Lessons Hong Kong Has Taught Us about Colonialism and Identity Politics
Since the publishing of my first article on Hong Kong, I have received mostly positive feedback. However, a few from young Hongkongers were provocative at best and abusive at worst. They all brought up widely spread misconceptions that I had already rebutted in the original article, such as that the mainland judicial system is wholly untrustworthy, and that the Hong Kong Police have used more violence than the police of any civilised country (which, in many Hong Kong youth’s eyes, means the likes of Britain and America) would have in similar circumstances. And invariably and unsurprisingly, instead of engaging in rational and factual discussions, they all ended with an ugly personal attack explicitly or implicitly along the lines of ‘You are brainwashed by the Chinese state and totally uncredible because you are from mainland China’. Sounds familiar?
Donald Trump kicked off his presidential bid more than a year ago with harsh words for Mexico. “They are not our friend, believe me,” he said, before disparaging Mexican immigrants: “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”
And more concerningly,
The doctrine of racism asserts that blood determines national-ethnic identity. Within a racist framework, the value of a human being is not determined by his or her individuality, but instead by membership in a so-called “racial collective nation.” … Racism, including racial antisemitism (prejudice against or hatred of Jews based on false biological theories), was always an integral part of German National Socialism (Nazism).
This brings us to one of the most important points I hope to make about the protests: it is an identity politics movement characterised by nativism and sinophobia in a postcolonial, neoliberal setting more than anything else that it purports to be.
Jewish Self-hatred
Loosely speaking, the term ‘Self-hating Jew’ refers to a Jewish person who holds certain types of antisemitic views. The phenomenon of auto-antisemitism started in 18th and 19th centuries Germany. When Jews became accepted in German society as fellow citizens after centuries’ oppression and discrimination, some Jews pursued further integration and social recognition by adopting the Gentile lifestyle, which, for some, meant conversion from Judaism to Christianity, receiving a German education, speaking German instead of Yiddish, etc. For them, Germanness and Jewishness became two opposing identities: modern versus ancient, good and bad, civilised versus backward. Later in the 19th and 20th centuries, some Jewish progressives started criticising their own people. Some took it to extremes and expressed views that would be considered antisemitic today.
Some of these critiques were not genuine self-reflection, but rather blind internalisation of European society’s long-held prejudice and discrimination against Jews.
This phenomenon has been explained in modern social psychology with the theory of internalised oppression. For example, Kenneth Levin, a psychiatrist and historian at Harvard University, attributed the Jewish self-hatred to the following causes
Segments of populations under chronic siege commonly embrace the indictments of the besiegers, however bigoted and outrageous. They hope that by doing so and reforming accordingly they can assuage the hostility of their tormenters and win relief. This has been an element of the Jewish response to anti-Semitism throughout the history of the Diaspora.
The paradigm on the level of individual psychology is the psychodynamics of abused children, who almost invariably blame themselves for their predicament, ascribe it to their being “bad,” and nurture fantasies that by becoming “good” they can mollify their abusers and end their torment.
Racism in British Hong Kong
A parallel can be drawn between Jews in pre-Nazi Germany and local Chinese in British Hong Kong to a large degree.
British Sinophobia traces all the way back to Shakespeare’s days and is well documented in history. There is a wealth of literature that can be drawn upon. It could be seen all across the British Empire, in America, Australia, and undoubtedly, Hong Kong. Similar to Jews in 18th century Germany, Hong Kong Chinese were seen as backward and therefore treated as second-class citizens for the most part of the colonial era.
A Concise History of Hong Kong written by Prof John M. Carroll, a leading historian in Hong Kong history and my former lecturer, provides a fantastic account of colonial rule.
Sources do not reveal much about how the Chinese viewed the Europeans, but Europeans often complained about the smells and sounds from the Chinese community: open-air markets and incense, musical instruments and firecrackers from religious ceremonies, and the cries of hawkers and peddlers. European residents also frequently criticized the government for allowing Chinese residents to run “houses of disreputable women” in or near European neighborhoods and to profane the Christian Sabbath by holding theatrical performances on Sunday. Both European residents and colonial officials often complained that the Chinese built flimsy wood structures that were too close together, increasing the risk of fire and the spread of disease. This contact between Chinese and British led to racism on both sides, but it particularly made many Europeans think of themselves as members of a special community.
Even after the emergence of a new class of Hong Kong Chinese who had become wealthy through business endeavours in the late 1800s and early 1900s, local Chinese continued to face prejudice and discrimination.
