Obama’s Legacy in International Relations
My thesis is that the foreign policies of the Obama Administration yielded an international relations environment that China and Russia perceived to be weak. The corollary to that thesis is that the perceived weakness was viewed as a power vacuum which Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin were more than happy to fill.
At the not insubstantial risk of judging without sufficient evidence, it appears that President Obama’s legacy was shaped by a reaction to the foreign policies of President Bush. President Obama’s judgement of the Bush policies was that they were too adventuresome, too aggressive, and too dismissive of international norms. However, Obama over-corrected, resulting in policies that were understood that the United States did not wish to confront the world. States like China and Russia saw opportunity to increase their influence.
A reasonable counter to my argument is that the Obama foreign policy was not, in fact weak, but that the leaders of China and Russia were merely power hungry and would have done what they did regardless of American actions. It is possible that those actions are relatively minor in the grand scheme of things and constitute little more than second rate powers attempting to annoy a great power.
However, both Russia and China see themselves as major players in the modern “Great Game.” They see themselves as having been unjustly pushed aside by an aggressive, even imperialistic United States. Nationalistic pride requires them to aggressively press for advantages wherever they can find it to increase their “rightful” place in the world. A series of events in recent years point to their more aggressive stance.
The specific actions I present as evidence include:
1. Chinese actions in the South China Sea.
2. The buildup and modernization of the Chinese military forces.
3. The Chinese support for the North Korean nuclear program.
4. Russian annexation of Crimea.
5. Russian military action in eastern Ukraine.
6. Russian intervention in Syria.
7. Russian moves for closer relations with Turkey, a NATO member.
8. Russia taking a leadership role in the Israeli-Palestinian problem.
9. Russian involvement in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iranian nuclear treaty).
10. Russian sale of an advanced S-300 air defense system to Iran.
Neither China nor Russia would have made those moves without some sense that the United States either would not or could not respond in such a fashion as to stop them. All the cases above serve to advance either Russian or Chinese power and influence and to diminish American power and influence. We see a realist zero-sum power game being played.
In President Obama’s favor, he was exceptionally aggressive in his operations against terrorist organizations. His use of drone strikes and deployment of Special Forces in attacking and killing terrorist leaders increased considerably from the Bush administration. He campaigned on ending American involvement in the Iraq War and did what he said he would. He was credited with reducing American military forces deployed overseas and a concurrent drop in American casualties. More recently he increased military support for the Iraqi government in its campaign against ISIS in Mosul and western Iraq. He has authorized the use of Special Forces and air power in striking ISIS inside Syria.
But, he was seen by some to be indecisive in his reactions to the Arab Spring. His failure to follow through on his “red line” threat concerning Syrian chemical weapons has drawn derision from many sources and has been blamed for insufficient support of the rebel forces opposing Bashir al-Assad. The recent defeat of anti-government forces in Aleppo is seen in some quarters as a failure of American foreign policy, especially given the Russian support for the Assad government.
Both Russia and China see themselves as major powers and believe that they warrant more respect on the world stage. They clearly believe themselves to be regional powers — Russia in Europe and China in East Asia. China has dreams of regional hegemony.
Both countries have a history of invasion by foreign powers and see themselves as victims of European adventurism. Russia has always seen itself as being surrounded by threatening neighbors. China has always worried about the foreign devil and keeping the barbarians at bay. Both see the United States as the primary threat to their regional dominance.
As George Kennan might write today, Vladimir Putin’s “neurotic view of world affairs” is derived from a “traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.” As in the past, a fear of “foreign penetration” remains at the heart of Russian foreign policy. As NATO drew closer to Russian borders, Vladimir Putin became more and more prepared to take strong military action.
Putin calculated accurately that there would be no effective reaction to his occupation and annexation of Crimea. In a very creative and effective “neo-invasion,” he occupied portions of eastern Ukraine, bringing it under Russian control. To date, other than a belated deployment of some troops to western Ukraine, there has been no effective U.S. or NATO response to his actions. Russian military actions in eastern Ukraine have been ramping up in recent days. The one action that appears to have some impact are the American economic sanctions against Russia.
Russia also sent military forces to Syria in response to the wavering Assad regime in Damascus. The revolt against Assad and the subsequent power vacuum in northern Syria permitted ISIS to gain a foothold. Russia, no fan of ISIS, decided that the solution to controlling or eliminating ISIS is a strong Syrian Army. From the Russian point of view, the means to that end is a strong Assad government, which explains the Russian attacks on anti-government forces and not on ISIS. To date, American reactions have been ineffective at changing the status quo.
China, continuing its nationalistic China-first policies, has been expanding its regional influence in Eastern and Southeast Asia. It sees the South China Sea as both an economic and security asset and treats it as an historical, territorial sea. By building new islands in the sea and exerting territorial and an exclusive economic zone over the surrounding waters, it seeks to create a defense in depth. To date, despite the occasional “Freedom of Navigation Operation” by U.S. Navy ships, the United States seems unable to check those advances.
China’s advances into what it sees as a power vacuum in East Asia will come to a head with Taiwan and North Korea. The “One China” concept is a non-negotiable issue with Beijing and should that be pressed by the current administration, China will react. It has shown a willingness to take aggressive action in the past.
With North Korea, it is increasingly apparent that the Chinese are assisting them with their nuclear capability. Obama’s decision to not engage Kim Jong-Un in response to their aggressive actions has resulted in more desperate North Korean security policies which will soon result in a long range ballistic missile test. To the extent that North Korea can miniaturize its already existing nuclear weapons to the point that it can mount one on a missile capable of reaching Alaska or California, the ability of the United States to remain idle is reduced. Aggressive American action against North Korea must take China into consideration.
So, where has the Obama foreign and security policy left the United States and what are the prospects of the new Trump administration reversing the trends? I am pessimistic.
Russia and China are challenging American power and influence. Obama attempted to short-circuit Chinese economic influence on the Pacific Rim by forging the Trans-Pacific Partnership. But, that pact was dead on arrival in the United States with no prospect of ratification by a Republican Senate. Now, with President Trump formally walking away from the pact, China is free to work its own economic treaties in East Asia. The President of the Philippines has already shown his preference for dealing with China instead of the United States and I would not be surprised to see Mexico signaling to China that it wants to talk about trade deals.
The Trump administration’s signals about a friendlier relationship with Russia appear to encourage and even reward Putin’s aggression in Europe. Military action in the Ukraine is getting more active, not less. NATO allies are now worried that the United States is losing interest in European security. Watch for increased interest on the part of Germany for access to nuclear weapons.
Trump’s encouragement of Taiwan and rough treatment of traditional allies, such as Australia, will encourage China to take more aggressive action in Asia. Japan is now concerned that it must take a more aggressive military stance in the region.
In short, I am worried that the troubling trends will only increase and may well result in violence within the next year or two. I am pessimistic about the ability of the Trump administration to reverse the trends internationally and concerned that it’s actions may, in fact, exacerbate them.
