Mirrored Realities: From the Lacanian Stage to Wittgenstein’s Games and Beyond
“As soon as I find God — I will die, but for me, this will be happiness.”
— Yuri Arabov
Exploring the Mimetic Process of Constructing Reality through Lacan, Wittgenstein, and Yuri Arabov
Let’s begin our exploration through the manifold landscapes that shape human understanding and behavior frequently with a reflection, both literal and metaphorical, encapsulated in the “mirror stage” as conceptualized by Jacques Lacan. This initial moment of recognition, where an individual encounters their reflection and begins to mimic observed behaviors, marks the inception of the ‘I’ or ego. This crucial phase not only signals the birth of self-identity but also highlights the deeply ingrained mimetic nature of human conduct, interwoven with our perceptions of the surrounding world.
Read a great article on truth or a version of the Real in…
Lacan’s depiction of the mirror stage serves as a pivotal gateway to the domain of images and symbols, introducing the infant to a complex web of identity, desire, and social interaction. This stage lays the foundational psyche elements, driving our desires and actions significantly. It illustrates our intrinsic tendency to imitate — encompassing behaviors, societal norms, and linguistic patterns, thus rooting our engagement with the world in imitation.
Wittgenstein further builds on this mimetic foundation with his notion of language games, suggesting that language, our primary medium for navigating and understanding the world, acts as a form of social mimicry. Through these games, we learn to attribute meanings, make assessments, and form judgments, although these interpretations are fluid, shaped by the cultural, historical, and situational contexts we find ourselves in, along with the ever-evolving laws that guide our social and political interactions.
Venturing beyond language, we encounter a form of relativism that challenges the very concept of a singular, objective reality. This perspective, invoking the idea of heterotopia, posits that our understanding of reality is not just mediated by language and social interactions but is also influenced by our position within self-created or externally imposed spaces; a world of curved manifolds where the notion of a singular, intrinsic reality dissolves.
In 1942, in Bavaria, Eva Braun is alone when Adolf Hitler arrives with Dr. Josef Göbbels and his wife Magda Göbbels and Martin Bormann to spend a couple of days without talking politics…As the film begins we see a nude woman dancing around on the parapets of some gothic castle at night as telescopes track her in the cross hairs. The woman is Eva Braun (Elena Rufanova), and she is anxious and excited, waiting for her beloved “Adi”, Adolf Hitler (Leonid Mosgovoi) to spend a few intimate hours with her. When Hitler arrives he is accompanied by his first officer…
Director: Aleksandr Sokurov
Writers: Yuriy Arabov, Marina Koreneva
IMDB: MOLOCH, 1999
Aleksandr Sokurov’s cinematic and Yuri Arabov’s narrative contributions delve into the grotesque nature of reality when viewed from a distance. By employing Brecht’s alienation effect, Arabov enables a critical observation of the grotesque in our own stories, highlighting our role as distanced observers, forever alienated from our own intrinsic reality, if it indeed exists.
This exploration into the Lacanian mirror stage, Wittgenstein’s language games, and Arabov’s portrayals unveils a multifaceted picture of human understanding and behavior. Our mimetic processes, deeply rooted in our early development, weave through the tapestry of our linguistic and social interactions, continually shaping our perception of reality. Yet, this reality is not a fixed entity but a relative construct, perpetually morphed by our interactions with space, time, and the cultural manifold.
The dialogue surrounding mimesis, as distinct from mere imitation, reveals a nuanced understanding of human behavior’s imitative aspect, an understanding that reductive behaviorism struggles to capture. This gap in comprehension reflects a broader issue within our societal and scientific frameworks, where the essence of mimesis — extending beyond simple action replication to include the imitation of desires — is overlooked by the simplistic viewpoint of behaviorism.
Rene Girard’s mimetic theory offers a comprehensive lens through which the complexity of human desires and their imitative nature can be understood, revealing the mimetic roots of rivalry, violence, and cultural norms crucial for maintaining social harmony and preventing crises. These dynamics, integral to the fabric of human society, are often ignored by the reductionist approach of behaviorism, highlighting a need for a deeper exploration of our mimetic tendencies and their impact on our collective psyche and behavior.