Despite their status and wealth, the members of the Chinese bourgeoisie, like all Chinese in Hong Kong, continued to face racial discrimination at every turn. Racial segregation was enforced both legally and informally. In 1901 a group of Europeans petitioned the colonial government for a separate school for Europeans, arguing that integrated education harmed the morality and character of European children. Although one Chinese resident complained in the local press that “to exclude Chinese from certain schools means to go against the law of nature and to aggravate the hatred between Chinese and foreigners”9 and Secretary for the Colonies Chamberlain condemned the proposal, it enjoyed great support among European parents and the colonial government. Ironically, the new school, the Kowloon British School, had originally been built and presented to the colonial government by the Eurasian Robert Ho Tung as a school for all races. Ho Tung now reluctantly agreed, regretting a decision “so opposed to the spirit which prompted my offer of the school to the Colony.” Chinese were barred from the Hong Kong Club and the Hong Kong Jockey Club, and in some hotels Chinese guests could stay only in certain rooms or could not stay overnight.
Victoria Peak, one of Hong Kong’s most iconic scenic spots today, was reserved as an exclusive residential area for non-Chinese between 1904 and 1930 under the Peak Reservation Ordinance.
According to Hong Kong’s constitution, laid out in the Letters Patent of April 5, 1843, Hong Kong would be run by a governor appointed by the British Crown. The governor would administer the colony with help from a lieutenant governor, a colonial secretary, an Executive Council, and a Legislative Council. The two councils were each to have both official and nonofficial members appointed by the governor. Often described as the governor’s cabinet, the Executive Council was mainly an advisory body with members drawn primarily from the British business elite. Its members, however, sometimes disagreed with the governor and served to restrain his power. Until the 1880s, members of the Legislative Council were almost all non-Chinese. Although this basic constitutional framework saw minor modifications over the years, it experienced no significant changes until the early 1980s.
In face of racial discrimination, local Chinese elite and Eurasians responded by adopting Western social activities and establishing their own exclusive social spaces similar to those of the Europeans.
As in the British clubs, the Chinese Recreation Club’s screening process was rigorous, and membership fees were high. Club rules were strict, and proper cricket and tennis whites were required. The club’s directors and members were some of the best-known Chinese and Eurasian men of the colony.
Emergence of A Local Identity
Up until the 1967 riots launched by local factory workers against exploitation, ‘Hong Kong had operated under the typical colonial marriage of authoritative government and a small but powerful community of businessmen and industrialists’.
The riots eventually prompted the colonial government to invest in public infrastructure and social welfare and increase representation of local Chinese in the government. Meanwhile, the government implemented a number of policies to cultivate a Hong Kong identity.
After the suppression of the rioting, the British continued to be wary of the revolutionary zeal still raging in China at the time of the Cultural Revolution. It was, consequently, important, for thesake of eff ective governance, to nurture a sense of Hong Kong identity to counter the Chinese threat. Using various measures, such as cultural and recreational activities, the government started a long-term campaign to promote Hong Kong as a modern, orderly,
international city, in contrast to China, which it portrayed as chaotic,
poor, and backward.
Since the Communist Party took over the mainland in 1940s, there had been huge contrasts between Hong Kong and mainland China: stability versus chaos, capitalism versus communism, Western versus Chinese, free versus unfree, wealthy versus poor, developed versus backward. These contrasts were especially pronounced during a series of tragedies that happened on the mainland, such as the Great Famine and the Cultural Revolution.
As China opened up itself to the outside world and industrialised rapidly, Hong Kong has become a lot less special. However, a sense of specialness endured among mang Hong Kong people, especially the young. Post-handover, the old colonial system with which the British governed is still very much in place. The difference is, local business tycoons have replaced their old British partners as the new overlords of Hong Kong. The continuation of this system has led to appalling levels of income disparity and social segregation along economic and cultural lines. China becomes an easy target for ordinary people to direct their anger at. Anti-China sentiments in Western media were quickly picked up by local youth and taken to extremes. Mainstream local media have been full of negative coverage of China, from misbehaving mainland tourists, to product quality scandals.
On the other hand, by glorifying the colonial history, even the ordinary people can maintain a sense of moral and cultural superiority to their mainland counterparts. All colonial legacies, regardless of their impact on Hong Kong, have become cherished.
For example, English, the former ruler’s language, remains one of the two official languages of Hong Kong and is widely used as the business and academic language. A high proficiency is necessary for young people to enter ‘high-end professions’, such as finance, law, medicine and academia. Wealthy Hongkongers tend to send their children to ridiculously expensive English-speaking international schools and eventually English-speaking countries for university education. The insistence on English in elite industries has constituted a barrier for those who are not fortunate enough to receive an English-language education. Nonetheless, Hong Kong people take great pride in their ability to speak (some) English, a symbol of their mixed heritage, despite the noticeable decline of English proficiency since the handover.
