The New Age of Military Manufacturing: Part 1
A series on the ramifications of advanced manufacturing technologies in the age of multi-domain operations.
Edit (09 20 2023): Revised final paragraph to account for change in Part 2 subject matter for upcoming release.
From the desk of James Blythe —
Over the past few months, I’ve published an array of topics on Medium ranging from business, to travel, and manufacturing. The subjects may vary but the perspective is always that of the consummate engineer.
The title topic is one that’s been on my mind for some time and I see a common thread track across history. I’m slowing the rate at which I’m publishing in order to assemble the larger body of work on this issue— namely, how will modern manufacturing shape the conflicts and armaments and tactics of the militaries of tomorrow?
Many of the insights herein are drawn from my own experiences straddling civilian and military manufacturing specialities. Supporting documentation will be drawn from open-source material. The analysis is my own. I have no special training or experience in military circles so take the information here for what it’s worth — one engineer’s perspective on the shape of things to come.
This material was originally developed as the prelude to a body of graduate study I had planned to pursue some years back but never quite materialized. Everything is possible with enough time and money. At current, a large portion of the formative work is complete and has been bending a digital shelf on my personal computer for some time. You may see that segments of this piece will mirror articles I’ve previously published here. Hopefully you will find their examinations updated and expanded as relevant to this essay.
This multi-part series will — hopefully — be more complete than what I’ve published on Medium to-date but significantly more abbreviated than the full body of academic work in its original form. The intent is for this to be reasonably digestable by most readers interested in the topic. For this reason the citation format will be non-academic and designed for accessability. Similarly, a large number of academic sources will be omitted and the most concise offered in their place for convenience.
In this first section, I’ll introduce the overall theme of this multi-part series and establish the essential, historical background and concept necessary to understand the discussion that will follow.
The New Age of Military Manufacturing, Part I: Introduction
Warfare continues to evolve. With modern advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and manufacturing autonomy, we stand on the precipice not knowing whether we will fall up or down when tipped over its technological edge. Since the end of the Cold War, the manufacturing dominance of the United States has waned significantly. European and asian industries, completely rebuilt at the end of World War II, have eclipsed American manufacturing capabilities in everything ranging from commodity textiles, to metal product, and advanced microelectronics.
Countries who have made focused investments in manufacturing have flooded international markets with cheap and available products. As markets do, they settle these production powerhouses where the best product can be produced at the lowest cost. The result has been a syphoning away of business and critical manufacturing capability from already anemic American companies.
For many, this is an esoteric point of economic concern. Workers in the software sector and providers of soft services have prospered and the American economy has shifted to support accordingly. However, this brain-drain of manufacturing capability has very real consequences in an impolite future.
Histories ranging from the modern to the ancient make one thing clear — logistics wins wars. More fully explained, those States and cultures who have been best able to tap the industrial power made available by a strong manufacturing base have an enormous advantage against their adversaries in terms of conventional military power, the ability to project that power, and the economic dynamics which fuel the supporting civilian communities.
This gives birth not only to the economics and supply lines needed to sustain military actions, but brings novel capabilities into the hands of commanders looking for a decisive edge over their adversaries.
In a digital age which still struggles with the existential threat of nuclear war and is increasingly conscious of the moral issues surrounding cyberwarfare and the use of autonomous weapon systems, it is still men and women of uncommon valor that populate the frontlines in times of conflict and who are called to serve when humanitarian aid is needed. To put the tools of their profession in their hands, when needed, is essential to their effectiveness and well-being.
History has told this tale many times.
Historical Lessons on the Importance of Manufacturing to Military Operations and Affairs
Among the first well documented cases of military tactics, strategy, and logistics comes from our understanding of ancient Rome (both republican and imperial). This isn’t because the Romans were the first to comprehend the power of such things. Rather, this is where a great deal of the historical evidence left behind in the western world is centered and there is tremendous interest (perhaps favoritism) in understanding this culture by the Europeans and their off-shoots.
Historians including Adrian Goldsworthy [1] and Nick Holmes [2] note that Rome’s fearsome martial reputation and skilled soldiers were only a contributing part of their military prowess. Manufactured goods and the logistics required to sustain the legions were the true key to success. [3] Projection of Roman might was not possible without innovations in metal production, manufacturing of arms and armor, and the advent of key Roman construction techniques. These “civilian” professions powered the legions and fed their soldiers.