Reductive behaviorism, particularly as it’s critiqued in Carl Solberg analysis of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and my discussion of Arabov’s cinematic portrayals applied to the grotesque being perceived as normal or rational, stands at a crossroads between scientific methodology and the inherent human traits like mimesis and adaptive thinking. This intersection, particularly highlighted in the film “Moloch” and the theoretical explorations of Dr. Solberg, opens up a discussion on the implications of behaviorism relevant not just as a psychological theory, but as a form of ethical and moral discourses in society.
Behaviorism, fundamentally, views human actions as a function of environmental stimuli in what is essentially known as Pavlovian S-R arc with all the consequent outcomes of conditioning. This perspective, while offering significant insights into learning and adaptation, fails to encapsulate the depth of human motivation, desire(S-O-R), and the inherent need for meaning that transcends mere survival or adaptation.
Stimulus-organism-response (SOR) is a psychological theory that explains how external stimuli influence a person’s internal state, which then triggers a behavioral response. The theory was proposed by Woodworth in 1929 as an extension of Pavlov’s 1927 stimulus-response model.
Stimulus-organism-model (S-O-R) was proposed by (Woodworth, 1929) as an extension to the classic theory of the stimulus — response model suggested by (Pavlov, 1927). S-O-R model is comprised of three constructs i.e. stimulus, organism, and response.
In environmental psychology, the stimulus-organism-response (SOR) model explains that various environmental aspects can act as a stimulus (S) that influences an individual’s internal state (O), which subsequently derives the individual’s behavioral response (R).
In the SOR model, stimulus (S) refers to input, which is an external factor related to the environment. Organism (O) refers to an individual, and response (R) refers to the effects, reactions, responses, and answers.
Arabov’s “Moloch” intricately displays this through its portrayal of Hitler’s life, not to glorify or speculate but to underline the grotesqueness of reducing human actions to mere responses devoid of deeper understanding or ethical considerations.
This reductionism is critically analyzed by Wittgenstein, who asserts that understanding human behavior necessitates looking beyond the surface to the broader spectrum of social interactions and linguistic constructs. His critique extends to the practice of behaviorism in the West, which, while achieving remarkable successes, often overlooks the complexity of human nature by not fostering the necessary social structures, or heterotopias, that allow for the full spectrum of human experience and moral contemplation.
The concept of heterotopias, spaces of otherness that are both isolated yet penetrative of everyday reality, presents an alternative to the monocultural narrative often propagated by reductive behaviorist approaches. These spaces, not explicitly explored in Arabov’s “Moloch” or Dick’s “The Man in the High Castle,” nonetheless resonate with the underlying critique of societal norms and the role of power in shaping human consciousness and moral judgments. The absence of these heterotopias within the narrative framework of behaviorism in the West highlights a critical void in the understanding and application of psychological theories to broader social and moral contexts.
Mimesis, as opposed to the more straightforward narrative structure of diegesis, offers a richer, more immersive experience that resonates with the human condition’s complexity. This contrast further illustrates the limitations of a purely behaviorist approach, which, by focusing on observable behaviors, misses the nuanced interplay of internal desires, societal influences, and the inherent search for meaning that characterizes human existence.
Arabov’s poignant reflection on finding God, juxtaposed with the mundane yet morally bankrupt discussions of Hitler in “Moloch,” encapsulates the deep-seated human longing for transcendence, a longing that behaviorism, in its reductive form, cannot satisfy. This search for something beyond the material, beyond the observable and quantifiable, challenges the core of behaviorism, urging a reconsideration of psychological practices that overlook the intrinsic value of human experience and the need for spaces where alternative beliefs and moral frameworks can flourish.
In conclusion, the critique of reductive behaviorism, informed by the works of Wittgenstein, Arabov, and the philosophical underpinnings of mimetic theory, calls for a more nuanced understanding of human behavior. It advocates for an approach that recognizes the complexity of human desires, the importance of social structures that foster moral and ethical contemplation, and the inherent need for meaning that transcends the bounds of behaviorist paradigms. This holistic view, embracing the richness of the human experience and the critical role of heterotopias, offers a more profound and ethically informed perspective on psychology and its application in shaping societal norms and values.
