I agree with you, but Mark feels differently. I was saying to him the inequality should be
P_punish(action) * (V_stake + V_dfuture + V_ifuture) < V_action where
V_dfuture is money you left on the table you could have made from your listing in the future (direct future earnings), and
V_ifuture is money you forfeit in the future in other affairs from…
> still am figuring out how to use this if you think about a network of TCRs and a single token economy covering a number of different schelling points.
As a general but not unbreakable rule, I feel that discrete TCRs should have their own discrete tokens. This way, the upside and downside alike of curation done for a TCR is…
> the attack is more likely to be successful the higher Minority_Bloc_Slash is because voters would consider that an added risk to not taking the bribe.
Ah, I see what you’re saying. Because if the attacker is successful and you didn’t take the bait, you’re SOL. You’re right.
I actually have a different conclusion Luke, let me know if you disagree!
In the P + e attack on SchellingCoin, e >= 1 suffices to make defection from the schelling point rational.
In a P + e attack where one stands to lose value for voting in the minority, the constraint on e is: e >= (stake *…