Dan Carlin, in his popular podcast Hardcore History, notes in several of his series that ancient Rome and Persia were distinct from other kingdoms in the ancient world due to their ability to suffer staggering losses of men and material and readily replace them. Often in history, the loss of a single battle could be so severe that the loser might never recover from the defeat. At best this would result in the end of hostilities. At worst, it resulted in the complete destruction of the losers sovereignty or civilization.
More recently, during World War I, European industries on both sides of the conflict found themselves unable to sustain frontline combat and the obscene rate at which war material was being consumed. Inevitably, the war was “won at the factory” with the mobilization of non-conventional manufacturing labor forces (including women) and the entrance of the Americans — with their manpower and material — into the conflict. Germany instituted several wartime programs to improve production as well . These tactics were centered around a top-down strategy orchestrated by government officials and military brass which proved insufficient to combat the productivity of a decentralized and motivated civilian manufacturing base. [4]
Arthur Hermann’s book Freedom’s Forge: How American Business Won World War II, is a love letter to commercial industry in the United States. Hermann tells the story of how corporate America — not the military brass in Washington — saved the 1940s U.S. Department of War from itself and helped turn the tide of this critical conflict.
In the preface to the text, Hermann sets the tone eloquently.
This is the story of America’s forgotten heroes of World War II. They didn’t wear uniforms, at least not at first. They wore business suits, dungarees and flannel shirts, spectacles and Stetsons, Homburg hats and hardhats, lab coats and welding leathers and patterned head scarves.
They were the American businessmen, engineerings, and production managers, and workers both male and female who built the most awesome military machine in history: the arsenal of democracy that armed the Allies and defeated the Axis.
Hermann extolls the efforts of men like Henry Kaiser [5] and Bill Knudsen. Both were vilified as war-time profiteers early-on in the conflict but, by serving corporate interests and national ones, proved essential in scaling a peace-time manufacturing giant into the formidable arsenal of democracy. The efforts of companies like Chrysler in the redesign and successful scaled production of the M4 Sherman are lauded both by civilian historians and those who relied on the vehicles at the front. [6] Chrysler was not unique in this. Ford, Lockheed, and many others boasted similar contributions to the war effort.
Following World War II, the world struggled with the existential threat now posed by the atomic bomb — the height of clandestine research by academics and the Superpowers of the new world order. In The Gun, C.J. Chives makes it painfully clear that it was the simple, lowly AK-47 produced in staggering numbers that shaped the Cold War and not the atomic bomb.
While Soviet physicists had been teasing out the secrets of the atom, the army’s Main Artillery Department had selected the AK-47 in a secret competition soon after the end of the Great Patriotic War [eastern front of World War II]… Within twenty-five years it would be the most abundant firearm the world had known… [Soviet manufacturing plants] would ship off their automatic rifles by the untold millions during the years ahead. And no one would have predicted, as the world worried over nuclear war, that these rifles… would become the most lethal instruments of the Cold War.
Arguably, the innovations in design, manufacturing, and logistics practices (legal and otherwise) which resulted in the success of the AK-47 continue to shape our world today. Surely, on-going civil unrest in the Middle East and recent conflicts in the Third World keenly feel the impact that Soviet manufacturers and distributors have had on their lives over thirty years after its fall.
Even the modern conflict between Russia and Ukraine tells this tale. Russia, historically a country of inexhaustible resources descended from fierce warriors, has failed to bring a quick resolution to the war with Ukraine. Why? There are many political and strategic contributions to the quagmire, but the influence of manufacturing and logistics cannot be underestimated.
Public source information has demonstrated that Russia is failing to maintain adequate supply lines and volumes of necessary materials. Although the nation has vast stores of Soviet era weaponry to draw on, those stockpiles continue to dwindle and Putin has been unable to bring a truly modern set of capabilities to the battlefield in any meaningful way. Lack of adequate fuel and ammunition has limited the effectiveness of Russian military strategies. The T-14 Armata, crowning jewel of Russia’s modern ground forces has seen little or no use in the conflict. The BMPT “Terminator” has received extensive coverage for its lethality but its numbers and application have been insufficient to push key fronts.
Why is this? Russia no longer has the economic backing to fuel the critical manufacturing infrastructure necessary to sustain these systems, get them into the fight, and keep them in the fight. [7] Even Russia’s modern military wonders have been produced in such small numbers as to make them largely irrelevant.
