China and the Coup d’état in Myanmar

INKA KOMAHI UGM
4 min readMar 2, 2021

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Contributor : Trystanto

In the early morning of February 1, 2021, a group of soldiers arrested the State Councilor of Myanmar and the Burmese de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint alongside other high-ranking members of the National League for Democracy (NLD). The commander-in-chief of the Burmese Armed Forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing took power after the Vice-president of Myanmar, acting as president, handed over the power to him. General Hlaing then declared a state of emergency of one year (BBC News, 2021).

Within hours, some speculated that China has supported the coup, given the fact that the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, had met with General Hlaing weeks before the meeting (Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, 2021). Other given evidences include the fact that China has refused to condemn the coup and blocked a condemnation of the coup in the United Nations Security Council (Ng, 2021). However, I argue that China actually does not have an optimistic feeling about the coup and I doubt that China supported the coup.

First of all, we need to question the Chinese rationale of supporting a coup against a government that has built very strong ties with China. The Belt and Road initiative’s investment in Myanmar amount to billions of dollars (Reed, 2020) and all of that are signed by the NLD government. Aung San Suu Kyi also consented to the creation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, a Chinese strategy to reduce dependence on the Strait of Malacca (Ramachandran, 2020). It is the NLD government that has brought Myanmar to a very close ties with China. Additionally, Myanmar also signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that would bring Myanmar closer to China (Han, 2021). Therefore, it is actually in the Chinese interest to support the NLD government.

On the other hand, it is highly unreasonable for China to support the military. Aside from the reasons already mentioned, the military junta government from 1988 and 2011 is unreliable for China (Han, 2021). Furthermore, China has regarded the Burmese Army as corrupt (Han, 2021). Even though China and the military junta built strong relations in 1988, the junta began to reduce its dependence on China in 2003. In 2011, President Thein Sein announced a halt on a Chinese-supported dam project saying that it is against the will of the people. In addition, the junta also stopped the Chinese-supported rail project connecting China’s Yunnan Province to Kyawpyu in Western Myanmar in 2014 (Takahashi, 2021)

Even though General Hlaing may depend on China for the time being, Takahashi (2021) argued that the Burmese army is actually wary of dependence on China. This is beginning to be visible as Myanmar reportedly bought Russian arms recently to offset Chinese influence (Macan-Markar 2021).

There are several arguments that are given that show Chinese support for the coup. These are the refusal of China to condemn the coup, the blockage of China in the UNSC condemnation of the coup, and the help China gives to the military in cutting off Myanmar’s internet (Reed and White, 2021). For the first two arguments, Han (2021) argued that this is standard Chinese practice as China has never condemn, nor support any harsh condemnation of, any coup against a democratic government. This makes sense that as China itself is an authoritarian regime, it would be a paradox for it to support a democratic government against a hostile military takeover. For the latter argument, I argue that this is a Chinese attempt to win the hearts and minds of the Burmese generals for the time being as if China refused, the Burmese generals could regard this act as a refusal to support the junta and as a result, the new junta could bring Myanmar away from China and put its massive investments and infrastructure projects in uncertainty.

In conclusion, I argue that it is actually better for Chinese interests to support the NLD’s return to power as the military, as history suggests, is unreliable and China should not have confidence and trust in them.

References

BBC News (2021). Myanmar coup: Aung San Suu Kyi detained as military seizes control. BBC News. [online] 1 Feb. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55882489 [Accessed 20 Feb. 2021].

Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China (2021). Wang Yi Meets with Myanmar’s Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services Min Aung Hlaing. [online] www.fmprc.gov.cn. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1846203.shtml [Accessed 20 Feb. 2021].

Han, E. (2021). China does not like the coup in Myanmar. [online] East Asia Forum. Available at: https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/02/06/china-does-not-like-the-coup-in-myanmar/ [Accessed 20 Feb. 2021].

Macan-Markar, M. (2021). Myanmar embraces Russian arms to offset China’s influence. [online] Nikkei Asia. Available at: https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Coup/Myanmar-embraces-Russian-arms-to-offset-China-s-influence [Accessed 20 Feb. 2021].

Ng, T. (2021). China under US pressure to condemn Myanmar military coup. [online] South China Morning Post. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3121993/china-under-us-pressure-condemn-myanmar-military-coup [Accessed 20 Feb. 2021].

Ramachandran, S. (2020). The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor: Delays Ahead. [online] Jamestown Foundation. Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/the-china-myanmar-economic-corridor-delays-ahead/ [Accessed 19 May 2020].

Reed, J. (2020). China and Myanmar sign off on Belt and Road projects. [online] Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/a5265114-39d1-11ea-a01a-bae547046735 [Accessed 20 Feb. 2021].

Reed, J. and White, E. (2021). Activists allege Beijing setting up “great firewall” and call for boycott of Chinese products. [online] www.ft.com. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/43e6ecfe-081a-4390-aa18-154ec87ff764 [Accessed 20 Feb. 2021].

Takahashi, T. (2021). It’s complicated: Myanmar and China have a difficult relationship. [online] Nikkei Asia. Available at: https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/It-s-complicated-Myanmar-and-China-have-a-difficult-relationship [Accessed 20 Feb. 2021].

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INKA KOMAHI UGM

Official blog of Departemen Intrakurikuler dan Akademik, Korps Mahasiswa Hubungan Internasional UGM | instagram: @komahiugm email: akademik.komahiugm@gmail.com