and was renamed Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B). Justifying the change, Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, said that the Air Force needs “Long-range strike, not next-generation bomber,” which looks like another “marketing ploy” to beg money from lawmakers. Like, “now we’re not just buying a bomber, but an entire long-range strike system and a manned bomber is only part of it” — hence the “B” and with a dash: other letters could have been chosen instead.

From a practical point of view, the competition probably did not change much, although it was actually suspended while the new administration “sharpened” its ideas. Nevertheless, in 2013 Boeing and Lockheed Martin confirmed their partnership in the “new” program, with Boeing taking the lead . Northrop Grumman again opposed them — and won in 2015. The most important reason for this was probably the experience of building and maintaining the B-2A.

B-21 — the sum of the knowns

Despite the opinion — in many respects fair — of the highest level of openness of the US military and the military-industrial complex, we know little about the B-21. Open and richly presented information on costs and bravura speeches about successes during the program cannot be somehow correlated with reality due to the fact that the aircraft has not even made its first flight, moreover, has not yet been shown to the public (probably this will be corrected in the near future) and even less has not begun flight tests and development to a combat-ready appearance.

B-21 (formerly NGB/LRS-B) development and production costs (after 2023 — projections), $ millions.

Soon after the choice of a particular project, spending on the program began to grow rapidly, which “fortunately” coincided with changes in the White House and the beginning of modernization of the U.S. military machine and its restructuring for the “era of great power competition”. In this paradigm, a new, massive (planned at first “modest” 80–100 machines, but now more often people speak of “at least 100” (e.g. 145 ) new bombers) strategic bomber, capable of effectively deliver future and existing nuclear and precision non-nuclear munitions was badly needed.

The worn-out B-1B fleet and the extremely sparse B-2A fleet modernization was not deemed useful. Instead, those will be decommissioned in the 2030s, after enough B-21As have entered service. The B-52H continues to serve in a modernized, re-motorized, hypersonic missile-armed version, but its niche, especially in a conflict with an advanced adversary, is quite narrow. The US Air Force is serious about making the B-21 a mass-use machine and not repeating the failure (in terms of re-equipping the fleet) with the B-2. To do this, according to available information, no special “challenges” were included in the bid, apart from keeping a given price per unit cap— with the production of the planned series of 100 aircraft, average costs should not exceed $550 million per unit. Reportedly, at the time of winning the tender the cost of the Northrop Grumman variant was estimated at $511 million.

Besides, it is crucial to keep up with the strict deadlines. US Air Force officials are extremely optimistic in their assessments of both, extolling the success of “digital design”. However, as practice shows, it is early and risky to judge the success of the defense program even before the physical tests begin. Despite all the assurances, the first flight has already been postponed to 2023, although at the beginning of 2021 it was expected bythe summer of 2022. Six B-21 prototypes are in various stages of construction, of which one or two should be at an extremely high level of readiness, in fact in pre-flight tests.

“The Air Force could buy 2.5 B-21s in fiscal ’23; nearly five in fiscal ’24; six in fiscal ’25; and between six and seven per year after, or just over 20 for the five-year period,” according to a publication close to the Air Force. Those figures roughly agree with initial revelations about the B-21 contract, which calls for 21 Raiders to be built in the first five production lots. Speaking of timing, there will be two to three extra years between the formal acquisition and actual delivery, so according to optimistic plans by 2030, the US Air Force could have a little over twenty new bombers. Initial operational capability is hoped to be achieved by the second half of the 2020s. By this time, spending on the development and production of vehicles will exceed $32 billion. According to some — probably overly optimistic — estimates the ‘minimal’ batch of 100 B-21A may be delivered in the early 2030s, and decommission the B-1B and B-2A can happen as early as in 2031 or 2032. The maximum rate of serial production is estimated at up to 15 bombers per year.

From what is known about the tactical and technical assignment, the likely high requirements for the weapons compartment should be noted, as it must accommodate not only existing, but also future aircraft munitions, including rather large hypersonic missiles. This requirement becomes even more difficult to achieve because of the smaller size of the platform compared to the B-2. This is probably due to economy considerations: the bomber should be equipped with only two Pratt & Whitney engines based on the F135 (F-35 engine), while the B-2A used four General Electric F118 engines. The dimensions should be noticeably smaller — the wingspan, according to indirect data (contracts for the construction of shelter hangars) should be no more than 45 meters, compared with 52.4 meters with the B-2A. The maximum payload is estimated at “over 13.6 tons” versus over 18 tons for the B-2A. By the way, officially the combat load of the B-2A is 40,000 lbs (18.1 tons), but there are estimates of 50,000 or even 60,000 lbs. Probably, this is a reserve capacity, not having practical implementation on the available air defenses, as well as a theoretical, but purely speculative combat load up to 45 tons for the Tu-160.

The aforementioned shelters are primarily being built at Ellsworth Air Force Base, which is to be the first home for the Raiders. Active construction work is going on at the base right now, with the first new hangars scheduled for delivery in 2024. Interestingly, the arrival of the B-21s there would require making the base “nuclear” again — at the moment only non-nuclear B-1Bs are based there.

Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota after the rebuild. Art by hangar builder Walsh Group, who made notable inaccuracies in the appearance of the B-21 by actually re-drawing a B-2.
The base after the reconstruction
No newer images in the wild, we suppose…

Nuclear certification of the bombers is estimated to take about two years after achieving initial operational capability. Initially, probably only with gravity “strategic” B61–7 thermonuclear bombs (dial-a-yield, up to 340 kt) and guided “tactical” B61–12 (dial-a-yield, up to 50 kt). In the future, the main nuclear weapon of the bomber should become the advanced AGM-181 cruise missile, created by Raytheon under the LRSO program (extra long range, with a dial-a-yield warhead of up to 150 kt).

There has been widespread discussion since the beginning of the program about the creation of an optionally crewed or uncrewed modifications or long-range “loyal wingman” UAVs. Summarizing the statements of officials, these plans are not cancelled completely, but postponed in order to focus now as much as possible on the finalization of the basic version.

Apart from the initial image used at the presentation of the project only two fully “official” (from the US Air Force) images have been published, which have variations with different backgrounds:

Showing, perhaps erroneously, the extremely strange shape of the window on the side. This “wink” is not present in any other artwork.
And a view in the hangar, showing the lighter landing gear compared to the B-2

Despite the frankly low amount of information on the artworks, analyzing all of those together we can see the differences of the B-21 from the B-2 (except the dimensions), which we can consider as reliable, first of all the simpler shape of the rear edge and a different shape of the air intakes. Some observers also noted a more pronounced sharp “beak”, but we can not rely on this until the public roll out of the prototype.

Given that the B-21 is going to the so-called “United States Air Force Plant 42” (more precisely in the final assembly shop Northrop Grumman at this facility) at the Palmdale dual purpose airfield to hide his run and the beginning of flight tests from the public will be impossible and the US Air Force is likely to hold a large public presentation ceremony. It is expected in early December 2022 . However, the aircraft has already been rolled out briefly “out in the fresh air” to be moved to the static test facility.

B-2A will soon give its place to B-21 here.

Epilogue

It seems clear that in mid-term the US will remain a power with the most advanced long-range strike aircraft fleet, especially given the challenges with the Russian Tupolev PAK DA and the Chinese Xian H-20 heavy bombers — which, in turn, also seem to follow the design principles of B-2 and B-21. Still, it might be a good idea to think about some limits, or at least transparency, for this sort of strategic weapons, both in nuclear and non-nuclear variants, because, as practice shows, dominance and superiority is not something one can easily preserve if the competition heats up. Of course, spending others into oblivion can sound good, especially if you have initial advantage, but, unfortunately, it comes with increased risks — both in terms of escalation and technological surprise that can undermine the superiority…and I am not speaking about US heavy bombers explicitly here, it works in many domains and for every country.

Now, as a final bonus, a list of known B-21 contractors and sub-contractors:

Northrop Grumman — lead contractor, final assembly
Pratt & Whitney — propulsion system
BAE Systems — avionics, in particular the electronic self-defense system
Spirit AeroSystems — airframe components, materials, probably primarily metal
Orbital ATK — the competence is broad, in addition later became part of the NG, ie can be and additional delegations. Reported to be responsible at least for plating, possibly for airframe components
Rockwell Collins — avionics, in particular communication systems, cockpit equipment
GKN Aerospace — equipment and parts, such as landing gear, glazing, wiring
Janicki Industries — airframe components, materials, possibly primarily composites

Sources:

https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/626131/air-force-awards-lrs-b-contract/

https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/673784/air-force-reveals-b-21-long-range-strike-bomber/

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/b-3.htm

Air Force Magazine Nov 2007

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/northrop-ngb-by-josef-gatial.6870/

https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2008-01-25-Boeing-and-Lockheed-Martin-Team-for-Next-Generation-Bomber-Program

«Air Force Next-Generation Bomber: Background and Issues for Congress» CRS, RL34406

https://boeing.mediaroom.com/Boeing-Lockheed-Martin-Team-for-US-Air-Force-Bomber-Program

Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range Strike Bomber. Congressional Research Service, R44463, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44463

https://www.airforcemag.com/producing-new-b-21-bomber-will-cost-20-billion-through-2027/

https://www.aero-mag.com/b-21-raider-fleet-27052021/

Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range Strike Bomber. Congressional Research Service, R44463, p.4

https://www.airandspaceforces.com/loads-data-for-new-b-21-stealth-bomber-confirms-digital-models-rollout-may-be-just-weeks-away/
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-17/b-21-bomber-delivers-pentagon-surprise-it-s-under-budget-so-far

https://www.airandspaceforces.com/b-21-raider-first-flight-now-postponed-to-2023/

https://www.airforcemag.com/producing-new-b-21-bomber-will-cost-20-billion-through-2027/

https://www.airforcemag.com/article/the-raider-comes-out-of-the-black/

https://www.airandspaceforces.com/limited-b-21-rollout-planned-for-early-december/

https://www.airforcemag.com/app/uploads/2021/02/Comparing_Stealth_Bombers.png

https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104482/b-2-spirit

https://www.walshgroup.com/news/2021/thewalshgrouptobuildnewb21hangaratellsworthafb.html

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/exclusive-air-force-scraps-b-21-drone-wingman-concept/

https://www.airandspaceforces.com/limited-b-21-rollout-planned-for-early-december/

https://www.airandspaceforces.com/first-b-21-moves-to-new-hangar-for-loads-calibration/

https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2016/04/05/why-bae-systems-scored-big-on-the-air-forces-secret-bomber/

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