Ukraine, on the other hand, a nation with far fewer people and internal resources, has found itself wielding the combined manufacturing and economic might of the western world. The power of a small, motivated military equipped with the boons of modern arms and manufacturing are apparent. While Russia hurls aging rockets and artillery shells at soft targets, Ukrainians have shown that they can be extremely effective against hardened, military targets by effective use of man portable anti-tank guided missiles, long rang precision guided munitions (artillery and otherwise), and targeted drone strikes.
Further, the long foretold “death of the tank” seems to be much exaggerated. Despite the failures of Russia to appropriately deploy and support their armored brigades, the Ukrainians are demonstrating the effectiveness of properly sustained and supported armored vehicles. These manufactured behemoths which include the Leopard 2 and Bradley Fighting Vehicle continue to play a significant role in the conflict despite the availability of non-conventional, man portable threats. As mentioned previously, the Russian BMPT “Terminator” has received some publicity in its few engagements. Appropriate application of armor is as relevant on the battlefield today as it has in the past.
This yet again illustrates that the ability to feed, shelter, arm, and armor the men and women who fight the conflicts of the day is critical to a nation’s defense and prosperity. No military can be successful without these things. When vehicles run out of fuel and soldiers run out of bullets, wars are lost. Those countries more skilled at these esoteric arts have an undeniable advantage over their adversaries.
So too with the advent of the atomic bomb, the world is learning that in the digital age, wars are still fought by men and women on the ground. As such, the relevance of manufactured material and the military industrial base will continue. Whether they are drones, anti-tank guided missiles, tanks, planes, bullets, bombs, night vision optics, batteries, rations, warm boots, ponchos or woobies, a healthy manufacturing base is essential to getting this critical material to the front.
As we see this throughout the annals of history, we consider what it means for our future.
The Worrying State of American Manufacturing and Reliance on Foreign Suppliers
American universities and government laboratories still fuel much of the leading research in advanced technology fields. Increasingly, however, the heavy lifting in manufacturing is done abroad. Economic dominance within the United States no longer resides in production as it once did. Instead it is services (social and otherwise), recreation, entertainment, and real estate upon which the American economy relies. Figure 1 shows the Q1 change in GDP for 2023 which helps illustrate the on-going trend away from manufacturing and the production of “real goods” in favor of service-based endeavors.
This has resulted in an American economy more reliant on external interests and capital for its sustainment. Many sectors and people have reaped the benefits of this shift, but it leaves the country worryingly vulnerable to its adversaries.
This is not a recent development.
For decades, American pundits and business insiders have hinted at the return of manufacturing from overseas and bemoaned unreliable suppliers with complex, international supply chains. Yet in 2023 no appreciable return of manufacturing capability has been realized. Even Apples much publicized Texas manufacturing center seems to be a failed experiment. Production of the Mac Pro has changed hands between domestic and foreign producers and is currently settled back in China. America has not found its answer to cheap, abundant labor pools in asian countries. There is also no likely solution in sight given that these countries can — and often are — run with dubious labor and environmental practices not condoned in the West.
The recent Covid-19 pandemic has further illustrated national concerns with reliance on overseas supply chains. Recognition of the importance of a strong manufacturing base to national security interests has increased [8] and initiatives to develop domestic production capability for microelectronics have been funded by the current administration. Unfortunately, chips and electronic hardware are only one aspect of the extensive manufacturing capability essential to modern conflicts.
In steelmaking and production of lightweight metals (aluminum, magnesium and titanium) the United States lags behind many Asian and European countries. As a result, American industries import a large amount of foreign steel [9] and aluminum [10] meaning the country is unable to support its own material needs. There are few exports.
This doesn’t even begin to address the production of metals and alloys critical to power and electronics industries which continue to haunt policy makers. American manufacturing isn’t only reliant on foreign suppliers for metal materials either.
While the United States leads the world in research of advanced textiles and ceramics, production capability is sparse and limited to only the most specialized products. Similarly, plastics manufacturing — essential to many consumer and durable military goods — is largely an overseas affair. Although the Berry Amendment attempts to ensure that military production of goods is based on American materials, lacking the capability to produce at anything resembling cost competitiveness and unable to live on government contracts alone, domestic companies often import and reprocess foreign materials to put the stamp of “Made in USA” on the packaging. Examples of this include the reliance of the commercial aviation industry on Russian titanium. [11] The consequence of this market behavior is that domestic production capability has shrunk or been willfully eliminated based on the availability of cheaper, foreign sourced stock materials.
