Re: Morocco’s Rif

On October 2016, police in Al-Hoceima confiscated and ordered the disposal of 500kg of swordfish caught illegally by a local fisherman, Mohucine Fikri. During the disposal, Fikri climbed into the garbage truck and was crushed to death by the compactor, providing the spark that resulted in the still-ongoing protests, the largest anywhere in the MENA region since the Arab Spring.
To date, the protest have gained momentum despite official measures taken by the government. Thousands of protestors in northern Morocco have taken to the streets, opposing the current socioeconomic situation and the country’s corrupt political establishment. Demonstrations have grown more violent and spread to other cities beyond Al-Hoceima, too, including Imzouren, Casablanca, and Rabat. In response, police have banned protests, used tear gas on protestors who defy said ban, and arrested more than 200 since the beginning of the protests in October 2016.
But while Fikri’s death provided the spark for the protests, the Rif’s struggle is one of opportunity, transcending this singular incident and feeding from other grievances and situations:
- The Rif is a majority Berber region in the north of Morocco. The Berber population led a decades-long battle for recognition of its language and culture, which was only acknowledged in the constitution with the reforms that came about as a result of the Arab Spring.
- The struggle between the Berbers and the King hampered the Rif region’s development for decades. To date, the region is still underdeveloped, with King Mohammed’s government only launching a four-year plan to promote the region’s development in 2015, to little effect. Meanwhile, since 2007, there has been a significant drop in national poverty, but the wealth generated is concentrated in the triangle between the cities of Tangier, Fes, and Agadir.
- Fishing is the main economic activity of Hoceima, where a dwindling number of fishing boats has left many youths unemployed and the general population impoverished.
- As a result of local grievances, the Al-Hirak al-Shaabi, or Popular Movement, arose, led by Nasser Zefzafi, to demand jobs, economic development, justice, and political participation. Zefzafi was subsequently arrested on charges of threatening national security, fueling further protests under the slogan, “We are all Zefzafi.”
In the cities, the cause has garnered the support of the Al-adl wa al-Ihsan (Justice and Spirituality) movement. This Islamist movement has significant mobilization capabilities as a result of their participation in the 2011 protests and has brought the demonstrations to Rabat, where a recent rally was estimated to have the participation of 10,000 people from different parts of the country, other smaller leftist groups, and labor unions. Similarly, protestors from the Rif manifested in Casablanca after Zefzafi was transferred there, following his arrest.
While participation in the protest is growing, they continue to be framed in a Berber narrative that is not likely to catch on. However, the involvement of the Justice and Spirituality movement could help change that through contagion to other underdeveloped or Berber areas in the south that would sympathize with the struggle. The economic aspect of discontent is particularly important considering the prospect of a floating dirham in the near future, which could negatively affect the purchase power of Moroccans as seen recently in Egypt, and further fuel discontent.
Morocco has proven itself to be a resourceful linchpin monarchy, savvy at navigating social factions. Thus, some theatrics (such as the recent blaming of officials for protest arrests and the call to expedite development projects in the Rif) and lip-service policies can be expected in the short term to defuse grievances, but it can’t be expected that the appeasement techniques will be effective for long. Thus, the continuance of the protests in north Morocco should be expected and it’s possible that the Justice and Spirituality movement will continue to organize rallies in Rabat in the short to medium term.
It should be noted that while the protests are directed at the political establishment, or “Makhzen,” the Moroccan monarchy is one of the the longest standing in the Middle East. This, coupled with the weariness stemming from the instability of neighboring countries arising from the 2011 regime changes, makes it unlikely that the protests will be directed towards a regime change, instead continuing to demand development, jobs, and economic development until measures are taken.