My alma mater, the University of Hong Kong, as the oldest university in the territory, is a prime example of such deeply engrained racial and cultural hierarchy in Hong Kong society. It brands itself as a Western-style university with English as the main instruction medium while most non-academic activities are dominated by local students and conducted in Cantonese. Non-local students who do not look Western enough (read ‘Caucasian’) routinely face isolation at best, hostility at worst, from local students. Juwon Park, a recent graduate, wrote a brilliant article on this issue.
Another colonial legacy that has yet to be repealed is the lassez faire economic policy. With free flow of capital, little government intervention and low taxes, Hong Kong has become a capitalist heaven, constantly ranked as one of the best places to do business in the world. Neoliberalism is more pronounced in Hong Kong than in the US or the UK and has caused serious social problems, such as wholly unaffordable property prices. However, Hong Kong has yet to see a socialist movement akin to those that have taken shape in the West in recent years, exemplified by Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders.
Sinophobia in Postcolonial Hong Kong
Negative sentiments against mainland Chinese are certainly justified in certain cases, given China’s mixed international reputation and a flux of mainland tourists who grew up in Mao’s China or its destructive legacies. However, such innocent grievances can easily lead to an us-versus-them nativism, especially when combined with often grossly exaggerated coverage by local media, Hong Kong’s declining economic superiority and cultural influence, deeply engrained colonial hierarchy, and widening wealth gaps.
With 92% of its population being ethnic Han-Chinese, Hong Kong is Chinese. The proportion in other Han-majority jurisdictions: mainland China (91.51%), Taiwan (95%), Macau (95%) and Singapore (76.2%).
Legally speaking, the vast majority of Hong Kong’s permanent residents are PRC citizens and hold the HKSAR passport, a type of PRC passport specially designed for Hong Kong residents of Chinese nationality.
Some Hongkongers who were born prior to the 1997 handover also hold the British National (Overseas) passport and thereby are British nationals. However, they are not British citizens and the ‘British’ passport does not grant them the right of abode in the UK. The supposed British nationality is also unrecognised by the EU.
Despite their cultural heritage being predominantly Chinese with Western influences and their legal status as PRC citizens, many protesters have hurled anti-Chinese racial slurs this year while branding themselves as ‘Hongkongers’, a distinct and, inferrably, superior category from ‘Chinese’.
On 21st July, thousands of anti-government protesters vandalised Beijing’s Liason Office in Hong Kong and spray-painted ‘fk Chee-na’ on the walls.
The use of the term ‘Chee-na’ by young localist activists in Hong Kong dates years back. Successful in the 2016 Legislative Council election, Sixtus Leung and Yau Wai-ching, two pro-independence activitists who had participated in the Umbrella Revolution in 2014, pronounced ‘China’ as ‘Chee-na’ during the oathtaking ceremony. Yau also inserted the f-word in her oath. Both were subsequently disqualified.
Jan Kiely, a professor of Chinese studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, said in an email that “strong feelings” were stirred in Chinese people when the Japanese Empire used the word to refer to China during its incursions into Chinese territory, from the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War through World War II. For many Chinese today, Professor Kiely said, Chee-na recalls the sufferings of the occupation and references a Japanese imperial sense that the Chinese were inherently inferior.
Using the same term as used by Japanese imperialists who inflicted decades of inhuman atrocities upon millions in China who they deemed inferior is a clear demonstration of the nativist nature of at least a considerable part of the current movement. It bears striking resemblance with the alt-right movement in America. Therefore, it should not have come as surprise that protesters marched to the US consulate in Hong Kong calling for Donald Trump to ‘liberate Hong Kong’.
The ‘pro-democracy’ movement may not be as noble as it sounds. There is nothing wrong with fighting for democracy with legitimate means. However, the use of racist language goes against the very spirit of liberal democracy.
One of the values often cited by protesters is the freedom of political expression. Even in Western political discourse, this freedom, like many other freedoms, is not without limits. Hate speech on racial grounds is legally prohibited in many Western countries.
There is no doubt that some among the protesters are genuinely fighting for democracy for its own sake. For others, given the strong Sinophobic rhetoric used, one could not help but wonder if demanding a Western-style democratic system is yet another way for them to distinguish themselves from the backward Chinese that the colonialists looked down upon for centuries.