With the current state of American manufacturing, is it any longer possible to power the arsenal of democracy in the current age? Can the United States compete with foreign manufacturing interests with its current way of doing business? Or is the country — and its national security — at the whim of “playing nice” with our adversaries?
Adversaries Around the World Understand the Value of Manufacturing in Military Affairs and Global Power Politics
In the background of the war in Ukraine, America — as with most of Europe — continues to prepare for its next conflict. There has not been a challenge since World War II that has truly pushed the United States and its allies to their limits. Military thinkers now look up, out of the deserts of the Middle East and see the potential for near-peer threats on the horizon. While Russia has shown it can no longer sit at the table and field a truly modern military, they are not alone on the world stage.
Since the 1990s, China seems to have understood that warfare continues to evolve into multiple, non-conventional domains. They have seen success in using political, economic, social, and technological innovations in a way the West has been slow to comprehend. Central to this idea of “total, unrestricted warfare” is the ability of the State to leverage manufacturing and public policy to circumvent direct conflict. When a more direct solution is needed, said innovations can be utilized as a force multiplier when hostilities do occur.
China has shown that national defense can be augmented by charitable contributions to the infrastructure of foreign nations. Manufacturing can be used to proliferate national products across borders. If pressure is properly applied, these products can displace equivalent items in peer countries and effectively drain the ability of their civilian manufacturing base to provide a viable equivalent. Thus, nations become economically and functionally dependent on China’s continued “good will”.
In this way, modern conflicts continue to demonstrate the importance of a strong, domestic manufacturing base in conflicts overt, covert, and unconventional.
Conclusions for The New Age of Military Manufacturing: Part 1
History shows us that the civilian manufacturing segment of any nation — modern or ancient — is essential to its effectiveness on the battlefield. Although the resolution of conflicts will always come down to the warfighter at the tip of the spear and diplomacy between nations, neither can sustain these activities and be successful without the backing of a healthy domestic industrial sector.
This section has illustrated that America needs a revitalized industrial base to maintain its economic and military supremacy in the world. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the United States can compete with its peers in this arena via conventional methodology. The investment would be too large and public policy changes required to fund domestic development and restrict the flow of competing goods into the market impractical to execute.
Instead, the United States will have to learn how to best leverage digital manufacturing infrastructure and advanced technologies including additive manufacturing, high speed machining, and rapid tooling/design approaches to disrupt the existing manufacturing and military paradigms. If the DOD can successfully embrace these technologies and processes, there is the potential for it to bring new military capabilities — conventional and non-conventional — into its growing concept of multi-domain operations.
In the following section, the military use-cases of advanced manufacturing as communicated in public release documentation will be discussed. In order to understand current military perception of the utility of advanced manufacturing technologies, an overview of joint-all domain operations — in specific multi-domain operations within the U.S. Army — will be presented. This will introduce the fundamental goals and potential challenges surrounding the battlespace of the future with which advanced manufacturing will play an essential part.
References and Footnotes
[1] Reference Pax Romana by Adrian Goldsworthy.
[2] Reference The Roman Revolution by Nick Holmes.
[3] Reference The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 BC to 235 AD) by Jonathan P. Roth.
[4] Reference How Germany Lost the WWI Arms Race by Saul David.
[5] Business man (or huckster, depending on your point of view) who founded the Kaiser Shipyards (Richmond, CA; Portland, OR; Vancouver, WA), metal, and mining operations whose progeny are recognizable today as Kaiser Aluminum and Kaiser Permanente among others.
[6] Reference Death Traps by Belton Cooper.
[7] Reference Will Logistics Be Russia’s Undoing in Ukraine? by Bradley Martin.
[8] Reference U.S. military comes to grips with over-reliance on Chinese imports by Phil Stewart and Mike Stone.
[9] Reference Donald Trump’s difficult decision on steel imports by The Economist.
[10] Reference U.S. Aluminum Import Monitor by U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration.
[11] Reference The Titanium Supply Chain For the Aerospace Industry Goes Through Russia by Willy Shih
