
The Lever of Shame
On training airline pilots and how I learn so much from them…
One of the problems with Line Training pilots on airliners is that you have difficulty assessing their spare mental capacity. Of course, in the simulator it’s simple, you dial in the fault, or combination of faults and then make observations of the pilots’ handling of the failure/s from the trainer’s seat. By contrast, ‘failure management’ cannot be assessed on the line.
In times gone by, (and not so long ago) there were stories about Training Captains on jet airliners, retarding a thrust lever to idle to see how the pilot would handle the aircraft on one engine for real! In the enlightened age in which we now work however, this sort of practice is not acceptable as the safety of the flight would be unnecessarily compromised. In addition, the quality of simulation has improved to the point where it’s just about as real as it gets. It was not always like this in pilot training…
I recall a story told to me by a civilian flying instructor close to retirement about the time when he was working in the RAF as a fitter. He was assigned to a squadron which used the Vickers Varsity for multi-engined pilot training. He smiled as he revealed the aircraft was known as “The Flying Pig” due in part to its’ handling qualities — or lack of them…

He said that during one hot summer in the 1960s, morale was particularly low among the engineers on the squadron, which was mainly a result of the high number of engine problems which they had to rectify. In those days, ‘single engine’ work really was that and the instructor used to shut down one engine completely to ensure proper asymmetric flight conditions. One afternoon, a group of fitters was sitting on the grass outside the hangar ‘goofing’ (watching aeroplanes) as Varsities were practising circuits and bumps. The aeroplane on finals was making a single engined approach and this was evident by the stationary propeller on one side.
…….their hands must have been a blur…..
What attracted the airmen’s attention however were the puffs of black smoke which began to emanate from the live engine, along with accompanying slowing down of the prop on that side. Almost immediately the ‘dead engine’ propeller started to rotate slowly along with more belches of black smoke. One can only imagine the frantic scene in the cockpit as the pilots tried to rush the restarting of the simulated failed motor — their hands must have been a blur on levers and switches as they attempted to rescue the situation.

Unfortunately… their efforts were in vain as the airspeed decayed, the nose was raised to stretch the glide and the aircraft crash-landed in the rough grass of the undershoot, wiping off the undercarriage along the way. The most remarkable part of the incident however, was the reaction of the groundcrew who all gave a resounding cheer and applauded as it went in! My colleague assured me that the two pilots survived with only cuts and bruises. The morale on the squadron improved markedly for a week or two after the event.
……I remember one young guy who was very confident.
It is interesting to watch the maturing of trainee pilots, as they go through their line training. Their first stumbling attempts on the radio, mumbled SOP calls, errors in performance calculations, lack of spare mental capacity to even complete any paperwork as the flight progresses. The assistance of the safety pilot on the cockpit jump-seat is invaluable at this stage. Before long though, you can see the trainee get up to speed and grow in confidence until, not only has the SP been released, but they’ve passed their Final Line Check and are operating online. Some of them make progress more rapidly than others and even appear full of confidence from the start. During a descent into Nice in the B737 in autumn 1999, I remember one young guy who was very confident. On this sector Gerry was the handling pilot. Normally the approach controllers at Nice tend to leave you quite high for what seems like ages, then they suddenly clear you to descend to 6000 feet BUT with “Maximum speed, 250 knots S’il Vous Plait!”
Now this is easier said than done, as modern airliners either go down or slow down — but it’s a real problem to achieve both at the same time. Now young Gerry was quite switched on and had already slowed down when they levelled us off at Flight Level 200 or thereabouts. He immediately put speedbrakes out at 250 knots when we were further cleared in our descent to 6000 feet and ensured thrust levers were idle. I had flown with him a few days previously and had been impressed already by what I had seen — this was just a continuation of that good performance.
……..“Your responses have to be in the accent of Sean Connery”….
My problem was that he seemed to take it all too much in his stride and even though our French controller had tried to ruin his descent profile, he had been quick to react and had the situation well under control. Now, as we descended towards minimum safe altitude over the sea off the beautiful Cote d’Azur I thought I detected a trace of smugness in his manner as he called for the approach checklist. Simultaneously the controller cut the corner on us as he turned us towards Cannes heading north; cleared us further descent to 4000 feet and we were going high and fast again. The weather was clear blue sky however so we could always convert to a visual approach if necessary. Gerry saw the steep profile and brought the speed back to 210 knots and called “Flap One!” At the same time, he called for the “Approach Checklist!” and I noted that his voice was slightly higher pitched than before.
“Okay” I said, “I’ll give you the approach checklist, but you’ve got to answer in the style of Sean Connery”. “What?” came his reply. “Your responses have to be in the accent of Sean Connery”. I said again. “Yeah, in which character?” was his quick riposte…
“Well, BOND OF COURSE!” I paused as the altimeters unwound further and time started to telescope in towards us. “Right, here goes!” I said theatrically removing the checklist from its holder with a flourish. “Altimeters?” I challenged, he called back “Checked and Set”.
“Oh No, that was nowhere near good enough Gerry, let’s try again shall we?” We noted the coastline getting closer as he called for more flap and then “GEAR DOWN!”
“Listen… it’s got to have more of a Scottish lilt to it and a bit of a lisp too, like this…Chacked and Shett!” The aircraft was level now and Gerry was anxious to deploy more flap, I sensed the tension building nicely. “Altimeters?” I called again, “Chacked and SHETT!” he responded as he turned the heading bug onto final approach for runway 04R. “Approach Aids?”, again he came back with “CHACKED and SHETT!”
“Approach checklist complete”, I confirmed as he called for landing flap. His relief was palpable as we completed the landing checklist in the same manner without repetition. His landing was excellent, and we trundled off the runway and were handed over to ground control for taxi instructions to the gate — another beautiful day in Nice. In his training file after the flight, I wrote that “…Gerry is making excellent progress, but Keep working on the Bond impressions…”

