Open Source Indicators to Track China’s Readiness for Armed Conflict

The title of this article will sound to be possibly overly ambitious and wide in scope. I am after all only a hobbyist open source researcher / investigator. With my modest time and efforts, what business do I have suggesting this? But hear me out. What I would like to propose is merely a broad framework for categorising indicators with some examples for data sources.

The indicators track the readiness to head into a military conflict over either Taiwan or the South China Sea. I think it’ll be quite unlikely to track intentions using open indicators since intentions are entirely the exclusive preserve of the highest echelons of power in the Communist Party of China (CPC). I suggest there are the following categories of indicators:

a. Military readiness. What we can see in terms of demonstrated capability – which includes what state media release as well as other sources. Less definite will be how we track the morale / mental preparedness of commanders and rank-and-file People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

b. Economic readiness. How well the Chinese economy can support a conflict which is likely to be protracted. This includes how well it can sustain its war efforts in the face of likely sanctions.

c. Diplomatic environment. China would need a diplomatic environment in which the neighbours in the region who are right now neutral to friendly are going to stay that way once the shooting starts. These include mainly Southeast Asian states (possibly minus Philippines since it is a state which could potentially be in conflict with China over its rival claims in the South China Sea). Here, we can look at frequency of engagement and what had been the general tone of these states when commenting Taiwan and the South China Sea.

At this point, I will be walking through how we can potentially use this framework by going through each metric.

Military Readiness

The PLA is certainly not shy of flexing its military capabilities. So in the open source, we do get glimpses of what it wants to show to create the effect of deterring its potential adversaries. Given the relative weakness of Philippines’ military, the showing off of military capabilities is more likely meant for the United States or its domestic audience (to say, hey let’s be proud of our strong military). This relates to PLA’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) such a missiles as well as air and naval capabilities. One salient area aspect is the regular updating of the progress in operationalising its third aircraft carrier The Fujian (福建舰).

The China Central Television (CCTV) reported in May 2024 of the first successful sea trial for The Fujian. Chinese “Military enthusiasts” (军迷) followed up on such releases with close updates on the progress in operationalising the aircraft carrier. Below is an example of this Weibo (dated 14 Jul 24) regarding the launching of an early-warning aircraft from The Fujian using what was reported to be its electromagnetic catapult system.

To track whether and how the PLA had rallied its rank-and-file, I chose to specifically focus on the PLA’s official website www.81.cn. As a channel for indoctrination, it could be a possible data source to see if there is any concerted effort to start indoctrinating PLA personnel toward a war over either Taiwan or the South China Sea. Searching the site specifically, so far a scan of results in the past year regarding the two issues showed that statements carried out the website were more toward warning against Taiwan, Philippines and any of their potential supporters. Nothing specifically directed toward boosting the “readiness to sacrifice” over Taiwan or the South China Sea.

For general rhetoric exalting sacrifice amongst PLA rank-and-file, I used the phrase “为国捐躯” (sacrificing your life for the nation) as the search term. The term can be found but it is often with reference to past sacrifices (see sample search results below).

In fact, I found one particular article in March 2024 that appears to suggest that the PLA is still on a peacetime footing where its messaging to soldiers is concerned.

Some may think that soldiers don’t need to sacrifice during peacetime, and even if they have the will to die for their country, there may be few opportunities to charge into battle. However, the value of a soldier lies not only on the battlefield but also in their everyday duties. When a young person dons their military uniform and bids farewell to their loved ones amidst the sound of drums and gongs, they also leave behind a life of comfort and the joy of family gatherings. What accompanies them is crawling and rolling on the training ground, observing enemy situations at sentry posts, and patrolling the border.

….也许有人认为和平时期军人不需要牺牲，纵有为国捐躯之志，也难有冲锋陷阵之时。但军人的价值不只在战场，也在平常的战位上。当一名青年穿上军装，在锣鼓声中告别亲人的时候，也就告别了安逸的生活，告别了和家人欢聚的幸福。伴随他们的是，在训练场摸爬滚打，在哨位上观察敌情，在边境线巡逻执勤。

From a broad survey of open sources, it appears that the PLA is building up toward a credible A2/AD capability that could make their war objectives more achievable and sustainable. It also appears that it might not have started indoctrination toward the inevitable loss of lives in the event of a future conflict. Perhaps it’s something they might only do just before the shooting starts – or maybe this will be delayed till after a conflict had started and the first casualties are suffered.

Economic Readiness

This is to a certain extent linked to diplomatic environment. The ability to weather sanctions will pretty much depend on China being able to have neutral and friendly trading partners. Apart from this, I think one possible metric to track is how well prepared would China be in case it didn’t have sufficient options for importing vital material. What emerged during a U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing in June 2024 was news that China was stockpiling minerals and other key resources which could be used in the event of a war.

In July 2024, there were reports that the Chinese government had directed state owned oil companies to increase the strategic stockpile by 60 million barrels. The Economist released an article in late-July 2024 which reinforced the impression that China was building up its stockpiles of key strategic resources.

So from the available open source reports, it would appear that China had been readying itself to be able to withstand sanctions that would likely be imposed should a war over Taiwan or the South China Sea break out.

Diplomatic Environment

To secure trading partners and diplomatic support, we can see that China had been actively courting its Southeast Asian neighbours. These states are not only a source of diplomatic support but trading partners whom China can import from and export to (vital to keep its economy ticking in the event of a conflict). We see the following recent engagements:

31 Mar – 2 Apr 24: Indonesian defence minister and President-elect Prabowo Subianto’s visit to China

12–13 Jun 24: Indonesian coordinating minister for maritime affairs Luhut Pandjaitan visit to China

18–20 Jun 24: Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Malaysia

18–19 Aug 24: General secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam To Lam to visit China and meet his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. This will be To’s introductory visit following his succession of Nguyen Phu Trong who passed away on 19 Jul 24.

The above is not exhaustive but it gives an indication of the frequency of contact with Southeast Asian states and a possible indicator of concerted efforts to court their support.

I hope anyone reading this would find the framework useful. It’s admittedly rudimentary and it’s not meant to be predictive of any intended military action by China. I think in a limited way, it’s useful as a measure of how ready China is for conflict which could help to draw conclusions on how well it can withstand the pressures militarily, economically and diplomatically.