Interesting essay in metaethics but I think you make a couple of assumptions that vitiate your account

The first is your assumption that utilitarianism could be a basis for your analysis and that you can basically dismiss any notion of truth with regard to value judgments

The second is your use of a possible worlds analysis to provide you with the distinction between “contingent”, “objective” and “subjective”. That needs justification because your attempt to justify the relativism on the basis of it, is just meaningless

Apart from that it may be useful to know why the language of value judgments should have no truth value attribution. Metaethical use of contingency requires a metameta-analysis and justification. That your metaethical judgments should be accepted with regard to moral judgments like “that it is wrong to harm others”, needs urgent argument.

By the way if contingency is to serve as your reason for the distinction between moral objectivity and subjectivity, what is the justification for the use of it to do so. Does it have a moral status or not? If human morality is to be judged as one possible world against others why is it it not the case that moral judgments as the one given above, hold in all possible worlds where there is human life and there are needs that every human being requires to be met?

More argument about these matters is desperately needed

    Horst Rainer Imberger

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    Former university teacher, social democrat with conservative tendencies and critical interests in just about everything