One of the most reassuring aspects of his flying was that he wasn’t shy of using the Speedbrake. Too many airline pilots consider their deployment of speedbrake, as a tacit admission of defeat in their attempts to produce the ideal descent. In fact, the descent and initial part of the approach is a very dynamic time in any flight and there are many variables involved in the successful management of the vertical profile.
I recall during a night descent into Accra (Ghana) on the 757, I was the operating Captain and was continuously assessing the angle of glide; comparing our passing altitude with distance to touchdown. I could see we were high on the profile and even though I had increased the speed with the engines at idle to correct back to the descent path, it just wasn’t going to be enough. More drag was required. Now in all the best CRM (Crew Resource Management) textbooks there are lots of different interaction techniques aimed at keeping both pilots on an even keel. Transactional Analysis is often used to demonstrate the positive effects of wholesome behavioural trends. Much store is placed in being careful in what you say on the flightdeck, so that you don’t inadvertently antagonise your working colleague/s. Caution is advised when using humour — especially if it could be misconstrued as being implied criticism of the other pilot/s operational standards or competence.
Well textbooks are all very well of course, but they cannot cover every possible scenario. Certainly, they wouldn’t have covered the very good working relationship between an experienced Senior First Officer (Tony) and myself on that evening into Accra. It was obvious that I was unable to control the aircraft flightpath by speed alone and I would have to use speedbrakes to slow us down and restore the energy levels. I grimaced in the dark and with a shrug of my shoulders — all nonchalance — I simply announced, “Speedbrakes” and smoothly moved the lever all the way aft. I wasn’t sure of what response I would get from my fellow aviator, but I couldn’t have predicted his next words. In a very solemn, admonishing, voice he intoned, “AHHHH……! THE LEVER OF SHAME!”
I was still laughing as we taxied in about ten minutes later. As a choice one-liner, the thought of it still amuses me; however I would advise junior FOs to be careful where and with whom they use it!
James McBride ©
Capt James McBride — author of 4 books available on Amazon.com (and Amazon.co.uk etc) He is an experienced commercial aviator with a passionate interest in Flight Safety and Training.
